Horizontal Accountability
#28Key Findings
In the category of horizontal accountability, Slovakia falls into the sample’s bottom ranks (rank 28).
The independent Supreme Audit Office has improved its auditing capabilities over time, but follow-up on its recommendations is inconsistent. The Office for Personal Data Protection has limited scope and powers.
The judiciary in Slovakia is formally autonomous, but recent decisions have indicated a lack of independence. Corruption within the judiciary is a significant concern. Judicial selection appears to be influenced by social connections rather than merit. Despite a range of transparency provisions, corruption remains a serious problem more broadly.
Civil rights are guaranteed by law. However, the Roma and LGBTQ+ communities, as well as Ukrainians fleeing the war in their country, face significant discrimination and rights violations. The parliament’s resources are limited, and committees are relatively weak and largely controlled by coalition parties, hampering the body’s ability to monitor the executive.
The independent Supreme Audit Office has improved its auditing capabilities over time, but follow-up on its recommendations is inconsistent. The Office for Personal Data Protection has limited scope and powers.
The judiciary in Slovakia is formally autonomous, but recent decisions have indicated a lack of independence. Corruption within the judiciary is a significant concern. Judicial selection appears to be influenced by social connections rather than merit. Despite a range of transparency provisions, corruption remains a serious problem more broadly.
Civil rights are guaranteed by law. However, the Roma and LGBTQ+ communities, as well as Ukrainians fleeing the war in their country, face significant discrimination and rights violations. The parliament’s resources are limited, and committees are relatively weak and largely controlled by coalition parties, hampering the body’s ability to monitor the executive.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
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7
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
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3
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3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
The Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic (NKÚ) is an independent body established by law. It has nearly 300 employees and a budget of €13.9 million in 2022, determined annually by the State Budget Law. NKÚ conducts financial, compliance, and performance audits with full discretion over the scope of its audits. It is authorized to obtain necessary information and question officials and witnesses. The president and two vice presidents of NKÚ are elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic via secret ballot (Law 39/1993).
Since its inception in 1993, NKÚ’s ability to perform high-quality audits has improved, and its reports have received significant media coverage. However, a key limitation is the follow-up on its recommendations, with implementation details often only available in control protocols (Nemec, 2022). The Open Budget Survey (OBS 2021) rates NKÚ as competent and efficient but suggests improvements in auditing a larger percentage of budgeted and extra-budgetary funds. The OBS also recommends that NKÚ report on executive actions taken in response to its findings and that the executive publicly disclose the steps taken to address these recommendations.
Citations:
Nemec, J. 2022. Public Administration and Governance: Slovakia. Brussels: European Union.
Zákon 39/1993 o Najvyššom kontrolnom úrade SR. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/1993/39/vyhlasene_znenie.html
Open Budget Survey. 2021. “Slovakia.” https://internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/country-results/2021/slovakia or https://internationalbudget.org/sites/default/files/country-surveys-pdfs/2021/open-budget-survey-slovakia-2021-en.pdf
www.nku.gov.sk
Since its inception in 1993, NKÚ’s ability to perform high-quality audits has improved, and its reports have received significant media coverage. However, a key limitation is the follow-up on its recommendations, with implementation details often only available in control protocols (Nemec, 2022). The Open Budget Survey (OBS 2021) rates NKÚ as competent and efficient but suggests improvements in auditing a larger percentage of budgeted and extra-budgetary funds. The OBS also recommends that NKÚ report on executive actions taken in response to its findings and that the executive publicly disclose the steps taken to address these recommendations.
Citations:
Nemec, J. 2022. Public Administration and Governance: Slovakia. Brussels: European Union.
Zákon 39/1993 o Najvyššom kontrolnom úrade SR. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/1993/39/vyhlasene_znenie.html
Open Budget Survey. 2021. “Slovakia.” https://internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/country-results/2021/slovakia or https://internationalbudget.org/sites/default/files/country-surveys-pdfs/2021/open-budget-survey-slovakia-2021-en.pdf
www.nku.gov.sk
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
2
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1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Law 18/2018 governs the protection of personal data in Slovakia, establishing rights and responsibilities for data processing and defining the role and organization of the Office for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic.
The Office for Personal Data Protection is an independent body with a budget set annually by the State Budget Law. In 2021, it had 45 employees and a budget of €1,738,043.75. The office monitors compliance with data protection laws and has the authority to obtain information and question officials. Its president is elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic via secret ballot, while the government nominates the vice-president based on the president’s proposal (Law 18/2018).
The Office’s direct control activities are limited; its 2023 control plan covers only three central ministries and one central state administration body. It maintains a relatively low profile, attracting media attention primarily when publishing annual reports on fines. Information on follow-up actions is not publicly available.
Citations:
Zákon 18/2018 o ochrane osobných údajov. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2018/18/20220330
https://dataprotection.gov.sk/uoou/sk
The Office for Personal Data Protection is an independent body with a budget set annually by the State Budget Law. In 2021, it had 45 employees and a budget of €1,738,043.75. The office monitors compliance with data protection laws and has the authority to obtain information and question officials. Its president is elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic via secret ballot, while the government nominates the vice-president based on the president’s proposal (Law 18/2018).
The Office’s direct control activities are limited; its 2023 control plan covers only three central ministries and one central state administration body. It maintains a relatively low profile, attracting media attention primarily when publishing annual reports on fines. Information on follow-up actions is not publicly available.
Citations:
Zákon 18/2018 o ochrane osobných údajov. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2018/18/20220330
https://dataprotection.gov.sk/uoou/sk
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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7
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The Slovak Republic has a low score on the World Bank Rule of Law indicator, with 0.6 in 2022, down from 0.7 in 2021 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). This decline reflects various challenges within the national judiciary.
The Slovak judiciary, including specialized courts, is formally autonomous and responsible for interpreting and reviewing laws. However, recent rulings, such as those by the Bratislava IV court regarding suspensions by Interior Minister Šutaj Eštók, show inconsistent decision-making, suggesting a selective commitment to independent judicial review (Drozdíková, 2023).
Corruption within the judiciary undermines its effectiveness. High-profile arrests, such as those of the former vice-president of the Supreme Court and ex-special chief prosecutor Dušan Kovačik, highlight ongoing corruption and clientelism. Public trust is low, with 88% of citizens perceiving corruption in the courts and less than 30% believing in their independence. The judicial selection process also appears to be influenced by social connections rather than merit (Spáč, 2022).
Appointment processes for the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court aim to ensure independence. For the Constitutional Court, 13 judges serve 12-year terms, selected by the president from a list approved by the National Council. However, media reports suggest that political parties may influence these appointments, especially if the president lacks independence (Remišová, 2018; Orosz, 2016). Similarly, the Supreme Court’s Chief Justices often face political interference despite the judicial council model (Kosář and Spáč, 2021).
The Judicial Council oversees the judiciary’s administration and has 18 members, half elected by judges and the rest appointed by the president, parliament, and government. Concerns about the independence of the council’s members persist, as their status can be precarious.
Challenging government actions in court is possible, with the Constitutional and Supreme Administrative Court handling such cases. The Public Procurement Office can also challenge decisions made by public bodies. However, case lengths are often excessive (Kullová 2023).
Rare but notable instances of noncompliance with court decisions include the Interior Minister’s refusal to revoke controversial orders.
Citations:
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastruzzi, M. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. Washington: World Bank.
Spáč, S. 2022. “The Illusion of Merit-Based Judicial Selection in Post-Communist Judiciary: Evidence from Slovakia.” Problems of Post-Communism 69 (6): 528-538.
Transparency International Slovakia. 2023. “Súdy.” https://transparency.sk/sk/temy/sudy/
Kosář, D., and Spáč, S. 2021. “Post‑communist Chief Justices in Slovakia: From Transmission Belts to Semi‑autonomous Actors?” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 13: 107–142.
Remišová, V. 2018. “Smer môže ovládnuť Ústavný súd na dvanásť rokov.” Aktuality.sk September 18. https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/624423/nazor-veroniky-remisovej
Orosz, L. 2016. “O aktuálnych problémoch pri ustanovovaní sudcov ústavných súdov (príčiny a dôsledky).” In Metamorfózy práva ve střední Evropě V. Překrásný nový svět nebo ostrov?, eds. XXX. Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, 69‒81.
Kullová, Z. 2023. “Advokát Fridrich: Firmy prežívajú absurdné časy. Ich žaloby proti štátu majú šancu uspieť.” Trend 50-51/2023. https://www.trend.sk/biznis/advokat-fridrich-firmy-prezivaju-absurdne-casy-ich-zaloby-proti-statu-maju-sancu-uspiet
Zákon 343/2015 o verejnom obstarávaní. 2015. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2015/343/
The Slovak judiciary, including specialized courts, is formally autonomous and responsible for interpreting and reviewing laws. However, recent rulings, such as those by the Bratislava IV court regarding suspensions by Interior Minister Šutaj Eštók, show inconsistent decision-making, suggesting a selective commitment to independent judicial review (Drozdíková, 2023).
Corruption within the judiciary undermines its effectiveness. High-profile arrests, such as those of the former vice-president of the Supreme Court and ex-special chief prosecutor Dušan Kovačik, highlight ongoing corruption and clientelism. Public trust is low, with 88% of citizens perceiving corruption in the courts and less than 30% believing in their independence. The judicial selection process also appears to be influenced by social connections rather than merit (Spáč, 2022).
Appointment processes for the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court aim to ensure independence. For the Constitutional Court, 13 judges serve 12-year terms, selected by the president from a list approved by the National Council. However, media reports suggest that political parties may influence these appointments, especially if the president lacks independence (Remišová, 2018; Orosz, 2016). Similarly, the Supreme Court’s Chief Justices often face political interference despite the judicial council model (Kosář and Spáč, 2021).
The Judicial Council oversees the judiciary’s administration and has 18 members, half elected by judges and the rest appointed by the president, parliament, and government. Concerns about the independence of the council’s members persist, as their status can be precarious.
Challenging government actions in court is possible, with the Constitutional and Supreme Administrative Court handling such cases. The Public Procurement Office can also challenge decisions made by public bodies. However, case lengths are often excessive (Kullová 2023).
Rare but notable instances of noncompliance with court decisions include the Interior Minister’s refusal to revoke controversial orders.
Citations:
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastruzzi, M. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. Washington: World Bank.
Spáč, S. 2022. “The Illusion of Merit-Based Judicial Selection in Post-Communist Judiciary: Evidence from Slovakia.” Problems of Post-Communism 69 (6): 528-538.
Transparency International Slovakia. 2023. “Súdy.” https://transparency.sk/sk/temy/sudy/
Kosář, D., and Spáč, S. 2021. “Post‑communist Chief Justices in Slovakia: From Transmission Belts to Semi‑autonomous Actors?” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 13: 107–142.
Remišová, V. 2018. “Smer môže ovládnuť Ústavný súd na dvanásť rokov.” Aktuality.sk September 18. https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/624423/nazor-veroniky-remisovej
Orosz, L. 2016. “O aktuálnych problémoch pri ustanovovaní sudcov ústavných súdov (príčiny a dôsledky).” In Metamorfózy práva ve střední Evropě V. Překrásný nový svět nebo ostrov?, eds. XXX. Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, 69‒81.
Kullová, Z. 2023. “Advokát Fridrich: Firmy prežívajú absurdné časy. Ich žaloby proti štátu majú šancu uspieť.” Trend 50-51/2023. https://www.trend.sk/biznis/advokat-fridrich-firmy-prezivaju-absurdne-casy-ich-zaloby-proti-statu-maju-sancu-uspiet
Zákon 343/2015 o verejnom obstarávaní. 2015. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2015/343/
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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3
There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
2
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1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
The Slovak constitution and national legal system formally guarantee the protection of civil rights. Section 2 of the constitution states that every person is entitled to their human rights and freedoms, including safeguarding personal liberty against both state and non-state actors, the right to life and security, the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment or punishment, and the protection of privacy. Section 4 stipulates that membership in any national minority or ethnic group must not be used to the detriment of any individual. Section 7 ensures equality before the law, equal access to justice, and due process under the rule of law, including protection against arbitrary imprisonment without due process. However, the constitution and legal system inadequately address the prevention of discrimination based on factors such as sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation (for further details, see the constitution).
Despite these formal guarantees, practical realization issues are significant. Amnesty International’s 2022/23 report, The State of the World’s Human Rights, is highly critical of Slovakia. The report highlights ongoing discrimination against Roma individuals and human rights violations against Ukrainians arriving in the country due to the war. It also notes the vacancy in the Public Defender of Rights office following the expiry of Mária Patakyová’s term in March. The appointment of Róbert Dobrovodský on 1 December 2022 left the office nonfunctional for several months, leading to increased complaints about human rights violations.
The situation for the Roma minority is particularly problematic. The Roma are the most vulnerable segment of society, frequently subjected to mistreatment by state authorities, including the police, and racial discrimination, especially in the labor market and access to education, where segregation is prevalent. According to an Amnesty International report, there has been no significant effort to improve the living conditions of the Roma community.
In 2022 and 2023, members of parliament from the leading coalition party OĽANO proposed several amendments to restrict abortion, but none of these proposals passed. Slovakia has also made no progress toward ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention).
LGBTQ+ individuals remain stigmatized, and their rights are insufficiently protected. Same-sex marriage is not possible due to a 2014 constitutional amendment defining marriage as “a unique union of a man and a woman” (Guasti & Bustikova, 2020). Registered civil partnerships are not legally recognized. In October 2022, negative attitudes toward the LGBTQ+ community culminated in a terrorist attack in Bratislava, where two gay individuals were shot. The police identified the assailant as a young man with anti-LGBTQ+ and antisemitic views.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Report 2022/23: The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
The Constitution of the Slovak Republic. https://www.prezident.sk/upload-files/46422.pdf
Guasti, P., and L. Bustikova. 2020. “In Europe’s Closet: The Rights of Sexual Minorities in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.” East European Politics 36 (2): 226-246.
DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2019.1705282
Despite these formal guarantees, practical realization issues are significant. Amnesty International’s 2022/23 report, The State of the World’s Human Rights, is highly critical of Slovakia. The report highlights ongoing discrimination against Roma individuals and human rights violations against Ukrainians arriving in the country due to the war. It also notes the vacancy in the Public Defender of Rights office following the expiry of Mária Patakyová’s term in March. The appointment of Róbert Dobrovodský on 1 December 2022 left the office nonfunctional for several months, leading to increased complaints about human rights violations.
The situation for the Roma minority is particularly problematic. The Roma are the most vulnerable segment of society, frequently subjected to mistreatment by state authorities, including the police, and racial discrimination, especially in the labor market and access to education, where segregation is prevalent. According to an Amnesty International report, there has been no significant effort to improve the living conditions of the Roma community.
In 2022 and 2023, members of parliament from the leading coalition party OĽANO proposed several amendments to restrict abortion, but none of these proposals passed. Slovakia has also made no progress toward ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention).
LGBTQ+ individuals remain stigmatized, and their rights are insufficiently protected. Same-sex marriage is not possible due to a 2014 constitutional amendment defining marriage as “a unique union of a man and a woman” (Guasti & Bustikova, 2020). Registered civil partnerships are not legally recognized. In October 2022, negative attitudes toward the LGBTQ+ community culminated in a terrorist attack in Bratislava, where two gay individuals were shot. The police identified the assailant as a young man with anti-LGBTQ+ and antisemitic views.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Report 2022/23: The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
The Constitution of the Slovak Republic. https://www.prezident.sk/upload-files/46422.pdf
Guasti, P., and L. Bustikova. 2020. “In Europe’s Closet: The Rights of Sexual Minorities in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.” East European Politics 36 (2): 226-246.
DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2019.1705282
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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6
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
The Registry of Public Contracts and Public Sector Partners significantly facilitates corruption detection. These tools ensure that public procurement processes are more transparent, with all details of tenders publicly accessible. Anti-corruption legislation also includes rules on conflicts of interest and asset declarations for high public officials. However, enforcement and investigation based on these regulations are reportedly inadequate.
For instance, in late 2023, Prime Minister Robert Fico purchased a luxury flat in a prestigious area of Bratislava but did not disclose the price or details of the transaction despite media pressure (Hajčáková 2024). Many other public officials face similar unresolved questions regarding their assets. While major anti-corruption stakeholders emphasize transparency, it alone is insufficient. There is a lack of coordination, enforcement, and accountability within the anti-corruption framework. Thus, while transparency raises public awareness, it does not guarantee effective investigation, prosecution, and justice. Slovakia experiences a mismatch between high perceived corruption and a low rate of investigated high-level corruption cases.
Rules governing the financing of political parties are established under Law 85/2005 on Political Parties and Political Movements. This law outlines regulations on private income, direct public funding, spending limits, reporting, oversight, and sanctions (see Law 85/2005). The Ethical Codex of the Civil Servant, effective from Jan. 1, 2020, under government regulation 400/2019, governs civil service ethics.
Despite these anti-corruption safeguards, their impact on the scope and scale of corruption in Slovakia is limited, with some describing the situation as “transparent corruption.” Like other countries in the region (see Langr, 2018), systemic corruption persists in Slovakia. The Group of States Against Corruption reports that Slovakia has made minimal progress in preventing corruption and promoting integrity within the central government (based on data from previous administrations).
During the 2020 – 2023 term under the OĽANO-led governments, combating corruption was a primary focus. Notable results include establishing the Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers and significantly increasing the number of investigated cases. High-ranking civil servants and judges were among those under criminal investigation, with some already sentenced. Nonetheless, there is ongoing debate about the legality of certain investigations. The Prosecutor General’s Office invoked Article 363 of the Penal Code to halt investigations in nearly 30 cases, including some where higher-level courts had upheld the legality of the charges. Notably, high-level politicians from the anti-corruption governments have been included in investigations. For example, in August 2023, the National Criminal Investigation Agency began investigating the director of the Slovak Secret Service, the previous director (appointed in 2020), and the director of the National Security Office (based on research for the EUPACK project).
Additionally, the caretaker government led by Eduard Heger was dismissed in May 2023 amid a corruption scandal involving Agriculture Minister Vlčan. Vlčan’s firm received a €1.4 million subsidy from the Environment Ministry’s competitive call. Despite other applications, the company won, and Vlčan refused to return the subsidy, opting to step down instead (see Benediktovičová, 2023).
Citations:
Zákon 85/2005 o politických stranách a politických hnutiach. 2005. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2005/85/
Etický kódex štátneho zamestnanca. ” https://radaprestatnusluzbu.vlada.gov.sk/eticky-kodex-statneho-zamestnanca/”
Langr, I. 2018. “Public Procurement in the Systemic Corruption Environment: Evidence from the Czech Republic.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 11 (2): 53–79.
Benediktovičová, M. 2023. “Budaj bol za zotrvanie Vlčana a chcel na detektor lži. Ako skládka pri prírodnom unikáte pritiahla Fica a odrovnala Hegera.” Denník N, June 14. https://dennikn.sk/3406008/budaj-bol-za-zotrvanie-vlcana-a-chcel-na-detektor-lzi-ako-skladka-pri-prirodnom-unikate-pritiahla-fica-a-odrovnala-hegera/?ref=list
GRECO. 2022. “Slovakia: Compliance Report.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/slovakia
Hajčáková, D. 2024. “Fico o kúpenom byte mlčí. Otázky o bývaní ho dráždili dlhodobo.” Daily Sme https://domov.sme.sk/c/23264477/fico-byt-sokolska-munko.html
For instance, in late 2023, Prime Minister Robert Fico purchased a luxury flat in a prestigious area of Bratislava but did not disclose the price or details of the transaction despite media pressure (Hajčáková 2024). Many other public officials face similar unresolved questions regarding their assets. While major anti-corruption stakeholders emphasize transparency, it alone is insufficient. There is a lack of coordination, enforcement, and accountability within the anti-corruption framework. Thus, while transparency raises public awareness, it does not guarantee effective investigation, prosecution, and justice. Slovakia experiences a mismatch between high perceived corruption and a low rate of investigated high-level corruption cases.
Rules governing the financing of political parties are established under Law 85/2005 on Political Parties and Political Movements. This law outlines regulations on private income, direct public funding, spending limits, reporting, oversight, and sanctions (see Law 85/2005). The Ethical Codex of the Civil Servant, effective from Jan. 1, 2020, under government regulation 400/2019, governs civil service ethics.
Despite these anti-corruption safeguards, their impact on the scope and scale of corruption in Slovakia is limited, with some describing the situation as “transparent corruption.” Like other countries in the region (see Langr, 2018), systemic corruption persists in Slovakia. The Group of States Against Corruption reports that Slovakia has made minimal progress in preventing corruption and promoting integrity within the central government (based on data from previous administrations).
During the 2020 – 2023 term under the OĽANO-led governments, combating corruption was a primary focus. Notable results include establishing the Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers and significantly increasing the number of investigated cases. High-ranking civil servants and judges were among those under criminal investigation, with some already sentenced. Nonetheless, there is ongoing debate about the legality of certain investigations. The Prosecutor General’s Office invoked Article 363 of the Penal Code to halt investigations in nearly 30 cases, including some where higher-level courts had upheld the legality of the charges. Notably, high-level politicians from the anti-corruption governments have been included in investigations. For example, in August 2023, the National Criminal Investigation Agency began investigating the director of the Slovak Secret Service, the previous director (appointed in 2020), and the director of the National Security Office (based on research for the EUPACK project).
Additionally, the caretaker government led by Eduard Heger was dismissed in May 2023 amid a corruption scandal involving Agriculture Minister Vlčan. Vlčan’s firm received a €1.4 million subsidy from the Environment Ministry’s competitive call. Despite other applications, the company won, and Vlčan refused to return the subsidy, opting to step down instead (see Benediktovičová, 2023).
Citations:
Zákon 85/2005 o politických stranách a politických hnutiach. 2005. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2005/85/
Etický kódex štátneho zamestnanca. ” https://radaprestatnusluzbu.vlada.gov.sk/eticky-kodex-statneho-zamestnanca/”
Langr, I. 2018. “Public Procurement in the Systemic Corruption Environment: Evidence from the Czech Republic.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 11 (2): 53–79.
Benediktovičová, M. 2023. “Budaj bol za zotrvanie Vlčana a chcel na detektor lži. Ako skládka pri prírodnom unikáte pritiahla Fica a odrovnala Hegera.” Denník N, June 14. https://dennikn.sk/3406008/budaj-bol-za-zotrvanie-vlcana-a-chcel-na-detektor-lzi-ako-skladka-pri-prirodnom-unikate-pritiahla-fica-a-odrovnala-hegera/?ref=list
GRECO. 2022. “Slovakia: Compliance Report.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/slovakia
Hajčáková, D. 2024. “Fico o kúpenom byte mlčí. Otázky o bývaní ho dráždili dlhodobo.” Daily Sme https://domov.sme.sk/c/23264477/fico-byt-sokolska-munko.html
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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7
6
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
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3
4
3
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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1
1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The Slovak parliament (NR SR) and its members of parliament fully control their resources. NR SR has a separate chapter in the state budget, and the amount of allocated resources is annually determined by the Law on the State Budget. Members of parliament have access to a parliamentary library, and the office of the parliament provides an information service to all members of parliament. They also have a budget for assistants, who are expected to perform research and analysis.
The Parliamentary Institute is a specialized research and information center that, upon official request, delivers analyses related to laws negotiated in parliament, responds to members’ of parliament information requests, drafts comparative analytical papers, and provides training for MPs. The parliament may commission expertise, such as from think tanks, to enhance evidence-based decision-making. Political parties also provide additional research and analytical support to their members of parliament (see Mackie, 2022). However, the evidence available through these channels and from other sources, like universities, is not systematically prepared and used for political decision-making in Slovakia (see, for example, Nemec, 2022).
Citations:
Mackie, I. et al. 2022. Quality of Legislative Process: Building a Conceptual Model and Developing Indicators. Luxembourg: European Union
Nemec, J. 2022. Public Administration and Governance: Slovakia. Brussels: European Union.
The Parliamentary Institute is a specialized research and information center that, upon official request, delivers analyses related to laws negotiated in parliament, responds to members’ of parliament information requests, drafts comparative analytical papers, and provides training for MPs. The parliament may commission expertise, such as from think tanks, to enhance evidence-based decision-making. Political parties also provide additional research and analytical support to their members of parliament (see Mackie, 2022). However, the evidence available through these channels and from other sources, like universities, is not systematically prepared and used for political decision-making in Slovakia (see, for example, Nemec, 2022).
Citations:
Mackie, I. et al. 2022. Quality of Legislative Process: Building a Conceptual Model and Developing Indicators. Luxembourg: European Union
Nemec, J. 2022. Public Administration and Governance: Slovakia. Brussels: European Union.
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
The National Assembly and parliamentary committees have the full ability to acquire documents from the government; they also have the exclusive right to summon ministers to committee meetings and hold them accountable. However, the ruling majority also holds the majority in these committees, which weakens accountability. Generally, documents are provided in their entirety and delivered within a reasonable timeframe. Ministers and other officials invited to parliamentary committee meetings normally comply with invitations and provide answers to the questions posed.
There are a few instances where ministers did not appear, or members of parliament from the ruling coalition parties did not participate, rendering the committees unable to even open the meeting. Opposition members of parliament are often not satisfied with the responses (see for example Jabúrková, 2023). The competition between the government and the opposition hinders effective oversight.
Citations:
Mackie, I. et al. 2022. Quality of Legislative Process: Building a Conceptual Model and Developing Indicators. Luxembourg: European Union.
Jabúrková, N. 2023. “Mimoriadny ústavný výbor sa mal zaoberať ministrom vnútra, nakoniec však bol neuznášaniaschopný.” Noviny PLUS, November 10. https://plus.noviny.sk/855454-mimoriadny-ustavny-vybor-sa-mal-zaoberat-ministrom-vnutra-nakoniec-vsak-bol-neuznasaniaschopny
There are a few instances where ministers did not appear, or members of parliament from the ruling coalition parties did not participate, rendering the committees unable to even open the meeting. Opposition members of parliament are often not satisfied with the responses (see for example Jabúrková, 2023). The competition between the government and the opposition hinders effective oversight.
Citations:
Mackie, I. et al. 2022. Quality of Legislative Process: Building a Conceptual Model and Developing Indicators. Luxembourg: European Union.
Jabúrková, N. 2023. “Mimoriadny ústavný výbor sa mal zaoberať ministrom vnútra, nakoniec však bol neuznášaniaschopný.” Noviny PLUS, November 10. https://plus.noviny.sk/855454-mimoriadny-ustavny-vybor-sa-mal-zaoberat-ministrom-vnutra-nakoniec-vsak-bol-neuznasaniaschopny
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
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9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
The main right of opposition parties is to call meetings of parliamentary committees to control the executive, including individual ministers, but not to initiate proper “investigations.” Even if such a control procedure did take place, the likelihood of an unfavorable decision or report is minimal, as coalition members of parliament usually boycott such meetings. This has been the common practice of all recent Slovak governments – for example, Jabúrková (2023). Slovakia’s parliamentary committees are the weakest among EU countries (Zubek 2021).
Citations:
Jabúrková, N. 2023. “Mimoriadny ústavný výbor sa mal zaoberať ministrom vnútra, nakoniec však bol neuznášaniaschopný.” Noviny PLUS, November 10. https://plus.noviny.sk/855454-mimoriadny-ustavny-vybor-sa-mal-zaoberat-ministrom-vnutra-nakoniec-vsak-bol-neuznasaniaschopny
Zubek, R. 2021. “Committee Strength in Parliamentary Democracies: A New Index.” European Journal of Political Research 60 (4): 1018-1031.
Citations:
Jabúrková, N. 2023. “Mimoriadny ústavný výbor sa mal zaoberať ministrom vnútra, nakoniec však bol neuznášaniaschopný.” Noviny PLUS, November 10. https://plus.noviny.sk/855454-mimoriadny-ustavny-vybor-sa-mal-zaoberat-ministrom-vnutra-nakoniec-vsak-bol-neuznasaniaschopny
Zubek, R. 2021. “Committee Strength in Parliamentary Democracies: A New Index.” European Journal of Political Research 60 (4): 1018-1031.
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
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9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
During the period under review, the National Council of the Slovak Republic has more parliamentary committees than ministries. This includes Mandate and Immunity Committees and at least three specialized committees overseeing intelligence services and the National Security Authority (NBÚ). Since the 1998 elections, the law has required proportional representation in these committees, with an informal practice that members of the opposition chair them. This practice has been respected since the 2023 elections.
The European Affairs Committee and the Committee for Human Rights and National Minorities have several ministerial counterparts, and the committees cover all ministerial task areas. Thus, allocating subject regions among committees does not hinder parliamentary oversight of ministries. The size of committees and the frequency with which they meet enable effective monitoring and discussion of ministerial activities.
Since the 2023 elections, the coalition has chaired 12 committees, and the opposition has chaired seven. The opposition currently chairs the following legislative committees:
Mandate and Immunity Committee
Committee public administration and regional development
Committee for human rights and national minorities
Special control committee to control the activities of the NBU
Special control committee to control SIS activities
The Special Control Committee oversees the activities of the Military Intelligence Service.
Committee to review the decisions of the NBU
This composition de facto means that only one “substantive” committee is chaired by an opposition member of parliament.
The likelihood that draft legislation will change due to committee deliberations is high, especially for “less politically sensitive” laws; however, exact data are unavailable.
Citations:
ACT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC (No. 350/1996 Coll.) ON RULES OF PROCEDURE
OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC. https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/en-US/NRSR/rules_of_procedure_20230101.pdf
The European Affairs Committee and the Committee for Human Rights and National Minorities have several ministerial counterparts, and the committees cover all ministerial task areas. Thus, allocating subject regions among committees does not hinder parliamentary oversight of ministries. The size of committees and the frequency with which they meet enable effective monitoring and discussion of ministerial activities.
Since the 2023 elections, the coalition has chaired 12 committees, and the opposition has chaired seven. The opposition currently chairs the following legislative committees:
Mandate and Immunity Committee
Committee public administration and regional development
Committee for human rights and national minorities
Special control committee to control the activities of the NBU
Special control committee to control SIS activities
The Special Control Committee oversees the activities of the Military Intelligence Service.
Committee to review the decisions of the NBU
This composition de facto means that only one “substantive” committee is chaired by an opposition member of parliament.
The likelihood that draft legislation will change due to committee deliberations is high, especially for “less politically sensitive” laws; however, exact data are unavailable.
Citations:
ACT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC (No. 350/1996 Coll.) ON RULES OF PROCEDURE
OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC. https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/en-US/NRSR/rules_of_procedure_20230101.pdf