Coordination
#12Key Findings
In the category of coordination, Switzerland falls into the sample’s upper-middle ranks (rank 12).
The Swiss political system lacks a prime minister. The Federal Council is a collegial body of seven ministries, each with broad areas of responsibility. Decision-making is usually based on consensus. Ministers must support decisions even if they differ personally or politically.
Ministries, called federal departments, engage in a formal process of consultation when drafting proposals. and the Federal Chancellery and Federal Council provide political coordination. Informal mechanisms such as ad hoc meetings, personal networks and behind-the-scenes negotiations complement formal structures.
Under the country’s highly decentralized systems, self-governing cantons and municipalities enjoy substantial autonomy. Few standards exist; it is up to the cantons and municipalities to decide what public services they want to offer, to what extent and at what level of quality. The three federal layers engage in close contact, but cantons insist on their discretionary autonomy.
The Swiss political system lacks a prime minister. The Federal Council is a collegial body of seven ministries, each with broad areas of responsibility. Decision-making is usually based on consensus. Ministers must support decisions even if they differ personally or politically.
Ministries, called federal departments, engage in a formal process of consultation when drafting proposals. and the Federal Chancellery and Federal Council provide political coordination. Informal mechanisms such as ad hoc meetings, personal networks and behind-the-scenes negotiations complement formal structures.
Under the country’s highly decentralized systems, self-governing cantons and municipalities enjoy substantial autonomy. Few standards exist; it is up to the cantons and municipalities to decide what public services they want to offer, to what extent and at what level of quality. The three federal layers engage in close contact, but cantons insist on their discretionary autonomy.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
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Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
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Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
The Swiss political system does not have a prime minister or a prime minister’s office. The government, called the Federal Council, is a collegial body composed of seven ministries, each of which has a broad area of competency and is responsible for a large variety of issues. There are no line ministries. However, there are federal offices and institutions connected to the various ministries. These work closely with the minister responsible for their group. Every minister is in a sense a “ministerial committee,” representing the coordination of their numerous cooperating ministerial units.
Since ministers must achieve a large Federal Council majority in order to win support for a proposal, there is also a strong coordination between ministries. There are several instruments of interministerial coordination, as well as various mechanisms by which ministries’ draft bills are evaluated. The ministries, called federal departments, engage in a formal process of consultation when drafting proposals, the Department of Justice provides legal evaluations of draft bills, and the Federal Chancellery and Federal Council provide political coordination. In particular, the Federal Chancellery has gained a reputation as the central institution for interministerial planning (Vatter 2020: Chapter 7).
More precisely, there is first a preliminary procedure of interministerial consultations at the level of the federal departments. After the departments have been consulted, the co-reporting procedure begins. This instrument is specifically designed to coordinate policy proposals between the ministries. This process invites the ministries to take positions on political issues. The Federal Chancellery leads the process by submitting the proposal under consideration as prepared by the ministry responsible to all other ministries. These then have the opportunity to submit a report or express an opinion. A process of discussion and coordination ensues, designed to eliminate all or most differences before the proposal is discussed by the Federal Council. The co-reporting procedure is largely a process of negative coordination that highlights incompatibilities with other policies but does not systematically scrutinize the potential for synergy. Policy coordination and policy integration could thus be strengthened (Trein/Maggetti 2019).
There is a tension, however, between the consensus principle in the Federal Council that demands a common solution supported by all seven ministers, and the departmental principle that enables ministers to pursue their party line within their departments, which in turn allows them to satisfy party members as they secure support for consensus-derived government solutions. Increasing polarization in parliament has strengthened the departmental principle and rendered consensus-driven solutions within the Federal Council more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, the Federal Council has to date managed to balance the two principles (Sager and Vatter 2019). However, the need to secure a substantial level of consensus within Switzerland’s nonadversarial system accounts for the slow and incremental nature of policy change, which can be an obstacle to ambitious reforms aimed at sustainability.
Citations:
Ali, A., Sager, F., and Trein, P. Forthcoming. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. J-M. Eymeri-Douzans, M. Goransson, and H. Kassim.
Mavrot, C., and Sager, F. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407.
Sager, F. and Vatter, A. 2019. “Regierungshandeln im Spannungsfeld von Partei- und Exekutivpolitik am Beispiel des Bundesrats.” In A. Ritz, T. Haldemann, and F. Sager, eds., Blackbox Exekutive. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Trein, P. and Maggetti, M. 2020. “Patterns of Policy Integration and Administrative Coordination Reforms: A Comparative Empirical Analysis.” Public Admin Rev 80 (2): 198-208. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13117
Vatter, A. 2020. Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Since ministers must achieve a large Federal Council majority in order to win support for a proposal, there is also a strong coordination between ministries. There are several instruments of interministerial coordination, as well as various mechanisms by which ministries’ draft bills are evaluated. The ministries, called federal departments, engage in a formal process of consultation when drafting proposals, the Department of Justice provides legal evaluations of draft bills, and the Federal Chancellery and Federal Council provide political coordination. In particular, the Federal Chancellery has gained a reputation as the central institution for interministerial planning (Vatter 2020: Chapter 7).
More precisely, there is first a preliminary procedure of interministerial consultations at the level of the federal departments. After the departments have been consulted, the co-reporting procedure begins. This instrument is specifically designed to coordinate policy proposals between the ministries. This process invites the ministries to take positions on political issues. The Federal Chancellery leads the process by submitting the proposal under consideration as prepared by the ministry responsible to all other ministries. These then have the opportunity to submit a report or express an opinion. A process of discussion and coordination ensues, designed to eliminate all or most differences before the proposal is discussed by the Federal Council. The co-reporting procedure is largely a process of negative coordination that highlights incompatibilities with other policies but does not systematically scrutinize the potential for synergy. Policy coordination and policy integration could thus be strengthened (Trein/Maggetti 2019).
There is a tension, however, between the consensus principle in the Federal Council that demands a common solution supported by all seven ministers, and the departmental principle that enables ministers to pursue their party line within their departments, which in turn allows them to satisfy party members as they secure support for consensus-derived government solutions. Increasing polarization in parliament has strengthened the departmental principle and rendered consensus-driven solutions within the Federal Council more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, the Federal Council has to date managed to balance the two principles (Sager and Vatter 2019). However, the need to secure a substantial level of consensus within Switzerland’s nonadversarial system accounts for the slow and incremental nature of policy change, which can be an obstacle to ambitious reforms aimed at sustainability.
Citations:
Ali, A., Sager, F., and Trein, P. Forthcoming. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. J-M. Eymeri-Douzans, M. Goransson, and H. Kassim.
Mavrot, C., and Sager, F. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407.
Sager, F. and Vatter, A. 2019. “Regierungshandeln im Spannungsfeld von Partei- und Exekutivpolitik am Beispiel des Bundesrats.” In A. Ritz, T. Haldemann, and F. Sager, eds., Blackbox Exekutive. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Trein, P. and Maggetti, M. 2020. “Patterns of Policy Integration and Administrative Coordination Reforms: A Comparative Empirical Analysis.” Public Admin Rev 80 (2): 198-208. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13117
Vatter, A. 2020. Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Not surprisingly, given the small number of ministries, there are no cabinet committees in Switzerland’s political system. However, there is considerable coordination, delegation and communication at the lower level of the federal government. Every minister is in a sense already a “ministerial committee” – representing the coordination of numerous cooperating departmental units.
Indeed, the Swiss political system employs several formalized coordination mechanisms across ministries to enhance policy coherence. These mechanisms include the collegiality, departmental and delegation principles within the federal government. These structured forms of coordination are essential for managing the complex and decentralized nature of the Swiss federal system, ensuring effective governance, and facilitating policy implementation (Ali et al., forthcoming).
The principle of collegiality implies that decisions should arise internally by consensus or, in exceptional cases, by majority. Each member of the Federal Council must support the decisions made, even if they have different personal or party-political viewpoints. This approach to decision-making promotes a form of formalized coordination, ensuring that various political perspectives are considered and integrated into policy decisions. “Intra-executive collegialism” is one of the power-sharing institutional features intended to avoid the activation of veto mechanisms such as popular referendums further down the line (Mueller 2021). Collegiality has been put under strain in the past two decades due to increased party polarization, but is still a core feature of Swiss political life (Freiburghaus/Vatter 2019).
The departmental principle divides government business among the seven ministers. This principle allows each minister to express their political interests and beliefs in their policy decisions within their department. This organizational structure potentially creates an environment for both cooperation and conflict among departments, necessitating formalized coordination mechanisms to ensure policy coherence.
Formal delegation of policy issues to departments and their subsequent delegation to subordinated federal offices is another formalized coordination mechanism. This principle allows for a clear delineation of responsibilities and tasks among different government entities, facilitating coordination and coherent policy implementation.
The Federal Council has developed a strategy for information and communication technology within the federal administration. It uses digital technologies effectively to support interministerial coordination. However, the development and use of IT in the federal administration has experienced challenges with regard to efficiency and the appropriate use of fiscal resources. For example, the development of software for use in tax policy and administration has been heavily criticized by the Swiss Federal Audit Office. In cross-national comparison, Switzerland receives medium to low scores on e-government issues.
Citations:
Ali, A., Sager, F., and Trein, P. Forthcoming. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. Eymeri-Douzans, J.-M., Goransson, M., and Kassim, H.
https://www.bakom.admin.ch/bakom/en/homepage/digital-switzerland-and-internet/strategie-digitale-schweiz.html
Freiburghaus, R., and A. Vatter. 2019. “The Political Side of Consociationalism Reconsidered: Switzerland between a Polarized Parliament and Delicate Government Collegiality.” Swiss Political Science Review 25: 357-380. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12359
Mueller, S. 2021. “The Politics of Compromise: Institutions and Actors of Power-Sharing in Switzerland.” In Power-Sharing in Europe. Federalism and Internal Conflicts, eds. S. Keil and A. McCulloch. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53590-2_4
Schmid, J., Urben, M., and Vatter, A. 2018. “Cyberföderalismus in der Schweiz: Befunde zur Digitalisierung kantonaler Verwaltungen.” Yearbook of Swiss Administrative Sciences 9 (1): 12–24. http://doi.org/10.5334/ssas.116https
https://www.egovernment.ch/de/aktuelles/medieninformationen/e-government-benchmark-der-eu-2021/
Indeed, the Swiss political system employs several formalized coordination mechanisms across ministries to enhance policy coherence. These mechanisms include the collegiality, departmental and delegation principles within the federal government. These structured forms of coordination are essential for managing the complex and decentralized nature of the Swiss federal system, ensuring effective governance, and facilitating policy implementation (Ali et al., forthcoming).
The principle of collegiality implies that decisions should arise internally by consensus or, in exceptional cases, by majority. Each member of the Federal Council must support the decisions made, even if they have different personal or party-political viewpoints. This approach to decision-making promotes a form of formalized coordination, ensuring that various political perspectives are considered and integrated into policy decisions. “Intra-executive collegialism” is one of the power-sharing institutional features intended to avoid the activation of veto mechanisms such as popular referendums further down the line (Mueller 2021). Collegiality has been put under strain in the past two decades due to increased party polarization, but is still a core feature of Swiss political life (Freiburghaus/Vatter 2019).
The departmental principle divides government business among the seven ministers. This principle allows each minister to express their political interests and beliefs in their policy decisions within their department. This organizational structure potentially creates an environment for both cooperation and conflict among departments, necessitating formalized coordination mechanisms to ensure policy coherence.
Formal delegation of policy issues to departments and their subsequent delegation to subordinated federal offices is another formalized coordination mechanism. This principle allows for a clear delineation of responsibilities and tasks among different government entities, facilitating coordination and coherent policy implementation.
The Federal Council has developed a strategy for information and communication technology within the federal administration. It uses digital technologies effectively to support interministerial coordination. However, the development and use of IT in the federal administration has experienced challenges with regard to efficiency and the appropriate use of fiscal resources. For example, the development of software for use in tax policy and administration has been heavily criticized by the Swiss Federal Audit Office. In cross-national comparison, Switzerland receives medium to low scores on e-government issues.
Citations:
Ali, A., Sager, F., and Trein, P. Forthcoming. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. Eymeri-Douzans, J.-M., Goransson, M., and Kassim, H.
https://www.bakom.admin.ch/bakom/en/homepage/digital-switzerland-and-internet/strategie-digitale-schweiz.html
Freiburghaus, R., and A. Vatter. 2019. “The Political Side of Consociationalism Reconsidered: Switzerland between a Polarized Parliament and Delicate Government Collegiality.” Swiss Political Science Review 25: 357-380. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12359
Mueller, S. 2021. “The Politics of Compromise: Institutions and Actors of Power-Sharing in Switzerland.” In Power-Sharing in Europe. Federalism and Internal Conflicts, eds. S. Keil and A. McCulloch. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53590-2_4
Schmid, J., Urben, M., and Vatter, A. 2018. “Cyberföderalismus in der Schweiz: Befunde zur Digitalisierung kantonaler Verwaltungen.” Yearbook of Swiss Administrative Sciences 9 (1): 12–24. http://doi.org/10.5334/ssas.116https
https://www.egovernment.ch/de/aktuelles/medieninformationen/e-government-benchmark-der-eu-2021/
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
The Swiss political system, being a consensus democracy with characteristics of consociationalism, involves a complex interplay of formal and informal coordination mechanisms. This implies the presence of deliberative processes in which compromises are made between interest groups, political parties and other stakeholders. This in turn suggests that informal mechanisms play a significant role in the decision-making process. Such informal mechanisms involve less formalized but still significant processes such as ad hoc meetings, personal networks and behind-the-scenes negotiations, all of which complement the formal structures. As the Swiss system includes strong neocorporatist features, informal governance processes also involve key players that are historically strongly integrated into Switzerland’s policymaking processes – especially in the pre-parliamentary phase – such as umbrella associations representing the business sector (Mach et al. 2019). This raises questions regarding the equality of access by various interest and citizen groups to the decision-making system.
Indeed, given the small size of the federal administration and the country’s tradition of informal coordination, strong and effective informal coordination continues to take place. Political coordination among the high ranks of the administration can be rather intense, although the limited capacity and time of the Federal Council members, as well as their diverging interests, create practical bottlenecks.
Citations:
Ali, A., Sager, F., and Trein, P. Forthcoming. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. J-M. Eymeri-Douzans, M. Goransson, and H. Kassim.
Mach, A., Varone, F., and Eichenberger, S. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations Toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Careja, R., Emmenegger, P., and Giger, N. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407.
Indeed, given the small size of the federal administration and the country’s tradition of informal coordination, strong and effective informal coordination continues to take place. Political coordination among the high ranks of the administration can be rather intense, although the limited capacity and time of the Federal Council members, as well as their diverging interests, create practical bottlenecks.
Citations:
Ali, A., Sager, F., and Trein, P. Forthcoming. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. J-M. Eymeri-Douzans, M. Goransson, and H. Kassim.
Mach, A., Varone, F., and Eichenberger, S. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations Toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Careja, R., Emmenegger, P., and Giger, N. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
The Swiss political system is one of the most decentralized systems in the world. The subnational self-governments, called cantons, and the municipalities enjoy substantial autonomy not only in terms of organization but also in terms of policy, while the federal state has a subsidiary role. Within the scope of their quite significant competencies, it is up to the cantons and municipalities to decide what public services they want to offer, to what extent and at what level of quality. While this can lead to “distributive injustice” (Sager & Thomann 2016) – the fact that not all Swiss citizens enjoy the same quality of public service depending on where they live – cantonal flexibility of this kind is a historical feature firmly grounded in the Swiss politico-institutional system. Due to the cantons’ high degree of legislative autonomy, the delegation of tasks applies not only to the actual implementation of federal laws (i.e., the right to act) but also to the adaptation of these provisions to local conditions (i.e., the right to decide). The cantons’ authority extends not only to policy implementation, but also to the tasks of designing and programming policy. Indeed, according to Article 3 of the constitution: “The cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution; they shall exercise all rights which are not transferred to the confederation.”
Furthermore, even in areas in which the federal state has tasks and powers, such as social insurance, environmental protection or zoning, the federal level is dependent on the cantons for the implementation of federal legislation. According to Vatter (2007, p. 91), “While the federation holds the legislative power in many areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides to a large extent with the cantons.” Cantons have considerable flexibility in performing their work, and the implementation of federal guidelines frequently varies substantially between cantons. Zoning policy has offered examples in which the same federal regulation has led to opposite outcomes in different cantons. In addition, much implementation is carried out by interest organizations through the corporatist channel. According to Sager and Thomann, the delivery of public services varies among the cantons and is determined by the party-political composition of each government, policy pressures and bureaucratic preferences at the cantonal level. This analysis allows for many different constellations, which helps explain the large variation in cantonal implementation of federal laws. Sager et al. (2019) further show how the cantons use their discretionary power to complement federal policies in order to achieve their stated objectives. Sometimes cantons are even key drivers of change in areas that would normally be better addressed at the federal level (e.g., tobacco regulation), thus creating a bottom-up dynamic of policy change (Mavrot & Sager forthcoming 2024). The delivery of public services must therefore be seen as a multilevel process.
Therefore, there are no national standards for public services except regarding those limited parts of the administration that implement federal law. However, all public services must comply with the rule of law and the human rights standards set out in the constitution. A comparatively small number of issues (i.e., social policies, rules regarding health insurance) are decided at the federal level and are thus subject to national standards. In these cases, federal laws are implemented by cantonal administrations and their implementation partners, who have to follow national norms and are subject to strict monitoring. Multilateral agreements between some or all cantons for common standards of public services – known as “Konkordate” – can be seen as a functional equivalent to national policy standards. As member-state implementation in all policy sectors leads to marked differences in both conformance and performance compliance, the federal government increasingly employs nonbinding policy programs instead of legal acts to steer the cantons and ensure distributive justice in service delivery. These programs often take the form of financial incentives or funding schemes for achieving given policy goals. They rest upon deliberative action rather than hierarchical coercion.
Finally, federal agencies are monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office and the Parliamentary Control of the Administration. Public and semi-public enterprises are monitored by various independent regulatory agencies.
Citations:
Linder, W. and S. Mueller. 2021. “Federalism.” In Swiss Democracy, eds. W. Linder and S. Mueller. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63266-3_3
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager. Forthcoming 2024. “The Local Tackling of Global Issues: A Governance Paradox in Federal States.” Territory, Politics, Governance.
Ritz, M., O. Neumann, and F. Sager. 2019. “Senkt New Public Management die Verwaltungsausgaben in den Schweizer Kantonen? Eine empirische Analyse über zwei Dekaden.” Swiss Polit Sci Rev 25 (3): 226–252. doi:10.1111/spsr.12381
Sager, F., Ingold, K., and Balthasar, A. 2017. Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz: Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Zürich: NZZ.
Sager, F., and E. Thomann. 2016. “A Multiple Streams Approach to Member State Implementation Research: Politics, Problem Construction and Policy Paths in Swiss Asylum Policy.” Journal of Public Policy 37 (3): 287–314.
Sager, F., Rüefli, C., and Thomann, E. 2019. “Fixing Federal Faults: Complementary Member State Policies in Swiss Health Care Policy.” International Review of Public Policy 1 (2). http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/426
Vatter, A. 2007. “Federalism.” In Klöti, U. et al., eds., Handbook of Swiss Politics, 2nd edn, 77-99. Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Furthermore, even in areas in which the federal state has tasks and powers, such as social insurance, environmental protection or zoning, the federal level is dependent on the cantons for the implementation of federal legislation. According to Vatter (2007, p. 91), “While the federation holds the legislative power in many areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides to a large extent with the cantons.” Cantons have considerable flexibility in performing their work, and the implementation of federal guidelines frequently varies substantially between cantons. Zoning policy has offered examples in which the same federal regulation has led to opposite outcomes in different cantons. In addition, much implementation is carried out by interest organizations through the corporatist channel. According to Sager and Thomann, the delivery of public services varies among the cantons and is determined by the party-political composition of each government, policy pressures and bureaucratic preferences at the cantonal level. This analysis allows for many different constellations, which helps explain the large variation in cantonal implementation of federal laws. Sager et al. (2019) further show how the cantons use their discretionary power to complement federal policies in order to achieve their stated objectives. Sometimes cantons are even key drivers of change in areas that would normally be better addressed at the federal level (e.g., tobacco regulation), thus creating a bottom-up dynamic of policy change (Mavrot & Sager forthcoming 2024). The delivery of public services must therefore be seen as a multilevel process.
Therefore, there are no national standards for public services except regarding those limited parts of the administration that implement federal law. However, all public services must comply with the rule of law and the human rights standards set out in the constitution. A comparatively small number of issues (i.e., social policies, rules regarding health insurance) are decided at the federal level and are thus subject to national standards. In these cases, federal laws are implemented by cantonal administrations and their implementation partners, who have to follow national norms and are subject to strict monitoring. Multilateral agreements between some or all cantons for common standards of public services – known as “Konkordate” – can be seen as a functional equivalent to national policy standards. As member-state implementation in all policy sectors leads to marked differences in both conformance and performance compliance, the federal government increasingly employs nonbinding policy programs instead of legal acts to steer the cantons and ensure distributive justice in service delivery. These programs often take the form of financial incentives or funding schemes for achieving given policy goals. They rest upon deliberative action rather than hierarchical coercion.
Finally, federal agencies are monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office and the Parliamentary Control of the Administration. Public and semi-public enterprises are monitored by various independent regulatory agencies.
Citations:
Linder, W. and S. Mueller. 2021. “Federalism.” In Swiss Democracy, eds. W. Linder and S. Mueller. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63266-3_3
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager. Forthcoming 2024. “The Local Tackling of Global Issues: A Governance Paradox in Federal States.” Territory, Politics, Governance.
Ritz, M., O. Neumann, and F. Sager. 2019. “Senkt New Public Management die Verwaltungsausgaben in den Schweizer Kantonen? Eine empirische Analyse über zwei Dekaden.” Swiss Polit Sci Rev 25 (3): 226–252. doi:10.1111/spsr.12381
Sager, F., Ingold, K., and Balthasar, A. 2017. Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz: Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Zürich: NZZ.
Sager, F., and E. Thomann. 2016. “A Multiple Streams Approach to Member State Implementation Research: Politics, Problem Construction and Policy Paths in Swiss Asylum Policy.” Journal of Public Policy 37 (3): 287–314.
Sager, F., Rüefli, C., and Thomann, E. 2019. “Fixing Federal Faults: Complementary Member State Policies in Swiss Health Care Policy.” International Review of Public Policy 1 (2). http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/426
Vatter, A. 2007. “Federalism.” In Klöti, U. et al., eds., Handbook of Swiss Politics, 2nd edn, 77-99. Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Swiss federalism is dual rather than cooperative. The extensive member-state implementation of federal policy is a consequence of this arrangement, and has become even more nuanced with the reorganization of the financial equalization and division of tasks between the confederation and the cantons (Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgabenteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen NFA) that came into force in 2008. Still, both horizontal and vertical coordination takes place. The most important form of horizontal policy coordination takes place via intercantonal conferences. The cantons have established specialized intercantonal conferences in 15 key policy areas (e.g., finance, social affairs, health).
As Vatter (2018: 99) states, these conferences serve three purposes. First, they provide a forum for exchanging information, best practices and benchmarks. Second, they enhance cooperation in implementing cantonal policies. Third, they enable the cantons to coordinate their interests and policy positions at the federal level. Intercantonal conferences are organizations that are not institutionalized by the federal constitution (Schnabel and Mueller, 2017: 552). They are formed by the cantons in a bottom-up manner and on a voluntary basis.
Vertically, there is close contact between the three federal layers, between governments and the executive administration. However, cantons are full-fledged political systems and consequently insist on their discretionary autonomy. Coordination is somewhat easier among administrative actors due to their shared professional language and values. Mavrot and Sager (2018) refer to vertical epistemic communities.
While these mechanisms broadly work for public service delivery, several authors agree that the system failed to ensure functional policy delivery during the COVID-19 crisis (Ali et al. 2024, Mavrot/Sager 2023). Across the various COVID-19 waves, there was uncertainty as to which governance level was in charge of crisis management, which led to delayed responses and incoherence (Mavrot/Sager 2023). Vertical coordination thus should be strengthened in times of crisis.
Citations:
Ali, Azad, Fritz Sager, and Philipp Trein. 2024. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. Jean-Michel Eymeri-Douzans, Marie Goransson, and Hussein Kassim.
Mavrot, C., and F. Sager. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557316X14788733118252
Mavrot, C., and F. Sager. 2023. “Blame-avoidance and fragmented crisis management during the COVID-19 pandemic in Switzerland.” European Policy Analysis 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1194
Mueller, Sean, and Alan Fenna. 2022. “Dual versus Administrative Federalism: Origins and Evolution of Two Models.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 52 (4): 525–552. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac008
Schnabel, Johanna, and Sean Mueller. 2017. “Vertical Influence or Horizontal Coordination? The Purpose of Intergovernmental Councils in Switzerland.” Regional & Federal Studies 27 (5): 549-572.
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Swiss Federalism: The Transformation of a Federal Model. London: Routledge.
As Vatter (2018: 99) states, these conferences serve three purposes. First, they provide a forum for exchanging information, best practices and benchmarks. Second, they enhance cooperation in implementing cantonal policies. Third, they enable the cantons to coordinate their interests and policy positions at the federal level. Intercantonal conferences are organizations that are not institutionalized by the federal constitution (Schnabel and Mueller, 2017: 552). They are formed by the cantons in a bottom-up manner and on a voluntary basis.
Vertically, there is close contact between the three federal layers, between governments and the executive administration. However, cantons are full-fledged political systems and consequently insist on their discretionary autonomy. Coordination is somewhat easier among administrative actors due to their shared professional language and values. Mavrot and Sager (2018) refer to vertical epistemic communities.
While these mechanisms broadly work for public service delivery, several authors agree that the system failed to ensure functional policy delivery during the COVID-19 crisis (Ali et al. 2024, Mavrot/Sager 2023). Across the various COVID-19 waves, there was uncertainty as to which governance level was in charge of crisis management, which led to delayed responses and incoherence (Mavrot/Sager 2023). Vertical coordination thus should be strengthened in times of crisis.
Citations:
Ali, Azad, Fritz Sager, and Philipp Trein. 2024. “Coordination in a Loosely Coupled Core: Insights from Switzerland.” In Coordination at the Core? Executive Decision-Making in International Organizations and the EU, eds. Jean-Michel Eymeri-Douzans, Marie Goransson, and Hussein Kassim.
Mavrot, C., and F. Sager. 2018. “Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance.” Policy & Politics 46 (3): 391-407. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557316X14788733118252
Mavrot, C., and F. Sager. 2023. “Blame-avoidance and fragmented crisis management during the COVID-19 pandemic in Switzerland.” European Policy Analysis 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1194
Mueller, Sean, and Alan Fenna. 2022. “Dual versus Administrative Federalism: Origins and Evolution of Two Models.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 52 (4): 525–552. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac008
Schnabel, Johanna, and Sean Mueller. 2017. “Vertical Influence or Horizontal Coordination? The Purpose of Intergovernmental Councils in Switzerland.” Regional & Federal Studies 27 (5): 549-572.
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Swiss Federalism: The Transformation of a Federal Model. London: Routledge.