Vertical Accountability
#20Key Findings
Slovakia falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 20) in the category of vertical accountability.
Elections are free and fair, with liberal provisions for party and candidate registration. The State Commission for Elections, whose members are nominated by political parties and judicial institutions, supervises elections and monitors party financing. Enforcement of financial transparency rules is weak.
All citizens can vote. The electoral system is based on a proportional representation system with a 5% threshold for entering parliament. Political parties in Slovakia are often highly centralized around their leaders and lack strong local structures. Mainstream parties have moved away from liberal values, and several far-right movements are active in the country.
Public institutions in Slovakia generally respond well to information requests, with a standard response time of eight days. Some state enterprises and local governments occasionally seek to withhold information.
Elections are free and fair, with liberal provisions for party and candidate registration. The State Commission for Elections, whose members are nominated by political parties and judicial institutions, supervises elections and monitors party financing. Enforcement of financial transparency rules is weak.
All citizens can vote. The electoral system is based on a proportional representation system with a 5% threshold for entering parliament. Political parties in Slovakia are often highly centralized around their leaders and lack strong local structures. Mainstream parties have moved away from liberal values, and several far-right movements are active in the country.
Public institutions in Slovakia generally respond well to information requests, with a standard response time of eight days. Some state enterprises and local governments occasionally seek to withhold information.
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To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
Slovak legislation enshrines all standard elements of free and fair elections. Legal provisions regarding the registration of parties and candidates are liberal and ensure a fair process. Registered political parties, movements, and coalitions can nominate candidate lists for parliamentary elections. These nominating organizations must obtain 10,000 signatures and deposit €17,000, which is returned only if they receive at least 2% of the vote. Eligible parties and candidates are not disqualified from registration without adhering to objectively verifiable legal criteria. Those denied the right to be elected or registered can appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court.
The State Commission for Elections and Control of Financing of Political Parties (Štátna komisia pre voľby a kontrolu financovania politických strán) supervises national elections. This commission has 14 members: ten nominated by political parties in parliament, and one member each delegated by the president of the Constitutional Court, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, the prosecutor general, and the president of the Supreme Audit Office. Parties must maintain accurate financial records, disclose donations, and regularly publish accounts. The State Commission monitors party funding, and each party must submit an annual report to parliament. Although the law on political parties stipulates various fines for noncompliance, these are infrequently enforced, as not all political parties use transparent accounts during elections.
Candidates and parties have fair opportunities to access public media. The public broadcaster, Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS), is legally required to introduce candidates and present their campaigns. Political broadcasting on private media outlets is free. No official bodies overseeing election campaign fairness reported media manipulation. However, a few days before the elections, a deepfake audio was posted on social media to discredit the leader of Progressive Slovakia (Kőváry, 2023).
Transparency International Slovakia evaluated the transparency and accuracy of financial records of political parties during the 2023 elections. The SaS party performed best in terms of transparency, while the Hlas party performed the worst. The National Criminal Agency (NAKA) is investigating possible manipulation of the 2023 parliamentary elections, particularly concerning the unrealistically high percentage of votes given to OĽANO and its allies in some Roma settlements.
Citations:
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Vančo, M., and Kozinková, K. 2023. “Bez Rómov by OĽaNO nebolo v parlamente. Ako Matovič získal desaťtisíce rómskych hlasov?” https://domov.sme.sk/c/23226885/romovia-olano-matovic-pollak-hlasy-volby-2023.html
Transparency International Slovensko. 2023. “Monitoring volebných kampaní.” https://volby.transparency.sk/parlament2023/aktuality/v-predvolebnej-kampani-su-uz-statisice-s-transparentnostou-si-davaju-strany-nacas
OSCE. 2023. Slovak Republic. Early parliamentary elections 30 September 2023. ODHIR needs assessment mission report. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/c/548809_0.pdf
Daniška, J. 2023. “Slovenské voľby nerozhodli médiá, ale voliči. Našťastie.” https://echo24.cz/a/H86fN/komentar-daniska-slovenske-volby-nerozhodly-media-ale-volici
Kőváry, K. 2023. “Slovakia: Deepfake Audio of Denník N Journalist Offers Worrying Example of AI Abuse.” https://ipi.media/slovakia-deepfake-audio-of-dennik-n-journalist-offers-worrying-example-of-ai-abuse
Smer-SSD. 2023. “Smer-SSD odmieta byť súčasťou manipulatívnych politických diskusií TV Markíza.”(Smer-SSD rejects to take part in a manipulative political debates of TV Markíza). https://www.facebook.com/smersd/posts/pfbid0jz9XjLiwyDKfFoQYsenptzS3zgxuN1QcvhnKqynDEfvcjcQ2WsZxcnXP4MTvGXt2l
The State Commission for Elections and Control of Financing of Political Parties (Štátna komisia pre voľby a kontrolu financovania politických strán) supervises national elections. This commission has 14 members: ten nominated by political parties in parliament, and one member each delegated by the president of the Constitutional Court, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, the prosecutor general, and the president of the Supreme Audit Office. Parties must maintain accurate financial records, disclose donations, and regularly publish accounts. The State Commission monitors party funding, and each party must submit an annual report to parliament. Although the law on political parties stipulates various fines for noncompliance, these are infrequently enforced, as not all political parties use transparent accounts during elections.
Candidates and parties have fair opportunities to access public media. The public broadcaster, Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS), is legally required to introduce candidates and present their campaigns. Political broadcasting on private media outlets is free. No official bodies overseeing election campaign fairness reported media manipulation. However, a few days before the elections, a deepfake audio was posted on social media to discredit the leader of Progressive Slovakia (Kőváry, 2023).
Transparency International Slovakia evaluated the transparency and accuracy of financial records of political parties during the 2023 elections. The SaS party performed best in terms of transparency, while the Hlas party performed the worst. The National Criminal Agency (NAKA) is investigating possible manipulation of the 2023 parliamentary elections, particularly concerning the unrealistically high percentage of votes given to OĽANO and its allies in some Roma settlements.
Citations:
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Vančo, M., and Kozinková, K. 2023. “Bez Rómov by OĽaNO nebolo v parlamente. Ako Matovič získal desaťtisíce rómskych hlasov?” https://domov.sme.sk/c/23226885/romovia-olano-matovic-pollak-hlasy-volby-2023.html
Transparency International Slovensko. 2023. “Monitoring volebných kampaní.” https://volby.transparency.sk/parlament2023/aktuality/v-predvolebnej-kampani-su-uz-statisice-s-transparentnostou-si-davaju-strany-nacas
OSCE. 2023. Slovak Republic. Early parliamentary elections 30 September 2023. ODHIR needs assessment mission report. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/c/548809_0.pdf
Daniška, J. 2023. “Slovenské voľby nerozhodli médiá, ale voliči. Našťastie.” https://echo24.cz/a/H86fN/komentar-daniska-slovenske-volby-nerozhodly-media-ale-volici
Kőváry, K. 2023. “Slovakia: Deepfake Audio of Denník N Journalist Offers Worrying Example of AI Abuse.” https://ipi.media/slovakia-deepfake-audio-of-dennik-n-journalist-offers-worrying-example-of-ai-abuse
Smer-SSD. 2023. “Smer-SSD odmieta byť súčasťou manipulatívnych politických diskusií TV Markíza.”(Smer-SSD rejects to take part in a manipulative political debates of TV Markíza). https://www.facebook.com/smersd/posts/pfbid0jz9XjLiwyDKfFoQYsenptzS3zgxuN1QcvhnKqynDEfvcjcQ2WsZxcnXP4MTvGXt2l
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
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9
There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
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7
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
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1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
All citizens, both de jure and de facto, can exercise their right to vote without restrictions. Voting rights are granted to all citizens, including those without permanent residence or with felony convictions. There is no disenfranchisement due to a flawed voter registry since registration is passive. In rare cases of registry errors, citizens can request corrections through municipal administration and appeal decisions to the administrative court.
Elections are organized by three levels of election commissions, headed by the State Commission for Elections and Control of Financing of Political Parties (SEC). These levels include 50 District Election Commissions (DECs) and around 6,000 Local Election Commissions (PECs) serving a country with 5.5 million inhabitants. Voters who are unable to visit polling stations on election day, usually for health reasons, can request to vote via a portable ballot box.
The Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Statistical Office support election commissions at all levels. The MoI handles technical preparations and methodological support. DECs and PECs, which are formed before each election, manage voting, counting, and results tabulation. Each DEC and PEC has at least five members nominated by election contestants. The Statistical Office administers results tabulation, sets up units in all DECs and the SEC, and installs a system for electronically processing election results.
The early 2023 parliamentary elections proceeded as scheduled, with minor delays in two PECs due to extended voting times for health reasons. Disabled citizens had the option to vote at home, highlighting issues with access. There were few incidents of harassment, violence, or intimidation against voters and voting commissions during the elections. Six thousand five hundred police officers maintained public order, and out of 123 reported violations before or during the elections, only five were classified as penal code violations. The results from one PEC were annulled due to the manipulation of envelopes by a commission member; this did not affect the overall election outcome.
Citations:
Ministerstvo vnútra SR. 2023. “Štátna komisia pre voľby a kontrolu financovania politických strán vyhlásila oficiálne výsledky volieb do NR SR 2023.” https://www.minv.sk/?informacie-komisia-pre-volby&sprava=statna-komisia-pre-volby-a-kontrolu-financovania-politickych-stran-vyhlasila-oficialne-vysledky-volieb-do-nr-sr-2023
OSCE. 2023. “Slovak Republic. Early Parliamentary Elections 30 September 2023. ODHIR Needs Assessment Mission Report.” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/c/548809_0.pdf
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Elections are organized by three levels of election commissions, headed by the State Commission for Elections and Control of Financing of Political Parties (SEC). These levels include 50 District Election Commissions (DECs) and around 6,000 Local Election Commissions (PECs) serving a country with 5.5 million inhabitants. Voters who are unable to visit polling stations on election day, usually for health reasons, can request to vote via a portable ballot box.
The Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Statistical Office support election commissions at all levels. The MoI handles technical preparations and methodological support. DECs and PECs, which are formed before each election, manage voting, counting, and results tabulation. Each DEC and PEC has at least five members nominated by election contestants. The Statistical Office administers results tabulation, sets up units in all DECs and the SEC, and installs a system for electronically processing election results.
The early 2023 parliamentary elections proceeded as scheduled, with minor delays in two PECs due to extended voting times for health reasons. Disabled citizens had the option to vote at home, highlighting issues with access. There were few incidents of harassment, violence, or intimidation against voters and voting commissions during the elections. Six thousand five hundred police officers maintained public order, and out of 123 reported violations before or during the elections, only five were classified as penal code violations. The results from one PEC were annulled due to the manipulation of envelopes by a commission member; this did not affect the overall election outcome.
Citations:
Ministerstvo vnútra SR. 2023. “Štátna komisia pre voľby a kontrolu financovania politických strán vyhlásila oficiálne výsledky volieb do NR SR 2023.” https://www.minv.sk/?informacie-komisia-pre-volby&sprava=statna-komisia-pre-volby-a-kontrolu-financovania-politickych-stran-vyhlasila-oficialne-vysledky-volieb-do-nr-sr-2023
OSCE. 2023. “Slovak Republic. Early Parliamentary Elections 30 September 2023. ODHIR Needs Assessment Mission Report.” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/c/548809_0.pdf
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Graph View
To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
Some legal aspects of Slovakia’s political system hinder the representation of important societal interests. The proportional representation system, which operates with a single electoral district and a 5% threshold, leads to the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities and underdeveloped regions. This setup undermines fair representation and governance. For instance, most major foreign investments are located in western Slovakia, and since the 2020 elections, none of the Hungarian minority parties have been represented in parliament.
These legal provisions have influenced the organization of political parties. Many parties in Slovakia are highly centralized and effectively owned by their political leaders and founders, lacking local and regional structures. An extreme example is OĽaNO (recently renamed “Slovensko”), which Igor Matovič fully controls. Since its foundation in 2011, this party has had no registered members or regional and local structures. The absence of party structure led SNS leader Andrej Danko to change the law on political parties after the 2016 elections, increasing regulation on party organization and membership transparency. Due to these requirements, political entities elected to parliament in 2023 have some membership and minimal regional and local structures. However, Slovensko remains a “non-standard” entity in terms of party organization (see Malý and Nemec, 2023).
All major political entities running for national elections publish their party manifestos. However, these texts do not comprehensively represent significant societal interests programmatically and do not rely much on clientelism. Instead, they are predominantly populist, aimed at attracting voters with often unrealistic promises (see Rossi, 2020).
Citations:
Michael Rossi. 2020. “Slovakia after Fico: Systemic Change or More of the Same?” Czech Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 235-258.
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences Special issue: 101-117.
Dolný, B. and Malová, D. 2016. “Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Slovakia: Parties Not for Members.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Sobolewska-Myslik, K., Kosowska-Gąstoł, B., and Borowiec, P. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.
These legal provisions have influenced the organization of political parties. Many parties in Slovakia are highly centralized and effectively owned by their political leaders and founders, lacking local and regional structures. An extreme example is OĽaNO (recently renamed “Slovensko”), which Igor Matovič fully controls. Since its foundation in 2011, this party has had no registered members or regional and local structures. The absence of party structure led SNS leader Andrej Danko to change the law on political parties after the 2016 elections, increasing regulation on party organization and membership transparency. Due to these requirements, political entities elected to parliament in 2023 have some membership and minimal regional and local structures. However, Slovensko remains a “non-standard” entity in terms of party organization (see Malý and Nemec, 2023).
All major political entities running for national elections publish their party manifestos. However, these texts do not comprehensively represent significant societal interests programmatically and do not rely much on clientelism. Instead, they are predominantly populist, aimed at attracting voters with often unrealistic promises (see Rossi, 2020).
Citations:
Michael Rossi. 2020. “Slovakia after Fico: Systemic Change or More of the Same?” Czech Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 235-258.
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences Special issue: 101-117.
Dolný, B. and Malová, D. 2016. “Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Slovakia: Parties Not for Members.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Sobolewska-Myslik, K., Kosowska-Gąstoł, B., and Borowiec, P. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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3
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
The majority of political parties in Slovakia support democratic values. However, during the 2023 election campaign, several mainstream political parties, such as Smer-SSD, distanced themselves from liberal values. Alongside “systemic” parties that support liberal democratic values (like SaS), there are several “anti-system” parties (for more, see Gyarfášová, 2018; Rybář and Spáč, 2020; Rossi, 2020; Malý and Nemec, 2023).
Slovakia has several far-right movements that support the country’s fascist past, such as Slovenská pospolitosť (Slovak Togetherness, SP). Since the mid-1990s, SP has advocated for the abolition of democracy in favor of a corporatist regime. The Supreme Court dissolved the party in 2006. Leaders, including Marián Kotleba, formed a new party, Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, recognized as ultra-right and neofascist (Gyarfášová, 2018). This party was elected to parliament in 2016 and 2020. In 2021, some members of parliament left to form Republika, which also used moderate rhetoric. In the 2023 elections, both parties failed to pass the 5% threshold, although Republika reached 4.75%. The Slovak National Party (SNS) gained 5.62% and 10 MPs, mainly due to popular figures from conspiracy circles with radical conservative and pro-Russian attitudes. Paradoxically, due to preferential votes, only SNS chair Andrej Danko was elected as a party member, with the rest being radical independents, several of whom became ministers or state secretaries.
The political spectrum in the Slovak parliament after the 2023 elections includes:
Smer: A formerly social-democratic party led by Robert Fico that is criticized for weak anti-corruption efforts and its shift toward nationalism and extremist rhetoric.
Progresívne Slovensko: A left-wing liberal, pro-European movement, elected to parliament for the first time.
Hlas: A social-democratic party formed after splitting from Smer in 2020, formally pro-European.
SaS: Freedom and Solidarity, a liberal, mostly pro-European party.
SNS: Slovak National Party, nationalist with limited acceptance of liberal democratic values and a reserved stance on EU membership.
KDH: Christian Democratic Movement, center-right, conservative on gender and family issues, pro-European.
OĽaNO: Now rebranded as “Slovakia,” a center-right movement supporting traditional Christian and family values.
The ruling coalition consists of Smer, Hlas, and SNS. There is ongoing debate about whether this coalition structure poses risks to EU and NATO memberships, though analysts note Fico’s experience and pragmatism (see Karnitschnig, 2023). However, his election rhetoric regarding the war in Ukraine and amendments to the Criminal Code have raised concerns domestically and internationally.
Ruling coalitions prepare and sign agreements to manage different ideological positions, though adherence can vary. The 2020–2022 coalition led by OĽaNO often ignored its agreement, leading to Prime Minister Matovič’s resignation in 2021 and the coalition’s collapse in 2022 (see Malý and Nemec, 2023).
Officially, all liberal democratic parties reject cooperation with anti-democratic entities. However, there were instances in 2022–23 where the ruling coalition relied on support from Republika to pass legal proposals (see Jabůrková, 2022). Matovič’s chaotic pandemic governance and past collaboration with the radical right are key reasons why the three 2023 post-election opposition parties (PS, SaS, and KDH) do not cooperate with his “Slovensko” movement.
Overall, the post-2023 election developments have blurred the boundaries between parties’ normative attitudes. The current Smer-SD-led coalition operates pragmatically, focusing on office-seeking and power interests.
Citations:
Oľga Gyárfášová. 2018. “The fourth generation: from anti-establishment to anti-system parties in Slovakia.” New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations 1: 109-133.
Rybář, M., and P. Spáč. 2020. “Social Origin Is No Destiny: Background, Institutionalization, and Electoral Performance of New Political Parties in Slovakia.” East European Politics and Societies 34 (3): 637-662.
Michael Rossi. 2020. “Slovakia after Fico: Systemic Change or More of the Same?” Czech Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 235-258.
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences. Special issue: 101-117.
Karnitschnig, M. 2023. “Why Slovakia’s Election Doesn’t Really Matter.” https://www.politico.eu/article/why-the-slovak-election-doesnt-really-matter/
Jabůrková, N. 2022. “Za čo vymenili liberáli z OĽaNO svoje hlasy? Matovič prišiel so spiknutím SaS so Smerom a fašistami z Republiky.” https://plus.noviny.sk/archiv/690347-za-co-vymenili-liberali-z-olano-svoje-hlasy-matovic-prisiel-so-spiknutim-sas-so-smerom-a-fasistami-z-republiky
Slovakia has several far-right movements that support the country’s fascist past, such as Slovenská pospolitosť (Slovak Togetherness, SP). Since the mid-1990s, SP has advocated for the abolition of democracy in favor of a corporatist regime. The Supreme Court dissolved the party in 2006. Leaders, including Marián Kotleba, formed a new party, Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, recognized as ultra-right and neofascist (Gyarfášová, 2018). This party was elected to parliament in 2016 and 2020. In 2021, some members of parliament left to form Republika, which also used moderate rhetoric. In the 2023 elections, both parties failed to pass the 5% threshold, although Republika reached 4.75%. The Slovak National Party (SNS) gained 5.62% and 10 MPs, mainly due to popular figures from conspiracy circles with radical conservative and pro-Russian attitudes. Paradoxically, due to preferential votes, only SNS chair Andrej Danko was elected as a party member, with the rest being radical independents, several of whom became ministers or state secretaries.
The political spectrum in the Slovak parliament after the 2023 elections includes:
Smer: A formerly social-democratic party led by Robert Fico that is criticized for weak anti-corruption efforts and its shift toward nationalism and extremist rhetoric.
Progresívne Slovensko: A left-wing liberal, pro-European movement, elected to parliament for the first time.
Hlas: A social-democratic party formed after splitting from Smer in 2020, formally pro-European.
SaS: Freedom and Solidarity, a liberal, mostly pro-European party.
SNS: Slovak National Party, nationalist with limited acceptance of liberal democratic values and a reserved stance on EU membership.
KDH: Christian Democratic Movement, center-right, conservative on gender and family issues, pro-European.
OĽaNO: Now rebranded as “Slovakia,” a center-right movement supporting traditional Christian and family values.
The ruling coalition consists of Smer, Hlas, and SNS. There is ongoing debate about whether this coalition structure poses risks to EU and NATO memberships, though analysts note Fico’s experience and pragmatism (see Karnitschnig, 2023). However, his election rhetoric regarding the war in Ukraine and amendments to the Criminal Code have raised concerns domestically and internationally.
Ruling coalitions prepare and sign agreements to manage different ideological positions, though adherence can vary. The 2020–2022 coalition led by OĽaNO often ignored its agreement, leading to Prime Minister Matovič’s resignation in 2021 and the coalition’s collapse in 2022 (see Malý and Nemec, 2023).
Officially, all liberal democratic parties reject cooperation with anti-democratic entities. However, there were instances in 2022–23 where the ruling coalition relied on support from Republika to pass legal proposals (see Jabůrková, 2022). Matovič’s chaotic pandemic governance and past collaboration with the radical right are key reasons why the three 2023 post-election opposition parties (PS, SaS, and KDH) do not cooperate with his “Slovensko” movement.
Overall, the post-2023 election developments have blurred the boundaries between parties’ normative attitudes. The current Smer-SD-led coalition operates pragmatically, focusing on office-seeking and power interests.
Citations:
Oľga Gyárfášová. 2018. “The fourth generation: from anti-establishment to anti-system parties in Slovakia.” New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations 1: 109-133.
Rybář, M., and P. Spáč. 2020. “Social Origin Is No Destiny: Background, Institutionalization, and Electoral Performance of New Political Parties in Slovakia.” East European Politics and Societies 34 (3): 637-662.
Michael Rossi. 2020. “Slovakia after Fico: Systemic Change or More of the Same?” Czech Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 235-258.
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences. Special issue: 101-117.
Karnitschnig, M. 2023. “Why Slovakia’s Election Doesn’t Really Matter.” https://www.politico.eu/article/why-the-slovak-election-doesnt-really-matter/
Jabůrková, N. 2022. “Za čo vymenili liberáli z OĽaNO svoje hlasy? Matovič prišiel so spiknutím SaS so Smerom a fašistami z Republiky.” https://plus.noviny.sk/archiv/690347-za-co-vymenili-liberali-z-olano-svoje-hlasy-matovic-prisiel-so-spiknutim-sas-so-smerom-a-fasistami-z-republiky
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
The three critical Slovak pillars of transparency – the law on free access to information, the existence of the registry of public contracts which stipulates that a contract can only be executed after being published in this registry, and the registry of public sector partners (only private bodies from this registry are eligible to receive grants from any level of the government over a certain value or sign a contract with any public body) – remained untouched and functional during the evaluated period (Nemec, 2022).
Access to government information remains “free.” The questioned body can only charge direct costs associated with providing the requested information. The court decides in cases of potential noncompliance (for detailed information about all aspects of the free access to information legislation, see Wilfling, 2012).
The earlier report by Transparency International Slovakia (TIS) indicates that Slovak public institutions generally respond adequately to citizens’ requests for information. The standard response time is a maximum of eight days. The report also suggests that state enterprises and, to some extent, self-government may try to conceal some eligible information, though not on a mass scale (Riapošová and Dančíková, 2015).
Citations:
Wilfling, P. 2012. Zákon o slobodnom prístupe k informáciám. Pezinok: VIA IURIS.
Nemec, J. 2022. Public Administration and Governance: Slovakia. Brussels: European Union.
Riapošová, L., and Z. Dančíková. 2015. Analýza vymáhateľnosti infozákona v štátnych a mestských firmách - Slovensko, Česká republika, Maďarsko, Poľsko, Estónsko. Bratislava: Transparency International Slovakia.
www.crz.gov.sk
www.rpvs.gov.sk
Access to government information remains “free.” The questioned body can only charge direct costs associated with providing the requested information. The court decides in cases of potential noncompliance (for detailed information about all aspects of the free access to information legislation, see Wilfling, 2012).
The earlier report by Transparency International Slovakia (TIS) indicates that Slovak public institutions generally respond adequately to citizens’ requests for information. The standard response time is a maximum of eight days. The report also suggests that state enterprises and, to some extent, self-government may try to conceal some eligible information, though not on a mass scale (Riapošová and Dančíková, 2015).
Citations:
Wilfling, P. 2012. Zákon o slobodnom prístupe k informáciám. Pezinok: VIA IURIS.
Nemec, J. 2022. Public Administration and Governance: Slovakia. Brussels: European Union.
Riapošová, L., and Z. Dančíková. 2015. Analýza vymáhateľnosti infozákona v štátnych a mestských firmách - Slovensko, Česká republika, Maďarsko, Poľsko, Estónsko. Bratislava: Transparency International Slovakia.
www.crz.gov.sk
www.rpvs.gov.sk