Diagonal Accountability
#5Key Findings
Switzerland performs relatively well (rank 5) in the category of vertical accountability.
Public and private media are free from government influence. Journalists can be imprisoned for using information that violates bank secrecy regulations, even when reporting on illegal activities. The state provides widespread media subsidies. The most important broadcast media are public. Regional newspapers are being crowded out by free commuter newspapers.
Some major media have specific political orientations. Political rights are strongly protected, although human rights groups have raised concerns about surveillance powers. Interest organizations are strongly integrated into policymaking. Trade unions are the junior partners, with the main axis of influence constituted by employers’ organizations and the state.
Social welfare organizations, like all groups, can influence policy via the direct democracy system, triggering a referendum or proposing an initiative. Environmental groups have similarly broad access to the political system, but limited influence, as climate-change policy is strongly influence by industry.
Public and private media are free from government influence. Journalists can be imprisoned for using information that violates bank secrecy regulations, even when reporting on illegal activities. The state provides widespread media subsidies. The most important broadcast media are public. Regional newspapers are being crowded out by free commuter newspapers.
Some major media have specific political orientations. Political rights are strongly protected, although human rights groups have raised concerns about surveillance powers. Interest organizations are strongly integrated into policymaking. Trade unions are the junior partners, with the main axis of influence constituted by employers’ organizations and the state.
Social welfare organizations, like all groups, can influence policy via the direct democracy system, triggering a referendum or proposing an initiative. Environmental groups have similarly broad access to the political system, but limited influence, as climate-change policy is strongly influence by industry.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
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7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
Public- and private sector media corporations are free from government influence (Hänggli/Feddersen 2023). This is enshrined in Art. 17 of the Swiss constitution, which states: “Freedom of the press, radio and television and of other forms of dissemination of features and information by means of public telecommunications is guaranteed. Censorship is prohibited. The protection of sources is guaranteed.”
Although the federal government chooses the chairperson and some board members of the quasi-public nonprofit radio and television organization, it exercises no influence over the organization’s daily reporting or journalistic work.
Since 2014, journalists reporting on illegal financial activities have faced up to three years in prison if they use information that violates bank secrecy regulations. Hence, no Swiss journalists took part in the Suisse Secrets investigations (NZZ 2022).
The Swiss government subsidizes media in various ways. It subsidizes the delivery of subscription-based daily and weekly newspapers, as well as club and association magazines, so that all parts of the country and all language regions can be covered by the media. This applies in particular to daily newspapers in sparsely populated regions. Likewise, private local radio and regional television receive money from the government. More far-reaching subsidies were rejected in a recent popular vote on 13 February 2022. However, the government has no means of influencing the contents of these media. These subsidies are not considered to be linked to political interference, as they are granted indiscriminately to many outlets (Höchli 2008). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to use these subsidies to influence the work of journalists. Likewise, no scandals or conflicts have become public regarding the government’s choice of board members of the quasi-public media organizations.
To our knowledge, there is no substantial issue with regard to self-censorship or harassment of journalists in Switzerland.
Citations:
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19
Höchli, Mark. 2008. The Invisible Scissors: Media Freedom and Censorship in Switzerland. Doctoral thesis, Brunel University London.
NZZ. 2022. “Suisse Secrets: Datenleck bei der Credit Suisse.” https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/suisse-secrets-datenleck-bei-der-credit-suisse-ld.1670838#subtitle-warum-ist-kein-schweizer-medienhaus-beteiligt-second
Although the federal government chooses the chairperson and some board members of the quasi-public nonprofit radio and television organization, it exercises no influence over the organization’s daily reporting or journalistic work.
Since 2014, journalists reporting on illegal financial activities have faced up to three years in prison if they use information that violates bank secrecy regulations. Hence, no Swiss journalists took part in the Suisse Secrets investigations (NZZ 2022).
The Swiss government subsidizes media in various ways. It subsidizes the delivery of subscription-based daily and weekly newspapers, as well as club and association magazines, so that all parts of the country and all language regions can be covered by the media. This applies in particular to daily newspapers in sparsely populated regions. Likewise, private local radio and regional television receive money from the government. More far-reaching subsidies were rejected in a recent popular vote on 13 February 2022. However, the government has no means of influencing the contents of these media. These subsidies are not considered to be linked to political interference, as they are granted indiscriminately to many outlets (Höchli 2008). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to use these subsidies to influence the work of journalists. Likewise, no scandals or conflicts have become public regarding the government’s choice of board members of the quasi-public media organizations.
To our knowledge, there is no substantial issue with regard to self-censorship or harassment of journalists in Switzerland.
Citations:
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19
Höchli, Mark. 2008. The Invisible Scissors: Media Freedom and Censorship in Switzerland. Doctoral thesis, Brunel University London.
NZZ. 2022. “Suisse Secrets: Datenleck bei der Credit Suisse.” https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/suisse-secrets-datenleck-bei-der-credit-suisse-ld.1670838#subtitle-warum-ist-kein-schweizer-medienhaus-beteiligt-second
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
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7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
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3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
The most important electronic media organizations in Switzerland in terms of coverage and intensity of citizen use are either online or publicly owned. Private sector television stations play only a small role in the country’s media landscape. These are largely regional stations. A number of foreign radio and television stations can be received in Switzerland, contributing to the country’s media plurality. The country has a high number of privately owned newspapers, with a highly decentralized system of regional concentration. However, a strong tendency toward centralization has weakened the regional newspaper market. This has been amplified by the strong growth of free papers for commuters such as 20 Minuten in the morning (which is distributed in three of the country’s linguistic regions). These newspapers have crowded out the readership of traditional newspapers, which have collectively suffered from a decline in subscriptions. The number of independent newspapers has also been on the decline as media concentration continues. There are eight major publishing houses in the whole country; among these major publishing houses, the three largest – Tamedia, NZZ and Ringier – account for about 80% of all major publishers’ newspaper circulation (calculated from FSO 2024; see also Hänggli and Fedddersen 2022; 2023). In parallel, online media consumption is outgrowing print media consumption. A specialized website finds in 2024 that there is “no nationally dominant majority media that could determine the opinion and audience market alone, even in 2022.” Combining the perceived media quality by citizens and the quantitative “market power” of media in an index of “opinion power,” Medienmonitor Schweiz found that online information is most important (29%), followed by television (23%), radio (18%), social media 16% and finally print media (14%) (Medienmonitor Schweiz 2024).
Certain media are politically oriented. This is most evident in the leading national newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which has strong historical and ideological ties to the “freisinnig” or pro-free-market liberal party. There are other newspapers and television stations that have been criticized for a left-green bias. In general, however, it can be said that all political positions are adequately represented in the media.
In a popular vote in March 2018, a proposal for a constitutional article relating to the public radio and television services was rejected by a large majority of 72%. The proposed article would have prohibited the federal government from subsidizing or running radio and television stations. This would have implied the abandonment of public radio and television. Although rejected, the debate on the initiative triggered reform processes within the public radio and television system – such as increasing efficiency and improving the use of resources.
In February 2022, a referendum that would have increased and expanded public subsidies for media was rejected. This aimed to ensure broad coverage of various media across the country. This represents a threat to smaller regional media channels, as well as to the pluralism of media and media ownership in Switzerland.
Currently, right-wing politicians are making attempts to reduce state subsidies to public sector media. If these attempts are successful, the campaign will in all likelihood lead to reduced subsidies to public TV and radio. According to the public sector media, “(t)he reduction of the SRG budget would inevitably have a negative impact on the program, for example in the areas of regional information, sports productions, coproductions of Swiss films and music recordings, and major popular events” (Tageanzeiger 2023).
Citations:
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2024. “Printmedien: Auflage- und Leserzahlen ausgewählter Tages- und Sonntagszeitungen, nach Sprachregionen.” Accessed on 2024 01 03.
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19.
Hänggli, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2022. “Medien und politische Kommunikation.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 491-516.
Medienmonitor Schweiz 2024: https://www.medienmonitor-schweiz.ch/
Tagesanzeiger. 2023. “Alternative zur Halbierungsinitiative. So funktioniert Röstis Plan für tiefere SRG-Gebühren.” https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/fragen-und-antworten-zur-halbierungsinitiative-so-funktioniert-roestis-plan-fuer-tiefere-srg-gebuehren-935068662902
Certain media are politically oriented. This is most evident in the leading national newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which has strong historical and ideological ties to the “freisinnig” or pro-free-market liberal party. There are other newspapers and television stations that have been criticized for a left-green bias. In general, however, it can be said that all political positions are adequately represented in the media.
In a popular vote in March 2018, a proposal for a constitutional article relating to the public radio and television services was rejected by a large majority of 72%. The proposed article would have prohibited the federal government from subsidizing or running radio and television stations. This would have implied the abandonment of public radio and television. Although rejected, the debate on the initiative triggered reform processes within the public radio and television system – such as increasing efficiency and improving the use of resources.
In February 2022, a referendum that would have increased and expanded public subsidies for media was rejected. This aimed to ensure broad coverage of various media across the country. This represents a threat to smaller regional media channels, as well as to the pluralism of media and media ownership in Switzerland.
Currently, right-wing politicians are making attempts to reduce state subsidies to public sector media. If these attempts are successful, the campaign will in all likelihood lead to reduced subsidies to public TV and radio. According to the public sector media, “(t)he reduction of the SRG budget would inevitably have a negative impact on the program, for example in the areas of regional information, sports productions, coproductions of Swiss films and music recordings, and major popular events” (Tageanzeiger 2023).
Citations:
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2024. “Printmedien: Auflage- und Leserzahlen ausgewählter Tages- und Sonntagszeitungen, nach Sprachregionen.” Accessed on 2024 01 03.
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19.
Hänggli, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2022. “Medien und politische Kommunikation.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 491-516.
Medienmonitor Schweiz 2024: https://www.medienmonitor-schweiz.ch/
Tagesanzeiger. 2023. “Alternative zur Halbierungsinitiative. So funktioniert Röstis Plan für tiefere SRG-Gebühren.” https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/fragen-und-antworten-zur-halbierungsinitiative-so-funktioniert-roestis-plan-fuer-tiefere-srg-gebuehren-935068662902
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
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9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
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3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
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1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
The constitution safeguards political rights such as freedom of association and freedom of assembly.
Art. 22 states: “Freedom of assembly is guaranteed. Every person has the right to organize meetings and to participate or not to participate in meetings.”
Art. 23 states: “Freedom of association is guaranteed. Every person has the right to form, join or belong to an association and to participate in the activities of an association.”
Art. 28 states: “Employees, employers and their organizations have the right to join together to protect their interests, to form associations, and to join or not to join such associations. Disputes must wherever possible be resolved through negotiation or mediation. Strikes and lockouts are permitted if they relate to employment relations and if they do not contravene any requirements to preserve peaceful employment relations or to conduct conciliation proceedings.”
These constitutional rules are implemented by public authorities without any major deviations in practice. While freedom of association as a fundamental right is strong in international comparison, human rights associations have raised concerns about the extended powers granted to surveillance authorities through the Federal Act on the Intelligence Service (put in place in 2017) for preventive surveillance purposes (Amnesty International 2023; Human Rights.ch). The 2022 Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism has raised similar concerns among human rights organizations regarding the prerogatives granted to the Federal Office of Police and the criteria used to justify restraining measures taken against individuals (Amnesty.ch).
Citations:
https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/europe-asie-centrale/suisse/mesures-policieres-de-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-mpt
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/droits-humains/securite-interieure/suisse-loi-renseignement
Art. 22 states: “Freedom of assembly is guaranteed. Every person has the right to organize meetings and to participate or not to participate in meetings.”
Art. 23 states: “Freedom of association is guaranteed. Every person has the right to form, join or belong to an association and to participate in the activities of an association.”
Art. 28 states: “Employees, employers and their organizations have the right to join together to protect their interests, to form associations, and to join or not to join such associations. Disputes must wherever possible be resolved through negotiation or mediation. Strikes and lockouts are permitted if they relate to employment relations and if they do not contravene any requirements to preserve peaceful employment relations or to conduct conciliation proceedings.”
These constitutional rules are implemented by public authorities without any major deviations in practice. While freedom of association as a fundamental right is strong in international comparison, human rights associations have raised concerns about the extended powers granted to surveillance authorities through the Federal Act on the Intelligence Service (put in place in 2017) for preventive surveillance purposes (Amnesty International 2023; Human Rights.ch). The 2022 Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism has raised similar concerns among human rights organizations regarding the prerogatives granted to the Federal Office of Police and the criteria used to justify restraining measures taken against individuals (Amnesty.ch).
Citations:
https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/europe-asie-centrale/suisse/mesures-policieres-de-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-mpt
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/droits-humains/securite-interieure/suisse-loi-renseignement
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
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All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
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Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
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4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
The right to form professional associations is enshrined in Art. 28 of the constitution. Trade union representation is split across several organizations. The Swiss Trade Union Federation is the leading union organization, and is historically close to the Social Democratic Party. It is strongest in membership figures (48% of all trade union members, 2021). Travail.Suisse was formed by a fusion of Catholic trade unions and unions for salaried employees. It is politically independent but close to the Social Democrats and the Center Party, and represents about 20% of all trade unionists (2021). The remaining smaller organizations account for about another third of all trade unionists (FSO 2024).
There are three types of associations representing capital. Economiesuisse (https://economiesuisse.ch/en) represents employers on the political level, the Swiss Employers’ Association is the main negotiation partner with the trade unions, and the Swiss Union of Arts and Crafts represents small and medium-sized enterprises.
Swiss interest organizations are pragmatic and avoid rigidly ideological stances. Of course, the major interest organizations do have their ideologies, but this does not prevent them from entering rational discussions with other organizations and political parties. Furthermore, interest organizations in general have access to more substantial professional resources and often have a better-informed view of problems than do political parties. Switzerland is well-known for its liberal corporatist integration of interest organizations into the state. Trade unions are the junior partners, with the main axis of influence constituted by employers’ interest organizations and the state. Interest organizations have an important role in developing and implementing policies. Since about the 1990s, this corporatist arrangement has been weakened but not eliminated by two developments. First, policymaking influence has shifted somewhat to the interaction between government and parliament. One of the major reasons for this change is the increasing Europeanization of Swiss policymaking. In addition, the power of the Swiss Employers’ Association has been weakened by the increasing internationalization of industries, with many foreign-managed or foreign-owned companies now active in the country (Armingeon 1997; 2011; Mach et al. 2020; 2021; 2023).
Hence, the major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the organizational strength to independently formulate policies and to participate in an integrated policy formulation process with the government. They pursue a policy of social partnership. While trade unions directly represent only about 20% of all employees, their collective agreements cover about half of all employees, and they are respected as representatives of the working class. In addition to these strong corporatist features – with traditional key players having established access to the decision-making process – additional citizen groups have gained access to the administrative and parliamentary venues in the last decades. The threat of referendums and a weakly professionalized parliament explain the system’s relative openness to demands from civil society groups. Corporatist groups remain, however, by far the most dominant interest groups in the decision-making process (Christiansen et al. 2017).
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus. 1997. “Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” West European Politics 20: 164-179.
Armingeon, Klaus. 2011. “A Prematurely Announced Death? Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” In Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy, eds. Christine Trampusch and André Mach. London/New York: Routledge, 165-185.
Christiansen, Peter Munk, André Mach, and Frédéric Varone. 2018. “How Corporatist Institutions Shape the Access of Citizen Groups to Policy-Makers: Evidence from Denmark and Switzerland.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (4): 526-545. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1268194.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2024. “Gewerkschaften und andere Arbeitnehmerorganisationen: Zahl der Mitglieder.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/gesamtarbeitsvertraege-sozialpartnerschaft/gewerkschaften.assetdetail.25085550.html
Mach, André, Frédéric Varone, and Steven Eichenberger. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Romana Careja, Patrick Emmenegger, and Nathalie Giger. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 51-68. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Mach, André, Thomas David, and Stéphanie Ginalski. 2021. “From Quiet to Noisy Politics: Transformations of Swiss Business Elites’ Power.” Politics & Society 49 (1): 17-41.
Mach, André, and Steven Eichenberger. 2023. “Interest Groups.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.17
There are three types of associations representing capital. Economiesuisse (https://economiesuisse.ch/en) represents employers on the political level, the Swiss Employers’ Association is the main negotiation partner with the trade unions, and the Swiss Union of Arts and Crafts represents small and medium-sized enterprises.
Swiss interest organizations are pragmatic and avoid rigidly ideological stances. Of course, the major interest organizations do have their ideologies, but this does not prevent them from entering rational discussions with other organizations and political parties. Furthermore, interest organizations in general have access to more substantial professional resources and often have a better-informed view of problems than do political parties. Switzerland is well-known for its liberal corporatist integration of interest organizations into the state. Trade unions are the junior partners, with the main axis of influence constituted by employers’ interest organizations and the state. Interest organizations have an important role in developing and implementing policies. Since about the 1990s, this corporatist arrangement has been weakened but not eliminated by two developments. First, policymaking influence has shifted somewhat to the interaction between government and parliament. One of the major reasons for this change is the increasing Europeanization of Swiss policymaking. In addition, the power of the Swiss Employers’ Association has been weakened by the increasing internationalization of industries, with many foreign-managed or foreign-owned companies now active in the country (Armingeon 1997; 2011; Mach et al. 2020; 2021; 2023).
Hence, the major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the organizational strength to independently formulate policies and to participate in an integrated policy formulation process with the government. They pursue a policy of social partnership. While trade unions directly represent only about 20% of all employees, their collective agreements cover about half of all employees, and they are respected as representatives of the working class. In addition to these strong corporatist features – with traditional key players having established access to the decision-making process – additional citizen groups have gained access to the administrative and parliamentary venues in the last decades. The threat of referendums and a weakly professionalized parliament explain the system’s relative openness to demands from civil society groups. Corporatist groups remain, however, by far the most dominant interest groups in the decision-making process (Christiansen et al. 2017).
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus. 1997. “Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” West European Politics 20: 164-179.
Armingeon, Klaus. 2011. “A Prematurely Announced Death? Swiss Corporatism in Comparative Perspective.” In Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy, eds. Christine Trampusch and André Mach. London/New York: Routledge, 165-185.
Christiansen, Peter Munk, André Mach, and Frédéric Varone. 2018. “How Corporatist Institutions Shape the Access of Citizen Groups to Policy-Makers: Evidence from Denmark and Switzerland.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (4): 526-545. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1268194.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2024. “Gewerkschaften und andere Arbeitnehmerorganisationen: Zahl der Mitglieder.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/gesamtarbeitsvertraege-sozialpartnerschaft/gewerkschaften.assetdetail.25085550.html
Mach, André, Frédéric Varone, and Steven Eichenberger. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, eds. Romana Careja, Patrick Emmenegger, and Nathalie Giger. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 51-68. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Mach, André, Thomas David, and Stéphanie Ginalski. 2021. “From Quiet to Noisy Politics: Transformations of Swiss Business Elites’ Power.” Politics & Society 49 (1): 17-41.
Mach, André, and Steven Eichenberger. 2023. “Interest Groups.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.17
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
While trade union membership fees are tax-deductible, other social welfare groups – such as church-affiliated organizations – do not enjoy these organizational safeguards. In addition to the plethora of organizations in the areas of social policy, social welfare and vocational training, there are also local and cantonal public organizations in these areas. Private and public organizations work together, but it is difficult to summarize and assess the power and effectiveness of these very different organizations.
In contrast to almost all European democracies, interest organizations in Switzerland may exert influence using the channels afforded by direct democracy. They can trigger a referendum or propose a new constitutional article by way of a so-called initiative. Moreover, as the Swiss administration is weak in international comparison and parliaments are weakly professionalized, CSOs have specialized sectoral expertise that is needed and used within the Swiss politico-administrative system (Christiansen et al. 2017; Sager et al. 2022). In this regard, these organizations have more opportunities to advocate on behalf of their preferences than do comparable organizations in other countries. However, CSOs do not have the capacity to match the influence of economic actors and industries in many sectors such as health, and Switzerland is well-known for its weak structural regulation of harmful products such as tobacco in European comparison (Mavrot 2021).
Citations:
Christiansen, Peter Munk, André Mach, and Frédéric Varone. 2018. “How Corporatist Institutions Shape the Access of Citizen Groups to Policy-Makers: Evidence from Denmark and Switzerland.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (4): 526-545. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1268194
Mavrot, Céline. 2021. “Playing the Multilevel Game: Successful Tobacco Control Advocacy Strategies in a Federal System.” In Casebook on Advocacy in Public Health, eds. Ildefonso Hernandez-Aguado, Lucy Anne Parker, Michael Moore, and Deborah Klein Walker, 194-203. Geneva: World Federation of Public Health Associations (WFPHA).
Sager, F., Asticher, L., and Pleger, L.E. 2022. “Lobbyismus in der Schweiz.” In Handbuch Lobbyismus, eds. A. Polk and K. Mause. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32324-0_32-1
In contrast to almost all European democracies, interest organizations in Switzerland may exert influence using the channels afforded by direct democracy. They can trigger a referendum or propose a new constitutional article by way of a so-called initiative. Moreover, as the Swiss administration is weak in international comparison and parliaments are weakly professionalized, CSOs have specialized sectoral expertise that is needed and used within the Swiss politico-administrative system (Christiansen et al. 2017; Sager et al. 2022). In this regard, these organizations have more opportunities to advocate on behalf of their preferences than do comparable organizations in other countries. However, CSOs do not have the capacity to match the influence of economic actors and industries in many sectors such as health, and Switzerland is well-known for its weak structural regulation of harmful products such as tobacco in European comparison (Mavrot 2021).
Citations:
Christiansen, Peter Munk, André Mach, and Frédéric Varone. 2018. “How Corporatist Institutions Shape the Access of Citizen Groups to Policy-Makers: Evidence from Denmark and Switzerland.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (4): 526-545. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1268194
Mavrot, Céline. 2021. “Playing the Multilevel Game: Successful Tobacco Control Advocacy Strategies in a Federal System.” In Casebook on Advocacy in Public Health, eds. Ildefonso Hernandez-Aguado, Lucy Anne Parker, Michael Moore, and Deborah Klein Walker, 194-203. Geneva: World Federation of Public Health Associations (WFPHA).
Sager, F., Asticher, L., and Pleger, L.E. 2022. “Lobbyismus in der Schweiz.” In Handbuch Lobbyismus, eds. A. Polk and K. Mause. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32324-0_32-1
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
A plethora of environmental groups exist in Switzerland. Four large organizations – Greenpeace, Pro Natura, the Transport Club (Verkehrsclub der Schweiz) and WWF Switzerland – cooperate in the Alliance for the Environment (Umweltallianz; https://umweltallianz.ch/). Steven Eichenberger (2020; Mach et al 2020) has found that citizen groups – including environmental groups – are strongly represented in the political system. Their share of seats in various commissions and their overall influence are comparable to the influence wielded by trade unions. Evidently, such groups are very capable of cooperating (Alliance for the Environment). Bailer and Bütikofer echo Eichenberger’s finding that environmental groups are a strong parliamentary lobbying influence (Bailer and Bütikofer 2023: 187). In the most recent European Social Survey (wave 10), about one-quarter of all respondents claimed to volunteer for a not-for-profit or charitable organization – which is a comparatively high share.
In contrast to the case in almost all European democracies, interest organizations may exert influence using the opportunities afforded by direct democracy. They can trigger a referendum or suggest a new constitutional article by way of a so-called initiative. For more on the institution of direct democracy, see Vatter (2018) and Stadelmann and Leemann (2023). This is a very powerful lever for citizen groups and interest associations.
In this regard, these organizations have substantially more power than comparable organizations in other countries. For example, the environmentally focused Transport Club (Verkehrsclub) has successfully collected signatures for a referendum against a massive motorway expansion. While environmental CSOs have considerable means and access to the political system, their concrete influence on policies remains limited, as Swiss domestic climate-change policy is in line with a typical industrial country perspective, and is strongly influenced by industry (Ingold/Pflieger 2016).
Citations:
Bailer, Stefanie, and Sarah Bütikofer. 2023. “Parliament.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 174–194. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.9
Eichenberger, Steven. 2020. “The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 26: 206-227. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12394
Ingold, K., and G. Pflieger. 2016. “Two Levels, Two Strategies: Explaining the Gap Between Swiss National and International Responses Toward Climate Change.” European Policy Analysis 2 (1): 20-38. https://doi.org/10.18278/epa.2.1.4
Mach, André, Varone, Frédéric, and Eichenberger, Steven. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations Toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, edited by Careja, Romana, Emmenegger, Patrick, and Giger, Nathalie, 51-68. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle, and Lucas Leemann. 2023. “Direct Democracy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 156–173. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.8
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
In contrast to the case in almost all European democracies, interest organizations may exert influence using the opportunities afforded by direct democracy. They can trigger a referendum or suggest a new constitutional article by way of a so-called initiative. For more on the institution of direct democracy, see Vatter (2018) and Stadelmann and Leemann (2023). This is a very powerful lever for citizen groups and interest associations.
In this regard, these organizations have substantially more power than comparable organizations in other countries. For example, the environmentally focused Transport Club (Verkehrsclub) has successfully collected signatures for a referendum against a massive motorway expansion. While environmental CSOs have considerable means and access to the political system, their concrete influence on policies remains limited, as Swiss domestic climate-change policy is in line with a typical industrial country perspective, and is strongly influenced by industry (Ingold/Pflieger 2016).
Citations:
Bailer, Stefanie, and Sarah Bütikofer. 2023. “Parliament.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 174–194. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.9
Eichenberger, Steven. 2020. “The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 26: 206-227. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12394
Ingold, K., and G. Pflieger. 2016. “Two Levels, Two Strategies: Explaining the Gap Between Swiss National and International Responses Toward Climate Change.” European Policy Analysis 2 (1): 20-38. https://doi.org/10.18278/epa.2.1.4
Mach, André, Varone, Frédéric, and Eichenberger, Steven. 2020. “Transformations of Swiss Neo-Corporatism: From Pre-Parliamentary Negotiations Toward Privileged Pluralism in the Parliamentary Venue.” In The European Social Model under Pressure, edited by Careja, Romana, Emmenegger, Patrick, and Giger, Nathalie, 51-68. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle, and Lucas Leemann. 2023. “Direct Democracy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 156–173. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.8
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).