Vertical Accountability
#8Key Findings
Switzerland performs well in international comparison (rank 8) in the category of vertical accountability.
Registration procedures for candidates and political parties are transparent and fair. Party financing regulations have been made more transparent. Party income and donations must be disclosed annually, and funding is monitored by the Federal Audit Office. There is no gerrymandering, but smaller electoral districts can disadvantage small parties.
Elections are free and fair, conducted in an impartial and nondiscriminatory manner. Voter turnout rates are comparatively low, perhaps due to election fatigue. Noncitizens, who cannot vote, make up about 25% of the population.
Parties are ideologically distinct. Swiss consensus democracy ensures strong cross-party cooperation. However, polarization has increased in past decades, hindering cooperation between elites especially on issues relating to migration and international openness. Freedom of information rules and practices are well developed.
Registration procedures for candidates and political parties are transparent and fair. Party financing regulations have been made more transparent. Party income and donations must be disclosed annually, and funding is monitored by the Federal Audit Office. There is no gerrymandering, but smaller electoral districts can disadvantage small parties.
Elections are free and fair, conducted in an impartial and nondiscriminatory manner. Voter turnout rates are comparatively low, perhaps due to election fatigue. Noncitizens, who cannot vote, make up about 25% of the population.
Parties are ideologically distinct. Swiss consensus democracy ensures strong cross-party cooperation. However, polarization has increased in past decades, hindering cooperation between elites especially on issues relating to migration and international openness. Freedom of information rules and practices are well developed.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
There are no doubts that Switzerland’s formal procedures correspond closely to the democratic ideal. Registration procedures for candidates and political parties meet standards of transparency and fairness. New transparency regulations regarding financial support for political parties became effective for the last national election in 2023 (Federal Council 2022). This mitigates international critique of the opaque financing of political organizations (such as by Transparency International (2019) or GRECO (2017)), although there is still considerable room for improvement with regard to transparency. This lack of transparency can be explained by the liberal stance of the Swiss political system with regard to political-party financing – which in turn means that public authorities need more arguments than elsewhere to justify controlling party organizations. Eligible candidates are not prevented from being elected and are not disqualified from registration in a manner that does not adhere to objectively verifiable criteria set by law. To the best of our knowledge, candidates and parties have not been denied the right to be elected or registered. In any case, Switzerland is a state under the rule of law and decisions by public authorities can be challenged in court. There is no special law on political parties; parties are associations according to Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code, which says: “The articles of association must be done in writing and indicate the objects of the association, its resources and its organization” (on formal rules see: Schiess Rütimann 2011).
Candidates and parties enjoy fair opportunities to access the media and other communication channels without discrimination, for example, on the basis of ethnicity. The media landscape as a whole offers fair coverage of various political positions (Hänggli and Feddersen 2022, 2023).
The new rules on transparency, in effect since 2023, mandate that “the political parties represented in the Federal Assembly must annually disclose their income, the monetary and non-monetary donations received if their value exceeds CHF 15,000 per person per year, as well as the contributions made by individual mandate holders. The source of the contribution must also be disclosed. In the case of votes and National Council elections, the campaigners must disclose the financing of their campaigns before the vote or election if they have budgeted more than CHF 50,000 for these campaigns. After the vote or election, they must disclose the final accounts. In Council of States elections, the transparency rules only apply to those elected. Campaign leaders must disclose the final accounts. The final accounts must include all income, including any contribution of more than CHF 15,000 per person and campaign, which the campaigners have received to finance the campaign in the 12 months prior to the vote or election. The acceptance of anonymous donations and donations from abroad are now prohibited. Exceptions apply to donations from Swiss nationals abroad and for elections to the Council of States” (Federal Council 2022).
Party funding is monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office. There is no gerrymandering. However, in national elections, cantons serve as electoral districts. The smaller the number of seats within an electoral district, the lower the chances of small parties, and the larger the disproportionality of electoral rules. In the six cantons with only one seat in the National Council, the de facto proportional rule is replaced by a first-past-the-post mechanism. There is no evidence that political competition is affected or distorted by deliberate manipulation through new media.
Citations:
Federal Council. 2022. “Neue Transparenzregeln bei der Politikfinanzierung gelten erstmals für die Nationalratswahlen 2023.” https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90040.html
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption). 2017. Evaluation Report Switzerland. Strasbourg: GRECO. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806fceda
Hänggli, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2022. “Medien und politische Kommunikation.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 491-516. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19
Schiess Rütimann, Patricia. 2011. Politische Parteien. Bern and Baden-Baden: Stämpfli/Nomos.
Transparency International. 2019. “Swiss Firms Give Over CHF5 Million a Year to Parties and Candidates.” https://transparency.ch/swiss-firms-give-over-chf5-million-a-year-to-parties-and-candidates
Candidates and parties enjoy fair opportunities to access the media and other communication channels without discrimination, for example, on the basis of ethnicity. The media landscape as a whole offers fair coverage of various political positions (Hänggli and Feddersen 2022, 2023).
The new rules on transparency, in effect since 2023, mandate that “the political parties represented in the Federal Assembly must annually disclose their income, the monetary and non-monetary donations received if their value exceeds CHF 15,000 per person per year, as well as the contributions made by individual mandate holders. The source of the contribution must also be disclosed. In the case of votes and National Council elections, the campaigners must disclose the financing of their campaigns before the vote or election if they have budgeted more than CHF 50,000 for these campaigns. After the vote or election, they must disclose the final accounts. In Council of States elections, the transparency rules only apply to those elected. Campaign leaders must disclose the final accounts. The final accounts must include all income, including any contribution of more than CHF 15,000 per person and campaign, which the campaigners have received to finance the campaign in the 12 months prior to the vote or election. The acceptance of anonymous donations and donations from abroad are now prohibited. Exceptions apply to donations from Swiss nationals abroad and for elections to the Council of States” (Federal Council 2022).
Party funding is monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office. There is no gerrymandering. However, in national elections, cantons serve as electoral districts. The smaller the number of seats within an electoral district, the lower the chances of small parties, and the larger the disproportionality of electoral rules. In the six cantons with only one seat in the National Council, the de facto proportional rule is replaced by a first-past-the-post mechanism. There is no evidence that political competition is affected or distorted by deliberate manipulation through new media.
Citations:
Federal Council. 2022. “Neue Transparenzregeln bei der Politikfinanzierung gelten erstmals für die Nationalratswahlen 2023.” https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90040.html
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption). 2017. Evaluation Report Switzerland. Strasbourg: GRECO. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806fceda
Hänggli, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2022. “Medien und politische Kommunikation.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 491-516. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19
Schiess Rütimann, Patricia. 2011. Politische Parteien. Bern and Baden-Baden: Stämpfli/Nomos.
Transparency International. 2019. “Swiss Firms Give Over CHF5 Million a Year to Parties and Candidates.” https://transparency.ch/swiss-firms-give-over-chf5-million-a-year-to-parties-and-candidates
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
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There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
Voting rights are granted to all Swiss nationals. Swiss nationals abroad without permanent residence have voting rights. Prison inmates are not excluded from voting rights. Persons who are subject to a general deputyship or are represented by a carer as they are permanently incapable of judgment are ineligible to vote (Federal Act on Political Rights, Art. 2). Foreigners, even those with permanent residence in the country, have no voting rights at the national level. In a few cantons, they are granted voting rights in their canton of residence.
There is no disenfranchisement resulting from a flawed voter registry. Rather, the commune of residence keeps an electoral register; voting documents are sent automatically to those who are in the electoral register. There is an impartial and highly capable electoral management body equipped with sufficient trained staff and the financial resources to administer elections effectively. During the past national election in 2023, a minor problem arose due to technical issues, which were fixed quickly.
Elections are conducted according to the established schedule, and the election process is carried out in an impartial and nondiscriminatory manner; there are no hidden impediments to electoral participation. Voting by mail (but not by email) is an established method, and is implemented impeccably. There are no incidents of harassment, violence or intimidation against voters. Likewise, there is no evidence of irregularities.
The real problem with regard to electoral participation in Switzerland is twofold: the rate of participation in popular votes and in elections is very low (47% in the national election of 2023; about 43% in the most recent popular vote on the national level in June 2023). This may be due to electoral fatigue (Swiss voters are called for popular votes several times a year on the municipal, cantonal, and national level), political dissatisfaction, political satisfaction – which is particularly high in Switzerland – institutional opportunities (citizens know that they may challenge a parliamentary bill in a popular vote if needed), or a lack of political interest or knowledge (Freitag/Zumbrunn 2022: 203; Fatke/Freitag 2015; Lutz 2022; 2023; Sciarini/Tresch 2022; 2023).
The other problem in the field of active and passive voting rights is the obvious challenge that 25% of the total population holds foreign citizenship, a much higher share than in other countries. The strict rules governing naturalization and the sheer size of the foreign population transform the “quantitative” problem of every modern democracy – that some adult inhabitants face discrimination on grounds of their nationality – into a qualitative problem: If almost one-quarter of the voting-age population is not entitled to vote or to run for public office, the legitimacy of parliament and government to rule on behalf of the total population (which is vastly more than the citizen base) is arguably called into question. Furthermore, criteria and procedures for nationalization vary across cantons and communes, which opens the door to arbitrariness at the local level.
Others argue, however, that while the economy is globalized, democracy functions only based on a national society that identifies itself in terms of citizenship. This includes the (constitutional) right to define who is eligible for citizenship. Hence, migration certainly creates new problems, in that the “demos” and the resident population do not coincide.
The interaction of low political participation among Swiss nationals and the exclusion of about a quarter of the resident population due to their status as foreigners creates very small “decisive majorities”: If 44% participate in a popular vote, this means that 22% of the Swiss nationals have the final say. These 22% represent almost 17% of the total adult population – Swiss nationals and adult foreigners – meaning just 17% of all adults in the nation have brought about a political “majority” decision. In addition, interest in politics and voting participation is correlated with income and level of education (BFS 2021), raising questions regarding de facto equal access to voting.
To date, Switzerland has dealt with these problems somewhat slowly and hesitantly. For example, some notable liberalizing changes were adopted with regard to naturalization (e.g., costs have been substantially reduced) and with regard to passive voting rights in some cantons and local communities.
Citations:
BFS. 2021. “https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/situation-economique-sociale-population/bien-etre-pauvrete/bien-etre-subjectif-et-conditions-de-vie/politique.html”
Fatke, Matthias, and Markus Freitag. 2015. “Wollen sie nicht, können sie nicht, oder werden sie nicht gefragt? Nichtwählertypen in der Schweiz.” In Wählen und Wählerschaft in der Schweiz, eds. Markus Freitag and Adrian Vatter. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, 95-119.
Freitag, Markus, and Alina Zumbrunn. 2022. “Politische Kultur.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 85-109.
Freitag, Markus, and Alina Zumbrunn. 2023. “The Political Culture of Switzerland in Comparative Perspective.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 50–72. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.4.
Lutz, Georg, and Anke Tresch. 2022. “Die nationalen Wahlen in der Schweiz.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 7th edition. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 519-557.
Lutz, Georg, and Anke Tresch. 2023. “National Elections.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics*, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 391–409. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.20
Sciarini, Pascal, and Anke Tresch. 2022. “Votations populaires.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, edited by Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 559-591. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Sciarini, Pascal, and Anke Tresch. 2023. “Direct-Democratic Votes.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 410–429. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.21
There is no disenfranchisement resulting from a flawed voter registry. Rather, the commune of residence keeps an electoral register; voting documents are sent automatically to those who are in the electoral register. There is an impartial and highly capable electoral management body equipped with sufficient trained staff and the financial resources to administer elections effectively. During the past national election in 2023, a minor problem arose due to technical issues, which were fixed quickly.
Elections are conducted according to the established schedule, and the election process is carried out in an impartial and nondiscriminatory manner; there are no hidden impediments to electoral participation. Voting by mail (but not by email) is an established method, and is implemented impeccably. There are no incidents of harassment, violence or intimidation against voters. Likewise, there is no evidence of irregularities.
The real problem with regard to electoral participation in Switzerland is twofold: the rate of participation in popular votes and in elections is very low (47% in the national election of 2023; about 43% in the most recent popular vote on the national level in June 2023). This may be due to electoral fatigue (Swiss voters are called for popular votes several times a year on the municipal, cantonal, and national level), political dissatisfaction, political satisfaction – which is particularly high in Switzerland – institutional opportunities (citizens know that they may challenge a parliamentary bill in a popular vote if needed), or a lack of political interest or knowledge (Freitag/Zumbrunn 2022: 203; Fatke/Freitag 2015; Lutz 2022; 2023; Sciarini/Tresch 2022; 2023).
The other problem in the field of active and passive voting rights is the obvious challenge that 25% of the total population holds foreign citizenship, a much higher share than in other countries. The strict rules governing naturalization and the sheer size of the foreign population transform the “quantitative” problem of every modern democracy – that some adult inhabitants face discrimination on grounds of their nationality – into a qualitative problem: If almost one-quarter of the voting-age population is not entitled to vote or to run for public office, the legitimacy of parliament and government to rule on behalf of the total population (which is vastly more than the citizen base) is arguably called into question. Furthermore, criteria and procedures for nationalization vary across cantons and communes, which opens the door to arbitrariness at the local level.
Others argue, however, that while the economy is globalized, democracy functions only based on a national society that identifies itself in terms of citizenship. This includes the (constitutional) right to define who is eligible for citizenship. Hence, migration certainly creates new problems, in that the “demos” and the resident population do not coincide.
The interaction of low political participation among Swiss nationals and the exclusion of about a quarter of the resident population due to their status as foreigners creates very small “decisive majorities”: If 44% participate in a popular vote, this means that 22% of the Swiss nationals have the final say. These 22% represent almost 17% of the total adult population – Swiss nationals and adult foreigners – meaning just 17% of all adults in the nation have brought about a political “majority” decision. In addition, interest in politics and voting participation is correlated with income and level of education (BFS 2021), raising questions regarding de facto equal access to voting.
To date, Switzerland has dealt with these problems somewhat slowly and hesitantly. For example, some notable liberalizing changes were adopted with regard to naturalization (e.g., costs have been substantially reduced) and with regard to passive voting rights in some cantons and local communities.
Citations:
BFS. 2021. “https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/situation-economique-sociale-population/bien-etre-pauvrete/bien-etre-subjectif-et-conditions-de-vie/politique.html”
Fatke, Matthias, and Markus Freitag. 2015. “Wollen sie nicht, können sie nicht, oder werden sie nicht gefragt? Nichtwählertypen in der Schweiz.” In Wählen und Wählerschaft in der Schweiz, eds. Markus Freitag and Adrian Vatter. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, 95-119.
Freitag, Markus, and Alina Zumbrunn. 2022. “Politische Kultur.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 85-109.
Freitag, Markus, and Alina Zumbrunn. 2023. “The Political Culture of Switzerland in Comparative Perspective.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 50–72. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.4.
Lutz, Georg, and Anke Tresch. 2022. “Die nationalen Wahlen in der Schweiz.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 7th edition. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 519-557.
Lutz, Georg, and Anke Tresch. 2023. “National Elections.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics*, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 391–409. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.20
Sciarini, Pascal, and Anke Tresch. 2022. “Votations populaires.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, edited by Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 559-591. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Sciarini, Pascal, and Anke Tresch. 2023. “Direct-Democratic Votes.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 410–429. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.21
Graph View
To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
The major Swiss political parties offer clearly distinctive programmatic positions, with some considerable overlap in the case of the Social Democratic and Green parties. The Swiss party system is one of the programmatically most polarized systems in Western Europe (Zollinger 2022: 6; Zollinger and Traber 2023). These distinctive party manifestos are easily publicly accessible, in particular via the websites of the parties.
While party identification (respondents saying that they are close to a political party) has decreased from about 60% in 1971 to 30% in 2019 (Lutz 2022: 542; Vatter 2018: 146), party voters identify very strongly in terms of positive feelings with their chosen party. At the same time, their degree of dislike of other parties is at the lower end of the distribution of 20 established democracies (Häusermann and Bornschier 2023: 24).
Given the proportional electoral rule in elections to the House of Representatives (Nationalrat), the representation of relevant societal interests through political parties is not hindered. Furthermore, in the bicameral parliamentary system, the Council of States (Ständerat) ensures the representation of cantonal-level representatives at the national level, thus allowing for the integration of regional interests into the institutional political structure. There have been recent debates about whether this gives excessive weight to the more conservative voice of non-urban cantons, as opposed to the political preferences of the cities in which a large proportion of the population is clustered. At the level of the federal government, the historically instituted “formule magique” (since 1959) mandates stability in the party representation of the seven members of the Federal Council (Bundesrates) (Burgos et al. 2009). Here again, there have been political discussions as to whether the Federal Council still reflects the composition of the parliament, as there has never been a representative of the Green Party in the Federal Council.
Historically, the Swiss party system has been very decentralized both programmatically and organizationally. Rather than one national party system, there have been 26 cantonal systems. In recent decades, some programmatic centralization has taken place; however, parties still have strong regional and local organizations (Ladner et al. 2022). The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) has historically strong links to farmers and small traders, with its policymaking clearly offering benefits for this electorate. In that regard, there may be some clientelism; however, in general, parties comprehensively represent significant societal interests programmatically.
Citations:
Burgos, Elie, Oscar Mazzoleni, and Hervé Rayner. 2009. “Le gouvernement de tous faute de mieux. Institutionnalisation et transformation de la ‘formule magique’ en Suisse (1959-2003).” Politix 88 (4): 39-61.
Häusermann, Silja, and Simon Bornschier. 2023. Democratic Conflict and Polarization: Healthy or Harmful? UBS Center Public Paper #1. Zürich: UBS Center for Economics in Society.
Ladner, Andreas, Daniel Schwarz, and Jan Fivaz. 2022. “Parteien und Parteiensystem.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 403-438.
Ladner, Andreas, Daniel Schwarz, and Jan Fivaz. 2023. “Parties and Party Systems.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford:Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.16. pp. 317-336
Lutz, Georg, and Anke Tresch. 2022. “Die nationalen Wahlen in der Schweiz.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 519-557. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
Zollinger, Delia. 2022. “Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12743
Zollinger, Delia, and Denise Traber. 2023. “The Ideological Space in Swiss Politics: Voters, Parties, and Realignment.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.1. pp. 116-136.
While party identification (respondents saying that they are close to a political party) has decreased from about 60% in 1971 to 30% in 2019 (Lutz 2022: 542; Vatter 2018: 146), party voters identify very strongly in terms of positive feelings with their chosen party. At the same time, their degree of dislike of other parties is at the lower end of the distribution of 20 established democracies (Häusermann and Bornschier 2023: 24).
Given the proportional electoral rule in elections to the House of Representatives (Nationalrat), the representation of relevant societal interests through political parties is not hindered. Furthermore, in the bicameral parliamentary system, the Council of States (Ständerat) ensures the representation of cantonal-level representatives at the national level, thus allowing for the integration of regional interests into the institutional political structure. There have been recent debates about whether this gives excessive weight to the more conservative voice of non-urban cantons, as opposed to the political preferences of the cities in which a large proportion of the population is clustered. At the level of the federal government, the historically instituted “formule magique” (since 1959) mandates stability in the party representation of the seven members of the Federal Council (Bundesrates) (Burgos et al. 2009). Here again, there have been political discussions as to whether the Federal Council still reflects the composition of the parliament, as there has never been a representative of the Green Party in the Federal Council.
Historically, the Swiss party system has been very decentralized both programmatically and organizationally. Rather than one national party system, there have been 26 cantonal systems. In recent decades, some programmatic centralization has taken place; however, parties still have strong regional and local organizations (Ladner et al. 2022). The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) has historically strong links to farmers and small traders, with its policymaking clearly offering benefits for this electorate. In that regard, there may be some clientelism; however, in general, parties comprehensively represent significant societal interests programmatically.
Citations:
Burgos, Elie, Oscar Mazzoleni, and Hervé Rayner. 2009. “Le gouvernement de tous faute de mieux. Institutionnalisation et transformation de la ‘formule magique’ en Suisse (1959-2003).” Politix 88 (4): 39-61.
Häusermann, Silja, and Simon Bornschier. 2023. Democratic Conflict and Polarization: Healthy or Harmful? UBS Center Public Paper #1. Zürich: UBS Center for Economics in Society.
Ladner, Andreas, Daniel Schwarz, and Jan Fivaz. 2022. “Parteien und Parteiensystem.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 403-438.
Ladner, Andreas, Daniel Schwarz, and Jan Fivaz. 2023. “Parties and Party Systems.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford:Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.16. pp. 317-336
Lutz, Georg, and Anke Tresch. 2022. “Die nationalen Wahlen in der Schweiz.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 519-557. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
Zollinger, Delia. 2022. “Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12743
Zollinger, Delia, and Denise Traber. 2023. “The Ideological Space in Swiss Politics: Voters, Parties, and Realignment.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.1. pp. 116-136.
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
2
1
1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
On the one hand, the Swiss consensus democracy ensures strong cross-party cooperation, with representatives of the main parties seated together in federal and cantonal governments. On the other hand, the Swiss party system has become programmatically polarized over the past three decades. The three polar parties are very far apart by international comparison: The Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerischen Volkspartei, SVP) occupies the particularistic-right quadrant, while the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party are in the universalistic-left quadrant of the ideological space (Zollinger 2022; Zollinger and Traber 2023; Häusermann and Bornschier 2023).
Even within the major right-wing party (Swiss People’s Party), the core values of democracy are broadly accepted, if with two major qualifications. First, democracy is understood as decision-making by the people. The people are considered to be the ultimate sovereign, and their power is not viewed as something that should be limited by international law, membership in international organizations, human rights or domestic veto actors such as constitutional courts. This reflects a narrow Schumpeterian view of democracy that was prominently challenged by de Tocqueville, and which is today contested by a broader understanding of an embedded democracy (Merkel 2004).
The second qualification concerns populism and xenophobia. The Swiss People’s Party is a radical right national-populist party (Mazzoleni 2008) based on nativism and populism, with a strong dose of authoritarianism (Mudde 2007: 22). The dichotomy between “them” and “us” and the staunch opposition to universalism, international openness and European integration is the electoral winning formula of the Swiss People’s Party. The polarizing political program of the SVP is also evident in direct democracy votes, as the party regularly launches xenophobic initiatives, such as the ban on the construction of minarets that was accepted by the Swiss population in 2009, and the initiative against mass immigration that was accepted in 2014.
The increasing programmatic polarization has become a main hindrance to cooperation between political elites, particularly on issues relating to migration and international openness. The failure to reach a sustainable relationship with the EU is a major example of this polarization. The effectiveness of the other political parties in neutralizing the isolationist and xenophobic-nativist stance of the country’s major party is limited by electoral constraints: A considerable share of voters of the two other major bourgeois parties (the center and liberal parties) and even of the Social Democratic party shares the isolationist-nativist views of the populist right.
Citations:
Häusermann, Silja, and Simon Bornschier. 2023. Democratic Conflict and Polarization: Healthy or Harmful? Zürich: UBS Center for Economics in Society.
Mazzoleni, Oscar. 2008 [2003]. Nationalisme et populisme en Suisse. La radicalisation de la “nouvelle” UDC. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes.
Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11: 33-58. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340412331304598
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zollinger, Delia. 2022. “Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12743
Zollinger, Delia, and Denise Traber. 2023. “The Ideological Space in Swiss Politics: Voters, Parties, and Realignment.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 116-136. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.1
Even within the major right-wing party (Swiss People’s Party), the core values of democracy are broadly accepted, if with two major qualifications. First, democracy is understood as decision-making by the people. The people are considered to be the ultimate sovereign, and their power is not viewed as something that should be limited by international law, membership in international organizations, human rights or domestic veto actors such as constitutional courts. This reflects a narrow Schumpeterian view of democracy that was prominently challenged by de Tocqueville, and which is today contested by a broader understanding of an embedded democracy (Merkel 2004).
The second qualification concerns populism and xenophobia. The Swiss People’s Party is a radical right national-populist party (Mazzoleni 2008) based on nativism and populism, with a strong dose of authoritarianism (Mudde 2007: 22). The dichotomy between “them” and “us” and the staunch opposition to universalism, international openness and European integration is the electoral winning formula of the Swiss People’s Party. The polarizing political program of the SVP is also evident in direct democracy votes, as the party regularly launches xenophobic initiatives, such as the ban on the construction of minarets that was accepted by the Swiss population in 2009, and the initiative against mass immigration that was accepted in 2014.
The increasing programmatic polarization has become a main hindrance to cooperation between political elites, particularly on issues relating to migration and international openness. The failure to reach a sustainable relationship with the EU is a major example of this polarization. The effectiveness of the other political parties in neutralizing the isolationist and xenophobic-nativist stance of the country’s major party is limited by electoral constraints: A considerable share of voters of the two other major bourgeois parties (the center and liberal parties) and even of the Social Democratic party shares the isolationist-nativist views of the populist right.
Citations:
Häusermann, Silja, and Simon Bornschier. 2023. Democratic Conflict and Polarization: Healthy or Harmful? Zürich: UBS Center for Economics in Society.
Mazzoleni, Oscar. 2008 [2003]. Nationalisme et populisme en Suisse. La radicalisation de la “nouvelle” UDC. Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes.
Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11: 33-58. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340412331304598
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zollinger, Delia. 2022. “Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12743
Zollinger, Delia, and Denise Traber. 2023. “The Ideological Space in Swiss Politics: Voters, Parties, and Realignment.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 116-136. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.1
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
Swiss authorities pursue very open strategies of information release. For example, the website of the federal administration offers access to major sources of political information.
Article 16 of the constitution, dealing with the issue of freedom of opinion and information, states that: “(1) The freedom of opinion and information is guaranteed; (2) Every person has the right to form, express and disseminate opinions freely; (3) Every person has the right to receive information freely, to gather it from generally accessible sources and to disseminate it.”
The Federal Law on the Principle of Administrative Transparency (Loi sur la Transparence, LTrans) was approved in December 2004 and took force in July 2006. The law gives any person the right to consult official documents and obtain information from authorities. The authorities must respond within 20 days. If a request is refused, a citizen can seek redress from the Federal Delegate for Data Protection. However, this law’s coverage is limited, applying only to public federal bodies, other organizations and persons who make decisions under the Administrative Procedures Act, and parliamentary services. The Swiss National Bank and the Federal Commission on Banks are exempted, as are the Federal Council (federal government) and the parliament as bodies. Similarly, the law also does not apply to official documents concerning civil or criminal law processes, documents relating to foreign policy, or political party dossiers relating to administrative disputes. Consumer organizations have argued that the law contains too many exceptions.
Given these qualifications, it is noteworthy that this law has gained some influence since the Federal Supreme Court has interpreted it in a liberal way. The cantons have similar laws on administrative transparency.
In systems of direct democracy, federal governments bear a particular burden in terms of ensuring proper information is provided for referendums and popular initiatives. In spring 2019, the Federal Supreme Court overturned a national referendum on how couples should be taxed because the information provided by the executive proved to have been incorrect. In its decision, the court pointed out that the information provided by the administration on the alternatives in referendums needs to be improved.
Citations:
Eveline Huegli, Marius Feìraud. 2014. Evaluation des Bundesgesetzes über das
Öffentlichkeitsprinzip der Verwaltung (BGÖ). Schlussbericht im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Justiz. Bern: Büro Vatter.
Article 16 of the constitution, dealing with the issue of freedom of opinion and information, states that: “(1) The freedom of opinion and information is guaranteed; (2) Every person has the right to form, express and disseminate opinions freely; (3) Every person has the right to receive information freely, to gather it from generally accessible sources and to disseminate it.”
The Federal Law on the Principle of Administrative Transparency (Loi sur la Transparence, LTrans) was approved in December 2004 and took force in July 2006. The law gives any person the right to consult official documents and obtain information from authorities. The authorities must respond within 20 days. If a request is refused, a citizen can seek redress from the Federal Delegate for Data Protection. However, this law’s coverage is limited, applying only to public federal bodies, other organizations and persons who make decisions under the Administrative Procedures Act, and parliamentary services. The Swiss National Bank and the Federal Commission on Banks are exempted, as are the Federal Council (federal government) and the parliament as bodies. Similarly, the law also does not apply to official documents concerning civil or criminal law processes, documents relating to foreign policy, or political party dossiers relating to administrative disputes. Consumer organizations have argued that the law contains too many exceptions.
Given these qualifications, it is noteworthy that this law has gained some influence since the Federal Supreme Court has interpreted it in a liberal way. The cantons have similar laws on administrative transparency.
In systems of direct democracy, federal governments bear a particular burden in terms of ensuring proper information is provided for referendums and popular initiatives. In spring 2019, the Federal Supreme Court overturned a national referendum on how couples should be taxed because the information provided by the executive proved to have been incorrect. In its decision, the court pointed out that the information provided by the administration on the alternatives in referendums needs to be improved.
Citations:
Eveline Huegli, Marius Feìraud. 2014. Evaluation des Bundesgesetzes über das
Öffentlichkeitsprinzip der Verwaltung (BGÖ). Schlussbericht im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Justiz. Bern: Büro Vatter.