Horizontal Accountability
#6Key Findings
In the category of horizontal accountability, Switzerland performs well in international comparison (rank 6).
The Federal Audit Office acts independently, especially in politically controversial cases. The Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner oversees data processing by the federal administration and private firms.
The judicial system operates without political interference, though practices vary between cantons. Federal Supreme Court judges are elected by parliamentary vote. Members are typically distributed proportionately by party, and judges voluntarily give part of their salary to their affiliated party. This has raised concerns about objectivity.
Direct-democracy initiatives have at times come into conflict with human rights principles. Corruption is rare, but some scandals have emerged. The “militia” legislature is not professionalized, with legislators serving alongside their regular jobs. Resources are limited in international comparison, but overall powers to monitor the executive are sufficient.
The Federal Audit Office acts independently, especially in politically controversial cases. The Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner oversees data processing by the federal administration and private firms.
The judicial system operates without political interference, though practices vary between cantons. Federal Supreme Court judges are elected by parliamentary vote. Members are typically distributed proportionately by party, and judges voluntarily give part of their salary to their affiliated party. This has raised concerns about objectivity.
Direct-democracy initiatives have at times come into conflict with human rights principles. Corruption is rare, but some scandals have emerged. The “militia” legislature is not professionalized, with legislators serving alongside their regular jobs. Resources are limited in international comparison, but overall powers to monitor the executive are sufficient.
Graph View
Graph View
Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
“Within the scope of legal and constitutional provisions, the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) is independent and autonomous. It determines its own audit program annually based on risk analysis and on criteria contained in Article 5 of the Federal Auditing Act. The Federal Council and the Joint Committee on Finance of the Federal Assembly are notified of this program. For administrative purposes, the Swiss Federal Audit Office is assigned to the Federal Department of Finance, but is not subordinate to it” (SFAO 224a).
Switzerland’s Audit Office supports the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council through the production of analyses and reports. The chairman of the Audit Office is elected by the Federal Council; this election must be confirmed by the Federal Assembly. The Audit Office acquired a very independent and self-confident role in the case of the politically controversial export of arms to war-prone regions (NZZ 4 September 2018). It has harshly criticized the federal administration for being insufficiently critical of and for working too closely with representatives of the arms industry.
The power and salience of the Audit Office have been further strengthened by the new rules on political-party financing transparency (SFAO 2024b). The Audit Office has substantial inquiry powers and means. Although it is affiliated with the Department of Finance, its mandate extends beyond strictly financial audits, and include the implementation and impact of laws. The Audit Office now has a dedicated line of action regarding whistleblowing.
Citations:
SFAO (Swiss Federal Audit Office, Eidgenössische Finanzkonrolle). 2024. “Legal mandate.” https://www.efk.admin.ch/en/about-us/act.html
SFAO (Swiss Federal Audit Office, Eidgenössische Finanzkonrolle). 2024. “How does transparency in political funding work in Switzerland?” https://www.efk.admin.ch/en/political-funding/background/how-does-transparency-in-political-funding-work-in-switzerland.html
Switzerland’s Audit Office supports the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council through the production of analyses and reports. The chairman of the Audit Office is elected by the Federal Council; this election must be confirmed by the Federal Assembly. The Audit Office acquired a very independent and self-confident role in the case of the politically controversial export of arms to war-prone regions (NZZ 4 September 2018). It has harshly criticized the federal administration for being insufficiently critical of and for working too closely with representatives of the arms industry.
The power and salience of the Audit Office have been further strengthened by the new rules on political-party financing transparency (SFAO 2024b). The Audit Office has substantial inquiry powers and means. Although it is affiliated with the Department of Finance, its mandate extends beyond strictly financial audits, and include the implementation and impact of laws. The Audit Office now has a dedicated line of action regarding whistleblowing.
Citations:
SFAO (Swiss Federal Audit Office, Eidgenössische Finanzkonrolle). 2024. “Legal mandate.” https://www.efk.admin.ch/en/about-us/act.html
SFAO (Swiss Federal Audit Office, Eidgenössische Finanzkonrolle). 2024. “How does transparency in political funding work in Switzerland?” https://www.efk.admin.ch/en/political-funding/background/how-does-transparency-in-political-funding-work-in-switzerland.html
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
10
9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Article 13 of the constitution mandates that every citizen must be protected against the abuse of data. Data protection legislation has been in force since 1993. “The Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC) is the authority responsible for data protection in the case of data processing by private parties (e.g., companies) and by federal bodies. Data processing by municipal and cantonal authorities is the responsibility of the data protection supervisory authorities of the cantons or municipalities. The FDPIC has the following tasks in particular in the area of data protection:
• It supervises data processing by the federal administration and federal-related companies … as well as by private parties (e.g., companies),
• It advises citizens, companies and private organizations as well as the federal administration and federal-related companies.
• It comments on federal legislative projects,
• It exchanges information with domestic and foreign data protection authorities and cooperates with them on a case-by-case basis,
• It raises awareness and informs the public” (FDPIC 2024).
The Federal Data Protection Law was revised in 2020, taking into account the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union, a regulation that Switzerland had already signed. The Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (Eidgenössischer Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragter, EDOEB) had 41 employees in 2023 (FDIP 2023: 101). A 2011 evaluation of the Federal Data Protection Law attested to the effectiveness, independence and transparency of the EDOEB (Bolliger et al. 2011).
Citations:
Christian Bolliger, Marius Feìraud, Astrid Epiney, and Julia Hänni. 2011. Evaluation des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz. Schlussbericht im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Justiz. Bern/Freiburg: Büro Vatter/Institut für Europarecht, Universität Freiburg.
FDPIC. 2023. “30th Annual Report 2022/2023.” https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/en/home/deredoeb/taetigkeitsberichte.html
Federal Data Protection Commissioner, Eidgenössischer Datenschutz- und Oeffentlichkeitsbeauftragter. 2024. “Data Protection.” https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/en/home/deredoeb/auftragundaufgaben-DS.html
• It supervises data processing by the federal administration and federal-related companies … as well as by private parties (e.g., companies),
• It advises citizens, companies and private organizations as well as the federal administration and federal-related companies.
• It comments on federal legislative projects,
• It exchanges information with domestic and foreign data protection authorities and cooperates with them on a case-by-case basis,
• It raises awareness and informs the public” (FDPIC 2024).
The Federal Data Protection Law was revised in 2020, taking into account the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union, a regulation that Switzerland had already signed. The Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (Eidgenössischer Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragter, EDOEB) had 41 employees in 2023 (FDIP 2023: 101). A 2011 evaluation of the Federal Data Protection Law attested to the effectiveness, independence and transparency of the EDOEB (Bolliger et al. 2011).
Citations:
Christian Bolliger, Marius Feìraud, Astrid Epiney, and Julia Hänni. 2011. Evaluation des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz. Schlussbericht im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Justiz. Bern/Freiburg: Büro Vatter/Institut für Europarecht, Universität Freiburg.
FDPIC. 2023. “30th Annual Report 2022/2023.” https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/en/home/deredoeb/taetigkeitsberichte.html
Federal Data Protection Commissioner, Eidgenössischer Datenschutz- und Oeffentlichkeitsbeauftragter. 2024. “Data Protection.” https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/en/home/deredoeb/auftragundaufgaben-DS.html
Graph View
To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
10
9
9
The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
2
1
1
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The Swiss judicial system is guided by professional norms without political interference. The judicial system is based on professional training, though a mixture of lay and professionally trained judges serve at the local level in many cantons. Decisions by these judges are subject to review by higher professional courts. The character of the Swiss judicial system varies substantially between cantons. This is due to Swiss federalism, which gives cantons great leeway in cantonal lawmaking and hence also in cantonal administration of justice. This also includes variations in the rules and examinations with regard to lawyers’ admission to the bar.
Formally, legal education is inclusive and accessible to all segments of society. However, due to the strong social selectivity of the Swiss education system – in particular direct access to universities (Becker and Schoch 2028) – lawyers and judges de facto come disproportionately often from academic families.
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in Switzerland. It adjudicates, in the last instance, appeals of rulings made by the high cantonal courts of appeal, the Federal Criminal Court, the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Patent Court. The areas of law thus covered are civil law, criminal law and administrative law. Violations of federal law, international law, intercantonal law or constitutional rights can be addressed. The Federal Supreme Court’s jurisprudence ensures the uniform application of federal law throughout the country. The other courts and the administrative authorities comply with the Federal Supreme Court’s case law and adopt its principles.
The Federal Administrative Court rules on the legality of rulings issued by the federal administration. The court also adjudicates appeals against certain decisions of the cantonal governments, for example, in the area of health insurance. However, constitutional review is not fully developed: “Acts of the Federal Assembly or the Federal Council may not be challenged in the Federal Supreme Court” (Art 189.4, Federal Constitution). The Federal Supreme Court has no powers to annul federal laws “if they are unconstitutional, and it can’t even refuse to apply them” (Flick Witzig et al. 2022: 217). However, there are some options to mitigate these constraints, and therefore in international comparison Flick Witzig et al. (2002: 226) suggest that “Swiss constitutional review appears to be de facto of medium strength.”
The judges of the Federal Supreme Court are elected for a period of six years in a joint session of both chambers of parliament, with approval requiring a majority of those voting. A parliamentary commission prepares the elections by screening the candidates. Unwritten rules stipulate a nearly proportional representation of the political parties then in parliament. By tradition, judges voluntarily pay part of their salary to the political party to which they are affiliated. This is considered a tax on their salary, which they would not have without the support of their party (Vatter/Ackermann 2014).
In 2017, a committee of the Council of Europe criticized this arrangement and recommended that “the system should be backed up by safeguards to ensure the quality and objectivity of the recruitment of federal judges. Once judges have been elected it is important to sever the ties with the political powers by doing away with the practice whereby judges pay part of their salary to their party” (GRECO 2017:4). Another unwritten rule demands representation of the various linguistic regions. There is no special majority requirement.
In international comparison, the independence of the Swiss judicial system has been ranked at only 106th place among 124 countries surveyed. However, taking into account the de facto independence found in empirical studies, Switzerland has been ranked at 17th place among 108 countries (Flick Witzig 2022: 222, 226).
In 2021, a popular initiative aiming to have federal judges selected by lottery rather than through election in parliament was rejected in a popular vote. Also in 2021, parliament started to discuss the legitimacy of the contributions federal judges are required to make to the parties that nominated them, and in March 2022 it rejected a ban on mandate taxes and party donations from members of the federal courts.
Switzerland is regularly called to order by supranational bodies for a lack of respect for the terms of international treaties, or for breaching fundamental rights. Examples include the United Nation’s concern “that persons with disabilities deemed ‘permanently incapable of discernment’ are excluded from exercising their right to vote” (see section D1) (UN/CRPD 2022), and a 2023 ECHR ruling against the rejection of refugees’ requests for family reunification.
Citations:
Becker, Rolf, and Jürg Schoch. 2018. Soziale Selektivität. Empfehlungen des Schweizerischen Wissenschaftsrates SWR. Expertenbericht von Rolf Becker und Jürg Schoch im Auftrag des SWR (Politische Analyse 3/2018). Bern: SWR.
Flick Witzig, Martina, Christine Rothmayr Allison, and Frédéric Varone. 2023. “Judicial System.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 214–232. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.11 (1/4/2024)
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO/Council of Europe). 2017. Fourth Evaluation Report. Corruption Prevention in Respect of Members of Parliament, Judges and Prosecutors. Strasbourg: GRECO, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/switzerland
Adrian Vatter and Maya Ackermann. 2014. “Richterwahlen in der Schweiz: Eine empirische Analyse der Wahlen an das Bundesgericht von 1848 bis 2013.” Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 133: 517-537.
UN/CRPD 2022: file:///Users/cmavrot/Dropbox/Mac/Downloads/CRPD%20Concluding%20observations%20on%20the%20initial%20report%20of%20Switzerland.pdf
Formally, legal education is inclusive and accessible to all segments of society. However, due to the strong social selectivity of the Swiss education system – in particular direct access to universities (Becker and Schoch 2028) – lawyers and judges de facto come disproportionately often from academic families.
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in Switzerland. It adjudicates, in the last instance, appeals of rulings made by the high cantonal courts of appeal, the Federal Criminal Court, the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Patent Court. The areas of law thus covered are civil law, criminal law and administrative law. Violations of federal law, international law, intercantonal law or constitutional rights can be addressed. The Federal Supreme Court’s jurisprudence ensures the uniform application of federal law throughout the country. The other courts and the administrative authorities comply with the Federal Supreme Court’s case law and adopt its principles.
The Federal Administrative Court rules on the legality of rulings issued by the federal administration. The court also adjudicates appeals against certain decisions of the cantonal governments, for example, in the area of health insurance. However, constitutional review is not fully developed: “Acts of the Federal Assembly or the Federal Council may not be challenged in the Federal Supreme Court” (Art 189.4, Federal Constitution). The Federal Supreme Court has no powers to annul federal laws “if they are unconstitutional, and it can’t even refuse to apply them” (Flick Witzig et al. 2022: 217). However, there are some options to mitigate these constraints, and therefore in international comparison Flick Witzig et al. (2002: 226) suggest that “Swiss constitutional review appears to be de facto of medium strength.”
The judges of the Federal Supreme Court are elected for a period of six years in a joint session of both chambers of parliament, with approval requiring a majority of those voting. A parliamentary commission prepares the elections by screening the candidates. Unwritten rules stipulate a nearly proportional representation of the political parties then in parliament. By tradition, judges voluntarily pay part of their salary to the political party to which they are affiliated. This is considered a tax on their salary, which they would not have without the support of their party (Vatter/Ackermann 2014).
In 2017, a committee of the Council of Europe criticized this arrangement and recommended that “the system should be backed up by safeguards to ensure the quality and objectivity of the recruitment of federal judges. Once judges have been elected it is important to sever the ties with the political powers by doing away with the practice whereby judges pay part of their salary to their party” (GRECO 2017:4). Another unwritten rule demands representation of the various linguistic regions. There is no special majority requirement.
In international comparison, the independence of the Swiss judicial system has been ranked at only 106th place among 124 countries surveyed. However, taking into account the de facto independence found in empirical studies, Switzerland has been ranked at 17th place among 108 countries (Flick Witzig 2022: 222, 226).
In 2021, a popular initiative aiming to have federal judges selected by lottery rather than through election in parliament was rejected in a popular vote. Also in 2021, parliament started to discuss the legitimacy of the contributions federal judges are required to make to the parties that nominated them, and in March 2022 it rejected a ban on mandate taxes and party donations from members of the federal courts.
Switzerland is regularly called to order by supranational bodies for a lack of respect for the terms of international treaties, or for breaching fundamental rights. Examples include the United Nation’s concern “that persons with disabilities deemed ‘permanently incapable of discernment’ are excluded from exercising their right to vote” (see section D1) (UN/CRPD 2022), and a 2023 ECHR ruling against the rejection of refugees’ requests for family reunification.
Citations:
Becker, Rolf, and Jürg Schoch. 2018. Soziale Selektivität. Empfehlungen des Schweizerischen Wissenschaftsrates SWR. Expertenbericht von Rolf Becker und Jürg Schoch im Auftrag des SWR (Politische Analyse 3/2018). Bern: SWR.
Flick Witzig, Martina, Christine Rothmayr Allison, and Frédéric Varone. 2023. “Judicial System.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 214–232. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.11 (1/4/2024)
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO/Council of Europe). 2017. Fourth Evaluation Report. Corruption Prevention in Respect of Members of Parliament, Judges and Prosecutors. Strasbourg: GRECO, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/switzerland
Adrian Vatter and Maya Ackermann. 2014. “Richterwahlen in der Schweiz: Eine empirische Analyse der Wahlen an das Bundesgericht von 1848 bis 2013.” Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 133: 517-537.
UN/CRPD 2022: file:///Users/cmavrot/Dropbox/Mac/Downloads/CRPD%20Concluding%20observations%20on%20the%20initial%20report%20of%20Switzerland.pdf
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
10
9
9
There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
8
7
6
7
6
There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
5
4
3
4
3
There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
2
1
1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution. However, the country does not have a classic constitutional court able to monitor the conformity of federal laws with the constitution outside the context of a particular case. Federal laws are binding for the federal courts. In contrast, the Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne monitors the conformity of federal regulations and cantonal laws with the constitution. With respect to basic civil rights, the European Court of Human Rights complements the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.
In December 2012, a parliamentary attempt to give the Federal Supreme Court the right to abstain from applying federal law if the federal law was incompatible with the constitution failed. The main argument was that in a direct democracy, the constitutional court should not be authorized to declare federal laws void as a whole (see also above D7.1).
Conflicts between human rights and direct democracy have emerged, particularly in recent years. One such concern was represented by the successful 2004 popular initiative providing for the life imprisonment of particularly dangerous criminal offenders without any opportunity for reexamination. This conflicts with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This convention guarantees periodic reviews in which the necessity for continued imprisonment can be evaluated.
Likewise, there have been conflicts between popular votes at the local and cantonal levels on naturalization and the call by foreign-born individuals for fair and transparent treatment and the opportunity to appeal naturalization decisions. Some observers have argued that the current naturalization procedure fails to conform to the human rights standards set out in the constitution. The Federal Supreme Court decided in 2003 that naturalization procedures previously established by popular vote were unconstitutional, since they violated constitutional norms of non-discrimination and the right to a lawful legal procedure.
The ban on the construction of minarets, approved in a popular vote in 2009, represents a particularly problematic decision. The basic claim of proponents was that minarets signify the potential aggression and power claims of Islam, which in turn need to be suppressed as a strategy for keeping the peace. However, it is evident that the popular initiative was clearly aimed against Islam and the Islamization of Europe. Legal scholars tend to argue that the text of the measure violated the freedom of worship and the non-discrimination rule. Another initiative launched by the People’s Party, the text of which prohibited Muslim women from covering their faces in public, was approved by the public in June 2021. Once again, Muslims were targeted, and their right to self-determination was undermined or even completely eliminated.
The approval in 2009 of an initiative to deport foreign criminals is also seen as problematic in terms of respect for fundamental rights. Finally, several measures passed via popular vote have contradicted international law, such as the 2014 initiative on stopping mass immigration. This was not compatible with Switzerland’s commitment to the free movement of persons as made in its bilateral agreements with the EU. Parliament therefore decided not to implement the constitutional provision directly (Armingeon and Lutz 2020, 2022).
The major underlying problem is the claim by many political actors that the people have an unrestricted right to decide any matter through popular vote. This conflicts with the basic rule of any liberal democracy that there are limitations to the will of the majority, such as human rights standards and protections for minorities. Switzerland’s public debate on the limits to majority rule (via popular vote) shows little cognizance of these traditional limitations to majoritarian rule. This has become very obvious in recent debates over the conflicts between international law and Swiss citizens’ decision-making rights in popular votes.
Although anxiety over the ebbing of popular sovereignty extends beyond conservatives, this latter group in particular feels uneasy with the internationalization of law and some recent interpretations of human rights that have been made by professional lawyers. In the right-wing populist and conservative view, the internationalization of law and international court rulings against the results of Swiss referendums contradict Switzerland’s legislative culture, which is characterized by the principle of subsidiarity and guided by the idea that popular decisions have the highest degree of legitimacy. Consequently, in the summer of 2016, the country’s strongest political party, the Swiss People’s Party, collected sufficient signatures for an initiative aiming to give federal law precedence over international law. This initiative was rejected on 25 November 2018. On the other hand, the Federal Constitutional Court has generally assumed (with exceptions) the primacy of international law (Flick Witzig et al. 2022: 223).
Switzerland has proved to be particularly resilient with regard to upholding political rights and democratic standards. The Pandemic Violations of Democratic Standards Index by the V-Dem project ranks Switzerland second out of 144 countries regarding non-violations of democratic standards during the pandemic (measured for the March 2020 – June 2021 period) (Edgell et al. 2021, 2022).
However, the approval in June 2021 of the Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism represents an additional threat to civil rights in Switzerland. This law gives the federal police (Fedpol) the power to implement several types of preventive measures, without any judicial decision, in order to prevent a “potential terrorist” from acting in the future. What or who exactly is considered a terrorist is not defined clearly within the framework of the law, which opens the door to potential abuses. In addition, the measure directly targets children beginning from the age of 12, in violation of the rights of children enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The preventive measures include electronic monitoring, a contact ban, a perimeter ban and house arrest. The bar association of the canton of Geneva released a statement opposing this law (2021), arguing that it represents a clear violation of many fundamental rights as well as international conventions including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights. Many human rights associations, such as Amnesty International, have also explicitly opposed the law and highlighted its threat to civil liberties, activism and basic human rights.
Still on the topic of breaches of human rights, several NGOs have criticized the criminalization of protests and civil disobedience in Switzerland – including those related to climate activism. This relates to restrictive laws on protest authorization as well as excessive police repression (Amnesty International 2023; Humanrights.ch 2023). Another matter of concern is the structural racism and institutional discrimination that persists in Switzerland, which have been comprehensively documented by several studies conducted on behalf of the Service for Combating Racism, a Federal Ministry of Home Affairs project (e.g., Mugglin et al. 2022). A comprehensive review of 304 empirical studies across a large array of policy fields in Switzerland has found “clear indications of institutional and structural discrimination” in the fields of work, housing, administrative procedures and naturalization, as well as in social protection, policing and the justice system to a certain extent (Mugglin et al. 2022: 50).
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/themes/droit-de-manifester/docs/2023/amnesty-lance-une-nouvelle-campagne”
Amnesty International. 2021. “Ordonnance relative à la Loi sur les mesures policières (MPT): une surveillance encore plus intrusive.” https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/europe-asie-centrale/suisse/docs/2021/ordonnance-relative-a-la-loi-sur-les-mesures-policieres-mpt-une-surveillance-encore-plus-intrusive
Armingeon, Klaus, and Philipp Lutz. 2022. “Citizens’ Response to a Non-Responsive Government: The Case of the Swiss Initiative on Mass Immigration.” Comparative European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-022-00306-4
Armingeon, Klaus, and Philipp Lutz. 2020. “Muddling between Responsiveness and Responsibility: The Swiss Case of a Non-implementation of a Constitutional Rule.” Comparative European Politics 18: 256-280. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00185-2
Edgell, Amanda B., Jean Lachapelle, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Sandra Grahn, Palina Kolvani, Ana Flavia Good God, Martin Lundstedt, Natalia Natsika, Shreeya Pillai, Paul Bederke, Milene Bruhn, Stefanie Kaiser, Cristina Schaver, Abdalhadi Alijla, Tiago Fernandes, Hans Tung, Matthew Wilson, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2022. “Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy During Covid-19 (PanDem), Version 6.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/pandemic-backsliding/
Edgell, Amanda B., Jean Lachapelle, and Anna Lührmann. 2021. “Pandemic Backsliding: Violations of Democratic Standards During Covid-19.” Social Science & Medicine 285: 114244. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953621005761
Flick Witzig, Martina, Rothmayr Allison, Christine, and Varone, Frédéric. 2023. “Judicial System.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 214–232. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.11.
Humanrights.ch. 2023. “https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/droits-humains/police/dossier-police/focus/?search=1”
Moekli, Daniel. 2011. “Of Minarets and Foreign Criminals: Swiss Direct Democracy and Human Rights.” Human Rights Law Review 11 (4): 774–794. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngr02
Leonie Mugglin, Denise Efionayi, Didier Ruedin, and Gianni D’Amato. 2022. Racisme structurel en Suisse: un état des lieux de la recherche et de ses résultats. SFM Studies #81f, University of Neuchâtel.
Ordre des Avocats de Genève. 2021. “Prise de position contre la Loi la fédérale sur les mesures policières de lutte contre le terrorisme (MPT).” https://www.odage.ch/medias/documents/determination-oda/2021.05.12_Prise_de_position_MPT.pdf
In December 2012, a parliamentary attempt to give the Federal Supreme Court the right to abstain from applying federal law if the federal law was incompatible with the constitution failed. The main argument was that in a direct democracy, the constitutional court should not be authorized to declare federal laws void as a whole (see also above D7.1).
Conflicts between human rights and direct democracy have emerged, particularly in recent years. One such concern was represented by the successful 2004 popular initiative providing for the life imprisonment of particularly dangerous criminal offenders without any opportunity for reexamination. This conflicts with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This convention guarantees periodic reviews in which the necessity for continued imprisonment can be evaluated.
Likewise, there have been conflicts between popular votes at the local and cantonal levels on naturalization and the call by foreign-born individuals for fair and transparent treatment and the opportunity to appeal naturalization decisions. Some observers have argued that the current naturalization procedure fails to conform to the human rights standards set out in the constitution. The Federal Supreme Court decided in 2003 that naturalization procedures previously established by popular vote were unconstitutional, since they violated constitutional norms of non-discrimination and the right to a lawful legal procedure.
The ban on the construction of minarets, approved in a popular vote in 2009, represents a particularly problematic decision. The basic claim of proponents was that minarets signify the potential aggression and power claims of Islam, which in turn need to be suppressed as a strategy for keeping the peace. However, it is evident that the popular initiative was clearly aimed against Islam and the Islamization of Europe. Legal scholars tend to argue that the text of the measure violated the freedom of worship and the non-discrimination rule. Another initiative launched by the People’s Party, the text of which prohibited Muslim women from covering their faces in public, was approved by the public in June 2021. Once again, Muslims were targeted, and their right to self-determination was undermined or even completely eliminated.
The approval in 2009 of an initiative to deport foreign criminals is also seen as problematic in terms of respect for fundamental rights. Finally, several measures passed via popular vote have contradicted international law, such as the 2014 initiative on stopping mass immigration. This was not compatible with Switzerland’s commitment to the free movement of persons as made in its bilateral agreements with the EU. Parliament therefore decided not to implement the constitutional provision directly (Armingeon and Lutz 2020, 2022).
The major underlying problem is the claim by many political actors that the people have an unrestricted right to decide any matter through popular vote. This conflicts with the basic rule of any liberal democracy that there are limitations to the will of the majority, such as human rights standards and protections for minorities. Switzerland’s public debate on the limits to majority rule (via popular vote) shows little cognizance of these traditional limitations to majoritarian rule. This has become very obvious in recent debates over the conflicts between international law and Swiss citizens’ decision-making rights in popular votes.
Although anxiety over the ebbing of popular sovereignty extends beyond conservatives, this latter group in particular feels uneasy with the internationalization of law and some recent interpretations of human rights that have been made by professional lawyers. In the right-wing populist and conservative view, the internationalization of law and international court rulings against the results of Swiss referendums contradict Switzerland’s legislative culture, which is characterized by the principle of subsidiarity and guided by the idea that popular decisions have the highest degree of legitimacy. Consequently, in the summer of 2016, the country’s strongest political party, the Swiss People’s Party, collected sufficient signatures for an initiative aiming to give federal law precedence over international law. This initiative was rejected on 25 November 2018. On the other hand, the Federal Constitutional Court has generally assumed (with exceptions) the primacy of international law (Flick Witzig et al. 2022: 223).
Switzerland has proved to be particularly resilient with regard to upholding political rights and democratic standards. The Pandemic Violations of Democratic Standards Index by the V-Dem project ranks Switzerland second out of 144 countries regarding non-violations of democratic standards during the pandemic (measured for the March 2020 – June 2021 period) (Edgell et al. 2021, 2022).
However, the approval in June 2021 of the Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism represents an additional threat to civil rights in Switzerland. This law gives the federal police (Fedpol) the power to implement several types of preventive measures, without any judicial decision, in order to prevent a “potential terrorist” from acting in the future. What or who exactly is considered a terrorist is not defined clearly within the framework of the law, which opens the door to potential abuses. In addition, the measure directly targets children beginning from the age of 12, in violation of the rights of children enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The preventive measures include electronic monitoring, a contact ban, a perimeter ban and house arrest. The bar association of the canton of Geneva released a statement opposing this law (2021), arguing that it represents a clear violation of many fundamental rights as well as international conventions including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights. Many human rights associations, such as Amnesty International, have also explicitly opposed the law and highlighted its threat to civil liberties, activism and basic human rights.
Still on the topic of breaches of human rights, several NGOs have criticized the criminalization of protests and civil disobedience in Switzerland – including those related to climate activism. This relates to restrictive laws on protest authorization as well as excessive police repression (Amnesty International 2023; Humanrights.ch 2023). Another matter of concern is the structural racism and institutional discrimination that persists in Switzerland, which have been comprehensively documented by several studies conducted on behalf of the Service for Combating Racism, a Federal Ministry of Home Affairs project (e.g., Mugglin et al. 2022). A comprehensive review of 304 empirical studies across a large array of policy fields in Switzerland has found “clear indications of institutional and structural discrimination” in the fields of work, housing, administrative procedures and naturalization, as well as in social protection, policing and the justice system to a certain extent (Mugglin et al. 2022: 50).
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/themes/droit-de-manifester/docs/2023/amnesty-lance-une-nouvelle-campagne”
Amnesty International. 2021. “Ordonnance relative à la Loi sur les mesures policières (MPT): une surveillance encore plus intrusive.” https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/europe-asie-centrale/suisse/docs/2021/ordonnance-relative-a-la-loi-sur-les-mesures-policieres-mpt-une-surveillance-encore-plus-intrusive
Armingeon, Klaus, and Philipp Lutz. 2022. “Citizens’ Response to a Non-Responsive Government: The Case of the Swiss Initiative on Mass Immigration.” Comparative European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-022-00306-4
Armingeon, Klaus, and Philipp Lutz. 2020. “Muddling between Responsiveness and Responsibility: The Swiss Case of a Non-implementation of a Constitutional Rule.” Comparative European Politics 18: 256-280. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00185-2
Edgell, Amanda B., Jean Lachapelle, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Sandra Grahn, Palina Kolvani, Ana Flavia Good God, Martin Lundstedt, Natalia Natsika, Shreeya Pillai, Paul Bederke, Milene Bruhn, Stefanie Kaiser, Cristina Schaver, Abdalhadi Alijla, Tiago Fernandes, Hans Tung, Matthew Wilson, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2022. “Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy During Covid-19 (PanDem), Version 6.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/pandemic-backsliding/
Edgell, Amanda B., Jean Lachapelle, and Anna Lührmann. 2021. “Pandemic Backsliding: Violations of Democratic Standards During Covid-19.” Social Science & Medicine 285: 114244. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953621005761
Flick Witzig, Martina, Rothmayr Allison, Christine, and Varone, Frédéric. 2023. “Judicial System.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 214–232. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.11.
Humanrights.ch. 2023. “https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/droits-humains/police/dossier-police/focus/?search=1”
Moekli, Daniel. 2011. “Of Minarets and Foreign Criminals: Swiss Direct Democracy and Human Rights.” Human Rights Law Review 11 (4): 774–794. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngr02
Leonie Mugglin, Denise Efionayi, Didier Ruedin, and Gianni D’Amato. 2022. Racisme structurel en Suisse: un état des lieux de la recherche et de ses résultats. SFM Studies #81f, University of Neuchâtel.
Ordre des Avocats de Genève. 2021. “Prise de position contre la Loi la fédérale sur les mesures policières de lutte contre le terrorisme (MPT).” https://www.odage.ch/medias/documents/determination-oda/2021.05.12_Prise_de_position_MPT.pdf
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Corruption in Switzerland is rare according to international rankings. Indeed, Switzerland is consistently rated as being among the most successful countries with respect to corruption prevention. The country is governed by the rule of law, has clear rules on corruption that are implemented effectively, offers high wages to public officials, and is based on a decentralized democracy with parties that efficiently control and audit public officials.
However, there are opportunities and incentives for political and societal elites to abuse their positions for private interests. This is due to the country’s small size and the correspondingly small number of people interacting in elite positions; to the culture of amicable agreement; and to the very pragmatic problem-solving culture. In addition, holders of elite positions know they are highly likely to meet again in the future (and probably in different roles). This creates opportunities for the creation of broad informal networks, a reluctance to engage in close mutual surveillance and incentives for the non-observance of formal rules.
Given the considerable overlap between economic and political elites (Bühlmann et al. 2012), critics have pointed to processes in which politicians’ economic interests may influence their decisions in parliament. Although it is legal, and does not fall within the realm of corruption, Swiss non-professionalized parliamentarians frequently sit on several organizational boards (e.g., of health insurance companies) in addition to their political activities, which leads to conflicts of interest.
There have been recurrent scandals about corruption. However, the overall level of corruption seems to be very low in Switzerland as compared with other countries. If there is evidence of corruption, officeholders are held accountable and face penalties. The problems listed above are clearly minor in international comparison. In contrast, Switzerland is little inclined to sanction domestic companies that engage in corruption or laundering (Transparency International Switzerland 2023).
As of the last national election, transparency rules on the private financing of political parties have been implemented. However, they are less stringent than those of other European democracies. This is due to the lack of public financing provided to political parties and the corresponding notion that the state must not monitor or intervene in the exchanges between citizens and their nonpublic organizations.
The members of the national parliament are required to disclose their links to organizations.
Citations:
Felix Bühlmann, Thomas David, and André Mach. 2012. “Political and Economic Elites in Switzerland.” European Societies 14 (5): 727-754. DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2012.709531
Transparency International Switzerland. 2023. “Rapport Poursuite Penale de l’Entreprise.” https://transparency.ch/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Rapport_Poursuite_penale_de_lentreprise.pdf
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90040.html
However, there are opportunities and incentives for political and societal elites to abuse their positions for private interests. This is due to the country’s small size and the correspondingly small number of people interacting in elite positions; to the culture of amicable agreement; and to the very pragmatic problem-solving culture. In addition, holders of elite positions know they are highly likely to meet again in the future (and probably in different roles). This creates opportunities for the creation of broad informal networks, a reluctance to engage in close mutual surveillance and incentives for the non-observance of formal rules.
Given the considerable overlap between economic and political elites (Bühlmann et al. 2012), critics have pointed to processes in which politicians’ economic interests may influence their decisions in parliament. Although it is legal, and does not fall within the realm of corruption, Swiss non-professionalized parliamentarians frequently sit on several organizational boards (e.g., of health insurance companies) in addition to their political activities, which leads to conflicts of interest.
There have been recurrent scandals about corruption. However, the overall level of corruption seems to be very low in Switzerland as compared with other countries. If there is evidence of corruption, officeholders are held accountable and face penalties. The problems listed above are clearly minor in international comparison. In contrast, Switzerland is little inclined to sanction domestic companies that engage in corruption or laundering (Transparency International Switzerland 2023).
As of the last national election, transparency rules on the private financing of political parties have been implemented. However, they are less stringent than those of other European democracies. This is due to the lack of public financing provided to political parties and the corresponding notion that the state must not monitor or intervene in the exchanges between citizens and their nonpublic organizations.
The members of the national parliament are required to disclose their links to organizations.
Citations:
Felix Bühlmann, Thomas David, and André Mach. 2012. “Political and Economic Elites in Switzerland.” European Societies 14 (5): 727-754. DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2012.709531
Transparency International Switzerland. 2023. “Rapport Poursuite Penale de l’Entreprise.” https://transparency.ch/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Rapport_Poursuite_penale_de_lentreprise.pdf
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90040.html
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
10
9
9
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
8
7
6
7
6
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
5
4
3
4
3
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
1
1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The Swiss parliament is not broadly professionalized. Officially, it is still a militia parliament, meaning that legislators serve alongside their regular jobs. However, this construction is far from the reality (Vatter 2018a: 283). Almost 90% of members use more than a third of their working time for their political roles. Legislators’ incomes have also been increased over time. On average, the various components of remuneration total more than CHF 100,000 annually (about €104,000). Because of this, fewer and fewer members of parliament have other professional activities beside their political mandate (including external mandates, paid or otherwise, that are related to their activity as a politician). In other words, an increasing number of members of parliament can be considered “professional politicians.” The parliamentary system is, therefore, often today described as semi-professional.
However, legislators do not have personal staff, and the parliamentary services division offers only very limited research services, though legislators do have access to the parliamentary library. Thus, from a comparative perspective, the resources available to members of parliament are very limited. The parliamentary services are staffed with 238 employees (2022); much less than in comparable small countries (Austria 485; Belgium 603). According to one recent review, the Swiss parliament is “an influential pseudo-militia parliament with modest resources” (Bailer and Bütikofer 2022: 182, 188). However, since 1990, the Federal Assembly has had an internal evaluation unit called the Parliamentary Control of the Administration (Parlamentarische Verwaltungskontrolle), which is permanent staffed by policy experts with extensive inquiry prerogatives. Parliamentarians can mandate reviews of administrative activity within any policy sector as well as within the Federal Chancellery or the federal courts (Ledermann 2016).
Citations:
Bailer, Stefanie, and Sarah Bütikofer. 2023. “Parliament.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 174–194. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.9
Bieri, Niklaus. 2018. “Das Parlament und die Vernehmlassung. Der Wandel der parlamentarischen Rezeption des Vernehmlassungsverfahrens als Hinweis auf die Erstarkung des Parlaments nach den Parlamentsreformen der frühen 1990er-Jahre.” Traverse – Zeitschrift für Geschichte / Revue d’histoire 2018 (3): 33–45. https://boris.unibe.ch/127608
Bütikofer, Sarah. 2014. Das Schweizer Parlament. Eine Institution auf dem Pfad der Moderne. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Ledermann, Simone. 2016. “Die Ausgestaltung der Unabhängigkeit von Evaluationsdiensten: Die Parlamentarische Verwaltungskontrolle im Kontext der Aufsichtsorgane des Bundes.” LeGes – Gesetzgebung & Evaluation 27 (1): 63–82.
SRF News. 2019. “Im neuen Nationalrat sitzen noch mehr Berufspolitiker.” https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/die-jobs-der-neugewaehlten-im-neuen-nationalrat-sitzen-noch-mehr-berufspolitiker
Vatter, Adrian. 2018a. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
Vatter, Adrian, eds. 2018. Das Parlament in der Schweiz. Macht und Ohnmacht der Volksvertretung. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
However, legislators do not have personal staff, and the parliamentary services division offers only very limited research services, though legislators do have access to the parliamentary library. Thus, from a comparative perspective, the resources available to members of parliament are very limited. The parliamentary services are staffed with 238 employees (2022); much less than in comparable small countries (Austria 485; Belgium 603). According to one recent review, the Swiss parliament is “an influential pseudo-militia parliament with modest resources” (Bailer and Bütikofer 2022: 182, 188). However, since 1990, the Federal Assembly has had an internal evaluation unit called the Parliamentary Control of the Administration (Parlamentarische Verwaltungskontrolle), which is permanent staffed by policy experts with extensive inquiry prerogatives. Parliamentarians can mandate reviews of administrative activity within any policy sector as well as within the Federal Chancellery or the federal courts (Ledermann 2016).
Citations:
Bailer, Stefanie, and Sarah Bütikofer. 2023. “Parliament.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 174–194. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.9
Bieri, Niklaus. 2018. “Das Parlament und die Vernehmlassung. Der Wandel der parlamentarischen Rezeption des Vernehmlassungsverfahrens als Hinweis auf die Erstarkung des Parlaments nach den Parlamentsreformen der frühen 1990er-Jahre.” Traverse – Zeitschrift für Geschichte / Revue d’histoire 2018 (3): 33–45. https://boris.unibe.ch/127608
Bütikofer, Sarah. 2014. Das Schweizer Parlament. Eine Institution auf dem Pfad der Moderne. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Ledermann, Simone. 2016. “Die Ausgestaltung der Unabhängigkeit von Evaluationsdiensten: Die Parlamentarische Verwaltungskontrolle im Kontext der Aufsichtsorgane des Bundes.” LeGes – Gesetzgebung & Evaluation 27 (1): 63–82.
SRF News. 2019. “Im neuen Nationalrat sitzen noch mehr Berufspolitiker.” https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/die-jobs-der-neugewaehlten-im-neuen-nationalrat-sitzen-noch-mehr-berufspolitiker
Vatter, Adrian. 2018a. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
Vatter, Adrian, eds. 2018. Das Parlament in der Schweiz. Macht und Ohnmacht der Volksvertretung. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
Parliamentary committees can be regarded as one of the major elements of the Swiss legislative process. They are equipped with major prerogatives (Sciarini 2023: 272, 278). They design, debate and reach compromises on legislative projects. “A more recent study of all votes in the National Council between 1996 and 2018 confirms that the committees are very often followed by the plenum: During this period, in 87% of cases, the plenum supported the proposal of the majority of a committee, rather than the proposal of the minority” (Sciarini 2023: 453). They, like individual members of parliament, have access to government documents and receive copies of these promptly upon request. Legislators have also electronic access to the majority of government documents.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers for hearings. Formally, this request is not binding. However, for political reasons, ministers typically respond to these requests and answer the committees’ questions.
Parliamentary committees are free to invite experts to provide testimony at hearings. This right is actively used. For example, in the summer of 2018, the National Council’s Foreign Policy Committee decided that it would publicly hear from experts on the outcome of the negotiations on the institutional agreement between Switzerland and the European Union. The committee set the relevant hearings for the afternoon of 15 January 2019, and the hearings were broadcast live over the internet.
Citations:
Sciarini, Pascal. 2023. Politique suisse. Institutions, acteurs, processus. Lausanne: Épistémé.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers for hearings. Formally, this request is not binding. However, for political reasons, ministers typically respond to these requests and answer the committees’ questions.
Parliamentary committees are free to invite experts to provide testimony at hearings. This right is actively used. For example, in the summer of 2018, the National Council’s Foreign Policy Committee decided that it would publicly hear from experts on the outcome of the negotiations on the institutional agreement between Switzerland and the European Union. The committee set the relevant hearings for the afternoon of 15 January 2019, and the hearings were broadcast live over the internet.
Citations:
Sciarini, Pascal. 2023. Politique suisse. Institutions, acteurs, processus. Lausanne: Épistémé.
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
Legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch. Both houses of parliament are “responsible for the overall supervision of the activities of the Federal Council, the federal administration, the federal courts and other federal bodies. In order to fulfill this supervisory duty, it can set up a PUK (parliamentary commission of enquiry) if incidents of major significance need to be clarified. … It is important to note that a PUK is neither a criminal court nor a disciplinary authority. It is set up in the form of a simple federal decree. This decision is initiated by means of a parliamentary initiative by a member of the Council or a parliamentary group or a committee initiative. It is set up after consultation with the Federal Council” (Federal Assembly 2024). These commissions in some cases arrive at conclusions which are highly critical of the government. For example, a commission examining problems with the national pension fund in 1995 concluded: “The main responsibility for the debacle at the [pension fund] lies with the former head of the [finance ministry] and the two former directors of the [relevant administration]” (Federal Assembly 2024).
Unfavorable investigation outcomes are likely to have consequences within the federal administration. However, given the logic of coalition building in Switzerland (the government coalition does not result from the outcome of an election; rather it is a “historical” compromise between the major parties) and the quasi-presidential position of the government (it does not depend on the support of a parliamentary majority once it is elected at the beginning of the legislative term), it is not very likely that a governing party will be forced to leave the government or that a member of the government will feel pressure to step down.
Citations:
Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung). 2024. “Parlamentarische Untersuchungskommissionen PUK.” https://www.parlament.ch/de/organe/kommissionen/aufsichtskommissionen/parlamentarische-untersuchungskommissionen-puk
Unfavorable investigation outcomes are likely to have consequences within the federal administration. However, given the logic of coalition building in Switzerland (the government coalition does not result from the outcome of an election; rather it is a “historical” compromise between the major parties) and the quasi-presidential position of the government (it does not depend on the support of a parliamentary majority once it is elected at the beginning of the legislative term), it is not very likely that a governing party will be forced to leave the government or that a member of the government will feel pressure to step down.
Citations:
Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung). 2024. “Parlamentarische Untersuchungskommissionen PUK.” https://www.parlament.ch/de/organe/kommissionen/aufsichtskommissionen/parlamentarische-untersuchungskommissionen-puk
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
10
9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
The Swiss government is an oversized grand coalition of the four major parties, which together hold 80% (2023) of the seats in the House of Representatives (Nationalrat). The government-opposition dichotomy does not apply to the Swiss system. The federal government is elected every four years by both houses of the parliament (Vereinigte Bundesversammlung) and cannot be dismissed by parliament within these four years. There is no impeachment procedure. Corresponding to the quasi-presidential structure, political parties in the federal parliament did not follow strict party discipline in parliamentary votes for many years. This has changed considerably in recent decades. Currently, the political party with the largest vote share in national elections, the Swiss People’s Party, systematically opposes the policies of the other three large parties, acting as an “opposition” – even though it holds two of the seven seats in the collegial government structure. There is neither a prime minister nor a “super” minister. All seven members of the government are on equal footing. The president of the council, a position that rotates annually, is primus inter pares and has no superior role in directing the politics and policies of the government.
All attempts to enlarge the number of ministries have failed due to political opposition within parliament. Hence, most of the seven ministries have responsibility for many more issue areas than in other democracies. Both the first and the second parliamentary chambers have nine committees dealing with legislation and two committees with oversight functions. There are nine committees for policy issues (foreign policy; transport and communication; legal questions; social security and health; security, state policy and politics (i.e., organization of government and administration, relationship between federation and cantons, etc.); environment, spatial planning and energy; economy and taxes; and science, education and culture), and two supervisory committees for financial matters (examining budgets, supplementary credits and the federal government’s accounts) and general oversight (Geschäftsprüfungskommission; scrutinizes the conduct of business by the Federal Council, the federal administration and other bodies).
Members of these committees are elected by parliament in proportion to the parties’ seats in the parliament (Vatter 2018). Members of the (small) opposition may become committee chairs. For example, the current president of the Political Institutions Committee and the vice-president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council are members of the Green Party, which is not represented in the federal government. Four other committees have additional tasks (e.g., the Drafting Committee, which checks the wording of bills and legal texts before final votes). Thus, the task areas of the parliamentary committees do not correspond closely to the task areas of the ministries. Nonetheless, this does not suggest that the committees are not able to monitor the ministries or legislative proposals. As the mismatch between ministerial committees and ministries is a function of how the federal government is organized, it does not impair parliament’s oversight function. The congruence between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries is therefore largely suited to the monitoring of ministries and legislative proposals.
Citations:
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
All attempts to enlarge the number of ministries have failed due to political opposition within parliament. Hence, most of the seven ministries have responsibility for many more issue areas than in other democracies. Both the first and the second parliamentary chambers have nine committees dealing with legislation and two committees with oversight functions. There are nine committees for policy issues (foreign policy; transport and communication; legal questions; social security and health; security, state policy and politics (i.e., organization of government and administration, relationship between federation and cantons, etc.); environment, spatial planning and energy; economy and taxes; and science, education and culture), and two supervisory committees for financial matters (examining budgets, supplementary credits and the federal government’s accounts) and general oversight (Geschäftsprüfungskommission; scrutinizes the conduct of business by the Federal Council, the federal administration and other bodies).
Members of these committees are elected by parliament in proportion to the parties’ seats in the parliament (Vatter 2018). Members of the (small) opposition may become committee chairs. For example, the current president of the Political Institutions Committee and the vice-president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council are members of the Green Party, which is not represented in the federal government. Four other committees have additional tasks (e.g., the Drafting Committee, which checks the wording of bills and legal texts before final votes). Thus, the task areas of the parliamentary committees do not correspond closely to the task areas of the ministries. Nonetheless, this does not suggest that the committees are not able to monitor the ministries or legislative proposals. As the mismatch between ministerial committees and ministries is a function of how the federal government is organized, it does not impair parliament’s oversight function. The congruence between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries is therefore largely suited to the monitoring of ministries and legislative proposals.
Citations:
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).