Coordination
#6Key Findings
In the category of coordination, Sweden performs comparatively well (rank 6).
The Government Office (GO), led by the prime minister, assists the government in policy preparation. While the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Finance Ministry play key roles in policy development, the practicalities of policy design are left to specialist public servants, whereas the GO and the PMO operate at the strategic level.
The government and its departments operate as a collective actor. All decisions are made collectively, and there is no individual ministerial accountability. Disagreements between governing parties or ministries are often resolved by lifting issues to the political level or through informal mechanisms. Agencies have considerable autonomy in carrying out policies.
Public services have been extensively decentralized, with management shifted to local governments. This has complicated the task of maintaining national standards, especially as services become more privatized. Some sectors such as healthcare have been chronically underfunded.
The Government Office (GO), led by the prime minister, assists the government in policy preparation. While the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Finance Ministry play key roles in policy development, the practicalities of policy design are left to specialist public servants, whereas the GO and the PMO operate at the strategic level.
The government and its departments operate as a collective actor. All decisions are made collectively, and there is no individual ministerial accountability. Disagreements between governing parties or ministries are often resolved by lifting issues to the political level or through informal mechanisms. Agencies have considerable autonomy in carrying out policies.
Public services have been extensively decentralized, with management shifted to local governments. This has complicated the task of maintaining national standards, especially as services become more privatized. Some sectors such as healthcare have been chronically underfunded.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
8
7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
Policymaking in Sweden is characterized by a small government and numerous autonomous public agencies. The central administrative entity, known as Government Offices (Regeringskansliet), is led by the prime minister and has a small staff that assists the government (Regeringen) in preparing policy and governing the country. This entity comprises the Office of the Prime Minister (Statsrådsberedningen) and all the ministries.
The GO employs a very small fraction of the public servants working for more than 300 government agencies. Furthermore, Sweden is characterized by the absence of formal ministerial rule when it comes to public agencies. This means that, even though agencies belong to a specific ministry, public agencies and civil servants have considerable freedom in interpreting laws or exercising public authority (Larsson and Bäck 2008). Ministries focus on strategic planning and budgeting, and the managerial autonomy of agencies has increased in the past decades (Hall 2016).
The leadership of the GO and the PMO is asserted when policies are initiated, when final decisions are made, and if a disagreement emerges among the governing parties or ministers, rather than as a continuous monitoring of policy implementation work. Regular briefings and informal consultations occur frequently. This informal coordination procedure nevertheless ensures that the PMO, in line with the finance ministry, plays a crucial role in policy developments. As is the case in many aspects of Swedish politics, there are established yet informal rules regulating procedures when there is disagreement among non-political advisers on how to design policy. The practicalities of policy design are left to specialist public servants, whereas the GO and the PMO operate at the strategic level.
Finally, line ministries often seek advice from executive agencies during the early stages of the policy process because these public agencies possess the necessary expertise in the policy sector (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Niemann, 2012; Page, 2012; Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
Citations:
Hall, P. 2016. “The Swedish Administrative Model.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics, ed. Jon Pierre, 299-314. Oxford: OUP.
Jacobsson, B., Pierre, J., and Sundström, G. 2015. Governing the Embedded State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Niemann, C. 2013. Villkorat Förtroende. Normer och Rollförväntningar i Relationen Mellan Politiker och Tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet. Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
Page, E.C. 2012. Policy Without Politicians: Bureaucratic Influence in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Premfors, R. and Sundström, G. 2007. Regeringskansliet. Stockholm: Liber.
The GO employs a very small fraction of the public servants working for more than 300 government agencies. Furthermore, Sweden is characterized by the absence of formal ministerial rule when it comes to public agencies. This means that, even though agencies belong to a specific ministry, public agencies and civil servants have considerable freedom in interpreting laws or exercising public authority (Larsson and Bäck 2008). Ministries focus on strategic planning and budgeting, and the managerial autonomy of agencies has increased in the past decades (Hall 2016).
The leadership of the GO and the PMO is asserted when policies are initiated, when final decisions are made, and if a disagreement emerges among the governing parties or ministers, rather than as a continuous monitoring of policy implementation work. Regular briefings and informal consultations occur frequently. This informal coordination procedure nevertheless ensures that the PMO, in line with the finance ministry, plays a crucial role in policy developments. As is the case in many aspects of Swedish politics, there are established yet informal rules regulating procedures when there is disagreement among non-political advisers on how to design policy. The practicalities of policy design are left to specialist public servants, whereas the GO and the PMO operate at the strategic level.
Finally, line ministries often seek advice from executive agencies during the early stages of the policy process because these public agencies possess the necessary expertise in the policy sector (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Niemann, 2012; Page, 2012; Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
Citations:
Hall, P. 2016. “The Swedish Administrative Model.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics, ed. Jon Pierre, 299-314. Oxford: OUP.
Jacobsson, B., Pierre, J., and Sundström, G. 2015. Governing the Embedded State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Niemann, C. 2013. Villkorat Förtroende. Normer och Rollförväntningar i Relationen Mellan Politiker och Tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet. Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
Page, E.C. 2012. Policy Without Politicians: Bureaucratic Influence in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Premfors, R. and Sundström, G. 2007. Regeringskansliet. Stockholm: Liber.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Interministerial coordination has long been problematic in the Swedish system of government. Formally, the government and its departments operate as a collective actor. All decisions are made collectively, and there is no individual ministerial accountability. The PMO and the finance ministry play a significant role in this process. Additionally, when the government is a coalition, as has been the case since 2006, policies must be coordinated not only among the relevant departments but also among the governing parties (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015).
Collective decision-making becomes even more complex in practice. Each department has a fair amount of autonomy in its respective sector. Coordination among departments occurs at different organizational levels, depending on whether the issue is technical and administrative or politically charged. With the latter, political actors make the final decisions.
Formal collaboration – a program that started in 2006 in the Government Offices of Sweden and has evolved to a broader partnership scheme – falls under the purview of Vinnova, Sweden’s innovation agency, with the latest strategy covering the period from 2019 – 2022. The scheme addresses four thematic areas: business climate change, skills supply and lifelong learning, health and life science, and business digital and structural transformation (Vinnova, 2021).
Citations:
Jacobsson, B., Pierre, J., and Sundström, G. 2015. Governing the Embedded State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vinnova. 2021. “Vinnova samordnar regeringens samverkansprogram.” https://www.vinnova.se/m/regeringens-samverkansprogram
Collective decision-making becomes even more complex in practice. Each department has a fair amount of autonomy in its respective sector. Coordination among departments occurs at different organizational levels, depending on whether the issue is technical and administrative or politically charged. With the latter, political actors make the final decisions.
Formal collaboration – a program that started in 2006 in the Government Offices of Sweden and has evolved to a broader partnership scheme – falls under the purview of Vinnova, Sweden’s innovation agency, with the latest strategy covering the period from 2019 – 2022. The scheme addresses four thematic areas: business climate change, skills supply and lifelong learning, health and life science, and business digital and structural transformation (Vinnova, 2021).
Citations:
Jacobsson, B., Pierre, J., and Sundström, G. 2015. Governing the Embedded State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vinnova. 2021. “Vinnova samordnar regeringens samverkansprogram.” https://www.vinnova.se/m/regeringens-samverkansprogram
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
When the government consists of more than one party, as has often been the case in Sweden’s recent history, mechanisms are in place to address disagreements. Either the political leadership proactively intervenes in the policy-planning process or such disagreements are “lifted” to the political level for a ruling. These mechanisms largely unfold during informal meetings.
Public agencies are often consulted by line ministries in the early stages of the policy process due to the significant policy knowledge that public servants possess (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
“Informal mechanisms of coordination among civil servants and politicians are a salient practice (Petridou and Sparf, 2017). However, they may not always be effective. Yet, informal contacts between departments and agencies are believed to be integral to the efficiency of the politico-administrative system. Informal coordination procedures effectively filter many, but not all, policy proposals (de Fine Licht and Pierre, 2017).”
Citations:
de Fine Licht, J., and Pierre, J. 2017. “Myndighetschefernas Syn på Regeringens Styrning.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Jacobsson, B., Pierre, J., and Sundström, G. 2015. Governing the Embedded State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Petridou, E., and J. Sparf. 2017. “For Safety’s Sake: The Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Reforms in Swedish Crisis Management, 2001–2009.” Policy and Society 36 (4): 556-574.
Premfors, R. and Sundström, G. 2007. Regeringskansliet. Stockholm: Liber.
Public agencies are often consulted by line ministries in the early stages of the policy process due to the significant policy knowledge that public servants possess (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
“Informal mechanisms of coordination among civil servants and politicians are a salient practice (Petridou and Sparf, 2017). However, they may not always be effective. Yet, informal contacts between departments and agencies are believed to be integral to the efficiency of the politico-administrative system. Informal coordination procedures effectively filter many, but not all, policy proposals (de Fine Licht and Pierre, 2017).”
Citations:
de Fine Licht, J., and Pierre, J. 2017. “Myndighetschefernas Syn på Regeringens Styrning.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Jacobsson, B., Pierre, J., and Sundström, G. 2015. Governing the Embedded State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Petridou, E., and J. Sparf. 2017. “For Safety’s Sake: The Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Reforms in Swedish Crisis Management, 2001–2009.” Policy and Society 36 (4): 556-574.
Premfors, R. and Sundström, G. 2007. Regeringskansliet. Stockholm: Liber.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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9
9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
2
1
1
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
Over the past decades, public services have been extensively decentralized. Once the provision and management of services are transferred from the national level to local governments, safeguarding national standards – and even defining and sustaining those standards – becomes problematic. This issue is exacerbated with increasingly privatized services, where oversight over national standards is even more challenging.
For a unitary state, the Swedish subnational level has pronounced autonomy, constitutionally protected in the idea of “kommunal självstyre,” or municipal self-government (SKR, 2024). In practice, this does not mean the 21 regions and 290 municipalities can make policy as they wish; rather, they have considerable leeway in implementing broadly articulated national policy and providing a wide range of welfare services, such as healthcare, which is the responsibility of the regions, and education, which is the responsibility of the municipalities.
The national government employs extensive evaluation structures to control policy implementation at the national level. Public agencies manage these evaluations. For example, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigketen för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB) oversees Risk and Vulnerability Analyses, which are reported up the levels of governance from the municipal to the national (MSB, 2021). Municipal public servants have expressed concerns that these reports become instrumental, creating disproportionate work relative to the benefits they provide.
Citations:
MSB (The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency). 2021. “Risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser.” https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/krisberedskap–civilt-forsvar/risk–och-sarbarhetsanalyser/
SKR (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions). 2024. “Lokala självstyret, historiskt tillbakablick.” https://skr.se/skr/demokratiledningstyrning/styrningledning/kommunaltsjalvstyre/lokalasjalvstyrethistorisktillbakablick.61409.html
For a unitary state, the Swedish subnational level has pronounced autonomy, constitutionally protected in the idea of “kommunal självstyre,” or municipal self-government (SKR, 2024). In practice, this does not mean the 21 regions and 290 municipalities can make policy as they wish; rather, they have considerable leeway in implementing broadly articulated national policy and providing a wide range of welfare services, such as healthcare, which is the responsibility of the regions, and education, which is the responsibility of the municipalities.
The national government employs extensive evaluation structures to control policy implementation at the national level. Public agencies manage these evaluations. For example, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigketen för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB) oversees Risk and Vulnerability Analyses, which are reported up the levels of governance from the municipal to the national (MSB, 2021). Municipal public servants have expressed concerns that these reports become instrumental, creating disproportionate work relative to the benefits they provide.
Citations:
MSB (The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency). 2021. “Risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser.” https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/krisberedskap–civilt-forsvar/risk–och-sarbarhetsanalyser/
SKR (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions). 2024. “Lokala självstyret, historiskt tillbakablick.” https://skr.se/skr/demokratiledningstyrning/styrningledning/kommunaltsjalvstyre/lokalasjalvstyrethistorisktillbakablick.61409.html
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
10
9
9
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
In the context of municipal autonomy, the main vehicle for collaboration between the national and subnational governments is the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (Sveriges kommuner och regioner, SKR) (SKR n.d.).
SKR is a membership organization that encompasses all municipalities and regions in the country. Its purpose is to support its members with knowledge and expertise. SKR is the largest employer organization in Sweden and conducts salary negotiations for employees of regions and municipalities. SKR enjoys legitimacy and is a key player in intergovernmental relations.
There are several formalized networks to connect public servants from different parts of the country who work in sectors such as education and health (SKR, 2024a). They meet regularly.
While the government announced an increase of SEK 6 billion in funding for regions and municipalities in 2022, budget cuts are expected in 2024 (Government Offices of Sweden 2022; SKR, 2024b). Recently, sectors such as healthcare have been chronically underfunded, resulting in serious consequences, especially for post-COVID treatment.
Citations:
Government Offices of Sweden. 2024. “Förstärkning av det generella statsbidrag till kommuner och regioner.” https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2022/11/forstarkning-av-det-generella-statsbidraget-till-kommuner-och-regioner/
SKR. n.d. “Om SKR.” https://skr.se/skr/omskr.409.html
SKR. 2024a. “Nationella nätverk med regionala representater.” https://skr.se/skr/integrationsocialomsorg/socialomsorg/nationellkunskapsstyrningsocialtjanst/styrningochsamverkan/nationellanatverkmedregionalarepresentanter.27216.html
SKR. 2024b. “Viktig besked om pengar till regionerna.” https://skr.se/skr/tjanster/pressrum/nyheter/nyhetsarkiv/viktigtbeskedompengartillregionerna.79344.html
SKR is a membership organization that encompasses all municipalities and regions in the country. Its purpose is to support its members with knowledge and expertise. SKR is the largest employer organization in Sweden and conducts salary negotiations for employees of regions and municipalities. SKR enjoys legitimacy and is a key player in intergovernmental relations.
There are several formalized networks to connect public servants from different parts of the country who work in sectors such as education and health (SKR, 2024a). They meet regularly.
While the government announced an increase of SEK 6 billion in funding for regions and municipalities in 2022, budget cuts are expected in 2024 (Government Offices of Sweden 2022; SKR, 2024b). Recently, sectors such as healthcare have been chronically underfunded, resulting in serious consequences, especially for post-COVID treatment.
Citations:
Government Offices of Sweden. 2024. “Förstärkning av det generella statsbidrag till kommuner och regioner.” https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2022/11/forstarkning-av-det-generella-statsbidraget-till-kommuner-och-regioner/
SKR. n.d. “Om SKR.” https://skr.se/skr/omskr.409.html
SKR. 2024a. “Nationella nätverk med regionala representater.” https://skr.se/skr/integrationsocialomsorg/socialomsorg/nationellkunskapsstyrningsocialtjanst/styrningochsamverkan/nationellanatverkmedregionalarepresentanter.27216.html
SKR. 2024b. “Viktig besked om pengar till regionerna.” https://skr.se/skr/tjanster/pressrum/nyheter/nyhetsarkiv/viktigtbeskedompengartillregionerna.79344.html