Vertical Accountability
#4Key Findings
Sweden falls into the top ranks internationally (rank 4) in the category of vertical accountability.
No formal party registration process exists. Political parties select candidates internally with no formal public rules guiding the process. Elections are free and fair, managed by the Election Authority. Public and private funding is permitted. While parties disclose private donations, they do not need to report expenses or assets, limiting the scope of public scrutiny.
Political parties have become more professionalized over time. Party membership rates are declining, which means parties are increasingly dependent on state subsidies. Polarization is increasing, with the traditional left-right divide giving way to a cultural divided centered around issues such as identity and migration.
The right-wing Swedish Democrats have gained substantial influence. Though not represented in the current governing coalition, they are a supporting party in parliament, and thus influence policy. Freedom of information rules are robust, and the transparency of government actions is remarkably high.
No formal party registration process exists. Political parties select candidates internally with no formal public rules guiding the process. Elections are free and fair, managed by the Election Authority. Public and private funding is permitted. While parties disclose private donations, they do not need to report expenses or assets, limiting the scope of public scrutiny.
Political parties have become more professionalized over time. Party membership rates are declining, which means parties are increasingly dependent on state subsidies. Polarization is increasing, with the traditional left-right divide giving way to a cultural divided centered around issues such as identity and migration.
The right-wing Swedish Democrats have gained substantial influence. Though not represented in the current governing coalition, they are a supporting party in parliament, and thus influence policy. Freedom of information rules are robust, and the transparency of government actions is remarkably high.
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To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
There is no formal party registration in Sweden, though political parties may register their name to avoid misuse. Candidates are selected and ranked within party organizations with essentially no public rules guiding the process. Political representation in Sweden is overwhelmingly collective representation (Karlsson and Gilljam, 2014). Swedish voters predominantly vote for parties, not individual candidates, as only approximately 25% of the electorate used the personal vote option in the 2022 general election (Gadd et al. 2022).
The Election Authority (Valmyndigheten) is responsible for planning and coordinating general elections, and this planning does not include practices such as gerrymandering. At the subnational level, elections are administered by County Administrative Boards, Municipal Elections Commissions, and Polling Boards.
Both public and private funding is permitted, and parties that participated in elections and received public funding must disclose private donations in a report to the Legal, Financial, and Administrative Services [Kammarkollegiet]. Notably, these reports concern only income; parties are not required to report their expenses, assets, and debts, so public scrutiny has a limited scope.
This practice does not fully comply with international standards and guidelines issued by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (OSCE, 2018). Despite intense debate, this rule has not changed. According to the latest data published in 2021, the eight parties of the Riksdag and the Feminist Initiative received a total of SEK 167,955,204, or approximately €15 million. The women’s groups of the eight Riksdag parties received financial support amounting to SEK 14,999,660, or approximately €1.3 million (Sveriges Riksdag 2024).
There is no legal regulation regarding media time allocated to political parties; rather, this is a matter for voluntary self-regulation. Publicly funded TV channels and newspapers are expected to host and promote political debate but also to remain impartial. Private media are not legally obligated to follow this line, but they normally do (OCSE, 2022).
Citations:
Gadd, Elin et al. 2022. Energivalet 2022, Rapport 2022:9, Valforskningsprogrammet Göteborgs universitet. https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2022-10/2022_9_Energivalet_2022.pdf
Karlsson, D., and Gilljam, M. 2014. Svenska politiker. Om de folkvalda i riksdag, landsting och kommun. Stockholm: Santérus.
OSCE. 2018. Sweden: General Elections 2018: ODIHR Election Expert Team Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/403760.pdf
OSCE. 2022. Sweden. General Elections 11 September 2022. ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report 31 May-2 June 2022. Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/0/523500.pdf
Oscarsson, H., and S. Holmberg. 2014. Svenska väljare. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer.
Sveriges Riksdag. 2024. “Verksamhetsredogörelse för Partibidragsnämnden 2020.” https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/redogorelse/verksamhetsredogorelse-for-partibidragsnamnden_h804pn1/
The Election Authority (Valmyndigheten) is responsible for planning and coordinating general elections, and this planning does not include practices such as gerrymandering. At the subnational level, elections are administered by County Administrative Boards, Municipal Elections Commissions, and Polling Boards.
Both public and private funding is permitted, and parties that participated in elections and received public funding must disclose private donations in a report to the Legal, Financial, and Administrative Services [Kammarkollegiet]. Notably, these reports concern only income; parties are not required to report their expenses, assets, and debts, so public scrutiny has a limited scope.
This practice does not fully comply with international standards and guidelines issued by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (OSCE, 2018). Despite intense debate, this rule has not changed. According to the latest data published in 2021, the eight parties of the Riksdag and the Feminist Initiative received a total of SEK 167,955,204, or approximately €15 million. The women’s groups of the eight Riksdag parties received financial support amounting to SEK 14,999,660, or approximately €1.3 million (Sveriges Riksdag 2024).
There is no legal regulation regarding media time allocated to political parties; rather, this is a matter for voluntary self-regulation. Publicly funded TV channels and newspapers are expected to host and promote political debate but also to remain impartial. Private media are not legally obligated to follow this line, but they normally do (OCSE, 2022).
Citations:
Gadd, Elin et al. 2022. Energivalet 2022, Rapport 2022:9, Valforskningsprogrammet Göteborgs universitet. https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2022-10/2022_9_Energivalet_2022.pdf
Karlsson, D., and Gilljam, M. 2014. Svenska politiker. Om de folkvalda i riksdag, landsting och kommun. Stockholm: Santérus.
OSCE. 2018. Sweden: General Elections 2018: ODIHR Election Expert Team Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/403760.pdf
OSCE. 2022. Sweden. General Elections 11 September 2022. ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report 31 May-2 June 2022. Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/0/523500.pdf
Oscarsson, H., and S. Holmberg. 2014. Svenska väljare. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer.
Sveriges Riksdag. 2024. “Verksamhetsredogörelse för Partibidragsnämnden 2020.” https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/redogorelse/verksamhetsredogorelse-for-partibidragsnamnden_h804pn1/
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
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9
There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
Eligible voters for the Swedish national elections include Swedish citizens over 18 who are either currently registered as residents or were registered as residents in the past in Sweden. EU citizens living in Sweden, regardless of how long they have been residents, along with residents from other countries or stateless persons who have resided in Sweden for 3 years prior to the election, have the right to vote in regional and local elections (Valmyndigheten, 2024).
The quality and robustness of the electoral system notwithstanding, the Swedish Election Authority has identified weaknesses following the 2022 elections and has made several recommendations, including (i) evaluating and simplifying the ballot system; (ii) demanding more rigor from parties regarding substantive representation in districts, such as implementing tighter registration rules; (iii) reviewing the system for voting from abroad; (iv) allocating more resources to the Swedish Election Authority to investigate complaints; and (v) giving more authority and power to the Election Authority to issue binding regulations (Valmyndigheten, 2023).
Recent work by Högström and colleagues (Högström and Jerhov 2023a; 2023b) highlights that despite robust democracy in Sweden, minor human errors in handling early votes and managing queues at voting places affect poll workers’ perception of the voting process quality, even if no serious errors occurred in the actual conduct of the elections. A recent report concludes that although there were fears about the spread of disinformation and misinformation on social media ahead of the 2022 elections, this did not happen, with the exception of small-scale activity on Twitter (currently known as X) (Svenonius et al. 2023).
Citations:
Högström, J., and C. Jerhov. 2023a. “Complaints Concerning Electoral Fraud and Administrative Inaccuracies: A Study of Complaints About the Parliamentary Elections in Sweden Between 2010 and 2018.” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 22 (1): 27-44.
Högström, J., and C. Jerhov. 2023. “Köer och röstmottagningens kvalitet vid det svenska valet 2022: En studie med fokus på röstmottagarnas erfarenheter från valet.” Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 125(4): 887–915.
Svenonius, O., Olsson, S., Michélsen Forsgren, M., Dungel, E., and Jarlsbo, M. 2023. Så Någon Valfusk? Informationsmiljön på Sociala Medier i Samband med Valrörelsen 2022. FOI Totalförsvarets Institutet. FOI-R – 5429-SE https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R–5429–SE
Valmyndigheten. 2023. “Erferenheter från Valen 2022.” Rapport: VAL-686. https://www.val.se/om-oss/vart-uppdrag/erfarenheter-fran-val.html
Valmyndigheten. 2024. “Rösträtt och Rostlängd.” https://www.val.se/att-rosta/vem-har-rostratt/rostratt-och-rostlangd.html
The quality and robustness of the electoral system notwithstanding, the Swedish Election Authority has identified weaknesses following the 2022 elections and has made several recommendations, including (i) evaluating and simplifying the ballot system; (ii) demanding more rigor from parties regarding substantive representation in districts, such as implementing tighter registration rules; (iii) reviewing the system for voting from abroad; (iv) allocating more resources to the Swedish Election Authority to investigate complaints; and (v) giving more authority and power to the Election Authority to issue binding regulations (Valmyndigheten, 2023).
Recent work by Högström and colleagues (Högström and Jerhov 2023a; 2023b) highlights that despite robust democracy in Sweden, minor human errors in handling early votes and managing queues at voting places affect poll workers’ perception of the voting process quality, even if no serious errors occurred in the actual conduct of the elections. A recent report concludes that although there were fears about the spread of disinformation and misinformation on social media ahead of the 2022 elections, this did not happen, with the exception of small-scale activity on Twitter (currently known as X) (Svenonius et al. 2023).
Citations:
Högström, J., and C. Jerhov. 2023a. “Complaints Concerning Electoral Fraud and Administrative Inaccuracies: A Study of Complaints About the Parliamentary Elections in Sweden Between 2010 and 2018.” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 22 (1): 27-44.
Högström, J., and C. Jerhov. 2023. “Köer och röstmottagningens kvalitet vid det svenska valet 2022: En studie med fokus på röstmottagarnas erfarenheter från valet.” Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 125(4): 887–915.
Svenonius, O., Olsson, S., Michélsen Forsgren, M., Dungel, E., and Jarlsbo, M. 2023. Så Någon Valfusk? Informationsmiljön på Sociala Medier i Samband med Valrörelsen 2022. FOI Totalförsvarets Institutet. FOI-R – 5429-SE https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R–5429–SE
Valmyndigheten. 2023. “Erferenheter från Valen 2022.” Rapport: VAL-686. https://www.val.se/om-oss/vart-uppdrag/erfarenheter-fran-val.html
Valmyndigheten. 2024. “Rösträtt och Rostlängd.” https://www.val.se/att-rosta/vem-har-rostratt/rostratt-och-rostlangd.html
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To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
Political parties are at the heart of modern representative democracy in Sweden. They are large, powerful organizations that recruit future political leaders and train current political activists. They have local chapters and, in theory, they are in tune with issues that are salient at both the local and national levels.
Erlingsson et al. (2016) identify three main developments in party organizations. First, Swedish party organizations have become professionalized and appear to be less connected with their grassroots base and civil society organizations. As a consequence, they risk providing less relevant solutions at the local level. Second, as party membership declines, parties are increasingly dependent on state subsidies. This may further disconnect them from the will of the citizens they are supposed to represent. Third, Erlingsson et al. (2016) find that although political parties are not a particularly trusted institution in Sweden, their reputation is improving, and there is little to suggest they are becoming internally less democratic.
Party manifestos are available online in an easy-to-read format. In the 2022 elections, there was significantly less focus on ideology in these documents compared to the 2018 elections. Parties either presented detailed policy proposals or conveyed a general message on safety – to address the issue of gang violence, which is currently a major concern on the political agenda (Demker, 2022).
Citations:
Demker, M. 2022. “Demokratins grindvakter.” In Snabbtänkt: 2.022. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare, eds. N. Bolin, K. Falasca, M. Grusell, and Lars Nord. https://www.miun.se/globalassets/forskning/center-och-institut/demicom/snabbtankt_2022_12okt.pdf
Erlingsson, G. Ó., A.-K. Kölln, and P. Öhberg. 2016. “The Party Organizations.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics, ed. J. Pierre, 169-187. Oxford: OUP.
Erlingsson et al. (2016) identify three main developments in party organizations. First, Swedish party organizations have become professionalized and appear to be less connected with their grassroots base and civil society organizations. As a consequence, they risk providing less relevant solutions at the local level. Second, as party membership declines, parties are increasingly dependent on state subsidies. This may further disconnect them from the will of the citizens they are supposed to represent. Third, Erlingsson et al. (2016) find that although political parties are not a particularly trusted institution in Sweden, their reputation is improving, and there is little to suggest they are becoming internally less democratic.
Party manifestos are available online in an easy-to-read format. In the 2022 elections, there was significantly less focus on ideology in these documents compared to the 2018 elections. Parties either presented detailed policy proposals or conveyed a general message on safety – to address the issue of gang violence, which is currently a major concern on the political agenda (Demker, 2022).
Citations:
Demker, M. 2022. “Demokratins grindvakter.” In Snabbtänkt: 2.022. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare, eds. N. Bolin, K. Falasca, M. Grusell, and Lars Nord. https://www.miun.se/globalassets/forskning/center-och-institut/demicom/snabbtankt_2022_12okt.pdf
Erlingsson, G. Ó., A.-K. Kölln, and P. Öhberg. 2016. “The Party Organizations.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics, ed. J. Pierre, 169-187. Oxford: OUP.
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
Party polarization has been increasing in Sweden, even though for a long time it was the exception. While radical right-wing populist parties were growing in countries such as Austria, Denmark and France, such a party did not enter the Swedish parliament until 2010. By the 2022 elections, the radical right-wing populist Sweden Democrats had become the second-largest party after the Social Democrats and ahead of the Moderate Party. The left-right divide, where redistributive policies were at the center of ideological differentiation, has given way to a cultural divide, with a focus on diversity (or lack thereof), identity, globalization and migration (Wikforss, 2022).
More specifically, the GAL-TAN divide (GAL: green, alternative, libertarian and TAN: traditional, authoritarian, nationalist), which refers to the political cleavages associated with values and lifestyles, has emerged as a new feature of the party system. Parties that traditionally occupied different places on the left-right spectrum may adopt similar positions within the GAL-TAN scale. For example, on issues such as migration, the Social Democrats and Conservatives share a similar policy position, while left-wing, green, and center parties tend to share a different policy position (Lindvall, 2017). There has been a polarization trend since 2010 that could mark the start of a steep polarization era. At the same time, this cleavage is not ahistorical in the Swedish context (Oscarsson et al., 2021).
Cross-party collaboration has been difficult and short-lived. The Tidöavtalet, the compromise that allowed for the formation of the minority coalition government after the 2022 elections, illustrated this. Even though the Sweden Democrats and the Liberals promised to be tough on crime, they have different ideas on how to tackle it. While the former hold a punitive stance, the latter prefer measures that maintain the integrity of the individual (Blombäck, 2023). Although the Sweden Democrats are not represented in the governing coalition – they are a supporting party – they are clearly imprinting their programmatic stamp on government policy.
In summary, there are no legal barriers to collaboration; in fact, it is an integral part of Swedish politics. Recently, it has been more difficult for parties to find common ground due to the strategically favorable position of the Sweden Democrats as the pivotal party between the political blocs.
Citations:
Blombäck, S. 2023. “Statsvetaren: Här står Sverigedemokraterna och Liberalerna långt ifrån varandra.” https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/statsvetaren-har-star-sverigedemokraterna-och-liberalerna-langt-ifran-varandra
Lindvall, J., Bäck, H., Dahlström, C., Naurin, E., and Teorell, J. 2017. “Samverkan och Strid i den Parlamentariska Demokratin.” SNS Demokratirapport 2017. https://snsse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2020/02/samverkan-och-strid-i-den-parlamentariska-demokratin.pdf
Oscarsson, H., Bergmann, T., Bergström, A., and Hellström, J. 2021. “Demokratirådets rapport 2021: Polarisering i Sverige.” https://snsse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2021/03/demokratiradets-rapport-2021-polarisering-i-sverige.pdf
Wikforss, Å. 2022. “Demokratins grindvakter.” In Snabbtänkt: 2.022. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare, eds. N. Bolin, K. Falasca, M. Grusell, and Lars Nord. https://www.miun.se/globalassets/forskning/center-och-institut/demicom/snabbtankt_2022_12okt.pdf
More specifically, the GAL-TAN divide (GAL: green, alternative, libertarian and TAN: traditional, authoritarian, nationalist), which refers to the political cleavages associated with values and lifestyles, has emerged as a new feature of the party system. Parties that traditionally occupied different places on the left-right spectrum may adopt similar positions within the GAL-TAN scale. For example, on issues such as migration, the Social Democrats and Conservatives share a similar policy position, while left-wing, green, and center parties tend to share a different policy position (Lindvall, 2017). There has been a polarization trend since 2010 that could mark the start of a steep polarization era. At the same time, this cleavage is not ahistorical in the Swedish context (Oscarsson et al., 2021).
Cross-party collaboration has been difficult and short-lived. The Tidöavtalet, the compromise that allowed for the formation of the minority coalition government after the 2022 elections, illustrated this. Even though the Sweden Democrats and the Liberals promised to be tough on crime, they have different ideas on how to tackle it. While the former hold a punitive stance, the latter prefer measures that maintain the integrity of the individual (Blombäck, 2023). Although the Sweden Democrats are not represented in the governing coalition – they are a supporting party – they are clearly imprinting their programmatic stamp on government policy.
In summary, there are no legal barriers to collaboration; in fact, it is an integral part of Swedish politics. Recently, it has been more difficult for parties to find common ground due to the strategically favorable position of the Sweden Democrats as the pivotal party between the political blocs.
Citations:
Blombäck, S. 2023. “Statsvetaren: Här står Sverigedemokraterna och Liberalerna långt ifrån varandra.” https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/statsvetaren-har-star-sverigedemokraterna-och-liberalerna-langt-ifran-varandra
Lindvall, J., Bäck, H., Dahlström, C., Naurin, E., and Teorell, J. 2017. “Samverkan och Strid i den Parlamentariska Demokratin.” SNS Demokratirapport 2017. https://snsse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2020/02/samverkan-och-strid-i-den-parlamentariska-demokratin.pdf
Oscarsson, H., Bergmann, T., Bergström, A., and Hellström, J. 2021. “Demokratirådets rapport 2021: Polarisering i Sverige.” https://snsse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2021/03/demokratiradets-rapport-2021-polarisering-i-sverige.pdf
Wikforss, Å. 2022. “Demokratins grindvakter.” In Snabbtänkt: 2.022. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare, eds. N. Bolin, K. Falasca, M. Grusell, and Lars Nord. https://www.miun.se/globalassets/forskning/center-och-institut/demicom/snabbtankt_2022_12okt.pdf
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
The Freedom of the Press Act is underpinned by five principles: the freedom to express one’s thoughts in print, the freedom to disseminate material, free access to this material, free access to official information, and the right of anonymity. Information is considered official if it has been received or created by a public authority. Such documents are freely available unless they are classified (Sveriges Riksdag, 2024).
The professional contact information for public servants working in municipalities or regions is readily available online, enabling public communication. Official websites are constantly updated, and the quality of information is very high. An increasing amount of information on these websites is available in English as well as other languages.
Even though media freedom and freedom of information in Sweden remain robust, issues with officials attempting to withhold information – or to hamper the expeditious handing over of such information – during the COVID-19 pandemic have been reported. More specifically, there have been reports of municipalities advising their employees in elder care homes not to convey information to journalists, as well as public servants purposefully delaying the conveyance of public material to the media (Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 2022). Nevertheless, the transparency of government actions is remarkably high.
Citations:
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM). https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74712
Sveriges Riksdag. 2024. “The Constitution.” https://www.riksdagen.se/en/how-the-riksdag-works/democracy/the-constitution/
The professional contact information for public servants working in municipalities or regions is readily available online, enabling public communication. Official websites are constantly updated, and the quality of information is very high. An increasing amount of information on these websites is available in English as well as other languages.
Even though media freedom and freedom of information in Sweden remain robust, issues with officials attempting to withhold information – or to hamper the expeditious handing over of such information – during the COVID-19 pandemic have been reported. More specifically, there have been reports of municipalities advising their employees in elder care homes not to convey information to journalists, as well as public servants purposefully delaying the conveyance of public material to the media (Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 2022). Nevertheless, the transparency of government actions is remarkably high.
Citations:
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM). https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74712
Sveriges Riksdag. 2024. “The Constitution.” https://www.riksdagen.se/en/how-the-riksdag-works/democracy/the-constitution/