Social Sustainability
#17Key Findings
In the category of social sustainability, Switzerland falls into the middle ranks internationally (rank 17).
Education is decentralized, managed by the cantons and municipalities. The quality of teaching is high, with a particularly strong vocational training tradition that contributes to low levels of youth unemployment. However, the overall system discriminates against students from low-status families.
Social assistance is also decentralized, with significant regional differences in support programs. Health insurance is mandatory. Premiums are high and not based on income, but low-wage earners. Quality is outstanding, but rising costs are an issue. The gender wage gap remains a significant issue. The old-age poverty rate is above the OECD average.
Family policy is underdeveloped. Parental leave polices are not generous, and there is a lack of affordable public services for childcare. The economy relies heavily on immigrants, especially those with high skills, but canton-based integration policies are not broadly successful. The major right-wing party engages in anti-immigration rhetoric.
Education is decentralized, managed by the cantons and municipalities. The quality of teaching is high, with a particularly strong vocational training tradition that contributes to low levels of youth unemployment. However, the overall system discriminates against students from low-status families.
Social assistance is also decentralized, with significant regional differences in support programs. Health insurance is mandatory. Premiums are high and not based on income, but low-wage earners. Quality is outstanding, but rising costs are an issue. The gender wage gap remains a significant issue. The old-age poverty rate is above the OECD average.
Family policy is underdeveloped. Parental leave polices are not generous, and there is a lack of affordable public services for childcare. The economy relies heavily on immigrants, especially those with high skills, but canton-based integration policies are not broadly successful. The major right-wing party engages in anti-immigration rhetoric.
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Graph View
To what extent do policies and regulations in the education system hinder or facilitate high-quality education and training?
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9
9
Education policies are fully aligned with the goal of ensuring high-quality education and training.
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6
Education policies are largely aligned with the goal of ensuring high-quality education and training.
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3
Education policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of ensuring high-quality education and training.
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1
1
Education policies are not at all aligned with the goal of ensuring high-quality education and training.
Switzerland’s education system (see for an overview: SKBF 2023; Giudici and Emmenegger 2023) is strongly influenced by the country’s federal and decentralized structure, as education policy falls under the jurisdiction of the cantons and municipalities. The system provides a high-quality education for a rich country that is dependent upon high-quality products in the industrial and services sectors. Given this dependence on education in a knowledge-based economy, education spending is relatively immune to short-term economic downturns. The university system performs very well, as is the case in many other small and open European countries. Vocational training is very solid and seems to be one of the most important factors in the low levels of unemployment, particularly among younger people. Two out of three young people undertake basic occupational training. The state plays an active role in orchestrating the vocational training system (Busemeyer et al. 2022, see in particular the section on Switzerland). The permeability of vocational and tertiary education has improved in comparison to other countries and is very high.
During the past 20 years, Switzerland experienced very strong growth in tertiary education. To a large extent, this has also been due to the strong growth of universities of applied sciences (Emmenegger et al. 2023). The number of students enrolled at the tertiary level (universities, universities of applied sciences, and professional education institutions) more than tripled between 1990/1991 and 2022/23. This is chiefly due to a growth of student numbers in colleges of education and universities of applied sciences, which have been institutionalized since the mid-1990s. Students with vocational training can acquire a diploma to enter these universities of applied sciences either during their training or through a special one-year course after they have finished their apprenticeship. For the educational year of 2022/23, 61% of all students in tertiary education attended universities, 30% attended universities of applied sciences and 9% attended professional education institutions. The share of female students in tertiary education increased from 39% in 1990 to 53% in 2022/23 (FSO 2023).
A strong growth of 21 percentage points occurred in the share of population with tertiary attainment between 2000 and 2022 – slightly above the average growth rate in 27 countries for which data are available (Indicator P9.4).
The vocational training system also offers considerable career prospects. Men with vocational training have similarly high employment rates throughout their working life as men with tertiary education. However, there is a significant difference in earnings. At the age of 50, the median annual earnings of a male academic are about CHF 125,000, in contrast to about CHF 80,000 for a male worker with vocational training. Average figures indicate that workers with vocational education earn about 60% of what a worker with a university degree earns (Korber and Oesch, 2016; BASS 2017). “(V)ocational education is associated with substantially lower earnings once workers enter their thirties, and this disadvantage is larger among women than men. While vocational degrees protect against unemployment, they come at the cost of flat earnings curves over the life course” (Korber and Oesch, 2019: 1).
Continuous monitoring of labor market demands, enabling the adaptation of education and training programs, is supported on the federal level by a specialized university of applied sciences (Swiss Federal University for Vocational Education and Training (https://www.sfuvet.swiss/)) and by a research project that explores how the Swiss Vocational and Professional Education and Training and comparable systems in other countries are governed (SERI 2023).
Universities and schools offer a range of opportunities for further education, such as certificates, diplomas and master’s of advanced studies, in addition to many other courses offered by firms or private organizations, ensuring that individuals have access to lifelong learning opportunities (www.berufsberatung.ch).
Educators, particularly at high schools and universities, are very well paid in international comparison, thereby facilitating the recruitment of highly skilled educators. For example, the maximum wage of a university professor is almost three times the median wage, and the average wage of a professor (all types of higher education) or a teacher at a high school is 1.5 times the median wage.
Education for sustainable development is integrated into the curricula of all school levels (Deutschschweizer Erziehungsdirektoren-Konferenz 2016).
Citations:
BASS (Büro für Arbeits- und Sozialpolitische Studien BASS AG). 2017. Analyse der Löhne von Frauen und Männern anhand der Lohnstrukturerhebung 2014. Bern/Neuchatel: Bass & Bundesamt für Statistik.
Busemeyer, Marius R., Martin B. Carstensen, and Patrick Emmenegger. 2022. “Orchestrators of Coordination: Toward a New Role of the State in Coordinated Capitalism?” European Journal of Industrial Relations 28(2): 231-250.
Deutschschweizer Erziehungsdirektoren-Konferenz. 2016. “Lehrplan 21.” https://v-fe.lehrplan.ch/index.php
Emmenegger, Patrick, Scherwin M. Bajka, and Cecilia Ivardi. 2023. “How Coordinated Capitalism Adapts to the Knowledge Economy: Different Upskilling Strategies in Germany and Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 29(4): 355-378.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023. “Tertiärstufe – Hochschulen.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bildung-wissenschaft/personen-ausbildung/tertiaerstufe-hochschulen.html
Giudici, Anja, and Patrick Emmenegger. 2023. “Education Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 604–622. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.31
Korber, Maïlys, and Daniel Oesch. 2016. “Berufslehre bietet bessere Lohnaussichten für Männer.” Die Volkswirtschaft, November, 44-47.
Korber, Maïlys, and Daniel Oesch. 2019. “Vocational versus General Education: Employment and Earnings over the Life Course in Switzerland.” Advances in Life Course Research 40: 1-13.
SERI (State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation; Staatssekretariat für Bildung, Forschung und Innovation). 2023. “Governance in Vocational and Professional Education and Training (GOVPET).” https://www.sbfi.admin.ch/sbfi/de/home/bildung/berufsbildungssteuerung-und–politik/berufsbildungsforschung/leading-houses/govpet.html
SKBF (Schweizerische Koordinationsstelle für Bildungsforschung). 2023. Bildungsbericht Schweiz 2023.
Aarau: Schweizerische Koordinationsstelle für Bildungsforschung.
During the past 20 years, Switzerland experienced very strong growth in tertiary education. To a large extent, this has also been due to the strong growth of universities of applied sciences (Emmenegger et al. 2023). The number of students enrolled at the tertiary level (universities, universities of applied sciences, and professional education institutions) more than tripled between 1990/1991 and 2022/23. This is chiefly due to a growth of student numbers in colleges of education and universities of applied sciences, which have been institutionalized since the mid-1990s. Students with vocational training can acquire a diploma to enter these universities of applied sciences either during their training or through a special one-year course after they have finished their apprenticeship. For the educational year of 2022/23, 61% of all students in tertiary education attended universities, 30% attended universities of applied sciences and 9% attended professional education institutions. The share of female students in tertiary education increased from 39% in 1990 to 53% in 2022/23 (FSO 2023).
A strong growth of 21 percentage points occurred in the share of population with tertiary attainment between 2000 and 2022 – slightly above the average growth rate in 27 countries for which data are available (Indicator P9.4).
The vocational training system also offers considerable career prospects. Men with vocational training have similarly high employment rates throughout their working life as men with tertiary education. However, there is a significant difference in earnings. At the age of 50, the median annual earnings of a male academic are about CHF 125,000, in contrast to about CHF 80,000 for a male worker with vocational training. Average figures indicate that workers with vocational education earn about 60% of what a worker with a university degree earns (Korber and Oesch, 2016; BASS 2017). “(V)ocational education is associated with substantially lower earnings once workers enter their thirties, and this disadvantage is larger among women than men. While vocational degrees protect against unemployment, they come at the cost of flat earnings curves over the life course” (Korber and Oesch, 2019: 1).
Continuous monitoring of labor market demands, enabling the adaptation of education and training programs, is supported on the federal level by a specialized university of applied sciences (Swiss Federal University for Vocational Education and Training (https://www.sfuvet.swiss/)) and by a research project that explores how the Swiss Vocational and Professional Education and Training and comparable systems in other countries are governed (SERI 2023).
Universities and schools offer a range of opportunities for further education, such as certificates, diplomas and master’s of advanced studies, in addition to many other courses offered by firms or private organizations, ensuring that individuals have access to lifelong learning opportunities (www.berufsberatung.ch).
Educators, particularly at high schools and universities, are very well paid in international comparison, thereby facilitating the recruitment of highly skilled educators. For example, the maximum wage of a university professor is almost three times the median wage, and the average wage of a professor (all types of higher education) or a teacher at a high school is 1.5 times the median wage.
Education for sustainable development is integrated into the curricula of all school levels (Deutschschweizer Erziehungsdirektoren-Konferenz 2016).
Citations:
BASS (Büro für Arbeits- und Sozialpolitische Studien BASS AG). 2017. Analyse der Löhne von Frauen und Männern anhand der Lohnstrukturerhebung 2014. Bern/Neuchatel: Bass & Bundesamt für Statistik.
Busemeyer, Marius R., Martin B. Carstensen, and Patrick Emmenegger. 2022. “Orchestrators of Coordination: Toward a New Role of the State in Coordinated Capitalism?” European Journal of Industrial Relations 28(2): 231-250.
Deutschschweizer Erziehungsdirektoren-Konferenz. 2016. “Lehrplan 21.” https://v-fe.lehrplan.ch/index.php
Emmenegger, Patrick, Scherwin M. Bajka, and Cecilia Ivardi. 2023. “How Coordinated Capitalism Adapts to the Knowledge Economy: Different Upskilling Strategies in Germany and Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 29(4): 355-378.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023. “Tertiärstufe – Hochschulen.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bildung-wissenschaft/personen-ausbildung/tertiaerstufe-hochschulen.html
Giudici, Anja, and Patrick Emmenegger. 2023. “Education Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 604–622. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.31
Korber, Maïlys, and Daniel Oesch. 2016. “Berufslehre bietet bessere Lohnaussichten für Männer.” Die Volkswirtschaft, November, 44-47.
Korber, Maïlys, and Daniel Oesch. 2019. “Vocational versus General Education: Employment and Earnings over the Life Course in Switzerland.” Advances in Life Course Research 40: 1-13.
SERI (State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation; Staatssekretariat für Bildung, Forschung und Innovation). 2023. “Governance in Vocational and Professional Education and Training (GOVPET).” https://www.sbfi.admin.ch/sbfi/de/home/bildung/berufsbildungssteuerung-und–politik/berufsbildungsforschung/leading-houses/govpet.html
SKBF (Schweizerische Koordinationsstelle für Bildungsforschung). 2023. Bildungsbericht Schweiz 2023.
Aarau: Schweizerische Koordinationsstelle für Bildungsforschung.
To what extent does the current policy approach in the education system hinder or facilitate equitable access to high-quality education and training?
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Education policies are fully aligned with the goal of ensuring equitable access to high-quality education and training.
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Education policies are largely aligned with the goal of ensuring equitable access to high-quality education and training.
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Education policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of ensuring equitable access to high-quality education and training.
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1
Education policies are not at all aligned with the goal of ensuring equitable access to high-quality education and training.
While women and – with some exceptions – persons from peripheral regions have equal access to higher education, the Swiss education system continues to discriminate at all levels against students from families with low social status. A recent report summarizes the current state of research: “(N)ot all citizens enjoy the same level of participation in education, achievement and qualifications. Despite the expansion of the education system and increasing participation in more advanced levels of education and training (‘educational expansion’), education opportunities depend on factors that have little to do with performance, such as social origin, migration background or gender. This runs counter to the principle of equal opportunity enshrined in the federal constitution and to the generally accepted notion that goods and positions should be allocated on the basis of merit. Measured in terms of learning outcomes, the Swiss education system is therefore not only inefficient but also unfair. Equal opportunity remains a utopia” (Becker and Schoch 2018: 30). This is exacerbated by the fact that children are separated into different education curricula tracks very early on at school (at the age of 12) leading either to high school or to occupation training.
Higher education in Switzerland is also affected by the federal system. Whereas cantons such as Geneva, Basel-City and Ticino have followed international trends favoring general qualifications for university entrance, other cantons – in particular the German-speaking parts of the country – have focused on a split system of university and vocational education. Thus, in the canton of Geneva, around 34% of each age cohort acquires the matura, a high school exit diploma that allows the student to go directly to a university or university of applied sciences. In contrast, in the canton of Uri, only 13% gain direct access to a university or university of applied sciences (2019). In any case, the proportion of individuals obtaining this university-track high school diploma is low in European comparison. The recent report on education finds that not only does the probability of obtaining a university-track high school diploma vary between cantons, the probability of entering a high school (Gymnasium) in the first place does as well. “The cantonal entry rate for high schools varies between 12.8% and 48.6%” (SKBF 2023: 158). However, the effect of this “federal” discrimination is somewhat reduced by permeability within the school and university systems.
Citations:
Becker, Rolf, und Jürg Schoch. 2018. Soziale Selektivität. Empfehlungen des Schweizerischen Wissenschaftsrates SWR. Expertenbericht von Rolf Becker und Jürg Schoch im Auftrag des SWR (Politische Analyse 3/2018). Bern: SWR.
SKBF (Schweizerische Koordinationsstelle für Bildungsforschung). 2023. Bildungsbericht Schweiz 2023. Aarau: Schweizerische Koordinationsstelle für Bildungsforschung.
Higher education in Switzerland is also affected by the federal system. Whereas cantons such as Geneva, Basel-City and Ticino have followed international trends favoring general qualifications for university entrance, other cantons – in particular the German-speaking parts of the country – have focused on a split system of university and vocational education. Thus, in the canton of Geneva, around 34% of each age cohort acquires the matura, a high school exit diploma that allows the student to go directly to a university or university of applied sciences. In contrast, in the canton of Uri, only 13% gain direct access to a university or university of applied sciences (2019). In any case, the proportion of individuals obtaining this university-track high school diploma is low in European comparison. The recent report on education finds that not only does the probability of obtaining a university-track high school diploma vary between cantons, the probability of entering a high school (Gymnasium) in the first place does as well. “The cantonal entry rate for high schools varies between 12.8% and 48.6%” (SKBF 2023: 158). However, the effect of this “federal” discrimination is somewhat reduced by permeability within the school and university systems.
Citations:
Becker, Rolf, und Jürg Schoch. 2018. Soziale Selektivität. Empfehlungen des Schweizerischen Wissenschaftsrates SWR. Expertenbericht von Rolf Becker und Jürg Schoch im Auftrag des SWR (Politische Analyse 3/2018). Bern: SWR.
SKBF (Schweizerische Koordinationsstelle für Bildungsforschung). 2023. Bildungsbericht Schweiz 2023. Aarau: Schweizerische Koordinationsstelle für Bildungsforschung.
Graph View
To what extent do existing institutions ensure equal access to essential services and basic income support for those in need?
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Existing essential public services and basic income support are fully aligned with the goal of ensuring equal access for those in need.
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Existing essential public services and basic income support are largely aligned with the goal of ensuring equal access for those in need.
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Existing essential public services and basic income support are only somewhat aligned with the goal of ensuring equal access for those in need.
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Existing essential public services and basic income support are not at all aligned with the goal of ensuring equal access for those in need.
Where individuals have access to the internet, information on rights and opportunities to access basic services and basic income security is readily available. See, for example, the list on SKOS 2023. Some organizations offer online tools for checking the availability of income support (e.g., SRF 2023), although the non-uptake of social benefits is also a relevant issue in Switzerland (Tabin/Leresche 2019). Several cantons are addressing the issue of non-uptake through dedicated units or programs. Likewise, access to these services and transfers is available provided the eligible individual is willing to accept the stigmatizing effects of means-tested income support. For example, a large group of pensioners who are entitled to social assistance (Ergänzungsleistungen) do not apply for these schemes either because they do not know about these opportunities or because they are embarrassed to apply (Pro Senecute 2022; SRF 2023).
In contrast to social security (i.e., the major insurance programs for health, unemployment, invalidity and old age), social assistance comes under the jurisdiction of cantons and municipalities. Therefore, there are no national policies ensuring that everyone in need has access to cash transfers, subsidies, earmarked financial support or benefits in kind in various areas such as housing, energy or transportation. This is done in a decentralized manner, and there are major differences between regions. For example, the city of Zurich is currently following the example of the city of Basel in the area of care for the homeless. These two cities offer unconditional housing to the homeless following the idea of “housing first” (NZZ 2023 12 27, pp. 1, 12-13).
Citations:
Pro Senecute. 2022. “Altersmonitor. Altersarmut in der Schweiz. Teilbericht 1.” https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/25856
SRF (Swiss Radio and Television). 2023. https://www.srf.ch/sendungen/kassensturz-espresso/espresso/tipps-und-tricks-fuer-ergaenzungsleistungen-muss-man-sich-nicht-schaemen
Schweizerische Konferenz für Sozialhilfe. 2023. “Anlaufstellen für Betroffene.” https://skos.ch/dienstleistungen/anlaufstellen-fuer-betroffene
Jean-Pierre Tabin and Frédérique Leresche. 2019. “Une critique furtive de l’État social. Une perspective théorique pour comprendre le non-recours raisonné aux prestations sociales.” Émulations Varia. Online. DOI: 10.14428/emulations.varia.026
In contrast to social security (i.e., the major insurance programs for health, unemployment, invalidity and old age), social assistance comes under the jurisdiction of cantons and municipalities. Therefore, there are no national policies ensuring that everyone in need has access to cash transfers, subsidies, earmarked financial support or benefits in kind in various areas such as housing, energy or transportation. This is done in a decentralized manner, and there are major differences between regions. For example, the city of Zurich is currently following the example of the city of Basel in the area of care for the homeless. These two cities offer unconditional housing to the homeless following the idea of “housing first” (NZZ 2023 12 27, pp. 1, 12-13).
Citations:
Pro Senecute. 2022. “Altersmonitor. Altersarmut in der Schweiz. Teilbericht 1.” https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/25856
SRF (Swiss Radio and Television). 2023. https://www.srf.ch/sendungen/kassensturz-espresso/espresso/tipps-und-tricks-fuer-ergaenzungsleistungen-muss-man-sich-nicht-schaemen
Schweizerische Konferenz für Sozialhilfe. 2023. “Anlaufstellen für Betroffene.” https://skos.ch/dienstleistungen/anlaufstellen-fuer-betroffene
Jean-Pierre Tabin and Frédérique Leresche. 2019. “Une critique furtive de l’État social. Une perspective théorique pour comprendre le non-recours raisonné aux prestations sociales.” Émulations Varia. Online. DOI: 10.14428/emulations.varia.026
To what extent do existing institutions and policies ensure high-quality services and basic income support?
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Existing essential public services and basic income support are fully aligned with the goal of satisfying basic human needs.
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Existing essential public services and basic income support are largely aligned with the goal of satisfying basic human needs.
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Existing essential public services and basic income support are only somewhat aligned with the goal of satisfying basic human needs.
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Existing essential public services and basic income support are not at all aligned with the goal of satisfying basic human needs.
The task of combating poverty is a competence of municipalities and cantons. By implication, there is substantial regional variation. For example, old-age poverty is lowest in the canton of Basel Stadt (6%) and almost five times higher (29.5%) in the canton of Ticino (Pro Senecute 2022: 20).
A national organization, the Swiss Conference for Social Assistance, develops guidelines jointly with the cantons, municipalities, cities and private aid organizations. The guidelines are adopted by the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Directors of Social Affairs (SODK) and recommended to the cantons for application. They become binding through cantonal legislation and municipal legislation and judgment (SKOS 2023a). These guidelines are followed to varying extents in the cantons and municipalities (SKOS 2023b).
Thus, the answer to the question of the generosity of basic income benefits enabling the fulfillment of basic human needs depends to some substantial extent on the region of the person in need.
Corresponding to its level of economic and social development, Switzerland manages on average to keep its residents from poverty – provided individuals do not shy away from applying for income support due to ignorance, embarrassment about the stigmatizing effects of means-tested social assistance or their legal status.
The risk of poverty is particularly large for foreigners and elderly citizens in Switzerland. According to the OECD, the old-age poverty rate is clearly above the OECD average in Switzerland, and it is particularly widespread among women (OECD 2023: 199). The major explanatory variables are education and uninterrupted professional careers. The pension system amplifies the inequalities that exist during working life. While about 86% of all pensioners are well-off, the remaining 14% are in poverty. This poverty rate could be halved if eligible pensioners would claim social assistance, but they often refrain from doing so because of ignorance, fear of red tape, fear of contradicting their liberal values, or shame (Pro Senecute 2022, 2023).
In the housing sector, emergency structures do not meet the current need, leaving homeless persons in the streets of Swiss cities. The COVID-19 pandemic has shed new light on the social and health needs of vulnerable populations in the eyes of the authorities (Jackson et al. 2021).
The public transportation system is strongly developed and of high quality. While the Green and Socialist parties have periodically proposed making it free of charge, the idea has never been adopted.
Citations:
Jackson, Y., Sibourd-Beaudry, A., Regard, S., and Petrucci, R. 2021. “Populations précaires et Covid-19 : innover et collaborer pour faire face aux besoins sociaux et de santé.” Rev Med Suisse 7 (724): 243–247. URL: https://www.revmed.ch/revue-medicale-suisse/2021/revue-medicale-suisse-724/populations-precaires-et-covid-19-innover-et-collaborer-pour-faire-face-aux-besoins-sociaux-et-de-sante
OECD. 2023. Pensions at a Glance. Paris: OECD.
Pro Senecute. 2022. “Altersmonitor. Altersarmut in der Schweiz 2022, Teilbericht 1.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
Pro Senecute. 2023. “Altersmonitor. Nichtbezug von Ergänzungsleistungen in der Schweiz, Teilbericht 2.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
Schweizerische Konferenz für Sozialhilfe (SKOS). 2023a. “Die SKOS Richtlinien.” https://skos.ch/skos-richtlinien/entstehung-und-bedeutung
Schweizerische Konferenz für Sozialhilfe (SKOS). 2023. “Monitoring Sozialhilfe.” https://skos.ch/publikationen/monitoring-sozialhilfe
A national organization, the Swiss Conference for Social Assistance, develops guidelines jointly with the cantons, municipalities, cities and private aid organizations. The guidelines are adopted by the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Directors of Social Affairs (SODK) and recommended to the cantons for application. They become binding through cantonal legislation and municipal legislation and judgment (SKOS 2023a). These guidelines are followed to varying extents in the cantons and municipalities (SKOS 2023b).
Thus, the answer to the question of the generosity of basic income benefits enabling the fulfillment of basic human needs depends to some substantial extent on the region of the person in need.
Corresponding to its level of economic and social development, Switzerland manages on average to keep its residents from poverty – provided individuals do not shy away from applying for income support due to ignorance, embarrassment about the stigmatizing effects of means-tested social assistance or their legal status.
The risk of poverty is particularly large for foreigners and elderly citizens in Switzerland. According to the OECD, the old-age poverty rate is clearly above the OECD average in Switzerland, and it is particularly widespread among women (OECD 2023: 199). The major explanatory variables are education and uninterrupted professional careers. The pension system amplifies the inequalities that exist during working life. While about 86% of all pensioners are well-off, the remaining 14% are in poverty. This poverty rate could be halved if eligible pensioners would claim social assistance, but they often refrain from doing so because of ignorance, fear of red tape, fear of contradicting their liberal values, or shame (Pro Senecute 2022, 2023).
In the housing sector, emergency structures do not meet the current need, leaving homeless persons in the streets of Swiss cities. The COVID-19 pandemic has shed new light on the social and health needs of vulnerable populations in the eyes of the authorities (Jackson et al. 2021).
The public transportation system is strongly developed and of high quality. While the Green and Socialist parties have periodically proposed making it free of charge, the idea has never been adopted.
Citations:
Jackson, Y., Sibourd-Beaudry, A., Regard, S., and Petrucci, R. 2021. “Populations précaires et Covid-19 : innover et collaborer pour faire face aux besoins sociaux et de santé.” Rev Med Suisse 7 (724): 243–247. URL: https://www.revmed.ch/revue-medicale-suisse/2021/revue-medicale-suisse-724/populations-precaires-et-covid-19-innover-et-collaborer-pour-faire-face-aux-besoins-sociaux-et-de-sante
OECD. 2023. Pensions at a Glance. Paris: OECD.
Pro Senecute. 2022. “Altersmonitor. Altersarmut in der Schweiz 2022, Teilbericht 1.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
Pro Senecute. 2023. “Altersmonitor. Nichtbezug von Ergänzungsleistungen in der Schweiz, Teilbericht 2.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
Schweizerische Konferenz für Sozialhilfe (SKOS). 2023a. “Die SKOS Richtlinien.” https://skos.ch/skos-richtlinien/entstehung-und-bedeutung
Schweizerische Konferenz für Sozialhilfe (SKOS). 2023. “Monitoring Sozialhilfe.” https://skos.ch/publikationen/monitoring-sozialhilfe
Graph View
To what extent does current health policy hinder or facilitate health system resilience?
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Health policies are fully aligned with the goal of achieving a resilient health system.
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Health policies are largely aligned with the goal of achieving a resilient health system.
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Health policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of achieving a resilient health system.
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1
Health policies are not at all aligned with the goal of achieving a resilient health system.
Major characteristics of the Swiss health system are decentralization and liberalism. There is one federal health system and 26 cantonal health systems; within the cantonal health systems, there are also variations by municipality. The cantonal competence is in the field of health provisions (such as services in case of emergencies or catastrophes, and provision of transportation or rescue services), hospitals, health policy, training of medical staff, licensing to practice medicine and medical services, and the provision of subsidies for health insurance premiums for low-income groups. Competencies on the federal level are mainly in the field of general health policy issues, supervision of health insurance providers, pharmaceutical industry oversight and regulation of medical staff training.
In 1996, health insurance was made obligatory for all residents. Premiums for health insurance do not depend on income and do not take into account the number of family members. Hence, insurance must be bought for each member of the family, although premiums are reduced for children. In recent years, this liberal model has been modified through the provision of subsidies for low-wage earners and their families. The cantons decide on the extent of subsidies; the federation covers about half the cost of these cantonal subsidies.
Mandatory healthcare insurance is provided by a large number of competing mutual funds (nonprofit insurance programs), all of which are required to offer the same benefits. However, health insurance companies can make a profit on optional healthcare insurance packages (see section P.11.3). Hence, there is no competition in the area of benefits, but only in the field of premiums, which is largely a function of administrative costs and membership structure. Considerable discussion has focused on whether this competitive market structure should be replaced by a single state-owned insurance company. In 2014, voters decided in a popular vote to retain the present system.
Total costs of the Swiss health sector amount to about 12% of GDP, and 13% of all employees work in the health sector (Trein et al. 2022: 904; Trein et al. 2023). In comparative view, Switzerland numbers among the countries with the highest healthcare costs, and arguably those with the highest quality of healthcare (see for instance the large Lancet study on comparative mortality index GBD 2015). The availability of health products and services is generally good, although the system has equity issues (see next subsection).
In 2021, the healthcare system was financed by the public sector (23%), by private mutual funds (health insurance providers) (36%), by other (private) health insurance providers (9%) and by patient own payments (22%) (FSO 2023). The health sector depends crucially on foreign labor, in particular physicians and nurses, since the Swiss education system does not attract and train enough such specialists.
Given this decentralized structure and the strong role of private (and competing) actors, there is no single answer to the question of how health policy contributes to the resilience of the health system.
Digitalization of health systems is a concern, in particular at the federal level (Federal Council 2019: 12-15). The system produces sufficient health products and services when and where they are needed, even in times of crisis. This was demonstrated during the pandemic when the health system was placed under strong pressure but did not collapse at any time.
While the resilience of the healthcare system in terms of quality, health outcomes and sufficient supply of health services is exceptional, the system has limited resilience in many regards, above all with regard to rising costs in the health sector. Currently, a number of attempts to curb the rapid increase in health expenditures are meeting with stiff resistance from vested interests, such as doctors, hospitals and health insurance funds. Arguably, the political elites have no consensus and or even convincing ideas regarding a grand cost-curbing strategy. Likewise, a salient issue is the strong increases in healthcare insurance premiums, which tend to overburden the household budgets of low- to middle-income earners. This raises the question of whether the system of competing mutual funds with parallel administrations is sustainable, and whether the liberal model of flat rate per capita premiums – albeit weakened by subsidies for low-income earners – can still be defended. Resilience is also limited regarding environmental durability: the Swiss health system could better take into account the close interactions between human, animal and environmental health (Senn et al. 2022). Resilience is also lacking with respect to the complex governance of the Swiss health system that is not sustainable in its current form, with its fragmentation across governance levels, lack of a central overview and steering body, poor foresight capacity regarding labor shortages, and excessive influence of insurance companies in the policymaking process (Monod et al. 2023). Finally, the system has room for improvement regarding its capacities to meet future challenges, be it population aging or health crises.
Citations:
Federal Council. 2019. “Health2030 – the Federal Council’s health policy strategy for the period 2020–2030.” https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/strategie-und-politik/gesundheit-2030/gesundheitspolitische-strategie-2030.html
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesanmt für Statistik). 2023. “Kosten. Finanzierung.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/gesundheit/kosten-finanzierung.html
GBD 2015 Healthcare Access and Quality Collaborators. 2017. “Healthcare Access and Quality Index based on mortality from causes amenable to personal healthcare in 195 countries and territories, 1990–2015: A novel analysis from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015.” The Lancet 390 (10091): 231-266.
Monod, S., Cavalli, V., Pin, S., and Grandchamp, C. 2023. “Système de santé suisse : y a-t-il un pilote dans la machine?” Rev Med Suisse 19 (819): 583–588. https://www.revmed.ch/revue-medicale-suisse/2023/revue-medicale-suisse-819/systeme-de-sante-suisse-y-a-t-il-un-pilote-dans-la-machine
Nicolas Senn, Marie Gaille, María del Río Carral, Julia Gonzalez Holguera. 2022. Santé et environnement: Vers une nouvelle approche globale. Chêne-Bourg: Editions Médecine et Hygiène.
Trein, Philipp, Adrian Vatter, and Christian Rüefli. 2022. “Gesundheitspolitik.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 903-930.
Trein, Philipp, Christian Rüefli, and Adrian Vatter. 2023. “Health Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 714–732. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.37
In 1996, health insurance was made obligatory for all residents. Premiums for health insurance do not depend on income and do not take into account the number of family members. Hence, insurance must be bought for each member of the family, although premiums are reduced for children. In recent years, this liberal model has been modified through the provision of subsidies for low-wage earners and their families. The cantons decide on the extent of subsidies; the federation covers about half the cost of these cantonal subsidies.
Mandatory healthcare insurance is provided by a large number of competing mutual funds (nonprofit insurance programs), all of which are required to offer the same benefits. However, health insurance companies can make a profit on optional healthcare insurance packages (see section P.11.3). Hence, there is no competition in the area of benefits, but only in the field of premiums, which is largely a function of administrative costs and membership structure. Considerable discussion has focused on whether this competitive market structure should be replaced by a single state-owned insurance company. In 2014, voters decided in a popular vote to retain the present system.
Total costs of the Swiss health sector amount to about 12% of GDP, and 13% of all employees work in the health sector (Trein et al. 2022: 904; Trein et al. 2023). In comparative view, Switzerland numbers among the countries with the highest healthcare costs, and arguably those with the highest quality of healthcare (see for instance the large Lancet study on comparative mortality index GBD 2015). The availability of health products and services is generally good, although the system has equity issues (see next subsection).
In 2021, the healthcare system was financed by the public sector (23%), by private mutual funds (health insurance providers) (36%), by other (private) health insurance providers (9%) and by patient own payments (22%) (FSO 2023). The health sector depends crucially on foreign labor, in particular physicians and nurses, since the Swiss education system does not attract and train enough such specialists.
Given this decentralized structure and the strong role of private (and competing) actors, there is no single answer to the question of how health policy contributes to the resilience of the health system.
Digitalization of health systems is a concern, in particular at the federal level (Federal Council 2019: 12-15). The system produces sufficient health products and services when and where they are needed, even in times of crisis. This was demonstrated during the pandemic when the health system was placed under strong pressure but did not collapse at any time.
While the resilience of the healthcare system in terms of quality, health outcomes and sufficient supply of health services is exceptional, the system has limited resilience in many regards, above all with regard to rising costs in the health sector. Currently, a number of attempts to curb the rapid increase in health expenditures are meeting with stiff resistance from vested interests, such as doctors, hospitals and health insurance funds. Arguably, the political elites have no consensus and or even convincing ideas regarding a grand cost-curbing strategy. Likewise, a salient issue is the strong increases in healthcare insurance premiums, which tend to overburden the household budgets of low- to middle-income earners. This raises the question of whether the system of competing mutual funds with parallel administrations is sustainable, and whether the liberal model of flat rate per capita premiums – albeit weakened by subsidies for low-income earners – can still be defended. Resilience is also limited regarding environmental durability: the Swiss health system could better take into account the close interactions between human, animal and environmental health (Senn et al. 2022). Resilience is also lacking with respect to the complex governance of the Swiss health system that is not sustainable in its current form, with its fragmentation across governance levels, lack of a central overview and steering body, poor foresight capacity regarding labor shortages, and excessive influence of insurance companies in the policymaking process (Monod et al. 2023). Finally, the system has room for improvement regarding its capacities to meet future challenges, be it population aging or health crises.
Citations:
Federal Council. 2019. “Health2030 – the Federal Council’s health policy strategy for the period 2020–2030.” https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/strategie-und-politik/gesundheit-2030/gesundheitspolitische-strategie-2030.html
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesanmt für Statistik). 2023. “Kosten. Finanzierung.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/gesundheit/kosten-finanzierung.html
GBD 2015 Healthcare Access and Quality Collaborators. 2017. “Healthcare Access and Quality Index based on mortality from causes amenable to personal healthcare in 195 countries and territories, 1990–2015: A novel analysis from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015.” The Lancet 390 (10091): 231-266.
Monod, S., Cavalli, V., Pin, S., and Grandchamp, C. 2023. “Système de santé suisse : y a-t-il un pilote dans la machine?” Rev Med Suisse 19 (819): 583–588. https://www.revmed.ch/revue-medicale-suisse/2023/revue-medicale-suisse-819/systeme-de-sante-suisse-y-a-t-il-un-pilote-dans-la-machine
Nicolas Senn, Marie Gaille, María del Río Carral, Julia Gonzalez Holguera. 2022. Santé et environnement: Vers une nouvelle approche globale. Chêne-Bourg: Editions Médecine et Hygiène.
Trein, Philipp, Adrian Vatter, and Christian Rüefli. 2022. “Gesundheitspolitik.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 903-930.
Trein, Philipp, Christian Rüefli, and Adrian Vatter. 2023. “Health Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 714–732. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.37
To what extent does current health policy hinder or facilitate achieving high-quality healthcare?
10
9
9
Health policies are fully aligned with the goal of achieving high-quality healthcare.
8
7
6
7
6
Health policies are largely aligned with the goal of achieving high-quality healthcare.
5
4
3
4
3
Health policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of achieving high-quality healthcare.
2
1
1
Health policies are not at all aligned with the goal of achieving high-quality healthcare.
By international standards, Swiss healthcare is of outstanding quality. The system fosters preventive healthcare, including detection and treatment, as well as the adoption of a healthy lifestyle. This is demonstrated by the country’s top position with regard to avoidable mortality and high life expectancy (see also FSO 2023) – phenomena that are also related to the general wealth and high quality of life in Switzerland. Health specialists note that despite excellent outcomes, the Swiss health system is oriented toward cutting-edge biomedical interventions at the individual level, while showing clear shortcomings with regard to preventive health, structural regulations and action on the social determinants of health (Monod/Grandchamp 2022). This latter perspective is believed to achieve better sustainability and stronger equity in the health field. To act in this direction, a large coalition of the main health advocacy organizations tried to pass a federal law on prevention and health promotion (LPrév), which failed in the Council of States in 2012 (Gesundheitsförderung Schweiz 2013).
Citations:
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023. Gesundheit. Taschenstatistik 2023. Neuchâtel: Bundesamt für Statistik. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/news/de/2023-0175 accessed on 2023 12 29
Mattig, T. 2013. Das gescheiterte Präventionsgesetz: ein Lehrstück. Arbeitspapier 9, Bern und Lausanne.
Gesundheitsförderung Schweiz.
Monod, S., and Grandchamp, C. 2022. “Système de santé suisse: aux origines de la machine.” Rev Med Suisse 8 (793): 1617–1620. https://www.revmed.ch/revue-medicale-suisse/2022/revue-medicale-suisse-793/systeme-de-sante-suisse-aux-origines-de-la-machine
Citations:
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023. Gesundheit. Taschenstatistik 2023. Neuchâtel: Bundesamt für Statistik. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/news/de/2023-0175 accessed on 2023 12 29
Mattig, T. 2013. Das gescheiterte Präventionsgesetz: ein Lehrstück. Arbeitspapier 9, Bern und Lausanne.
Gesundheitsförderung Schweiz.
Monod, S., and Grandchamp, C. 2022. “Système de santé suisse: aux origines de la machine.” Rev Med Suisse 8 (793): 1617–1620. https://www.revmed.ch/revue-medicale-suisse/2022/revue-medicale-suisse-793/systeme-de-sante-suisse-aux-origines-de-la-machine
To what extent does current health policy hinder or facilitate equitable access to high-quality healthcare?
10
9
9
Health policies are fully aligned with the goal of achieving equitable access to high-quality healthcare.
8
7
6
7
6
Health policies are largely aligned with the goal of achieving equitable access to high-quality healthcare.
5
4
3
4
3
Health policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of achieving equitable access to high-quality healthcare.
2
1
1
Health policies are not at all aligned with the goal of achieving equitable access to high-quality healthcare.
High-quality healthcare is accessible to all inhabitants, as basic insurance coverage is mandatory in Switzerland. However, an explorative small-N study conducted in the canton of Vaud showed that 40% of health insurance companies refused affiliation to undocumented migrants, which is against the law (Dabboudi et al. 2011).
However, there are further qualifications: As in many other countries, the supply of medical services varies by region, with large cities having higher densities of medical staff. More serious are the side effects of self-payments by patients. The share of healthcare costs borne by individuals is comparatively very high in Switzerland. Individuals pay a monthly health insurance premium (on average more than CHF 300), an annual deductible, and an additional participation in purchased medication and hospitalization costs. The basic insurance package does not cover elements that are considered basic elsewhere, including dental care, glasses or physiotherapy. For additional optional health insurance packages, the costs depend on individual characteristics, and health insurance providers can reject applicants. This accounts for inequalities in health access.
Drawing on several studies, the federal government reported that the proportion of people who forego medical services for cost reasons is in the range of 10% to 20% of the population. According to a report by the Swiss Health Observatory, the proportion of the population that has given up going to the doctor because of cost-related reasons rose sharply between 2010 and 2016, and is most marked in the 18 to 45 age group, with an increase of around 15% (Merçay 2016). The proportion of those who would forego necessary services is in the lower single-digit percentage range, although it is very difficult to define “necessary treatments” (Federal Council 2017: 22-26).
Citations:
Dabboubi, N., J. Diakhate, S. Piergiovanni, D. Solari, and D. Utebay. 2011. “Sans-papiers mais pas sans droit à la santé.” Revue médicale suisse 288 (3): 717–718.
Federal Council (Bundesrat). 2017. Kostenbeteiligung in der obligatorischen Krankenpflegeversicherung. Bericht des Bundesrats in Erfüllung des Postulats Schmid-Federer vom 22.03.2013 (13.3250 «Auswirkung der Franchise auf die Inanspruchnahme von medizinischen Leistungen») 28.06.2017. Bern: Bundesrat.
Mercay, Clémence. 2016. “Expeìrience de la population âgeìe de 18 ans et plus avec le systeÌme de santeì – Situation en Suisse et comparaison internationale: Analyse de l’International Health Policy Survey 2016 du Commonwealth Fund sur mandat de l’Office feìdeìral de la santeì publique (OFSP) (Obsan Dossier No. 56).” Neuchâtel: Observatoire suisse de la santeì. https://www.obsan.admin.ch/fr/publications/2016-experience-de-la-population-agee-de-18-ans-et-plus-avec-le-systeme-de-sante
However, there are further qualifications: As in many other countries, the supply of medical services varies by region, with large cities having higher densities of medical staff. More serious are the side effects of self-payments by patients. The share of healthcare costs borne by individuals is comparatively very high in Switzerland. Individuals pay a monthly health insurance premium (on average more than CHF 300), an annual deductible, and an additional participation in purchased medication and hospitalization costs. The basic insurance package does not cover elements that are considered basic elsewhere, including dental care, glasses or physiotherapy. For additional optional health insurance packages, the costs depend on individual characteristics, and health insurance providers can reject applicants. This accounts for inequalities in health access.
Drawing on several studies, the federal government reported that the proportion of people who forego medical services for cost reasons is in the range of 10% to 20% of the population. According to a report by the Swiss Health Observatory, the proportion of the population that has given up going to the doctor because of cost-related reasons rose sharply between 2010 and 2016, and is most marked in the 18 to 45 age group, with an increase of around 15% (Merçay 2016). The proportion of those who would forego necessary services is in the lower single-digit percentage range, although it is very difficult to define “necessary treatments” (Federal Council 2017: 22-26).
Citations:
Dabboubi, N., J. Diakhate, S. Piergiovanni, D. Solari, and D. Utebay. 2011. “Sans-papiers mais pas sans droit à la santé.” Revue médicale suisse 288 (3): 717–718.
Federal Council (Bundesrat). 2017. Kostenbeteiligung in der obligatorischen Krankenpflegeversicherung. Bericht des Bundesrats in Erfüllung des Postulats Schmid-Federer vom 22.03.2013 (13.3250 «Auswirkung der Franchise auf die Inanspruchnahme von medizinischen Leistungen») 28.06.2017. Bern: Bundesrat.
Mercay, Clémence. 2016. “Expeìrience de la population âgeìe de 18 ans et plus avec le systeÌme de santeì – Situation en Suisse et comparaison internationale: Analyse de l’International Health Policy Survey 2016 du Commonwealth Fund sur mandat de l’Office feìdeìral de la santeì publique (OFSP) (Obsan Dossier No. 56).” Neuchâtel: Observatoire suisse de la santeì. https://www.obsan.admin.ch/fr/publications/2016-experience-de-la-population-agee-de-18-ans-et-plus-avec-le-systeme-de-sante
Graph View
How committed is the government to ensuring gender equality in all respects?
10
9
9
The government is clearly committed to the goal of ensuring gender equality.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely committed to the goal of ensuring gender equality.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is only somewhat committed to the goal of ensuring gender equality.
2
1
1
The government is not at all committed to the goal of ensuring gender equality.
Passed in 1981, Article 8 of the constitution expressly states that women and men have equal rights and that gender discrimination is prohibited. A Federal Act on Gender Equality (1996) implements the constitutional mandate for gender equality in the workplace. Gender equality came late to Switzerland. It was only in 1971 that women were given suffrage on the national level. The last canton that – following pressure by the Federal Court – implemented female suffrage was Appenzell Innerrhoden in 1990.
Formally, gender equality is respected in law and politics with a Federal Office for Gender Equality and a Conference of Cantonal Delegates for Gender Equality supervising the implementation of the constitutional rules. There is no doubt that federal and cantonal governments are committed to the constitution and willing to implement rules of equality. It is much less clear whether these governments actively pursue the objective of gender equality. As in many other countries, gender equality is not reached in practice (Engeli 2022; 2023).
In 2021, a survey revealed that 82% of respondents think that women tend to do more unpaid domestic and caring work. Female employees find it particularly difficult to reconcile work and family. But equality is also an accepted goal in society: For example, only 10% of men and 11% of women prefer the traditional male-breadwinner model (Equality.CH 2021).
One of the major elements of gender inequality – the gender wage gap – occurs in the private sector of the economy. Public policy has done little to ease this situation. In 2022, the OECD found: “The sizable gender income gap and disproportionately high incidence of part-time work among women call for measures to address women’s disincentives to work full time. The high cost of childcare, and low supply of early childhood education as well as an organization of the school day that is not well aligned with working hours have long been reported as major reasons for difficulties of mothers to join the labor force full time… Moreover, the income tax system leads to high marginal taxation of second-earner incomes, adding further disincentives to work” (OECD 2022: 88f.).
Due to the difficulties in reconciling work and family typically experienced by women, female workers suffer from disadvantages in the area of pension funds. Frequently, they cannot contribute to these funds to the same extent as male workers do – mainly due to part-time employment or interrupted careers due to child-rearing – which means they receive lower pension payments during retirement. Therefore, old-age poverty rates are higher among women (Pro Senecute 2022). At least in this regard, an element of a recent reform of the pension system tried to improve the position of women (FSIO 2023). However, the political left considers this reform to be insufficient and not well targeted, and it triggered a popular vote that will be held in 2024.
Given the decentralized structure of Swiss politics in the field of gender equality, as well as the role of private firms in creating gender wage gaps and engaging in discrimination in career patterns, it is hard to evaluate the overall effect of equality-promoting policies. Starting from indicators of outcomes, the position of females seems to correspond at least to the continental European pattern. There is a noticeable gap in the share of women in high managerial positions, as only one woman serves as head of one of the 50 biggest Swiss companies. That woman is Magdalena Martullo-Blocher, the daughter of Christoph Blocher, the former leader of the SVP party (rts.ch 2020).
Regarding violence against women, sexual harassment is defined in the Labor Act and the Code of Obligations (private law), but it lacks a comprehensive definition in the Penal Code (see SECO), which limits opportunities for legal action. After many debates between the two chambers of the Federal Assembly, an extended definition of rape was adopted in 2023. While the majority of the National Council advocated an “only a yes is a yes” option, the Council of States won with a “no is no” option.
A major obstacle to realizing gender equality is the lack of policies helping to reconcile work and family. Family policy is clearly underdeveloped in Switzerland, and the lack of affordable public services for childcare may be a major impediment to gender equality in working life (Bürgisser and Häusermann 2022; 2023). Reforms fostering such policies have frequently lacked support in the political system, which is dominated by liberal-conservative forces. Moreover, these reforms have typically not been successful in popular votes. A major argument in these votes has been the consequences in terms of taxes needed to finance these goals. A related argument concerned the consequences for the tax wedge – that is, the increased labor costs – and its implication for the international competitiveness of Swiss industries.
Citations:
Engeli, Isabelle. 2022. “La politique d’égalité de genre.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 955-974. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Engeli, Isabelle. 2023. “Gender and Equality Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 753–770. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.39
Schweizerische Konferenz der Gleichstellungsbeauftragten. 2021. Nationales Barometer zur Gleichstellung 2021. Bern: SKG. https://www.equality.ch/pdf_d/Barometer_DE_komplett.pdf
FSIO (Federal Social Insurance Office, Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen). 2023. “Reform der beruflichen Vorsorge (BVG-Reform).”
https://www.bsv.admin.ch/bsv/de/home/sozialversicherungen/bv/reformen-und-revisionen.html
Häusermann, Silja, and Reto Bürgisser. 2022. “Familienpolitik.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 931-954.
Häusermann, Silja, and Reto Bürgisser. 2023. “Family Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 733–752. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.38
Pro Senecute. 2022. “Altersmonitor. Altersarmut in der Schweiz 2022, Teilbericht 1.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
Rts.ch. 2020. “Une Seule Femme Parmi les Dirigeants des 50 Plus Grandes Entreprises Suisses.” https://www.rts.ch/info/economie/10999117-une-seule-femme-parmi-les-dirigeants-des-50-plus-grandes-entreprises-suisses.html
SECO: https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/fr/home/Arbeit/Arbeitsbedingungen/gesundheitsschutz-am-arbeitsplatz/Psychosoziale-Risiken-am-Arbeitsplatz/Sexuelle-Belaestigung.html
Formally, gender equality is respected in law and politics with a Federal Office for Gender Equality and a Conference of Cantonal Delegates for Gender Equality supervising the implementation of the constitutional rules. There is no doubt that federal and cantonal governments are committed to the constitution and willing to implement rules of equality. It is much less clear whether these governments actively pursue the objective of gender equality. As in many other countries, gender equality is not reached in practice (Engeli 2022; 2023).
In 2021, a survey revealed that 82% of respondents think that women tend to do more unpaid domestic and caring work. Female employees find it particularly difficult to reconcile work and family. But equality is also an accepted goal in society: For example, only 10% of men and 11% of women prefer the traditional male-breadwinner model (Equality.CH 2021).
One of the major elements of gender inequality – the gender wage gap – occurs in the private sector of the economy. Public policy has done little to ease this situation. In 2022, the OECD found: “The sizable gender income gap and disproportionately high incidence of part-time work among women call for measures to address women’s disincentives to work full time. The high cost of childcare, and low supply of early childhood education as well as an organization of the school day that is not well aligned with working hours have long been reported as major reasons for difficulties of mothers to join the labor force full time… Moreover, the income tax system leads to high marginal taxation of second-earner incomes, adding further disincentives to work” (OECD 2022: 88f.).
Due to the difficulties in reconciling work and family typically experienced by women, female workers suffer from disadvantages in the area of pension funds. Frequently, they cannot contribute to these funds to the same extent as male workers do – mainly due to part-time employment or interrupted careers due to child-rearing – which means they receive lower pension payments during retirement. Therefore, old-age poverty rates are higher among women (Pro Senecute 2022). At least in this regard, an element of a recent reform of the pension system tried to improve the position of women (FSIO 2023). However, the political left considers this reform to be insufficient and not well targeted, and it triggered a popular vote that will be held in 2024.
Given the decentralized structure of Swiss politics in the field of gender equality, as well as the role of private firms in creating gender wage gaps and engaging in discrimination in career patterns, it is hard to evaluate the overall effect of equality-promoting policies. Starting from indicators of outcomes, the position of females seems to correspond at least to the continental European pattern. There is a noticeable gap in the share of women in high managerial positions, as only one woman serves as head of one of the 50 biggest Swiss companies. That woman is Magdalena Martullo-Blocher, the daughter of Christoph Blocher, the former leader of the SVP party (rts.ch 2020).
Regarding violence against women, sexual harassment is defined in the Labor Act and the Code of Obligations (private law), but it lacks a comprehensive definition in the Penal Code (see SECO), which limits opportunities for legal action. After many debates between the two chambers of the Federal Assembly, an extended definition of rape was adopted in 2023. While the majority of the National Council advocated an “only a yes is a yes” option, the Council of States won with a “no is no” option.
A major obstacle to realizing gender equality is the lack of policies helping to reconcile work and family. Family policy is clearly underdeveloped in Switzerland, and the lack of affordable public services for childcare may be a major impediment to gender equality in working life (Bürgisser and Häusermann 2022; 2023). Reforms fostering such policies have frequently lacked support in the political system, which is dominated by liberal-conservative forces. Moreover, these reforms have typically not been successful in popular votes. A major argument in these votes has been the consequences in terms of taxes needed to finance these goals. A related argument concerned the consequences for the tax wedge – that is, the increased labor costs – and its implication for the international competitiveness of Swiss industries.
Citations:
Engeli, Isabelle. 2022. “La politique d’égalité de genre.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 955-974. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Engeli, Isabelle. 2023. “Gender and Equality Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 753–770. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.39
Schweizerische Konferenz der Gleichstellungsbeauftragten. 2021. Nationales Barometer zur Gleichstellung 2021. Bern: SKG. https://www.equality.ch/pdf_d/Barometer_DE_komplett.pdf
FSIO (Federal Social Insurance Office, Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen). 2023. “Reform der beruflichen Vorsorge (BVG-Reform).”
https://www.bsv.admin.ch/bsv/de/home/sozialversicherungen/bv/reformen-und-revisionen.html
Häusermann, Silja, and Reto Bürgisser. 2022. “Familienpolitik.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 931-954.
Häusermann, Silja, and Reto Bürgisser. 2023. “Family Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 733–752. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.38
Pro Senecute. 2022. “Altersmonitor. Altersarmut in der Schweiz 2022, Teilbericht 1.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
Rts.ch. 2020. “Une Seule Femme Parmi les Dirigeants des 50 Plus Grandes Entreprises Suisses.” https://www.rts.ch/info/economie/10999117-une-seule-femme-parmi-les-dirigeants-des-50-plus-grandes-entreprises-suisses.html
SECO: https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/fr/home/Arbeit/Arbeitsbedingungen/gesundheitsschutz-am-arbeitsplatz/Psychosoziale-Risiken-am-Arbeitsplatz/Sexuelle-Belaestigung.html
Graph View
To what extent does the current family policy approach support or hinder unpaid family care work?
10
9
9
Family policies are fully aligned with the goal of creating the conditions for strong families.
8
7
6
7
6
Family policies are largely aligned with the goal of creating the conditions for strong families.
5
4
3
4
3
Family policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of creating the conditions for strong families.
2
1
1
Family policies are not at all aligned with the goal of creating family-friendly conditions.
In general, Swiss family policy has a clearly conservative outlook with a strong liberal undertone (Häusermann and Bürgisser 2022; 2023). It is mildly supportive of the traditional family. For example, there is a period of 14 weeks of parental leave for mothers (introduced after a popular vote only in 2004), as well as a very limited number of childcare facilities. In September 2020, a constitutional amendment was accepted in a public vote. The amendment, which establishes two weeks of parental leave for fathers, while covering 80% of the father’s wage, came into effect on 1 January 2021. This clearly falls short of the WHO guideline of six months of maternity leave, and likewise does very little to promote shared responsibility within households and families. There are no federal rules providing parents with paid leave to care for sick children or elderly family members in need of assistance.
Recent statistics show that women spend an average of 16.6 hours a week in paid employment compared to 27.3 hours for men. Likewise, women spend a weekly average of 28.1 hours on domestic work and men 17.9 hours (FSO 2017). Other figures show that within couples that live together, domestic chores are carried out by women in 60% of cases. In 33.7% of households, the tasks are divided equally between men and women. However, it was noted that inequalities in the distribution of domestic chores explode with children. Tasks are distributed equally among 49.5% of couples without children, as compared to 25.9% of couples in households with children under 25 (FSO 2019).
In international comparison, Swiss family policy has done relatively little to enable women to enter the workforce. Policies facilitating the reconciliation of work and family lag behind those in other comparable modern societies. Overall spending for family benefits is low in international comparison, and Switzerland ranks very low with regard to the length of paid maternity leave as well as enrollment of children between the ages of three and five in formal pre-primary education (Bürgisser and Häusermann 2022). Along with Turkey, Switzerland is at the bottom of enrollment rates in early childhood education and care (OECD 2022: 89). Additionally, the tax system with its high marginal personal income taxation of second earners, combined with high costs for external childcare, is a major impediment for caregivers, typically women, to move into the labor market. The OECD reports that “for a family with two young children using childcare facilities, the cost for a second earner to move from inactivity … to full-time employment (earning the average wage) represents 75% of the average wage, versus 53% on average in the OECD countries” (OECD 2022: 89).
A January 2009 federal law providing subsidy payments to families – amounting to 3.7% of all social policy spending in 2020 (FSIO 2022) – has done little to change the country’s ranking in international comparison. Nor has it changed the substantial variation between cantons, one of the most salient characteristics of Swiss family policy. The new federal law defines minimum child and education benefits, but cantons may add a variable amount to this basic federal benefit level. Single-parent families suffer in particular from lack of public support both with regard to income as well as affordable childcare facilities (FSIO 2023).
In 2020, the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report, which focused on the road out of the pandemic, ranked Switzerland 12th among 37 countries regarding expansions of care for the elderly, childcare, and healthcare infrastructure and innovation, after countries including Canada, the United States and Germany (WEF 2020: 74). It is also notable that many measures introduced to mitigate the pandemic placed a greater burden on women than on men. For example, the closure of schools and childcare facilities, as well as quarantine periods for children, were mostly compensated for by women who were pushed back into the household, reinforcing the traditionally conservative division of labor.
There are substantial variations in family policy at the cantonal and municipal levels. The canton of Ticino has a very extensive family policy aimed at helping mothers reconcile work and family; other cantons and their municipalities frequently fail to offer any substantial help, such as childcare facilities, on a broad scale. Differences and reform dynamics are particularly pronounced between municipalities with regard to external childcare. For example, in the largest canton, Zürich, 75% of the costs of preschool care (Kitas) are covered privately by parents (NZZ 9 December 2020). Local communities with minimalistic family policies coexist with municipalities that strongly facilitate the reconciliation of work and family for young mothers. The interplay of local, cantonal and federal family policies makes the policy process and power distribution very disparate.
Likewise, tax policies providing incentives either to stay at home or reenter the labor market vary from canton to canton. However, taking the median canton and municipality, the portrait of a liberal-conservative family policy applies. Policies tend to create incentives for young mothers to stay at home during the first years of their children’s lives (the short duration of the maternity leave notwithstanding). Afterward, mothers are provided with reasonable opportunities to find employment; however, these are in most cases part-time jobs. This incentivizes mothers to care for their children while also having some limited employment. Taking part-time jobs usually reduces the ability to have a sustained career compared to the opportunities offered by full-time employment (FSIO 2023; OECD 2022: 79). In this regard, the OECD recently suggested expanding affordable childcare and access to early childhood education so women can expand their working hours (OECD 2022: 89). Currently, the system works in the sense that it mobilizes women within the labor market, but without giving them opportunities for income and career advancement equal to those afforded to men – with considerable regional variation.
Citations:
Chzhen, Y., Anna Gromada, and Gwyther Rees. 2019. Are the World’s Richest Countries Family Friendly? Policy in the OECD and EU. Florence: UNICEF Office of Research.
Federal Council (Bundesrat). 2017. Familienbericht 2017. Bern: Bundesrat.
FSIO (Federal Social Insurance Office, Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen). 2022. Schweizerische Sozialversicherungsstatistik 2022. Bern: FSIO.
Federal Social Insurance Office, Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen. 2023. Die wirtschaftliche Situation von Familien in der Schweiz. Bern: FSIO.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2017. Schweizerische Arbeitskräfteerhebung, Unbezahlte Arbeit (Modul der Schweizerischen Arbeitskräfteerhebung SAKE), No je-f-03.06.00.01
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2019. Enquête sur les familles et les générations, No su-f-01.07.05.08.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2017. Familien in der Schweiz. Statistischer Bericht 2017. Neuenburg: BfS.
FOGE (Federal Office for Gender Equality). 18.06.2020. “Impact of the Pandemic on Families: Word and Childcare Place Greater Burden on Women Than Men.” https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-79484.html
Häusermann, Silja, and Reto Bürgisser. 2022. “Familienpolitik.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, edited by Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7: 931-954.
Häusermann, Silja, and Reto Bürgisser. 2023. “Family Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 733–752. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.38
Häusermann, Silja. 2013. “The Politics of Old and New Social Policies.” In The Politics of the New Welfare State, eds. Giuliano Bonoli and David Natali. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
NZZ. 2020. “Kitas in Zürich: Eltern Zahlen Drei Viertel Aller Kosten.” https://www.nzz.ch/zuerich/kitas-in-zuerich-eltern-zahlen-drei-viertel-aller-kosten-ld.1590904?mktcid=nled&mktcval=165_2020-12-09&kid=_2020-12-8&ga=1&trco
OECD. 2022. Economic Survey Switzerland, November 2022. Paris: OECD.
Stutz, Heid, Livia Bannwart, and Victor Legler. 2017. Familienberichte, Familienleitbilder und Familienkonzepte der Kantone. Forschungsbericht Nr. 1/2017, Bern: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen.
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle, and Dominique Oehrli. 2017. “Perceiving Reconciliation: Child Care Policies and Gendered Time Conflicts.” Gender & Society 31 (5): 597-623.
WEF. 2020. The Global Competitiveness Report: How Countries Are Performing on the Road to Recovery, Special Edition. Geneva: WEF. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2020.pdf
Recent statistics show that women spend an average of 16.6 hours a week in paid employment compared to 27.3 hours for men. Likewise, women spend a weekly average of 28.1 hours on domestic work and men 17.9 hours (FSO 2017). Other figures show that within couples that live together, domestic chores are carried out by women in 60% of cases. In 33.7% of households, the tasks are divided equally between men and women. However, it was noted that inequalities in the distribution of domestic chores explode with children. Tasks are distributed equally among 49.5% of couples without children, as compared to 25.9% of couples in households with children under 25 (FSO 2019).
In international comparison, Swiss family policy has done relatively little to enable women to enter the workforce. Policies facilitating the reconciliation of work and family lag behind those in other comparable modern societies. Overall spending for family benefits is low in international comparison, and Switzerland ranks very low with regard to the length of paid maternity leave as well as enrollment of children between the ages of three and five in formal pre-primary education (Bürgisser and Häusermann 2022). Along with Turkey, Switzerland is at the bottom of enrollment rates in early childhood education and care (OECD 2022: 89). Additionally, the tax system with its high marginal personal income taxation of second earners, combined with high costs for external childcare, is a major impediment for caregivers, typically women, to move into the labor market. The OECD reports that “for a family with two young children using childcare facilities, the cost for a second earner to move from inactivity … to full-time employment (earning the average wage) represents 75% of the average wage, versus 53% on average in the OECD countries” (OECD 2022: 89).
A January 2009 federal law providing subsidy payments to families – amounting to 3.7% of all social policy spending in 2020 (FSIO 2022) – has done little to change the country’s ranking in international comparison. Nor has it changed the substantial variation between cantons, one of the most salient characteristics of Swiss family policy. The new federal law defines minimum child and education benefits, but cantons may add a variable amount to this basic federal benefit level. Single-parent families suffer in particular from lack of public support both with regard to income as well as affordable childcare facilities (FSIO 2023).
In 2020, the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report, which focused on the road out of the pandemic, ranked Switzerland 12th among 37 countries regarding expansions of care for the elderly, childcare, and healthcare infrastructure and innovation, after countries including Canada, the United States and Germany (WEF 2020: 74). It is also notable that many measures introduced to mitigate the pandemic placed a greater burden on women than on men. For example, the closure of schools and childcare facilities, as well as quarantine periods for children, were mostly compensated for by women who were pushed back into the household, reinforcing the traditionally conservative division of labor.
There are substantial variations in family policy at the cantonal and municipal levels. The canton of Ticino has a very extensive family policy aimed at helping mothers reconcile work and family; other cantons and their municipalities frequently fail to offer any substantial help, such as childcare facilities, on a broad scale. Differences and reform dynamics are particularly pronounced between municipalities with regard to external childcare. For example, in the largest canton, Zürich, 75% of the costs of preschool care (Kitas) are covered privately by parents (NZZ 9 December 2020). Local communities with minimalistic family policies coexist with municipalities that strongly facilitate the reconciliation of work and family for young mothers. The interplay of local, cantonal and federal family policies makes the policy process and power distribution very disparate.
Likewise, tax policies providing incentives either to stay at home or reenter the labor market vary from canton to canton. However, taking the median canton and municipality, the portrait of a liberal-conservative family policy applies. Policies tend to create incentives for young mothers to stay at home during the first years of their children’s lives (the short duration of the maternity leave notwithstanding). Afterward, mothers are provided with reasonable opportunities to find employment; however, these are in most cases part-time jobs. This incentivizes mothers to care for their children while also having some limited employment. Taking part-time jobs usually reduces the ability to have a sustained career compared to the opportunities offered by full-time employment (FSIO 2023; OECD 2022: 79). In this regard, the OECD recently suggested expanding affordable childcare and access to early childhood education so women can expand their working hours (OECD 2022: 89). Currently, the system works in the sense that it mobilizes women within the labor market, but without giving them opportunities for income and career advancement equal to those afforded to men – with considerable regional variation.
Citations:
Chzhen, Y., Anna Gromada, and Gwyther Rees. 2019. Are the World’s Richest Countries Family Friendly? Policy in the OECD and EU. Florence: UNICEF Office of Research.
Federal Council (Bundesrat). 2017. Familienbericht 2017. Bern: Bundesrat.
FSIO (Federal Social Insurance Office, Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen). 2022. Schweizerische Sozialversicherungsstatistik 2022. Bern: FSIO.
Federal Social Insurance Office, Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen. 2023. Die wirtschaftliche Situation von Familien in der Schweiz. Bern: FSIO.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2017. Schweizerische Arbeitskräfteerhebung, Unbezahlte Arbeit (Modul der Schweizerischen Arbeitskräfteerhebung SAKE), No je-f-03.06.00.01
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2019. Enquête sur les familles et les générations, No su-f-01.07.05.08.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2017. Familien in der Schweiz. Statistischer Bericht 2017. Neuenburg: BfS.
FOGE (Federal Office for Gender Equality). 18.06.2020. “Impact of the Pandemic on Families: Word and Childcare Place Greater Burden on Women Than Men.” https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-79484.html
Häusermann, Silja, and Reto Bürgisser. 2022. “Familienpolitik.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, edited by Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7: 931-954.
Häusermann, Silja, and Reto Bürgisser. 2023. “Family Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 733–752. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.38
Häusermann, Silja. 2013. “The Politics of Old and New Social Policies.” In The Politics of the New Welfare State, eds. Giuliano Bonoli and David Natali. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
NZZ. 2020. “Kitas in Zürich: Eltern Zahlen Drei Viertel Aller Kosten.” https://www.nzz.ch/zuerich/kitas-in-zuerich-eltern-zahlen-drei-viertel-aller-kosten-ld.1590904?mktcid=nled&mktcval=165_2020-12-09&kid=_2020-12-8&ga=1&trco
OECD. 2022. Economic Survey Switzerland, November 2022. Paris: OECD.
Stutz, Heid, Livia Bannwart, and Victor Legler. 2017. Familienberichte, Familienleitbilder und Familienkonzepte der Kantone. Forschungsbericht Nr. 1/2017, Bern: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen.
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle, and Dominique Oehrli. 2017. “Perceiving Reconciliation: Child Care Policies and Gendered Time Conflicts.” Gender & Society 31 (5): 597-623.
WEF. 2020. The Global Competitiveness Report: How Countries Are Performing on the Road to Recovery, Special Edition. Geneva: WEF. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2020.pdf
Graph View
To what extent does the current pension policy approach prevent poverty among senior citizens?
10
9
9
Pension policies are fully aligned with the goal of preventing old-age poverty.
8
7
6
7
6
Pension policies are largely aligned with the goal of preventing old-age poverty.
5
4
3
4
3
Pension policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of preventing old-age poverty.
2
1
1
Pension policies are not at all aligned with the goal of preventing old-age poverty.
The Swiss pension system is based on three pillars, each with its own logic of financing and redistribution. The underlying concept is that pension income should not fall below the subsistence level and should provide 60% of average pre-retirement income. The first pillar guarantees a basic income. The minimum benefit level for a single person in 2023 was CHF 1,225 per month, while the maximum benefit was CHF 2,450 per month. The sum of the two individual pensions of a married couple may not exceed 150% of the maximum pension (i.e., CHF 3,675 per month). If this maximum amount is exceeded, the two individual pensions are reduced accordingly. Employers and employees finance this through contributions. It is a pay-as-you-go system and is highly redistributive, since the maximum benefit level for couples (provided to high-income earners) is just 1.5 times that of the minimum benefit level, while contributions are proportional to income. Every resident has to contribute to this first pillar.
The second pillar is a funded system financed through contributions by employers and employees. Contributions and benefits are proportional to income. Employees whose income from the first pillar already covers about 60% of their wage income are not entitled to this system. Many pension programs, particularly in the public sector, are very generous and provide pension incomes (first and second pillars combined) that exceed 60% of previous income. Historically, this system of occupational pensions is the core of the Swiss pension system, and powerful interests – especially major political parties and financial institutions – have allowed for only piecemeal reforms (Armingeon 2018; Leimgruber 2008).
The third pillar takes the form of personal tax-deductible savings of up to CHF 7,056 per year (2023). This system benefits high-income groups, since they can afford to put aside these sums and have the highest returns on these savings given the tax advantages.
In international comparison, the Swiss pension system performs extremely well. According to a comparative analysis of 24 countries, this system has one of the smallest pension gaps among developed democracies. A pension gap is the estimated share of income which a worker at age 50 must save privately in addition to contributions to the pension system if she wants to enjoy an adequate lifestyle during retirement. The respective figure for Switzerland is 14%, while in Germany it is 30%, in the United Kingdom 26% and in France 44% (UBS 2021).
Typically, low-income groups are neither covered by the second pillar nor can they afford to use the third pillar (FSO 2023). If their pension income does not meet the minimal costs of living, they can apply for additional payments (Ergänzungsleistungen). For example, a pensioner (single, with usual rent and health insurance costs) who receives the minimum pension is entitled to another CHF 6,000 per annum as supplementary benefits, resulting in an annual income of about CHF 20,000 (https://www.ahv-iv.ch/en/Social-insurances/Supplementary-benefits-EL). Given the Swiss cost of living, it is extremely hard to survive with this income. In addition, these additional payments are means-tested – that is, they are stigmatizing, and many individuals who are entitled to additional payments either do not know about it, are discouraged by the complexity of the system or are embarrassed to ask for this social assistance (Leyvraz et al. 2022).
Statistics from the OECD (2022) and a recent survey on old-age poverty (Pro Senecute 2022) show that Switzerland’s old-age poverty rate is above the OECD average. Old-age poverty affects about 15% of the population aged 65 or above, which is striking given the overall wealth of the country. This rate could be halved if all eligible pensioners claimed social assistance (Pro Senecute 2023). Poverty is measured as having an income below half the national median equivalized household disposable income. If a measure of material deprivation is applied, Switzerland has one of the lowest shares of the population aged 65 or above being in a state of deprivation (i.e., not possessing items considered basic, such as a washing machine, telephone or television; not living in a neighborhood without excessive criminality or noise; and not being able to afford expenditures such as eating meat twice a week, heating the apartment or paying an unforeseen expenditure of around CHF 2,000) (Bonoli and Fossati 2022; 2023: 708 – 709).
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus. 2018. “Die Entwicklung der schweizerischen Altersvorsorge.” Swiss Political Science Review 24 (1): 43-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12291
Bertozzi, Fabio, Giuliano Bonoli, and Benoit Gay-des-Combes. 2005. La Reìforme De L’etat Social En Suisse. Vieillissement, Emploi, Conflit Travail-Famille. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.
Bonoli, Giuliano, and Flavia Fossati. 2022. “Les politiques sociales.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 7th ed., 883-902.
Bonoli, Giuliano, and Flavia Fossati. 2023. “Social Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 695–713. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.36
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023. “Recipients of Old-Age Benefits.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/social-security/old-age-provision-reports/recipients-old-age-benefits.html
Anne-Cécile Leyvraz, Jean-Pierre Tabin, Cédric Gaspoz, Camille Pellaton, Boris Fritscher, and Ulysse Rosselet. 2022. “Obstacles au développement d’un instrument pour lutter contre le non-recours aux prestations sociales sous condition de ressources en Suisse romande.” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziale Arbeit 30: 63-83.
Leimgruber, Matthieu. 2008. Solidarity without the State?: Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State, 1890-2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
OECD. 2023. Pensions at a Glance. Paris: OECD.
Pro Senecute. 2022. “Altersmonitor. Altersarmut in der Schweiz 2022, Teilbericht 1.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
Pro Senecute. 2023. “Altersmonitor. Nichtbezug von Ergänzungsleistungen in der Schweiz, Teilbericht 2.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
UBS. 2021. “UBS International Pension Gap Index.” https://www.ubs.com/ch/de/private/pension/pension-gap-index.html
The second pillar is a funded system financed through contributions by employers and employees. Contributions and benefits are proportional to income. Employees whose income from the first pillar already covers about 60% of their wage income are not entitled to this system. Many pension programs, particularly in the public sector, are very generous and provide pension incomes (first and second pillars combined) that exceed 60% of previous income. Historically, this system of occupational pensions is the core of the Swiss pension system, and powerful interests – especially major political parties and financial institutions – have allowed for only piecemeal reforms (Armingeon 2018; Leimgruber 2008).
The third pillar takes the form of personal tax-deductible savings of up to CHF 7,056 per year (2023). This system benefits high-income groups, since they can afford to put aside these sums and have the highest returns on these savings given the tax advantages.
In international comparison, the Swiss pension system performs extremely well. According to a comparative analysis of 24 countries, this system has one of the smallest pension gaps among developed democracies. A pension gap is the estimated share of income which a worker at age 50 must save privately in addition to contributions to the pension system if she wants to enjoy an adequate lifestyle during retirement. The respective figure for Switzerland is 14%, while in Germany it is 30%, in the United Kingdom 26% and in France 44% (UBS 2021).
Typically, low-income groups are neither covered by the second pillar nor can they afford to use the third pillar (FSO 2023). If their pension income does not meet the minimal costs of living, they can apply for additional payments (Ergänzungsleistungen). For example, a pensioner (single, with usual rent and health insurance costs) who receives the minimum pension is entitled to another CHF 6,000 per annum as supplementary benefits, resulting in an annual income of about CHF 20,000 (https://www.ahv-iv.ch/en/Social-insurances/Supplementary-benefits-EL). Given the Swiss cost of living, it is extremely hard to survive with this income. In addition, these additional payments are means-tested – that is, they are stigmatizing, and many individuals who are entitled to additional payments either do not know about it, are discouraged by the complexity of the system or are embarrassed to ask for this social assistance (Leyvraz et al. 2022).
Statistics from the OECD (2022) and a recent survey on old-age poverty (Pro Senecute 2022) show that Switzerland’s old-age poverty rate is above the OECD average. Old-age poverty affects about 15% of the population aged 65 or above, which is striking given the overall wealth of the country. This rate could be halved if all eligible pensioners claimed social assistance (Pro Senecute 2023). Poverty is measured as having an income below half the national median equivalized household disposable income. If a measure of material deprivation is applied, Switzerland has one of the lowest shares of the population aged 65 or above being in a state of deprivation (i.e., not possessing items considered basic, such as a washing machine, telephone or television; not living in a neighborhood without excessive criminality or noise; and not being able to afford expenditures such as eating meat twice a week, heating the apartment or paying an unforeseen expenditure of around CHF 2,000) (Bonoli and Fossati 2022; 2023: 708 – 709).
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus. 2018. “Die Entwicklung der schweizerischen Altersvorsorge.” Swiss Political Science Review 24 (1): 43-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12291
Bertozzi, Fabio, Giuliano Bonoli, and Benoit Gay-des-Combes. 2005. La Reìforme De L’etat Social En Suisse. Vieillissement, Emploi, Conflit Travail-Famille. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.
Bonoli, Giuliano, and Flavia Fossati. 2022. “Les politiques sociales.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 7th ed., 883-902.
Bonoli, Giuliano, and Flavia Fossati. 2023. “Social Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 695–713. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.36
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023. “Recipients of Old-Age Benefits.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/social-security/old-age-provision-reports/recipients-old-age-benefits.html
Anne-Cécile Leyvraz, Jean-Pierre Tabin, Cédric Gaspoz, Camille Pellaton, Boris Fritscher, and Ulysse Rosselet. 2022. “Obstacles au développement d’un instrument pour lutter contre le non-recours aux prestations sociales sous condition de ressources en Suisse romande.” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziale Arbeit 30: 63-83.
Leimgruber, Matthieu. 2008. Solidarity without the State?: Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State, 1890-2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
OECD. 2023. Pensions at a Glance. Paris: OECD.
Pro Senecute. 2022. “Altersmonitor. Altersarmut in der Schweiz 2022, Teilbericht 1.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
Pro Senecute. 2023. “Altersmonitor. Nichtbezug von Ergänzungsleistungen in der Schweiz, Teilbericht 2.” https://www.prosenectute.ch/de/fachwelt/publikationen/altersmonitor.html
UBS. 2021. “UBS International Pension Gap Index.” https://www.ubs.com/ch/de/private/pension/pension-gap-index.html
To what extent does the current pension policy approach hinder or promote intergenerational equity?
10
9
9
Pension policies are fully aligned with the goal of achieving intergenerational equity.
8
7
6
7
6
Pension policies are largely aligned with the goal of achieving intergenerational equity.
5
4
3
4
3
Pension policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of achieving intergenerational equity.
2
1
1
Pension policies are not at all aligned with the goal of achieving intergenerational equity.
The Swiss pension system is composed of three pillars (see also P14.1). The first pillar is highly redistributive since the spread between minimum and maximum pensions is low (i.e., maximum pensions are twice minimum pensions) while contributions to the first pillar are basically linear to income. This corresponds to a social democratic model of redistributive social policy.
The second pillar is conservative, since its benefits are linear to income during working life. While the first pillar is a pay-as-you-go system, the second pillar is a capital accumulation fund in the name of the contributor.
The third pillar is liberal and regressive, since only well-to-do citizens can afford to contribute to these tax-deductible funds; the higher the income, the greater the beneficial effects of this pillar (Armingeon 2001; Bonoli and Fossati 2022; 2023).
The pension system offers few incentives to work longer. In the first pillar, pensions can be deferred if individuals work beyond age 65. This leads to slightly higher pension payments afterward. There is also the possibility of early retirement with reduced pensions in both the first and second pillars. However, this is mainly a feasible option for high-income groups who will receive sufficiently high pensions from the second and perhaps also the third pillar.
Given demographic developments, the first pillar is particularly vulnerable. In the second pillar, there are also some opportunities to redistribute from younger generations to older ones. Notwithstanding the likely unsustainability of the first pillar due to demographic aging, the political left supports the extension of the first pillar because of its redistributive logic and its aim to minimize old-age poverty. This implies either a shrinking of the size of the second pillar or higher taxes or social contributions. Hence, the values of intergenerational and intragenerational equity are in conflict, and it depends on political views which solution is preferred.
A recent study finds that there is no majority for substantial retrenchment of pension systems, particularly regarding an increase in the retirement age. Likewise, there is no majority for increasing the generosity of the system if this endangers its financial sustainability (Häusermann et al. 2019). Hence, major reforms in the coming years do not seem very likely.
In sum, while there are certainly some demographic challenges for the Swiss pension system, given its three-pillar construction it is more robust than national systems that rely only on pay-as-you-go pension systems.
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus. 2001. “Institutionalising the Swiss Welfare State.” West European Politics 24 (2): 145-168.
Bonoli, Giuliano, and Fossati, Flavia. 2023. “Social Policy.” In Emmenegger, Patrick, Fossati, Flavia, Häusermann, Silja, Papadopoulos, Yannis, Sciarini, Pascal, and Adrian Vatter, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 695–713. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.36
Bonoli, Giuliano, and Flavia Fossati. 2022. “Les politiques sociales.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. 883-902.
Häusermann, Silja, Thomas Kurer, and Denise Traber. 2019. “The Politics of Trade-Offs: Studying the Dynamics of Welfare State Reform With Conjoint Experiments.” Comparative Political Studies 52: 1059-1095.
The second pillar is conservative, since its benefits are linear to income during working life. While the first pillar is a pay-as-you-go system, the second pillar is a capital accumulation fund in the name of the contributor.
The third pillar is liberal and regressive, since only well-to-do citizens can afford to contribute to these tax-deductible funds; the higher the income, the greater the beneficial effects of this pillar (Armingeon 2001; Bonoli and Fossati 2022; 2023).
The pension system offers few incentives to work longer. In the first pillar, pensions can be deferred if individuals work beyond age 65. This leads to slightly higher pension payments afterward. There is also the possibility of early retirement with reduced pensions in both the first and second pillars. However, this is mainly a feasible option for high-income groups who will receive sufficiently high pensions from the second and perhaps also the third pillar.
Given demographic developments, the first pillar is particularly vulnerable. In the second pillar, there are also some opportunities to redistribute from younger generations to older ones. Notwithstanding the likely unsustainability of the first pillar due to demographic aging, the political left supports the extension of the first pillar because of its redistributive logic and its aim to minimize old-age poverty. This implies either a shrinking of the size of the second pillar or higher taxes or social contributions. Hence, the values of intergenerational and intragenerational equity are in conflict, and it depends on political views which solution is preferred.
A recent study finds that there is no majority for substantial retrenchment of pension systems, particularly regarding an increase in the retirement age. Likewise, there is no majority for increasing the generosity of the system if this endangers its financial sustainability (Häusermann et al. 2019). Hence, major reforms in the coming years do not seem very likely.
In sum, while there are certainly some demographic challenges for the Swiss pension system, given its three-pillar construction it is more robust than national systems that rely only on pay-as-you-go pension systems.
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus. 2001. “Institutionalising the Swiss Welfare State.” West European Politics 24 (2): 145-168.
Bonoli, Giuliano, and Fossati, Flavia. 2023. “Social Policy.” In Emmenegger, Patrick, Fossati, Flavia, Häusermann, Silja, Papadopoulos, Yannis, Sciarini, Pascal, and Adrian Vatter, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 695–713. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.36
Bonoli, Giuliano, and Flavia Fossati. 2022. “Les politiques sociales.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. 883-902.
Häusermann, Silja, Thomas Kurer, and Denise Traber. 2019. “The Politics of Trade-Offs: Studying the Dynamics of Welfare State Reform With Conjoint Experiments.” Comparative Political Studies 52: 1059-1095.
Graph View
To what extent does the current policy approach hinder or facilitate the inclusion of migrants into society and the labor market?
10
9
9
Integration policies are fully aligned with achieving the sustainable inclusion of migrants in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Integration policies are largely aligned with achieving the sustainable inclusion of migrants in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Integration policies are only somewhat aligned with achieving the sustainable inclusion of migrants in society.
2
1
1
Integration policies are not at all aligned with achieving the sustainable inclusion of migrants in society.
Swiss industries depend heavily on the recruitment of foreign labor. In the first postwar decades, immigration mainly involved low-skilled workers from Mediterranean countries, though some sectors such as universities also relied on high-skilled labor. Since the 1990s, the pattern of immigration has changed, with an emphasis on high-skilled labor. Currently, Germans and Italians are the largest group of foreigners. Forty-one percent of the Swiss population had a migration background in 2022 (FSO 2023), and about 25% of the population has no Swiss passport. Immigration is one of the most salient political issues, with the largest political party – the Swiss People’s Party – taking a very critical stance on immigration.
Apart from the small share of asylum-seekers and refugees from Ukraine, access to the labor market is available, as foreigners fill the market needs. For high-skilled foreign labor, unemployment figures and rates of reliance on social assistance are as low or even lower than among Swiss citizens, while these figures are higher among low-skilled foreign workers. Most migrants come from the EU based on the bilateral treaty on the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the EU. This treaty creates conditions for EU immigrants that are similar to those that EU citizens enjoy within the EU. Citizens of non-EU/EFTA countries may immigrate only if they are highly skilled, and if similarly qualified workers cannot be recruited from the EU/EFTA. For the group of foreigners permanently residing in Switzerland, rules relating to family reunification and change of place of residence have been strongly liberalized (Lavenex and Manatschal 2022; Lavenex 2023; Manatschal 2023; Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration, 15 Dec. 2005, article 37 and chapter 7).
Integration characteristics vary by cantons and municipalities, and the group of foreigners in the country is highly diverse, ranging from high-skill specialists to precarious workers in the informal economy.
While immigration policy is mainly based on economic needs, integration policy is politics-driven (Lutz 2019) and is implemented by cantons with considerable intercantonal differences (Manatschal/Stadelmann-Steffen 2013). For many years, Swiss integration policy was predicated on the perception that foreigners were “guest workers,” whose limited stay meant that broad efforts to encourage integration were unnecessary. As many foreign workers gained access to unlimited-time work permits between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, the policy approach grew inappropriate over time. Accordingly, a number of efforts to improve integration policy have been made, starting as early as kindergarten. Nonetheless, integration policy cannot broadly be called a success in Switzerland. For example, the Migrant Integration Policy Index score for Switzerland (MIPEX 2022, data for 2019) is “halfway favorable” (45), while being clearly below all neighboring countries except Austria. There is substantial variation in integration success across different groups of migrants. In 2017, 39% of migrants from Northern and Western Europe were members of voluntary associations and groups compared to about 50% of Swiss citizens without a migration background. In contrast, less than 20% of those from southern and eastern European countries hold such memberships.
Yet if the lack of a coherent federal integration policy is undisputable, this does not mean that integration policy as a whole is failing. Many local and cantonal authorities are doing a good and sometimes innovative job with regard to integration services, especially for second-generation migrants. In this respect, most policy development and implementation tasks are decentralized to the local and regional levels.
According to OECD statistics, second-generation migrants in Switzerland perform better in school and are better integrated into the labor market than in other European countries. This is not to say that immigrants have equal opportunities. Individuals with an immigration background score lower on PISA tests and are less likely to go to university than individuals with Swiss-born parents (Picot/Hou 2013). If immigrants’ rates of unemployment and dependence on social aid are above the national average, this is in part because the share of low-skilled workers, with a correspondingly higher risk of unemployment, is also above average among immigrants. But the lack of a coherent integration policy may add to the problems, and social discrimination is not limited to the labor market. Within the housing market, for instance, some groups of immigrants find it comparatively difficult to rent apartments, and rental agents openly discriminate against applicants based on racial stereotypes (Bonnet/Pollard 2021).
Thirty-seven percent of the resident foreign population comes from countries in which one of the official languages of Switzerland is spoken (Germany, Italy, France, Austria) (FSO 2023b). Among high-skilled workers, language is also a secondary problem, since English is the lingua franca in many industries. Language problems are considerable among less-skilled workers and refugees/asylum seekers. Depending on the canton, various opportunities exist to learn the language of the region.
Social integration is difficult for expats in Switzerland. According to a large survey among expats, the country ranks 47th among 53 nations with regard to ease of settling. Expats express concerns about local friendliness and welcome. The headline of the report reads: “Expat life in Switzerland is safe, but lonely and expensive” (InterNations 2024).
With regard to naturalization, about 41,500 foreigners were granted Swiss citizenship in 2022, with Germans and Italians comprising the largest groups (FSO 2023c). Calculating the number of naturalizations as a share of all migrants actually living in the country, the Swiss rate of naturalization is very low in comparison with other consolidated democracies. In 2022, about 2.0% of resident foreigners acquired Swiss citizenship (FSO 2023c). Only some of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and a few Western democracies – such as Austria and Germany – have similar or lower naturalization rates. The naturalization procedure is burdensome. As naturalization in Switzerland is a bottom-up process that starts at the level of the commune, considerable regional differences are evident, with some communes and cantons pursuing a liberal naturalization policy, and others acting more restrictively. The potentially arbitrary nature of naturalization procedures in municipalities is also regularly discussed.
These regional differences also show up with regard to the issue of political rights. A few cantons and communes – particularly in the French-speaking part of the country – grant political participation rights to foreigners, even though the federal government does not. Thus, with regard to integration, naturalization and legislation on political rights, we find a bottom-up approach rather than federal standards, which also raises the question of equal treatment and equal opportunities for foreigners.
In Switzerland, as in all contemporary societies, some segments of the population have suffered from globalization, and in particular from the free movement of labor. These “globalization losers” are particularly likely to hold xenophobic attitudes – to insist on “my country first” positions – and, consequently, to vote for right-wing populist parties. The Swiss People’s Party is the political party with the strongest electoral support. It has been particularly successful in mobilizing these segments of society. However, this is a far-from-perfect explanation. In a 2017 survey (MOSAiCH), 59% of all respondents with below-median years of education supported a xenophobic statement, compared to 43% of those with above-median years of education.
About 70% of all prison inmates are foreigners; most of them are nonresident foreigners. For the resident population, the share of foreign prison inmates is 40%, which in part reflects the fact that some groups of foreigners are on average low-skilled, a characteristic that itself correlates with a higher incarceration rate. Human rights NGOs have documented acts of racism and violence from the police against visible minorities, sometimes even resulting in deaths (Amnesty International 2007).
Therefore, on the one hand, there is limited prospect for a more generous and liberal integration policy in the near term given the strength of integration-averse political actors and citizens. On the other hand, as a comparative analysis of European Social Survey data shows, Switzerland numbers among the least xenophobic societies in Western Europe, together with the Nordic countries; for example, the country is much less xenophobic than Austria, the United Kingdom or France (Armingeon/Engler 2015).
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2007. “Police, justice et droits humains, pratiques policières et droits humains en Suisse, préoccupations et recommandations d’Amnesty International.” https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/europe-asie-centrale/suisse/docs/2007/rapport-pour-une-police-respectueuse-des-droits-humains/rapportpolice_fr.pdf
Armingeon, Klaus and Sarah Engler. 2015. “Polarisierung als Strategie: Die Polarisierung des Schweizer Parteiensystems im internationalen Vergleich.” In Wahlen und Wählerschaften in der Schweiz, eds. Markus Freitag and Adrian Vatter, 355-379, 467-469. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Francois Bonnet and Julie Pollard. 2021. “Tenant Selection in the Private Rental Sector of Paris and Geneva.” Housing Studies 36 (9): 1427-1445. DOI: 10.1080/02673037.2020.1769565
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik) 2023a. “Population by Migration Status.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/by-migration-status.html
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023b. “Composition of the Foreign Population.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/foreign/composition.html
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023. “Acquisition of Swiss citizenship.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/citizenship/acquisition-citizenship.html
InterNations. 2024. “Expat City Ranking 2023.” https://www.internations.org/expat-insider/2023/switzerland-40376
Lavenex, Sandra, Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, and Philipp Lutz. 2021. “Migration.” In Eine Aussenpolitik für die Schweiz, eds. Thomas Bernauer, Katja Gentinetta, and Joëlle Kuntz. Zürich: NZZ Verlag.
Lavenex, Sandra, and Anita Manatschal. 2022. “Migrationspolitik.” In Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, eds., Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 857-881.
Lavenex, Sandra. 2023. “Migration Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 658–676. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.34
Lutz, Philipp. 2019. Inside the Migration State: The Quest for Democratic Legitimacy. Bern: unpublished PhD Dissertation.
Manatschal, Anita. 2023. “Integration Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 677–694. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.35
Picot, G., and Hou, F. 2013. “Why Immigrant Background Matters for University Participation: A Comparison of Switzerland and Canada.” International Migration Review 47 (3): 612-642. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12038
Apart from the small share of asylum-seekers and refugees from Ukraine, access to the labor market is available, as foreigners fill the market needs. For high-skilled foreign labor, unemployment figures and rates of reliance on social assistance are as low or even lower than among Swiss citizens, while these figures are higher among low-skilled foreign workers. Most migrants come from the EU based on the bilateral treaty on the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the EU. This treaty creates conditions for EU immigrants that are similar to those that EU citizens enjoy within the EU. Citizens of non-EU/EFTA countries may immigrate only if they are highly skilled, and if similarly qualified workers cannot be recruited from the EU/EFTA. For the group of foreigners permanently residing in Switzerland, rules relating to family reunification and change of place of residence have been strongly liberalized (Lavenex and Manatschal 2022; Lavenex 2023; Manatschal 2023; Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration, 15 Dec. 2005, article 37 and chapter 7).
Integration characteristics vary by cantons and municipalities, and the group of foreigners in the country is highly diverse, ranging from high-skill specialists to precarious workers in the informal economy.
While immigration policy is mainly based on economic needs, integration policy is politics-driven (Lutz 2019) and is implemented by cantons with considerable intercantonal differences (Manatschal/Stadelmann-Steffen 2013). For many years, Swiss integration policy was predicated on the perception that foreigners were “guest workers,” whose limited stay meant that broad efforts to encourage integration were unnecessary. As many foreign workers gained access to unlimited-time work permits between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, the policy approach grew inappropriate over time. Accordingly, a number of efforts to improve integration policy have been made, starting as early as kindergarten. Nonetheless, integration policy cannot broadly be called a success in Switzerland. For example, the Migrant Integration Policy Index score for Switzerland (MIPEX 2022, data for 2019) is “halfway favorable” (45), while being clearly below all neighboring countries except Austria. There is substantial variation in integration success across different groups of migrants. In 2017, 39% of migrants from Northern and Western Europe were members of voluntary associations and groups compared to about 50% of Swiss citizens without a migration background. In contrast, less than 20% of those from southern and eastern European countries hold such memberships.
Yet if the lack of a coherent federal integration policy is undisputable, this does not mean that integration policy as a whole is failing. Many local and cantonal authorities are doing a good and sometimes innovative job with regard to integration services, especially for second-generation migrants. In this respect, most policy development and implementation tasks are decentralized to the local and regional levels.
According to OECD statistics, second-generation migrants in Switzerland perform better in school and are better integrated into the labor market than in other European countries. This is not to say that immigrants have equal opportunities. Individuals with an immigration background score lower on PISA tests and are less likely to go to university than individuals with Swiss-born parents (Picot/Hou 2013). If immigrants’ rates of unemployment and dependence on social aid are above the national average, this is in part because the share of low-skilled workers, with a correspondingly higher risk of unemployment, is also above average among immigrants. But the lack of a coherent integration policy may add to the problems, and social discrimination is not limited to the labor market. Within the housing market, for instance, some groups of immigrants find it comparatively difficult to rent apartments, and rental agents openly discriminate against applicants based on racial stereotypes (Bonnet/Pollard 2021).
Thirty-seven percent of the resident foreign population comes from countries in which one of the official languages of Switzerland is spoken (Germany, Italy, France, Austria) (FSO 2023b). Among high-skilled workers, language is also a secondary problem, since English is the lingua franca in many industries. Language problems are considerable among less-skilled workers and refugees/asylum seekers. Depending on the canton, various opportunities exist to learn the language of the region.
Social integration is difficult for expats in Switzerland. According to a large survey among expats, the country ranks 47th among 53 nations with regard to ease of settling. Expats express concerns about local friendliness and welcome. The headline of the report reads: “Expat life in Switzerland is safe, but lonely and expensive” (InterNations 2024).
With regard to naturalization, about 41,500 foreigners were granted Swiss citizenship in 2022, with Germans and Italians comprising the largest groups (FSO 2023c). Calculating the number of naturalizations as a share of all migrants actually living in the country, the Swiss rate of naturalization is very low in comparison with other consolidated democracies. In 2022, about 2.0% of resident foreigners acquired Swiss citizenship (FSO 2023c). Only some of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and a few Western democracies – such as Austria and Germany – have similar or lower naturalization rates. The naturalization procedure is burdensome. As naturalization in Switzerland is a bottom-up process that starts at the level of the commune, considerable regional differences are evident, with some communes and cantons pursuing a liberal naturalization policy, and others acting more restrictively. The potentially arbitrary nature of naturalization procedures in municipalities is also regularly discussed.
These regional differences also show up with regard to the issue of political rights. A few cantons and communes – particularly in the French-speaking part of the country – grant political participation rights to foreigners, even though the federal government does not. Thus, with regard to integration, naturalization and legislation on political rights, we find a bottom-up approach rather than federal standards, which also raises the question of equal treatment and equal opportunities for foreigners.
In Switzerland, as in all contemporary societies, some segments of the population have suffered from globalization, and in particular from the free movement of labor. These “globalization losers” are particularly likely to hold xenophobic attitudes – to insist on “my country first” positions – and, consequently, to vote for right-wing populist parties. The Swiss People’s Party is the political party with the strongest electoral support. It has been particularly successful in mobilizing these segments of society. However, this is a far-from-perfect explanation. In a 2017 survey (MOSAiCH), 59% of all respondents with below-median years of education supported a xenophobic statement, compared to 43% of those with above-median years of education.
About 70% of all prison inmates are foreigners; most of them are nonresident foreigners. For the resident population, the share of foreign prison inmates is 40%, which in part reflects the fact that some groups of foreigners are on average low-skilled, a characteristic that itself correlates with a higher incarceration rate. Human rights NGOs have documented acts of racism and violence from the police against visible minorities, sometimes even resulting in deaths (Amnesty International 2007).
Therefore, on the one hand, there is limited prospect for a more generous and liberal integration policy in the near term given the strength of integration-averse political actors and citizens. On the other hand, as a comparative analysis of European Social Survey data shows, Switzerland numbers among the least xenophobic societies in Western Europe, together with the Nordic countries; for example, the country is much less xenophobic than Austria, the United Kingdom or France (Armingeon/Engler 2015).
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2007. “Police, justice et droits humains, pratiques policières et droits humains en Suisse, préoccupations et recommandations d’Amnesty International.” https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/europe-asie-centrale/suisse/docs/2007/rapport-pour-une-police-respectueuse-des-droits-humains/rapportpolice_fr.pdf
Armingeon, Klaus and Sarah Engler. 2015. “Polarisierung als Strategie: Die Polarisierung des Schweizer Parteiensystems im internationalen Vergleich.” In Wahlen und Wählerschaften in der Schweiz, eds. Markus Freitag and Adrian Vatter, 355-379, 467-469. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Francois Bonnet and Julie Pollard. 2021. “Tenant Selection in the Private Rental Sector of Paris and Geneva.” Housing Studies 36 (9): 1427-1445. DOI: 10.1080/02673037.2020.1769565
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik) 2023a. “Population by Migration Status.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/by-migration-status.html
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023b. “Composition of the Foreign Population.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/foreign/composition.html
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2023. “Acquisition of Swiss citizenship.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/citizenship/acquisition-citizenship.html
InterNations. 2024. “Expat City Ranking 2023.” https://www.internations.org/expat-insider/2023/switzerland-40376
Lavenex, Sandra, Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, and Philipp Lutz. 2021. “Migration.” In Eine Aussenpolitik für die Schweiz, eds. Thomas Bernauer, Katja Gentinetta, and Joëlle Kuntz. Zürich: NZZ Verlag.
Lavenex, Sandra, and Anita Manatschal. 2022. “Migrationspolitik.” In Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, eds., Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 857-881.
Lavenex, Sandra. 2023. “Migration Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 658–676. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.34
Lutz, Philipp. 2019. Inside the Migration State: The Quest for Democratic Legitimacy. Bern: unpublished PhD Dissertation.
Manatschal, Anita. 2023. “Integration Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 677–694. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.35
Picot, G., and Hou, F. 2013. “Why Immigrant Background Matters for University Participation: A Comparison of Switzerland and Canada.” International Migration Review 47 (3): 612-642. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12038
Graph View
How committed is the government to helping build the capacity to reduce poverty and provide social protection in low- and middle-income countries?
10
9
9
The government’s development cooperation strategy is fully aligned with the goal of improving capacity-building for poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries.
8
7
6
7
6
The government’s development cooperation strategy is largely aligned with the goal of improving capacity-building for poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries.
5
4
3
4
3
The government’s development cooperation strategy is only somewhat aligned with the goal of improving capacity-building in poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries.
2
1
1
The government’s development cooperation strategy is not all aligned with the goal of improving capacity-building for poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries.
The Swiss government’s development strategy focuses on reducing poverty, mitigating global risks and promoting a stable international order. It concerns “the needs of populations in partner countries, the promotion of Swiss economic, migration and security interests, and the comparative benefits of Swiss international cooperation (added value, capabilities and innovation)” (Federal Council 2023a). Emphasis is put on “job creation, the fight against climate change, better migration management, and a commitment to the rule of law and peace” (Federal Council 2019). Every four years the government publishes a report on international cooperation (FDFA 2020), and it shares data and information with international organizations such as the OECD. The activities of the government for global poverty reduction cover different activities ranging from support to Central and Eastern European countries within the framework of the bilateral treaties (i.e., the Swiss compensation paid to the EU for access to the common market) to drinking water supply in mountainous Central Asian regions. Therefore, it is hard to summarize standards, procedures and outcomes. Official development assistance flows for poverty eradication are predictable within the four-year strategy.
In the countries where it supports projects or aid distribution, Swiss development cooperation has a good reputation for maintaining independence from Swiss industrial interests, and for making long-term commitments. Nevertheless, the country is a small donor with limited impact. Swiss development cooperation is well embedded within international development agencies and coordinates its activities with their agendas on issues such as poverty reduction, climate change and sustainable economic development.
Citations:
Federal Council. 2019. “Erläuternder Bericht zur internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024.” https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/filestore/fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/dl/proj/6019/32/cons_1/doc_2/de/pdf-a/fedlex-data-admin-ch-eli-dl-proj-6019-32-cons_1-doc_2-de-pdf-a.pdf
Federal Council. 2023. “The Federal Council Outlines the Strategic Markers for the Upcoming Dispatch on International Cooperation (2021–2024).” https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-73201.html
FDFA (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs). 2020. “Switzerland’s International Cooperation is Working. Final Report on the Implementation of the Dispatch 2017–20.” Bern: FDFA. https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/de/home/aktivitaeten_projekte/grundsaetze-transparenz.html
DEZA. 2022. “https://admin.media-flow.ch/deza-seco-jahresbericht-2020-de#2637”
In the countries where it supports projects or aid distribution, Swiss development cooperation has a good reputation for maintaining independence from Swiss industrial interests, and for making long-term commitments. Nevertheless, the country is a small donor with limited impact. Swiss development cooperation is well embedded within international development agencies and coordinates its activities with their agendas on issues such as poverty reduction, climate change and sustainable economic development.
Citations:
Federal Council. 2019. “Erläuternder Bericht zur internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024.” https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/filestore/fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/dl/proj/6019/32/cons_1/doc_2/de/pdf-a/fedlex-data-admin-ch-eli-dl-proj-6019-32-cons_1-doc_2-de-pdf-a.pdf
Federal Council. 2023. “The Federal Council Outlines the Strategic Markers for the Upcoming Dispatch on International Cooperation (2021–2024).” https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-73201.html
FDFA (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs). 2020. “Switzerland’s International Cooperation is Working. Final Report on the Implementation of the Dispatch 2017–20.” Bern: FDFA. https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/de/home/aktivitaeten_projekte/grundsaetze-transparenz.html
DEZA. 2022. “https://admin.media-flow.ch/deza-seco-jahresbericht-2020-de#2637”