Consensus-Building
#13Key Findings
The Netherlands falls into the sample’s middle ranks (rank 13) with regard to consensus-building.
The government obtains high-quality scientific support in its policymaking via a range of permanent scientific advisory institutes. Other parts of government have also enhanced their access to scientific information.
Civil society organizations representing both capital and labor are still firmly embedded in the culture and practices of poldering, and thus have a strong influence on government policy. Social welfare organizations also routinely consult with the government, with somewhat less influence.
Environmental organizations also consult with the government through the poldering process. However, some have turned to the courts as a means of avoiding the delays of the traditional consultation procedure.
The government obtains high-quality scientific support in its policymaking via a range of permanent scientific advisory institutes. Other parts of government have also enhanced their access to scientific information.
Civil society organizations representing both capital and labor are still firmly embedded in the culture and practices of poldering, and thus have a strong influence on government policy. Social welfare organizations also routinely consult with the government, with somewhat less influence.
Environmental organizations also consult with the government through the poldering process. However, some have turned to the courts as a means of avoiding the delays of the traditional consultation procedure.
To what extent is the government successful in effectively harnessing the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes?
10
9
9
The government is able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, the government is able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
5
4
3
4
3
Only rarely is the government able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
2
1
1
The government is not able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
The Netherlands has always had a good reputation with regard to seeking scientific support for government policy. Econometric modeling intended to inform economic policy was practically invented here by Nobel Prize-winning economist Jan Tinbergen. This was the starting point for the establishment of a series of important permanent scientific advisory institutes, formally part of ministries but effectively independent: the Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), the Ministry of Justice and Security’s Scientific Research and Documentation Center (WODC) and parliament’s Rathenau Institute, which provides advice on scientific and technological issues. These institutes produce a continuous stream of reports and advisory policy briefs, and their chairs frequently participate in meetings of ministerial sub-councils. The SCP’s chair was elected “most influential Dutch person” by journalists in 2019 and 2020.
In spite of criticism of the role of the Outbreak Management Team during and after the COVID-19 pandemic years, the scientization trend has not lost momentum. Since 2019, the project Parliament and Science has picked up steam. This is a cooperative project between the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer), the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW), the Young Academy, the Dutch Research Council (NWO), the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), the Universities Netherlands (Universiteiten van Nederland) and the Dutch Federation of University Medical Centers (FNU). The permanent house committees now have a knowledge coordinator and an information specialist, seconded from the Analysis and Research Service. Each house committee is also tasked with drawing up a knowledge agenda for the new calendar year, with topics on which additional knowledge needs to be acquired, and has a budget for purchasing knowledge. For the science organizations, these changes prompted them to increase their commitment to 1.5 full-time staffers, and they have appointed a full-time “liaison” to Parliament and Science. Since 2020, some 18 bills have been subjected to a review by scientific experts before parliamentary debate.
Other parts of government have also enhanced their access to scientific information. In response to criticism of the state for using scientifically developed critical deposition values as a basis for nitrogen policymaking and legal decisions, a new Ecological Authority was established and tasked with critically assessing and validating scientific contributions. A Scientific Climate Council was established by the minister for climate and energy. The Ministry of Internal Affairs mobilized the public administration community in an effort to comparatively study all aspects of the obvious implementation failures affecting many government policies. In view of their ever-increasing role in implementing national policies, local governments’ knowledge management and use is also being studied.
Public opinion is in favor of increasing accessibility to scientific information. According to the Rathenau Institute, between 2018 and 2021, public trust in science increased from 7.07 to 7.42 out of 10 points. Many people credit the fast development of an effective COVID-19 vaccination as having enhanced their trust in science. Interestingly, others cite this fact as a reason for their increased distrust. This is not to say that science has not come under increased societal and political scrutiny. The values used to make nitrogen policymaking and legal decisions were attacked by scientists funded by large agro-industrial companies, and with the BBB party serving as a political mouthpiece. In 2023, scientific scrutiny of party platforms before elections was skipped by many political parties, among them several major parties (e.g., PVV, NSC, BBB) likely to be coalition members in the next government. Close contacts between CPB and PBL experts and politicians have been considered beneficial to the Dutch consensus democracy with regard to easing coalition negotiations. The reluctance of political parties to subject themselves to this scrutiny is partly based on justified scientific criticism of the shortcomings and blind spots of econometric modeling as a basis for political decisions. “Broader Prosperity” initiatives and activities have begun to remedy this.
Citations:
Velden, N. van der. 2021. Scientization of Dutch Policy Advice: A Study on the Reliance on Academic Expertise in Dutch State Committees Between 1970-2017 and Its Relation to Different Understandings of Democracy.
NRC, Stellinga. 2021. “Naar Kim Putters, de ‘invloedrijkste Nederlander’, wordt echt niet altijd geluisterd.” NRC November 7.
Parlement en Wetenschap. 2023. “Van Bergen, Liaison Parlement & Wetenschap.”
Grootel, L. van, D. Das, and P. Diederen. 2022. Kennis voor lokaal beleid – Verkenning van de kennis- en leerbehoeften van gemeenten. Den Haag: Rathenau Instituut.
Spekschoor. 2022. “Ook met nieuw opgerichte Ecologische Autoriteit moet stikstofuitstoot flink omlaag.” NOS Nieuws, September 3.
CPB en doorrekening partijprogramma’s
Rijksoverheid. 2023. “Brief aan Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad met adviesaanvraag klimaatneutraliteit.”
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken. Special 2023. Inspiratie uit het buitenland.
NRC, Rutten. 2023. “De liefde voor het doorrekenen van partijprogramma’s is bekoeld: ‘We doen het met tegenzin, de laatste jaren zeker’.” NRC, November 6.
NRC, Meeus. 2022. “Politiek in 2022: het rondpompen van misstanden die mogelijk niet bestaan.” February 19.
Rathenau Instituut (2021). Trust in science in the Netherlands (2021 survey). The Hague (authors: Broek-Honingh van den, N., I. Glas and A. Vennekens). https://www.rathenau.nl/sites/default/files/2021-12/REPORT_Trust_in_science_in_the_Netherlands_2021_survey_Rathenau_Instituut.pdf
In spite of criticism of the role of the Outbreak Management Team during and after the COVID-19 pandemic years, the scientization trend has not lost momentum. Since 2019, the project Parliament and Science has picked up steam. This is a cooperative project between the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer), the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW), the Young Academy, the Dutch Research Council (NWO), the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), the Universities Netherlands (Universiteiten van Nederland) and the Dutch Federation of University Medical Centers (FNU). The permanent house committees now have a knowledge coordinator and an information specialist, seconded from the Analysis and Research Service. Each house committee is also tasked with drawing up a knowledge agenda for the new calendar year, with topics on which additional knowledge needs to be acquired, and has a budget for purchasing knowledge. For the science organizations, these changes prompted them to increase their commitment to 1.5 full-time staffers, and they have appointed a full-time “liaison” to Parliament and Science. Since 2020, some 18 bills have been subjected to a review by scientific experts before parliamentary debate.
Other parts of government have also enhanced their access to scientific information. In response to criticism of the state for using scientifically developed critical deposition values as a basis for nitrogen policymaking and legal decisions, a new Ecological Authority was established and tasked with critically assessing and validating scientific contributions. A Scientific Climate Council was established by the minister for climate and energy. The Ministry of Internal Affairs mobilized the public administration community in an effort to comparatively study all aspects of the obvious implementation failures affecting many government policies. In view of their ever-increasing role in implementing national policies, local governments’ knowledge management and use is also being studied.
Public opinion is in favor of increasing accessibility to scientific information. According to the Rathenau Institute, between 2018 and 2021, public trust in science increased from 7.07 to 7.42 out of 10 points. Many people credit the fast development of an effective COVID-19 vaccination as having enhanced their trust in science. Interestingly, others cite this fact as a reason for their increased distrust. This is not to say that science has not come under increased societal and political scrutiny. The values used to make nitrogen policymaking and legal decisions were attacked by scientists funded by large agro-industrial companies, and with the BBB party serving as a political mouthpiece. In 2023, scientific scrutiny of party platforms before elections was skipped by many political parties, among them several major parties (e.g., PVV, NSC, BBB) likely to be coalition members in the next government. Close contacts between CPB and PBL experts and politicians have been considered beneficial to the Dutch consensus democracy with regard to easing coalition negotiations. The reluctance of political parties to subject themselves to this scrutiny is partly based on justified scientific criticism of the shortcomings and blind spots of econometric modeling as a basis for political decisions. “Broader Prosperity” initiatives and activities have begun to remedy this.
Citations:
Velden, N. van der. 2021. Scientization of Dutch Policy Advice: A Study on the Reliance on Academic Expertise in Dutch State Committees Between 1970-2017 and Its Relation to Different Understandings of Democracy.
NRC, Stellinga. 2021. “Naar Kim Putters, de ‘invloedrijkste Nederlander’, wordt echt niet altijd geluisterd.” NRC November 7.
Parlement en Wetenschap. 2023. “Van Bergen, Liaison Parlement & Wetenschap.”
Grootel, L. van, D. Das, and P. Diederen. 2022. Kennis voor lokaal beleid – Verkenning van de kennis- en leerbehoeften van gemeenten. Den Haag: Rathenau Instituut.
Spekschoor. 2022. “Ook met nieuw opgerichte Ecologische Autoriteit moet stikstofuitstoot flink omlaag.” NOS Nieuws, September 3.
CPB en doorrekening partijprogramma’s
Rijksoverheid. 2023. “Brief aan Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad met adviesaanvraag klimaatneutraliteit.”
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken. Special 2023. Inspiratie uit het buitenland.
NRC, Rutten. 2023. “De liefde voor het doorrekenen van partijprogramma’s is bekoeld: ‘We doen het met tegenzin, de laatste jaren zeker’.” NRC, November 6.
NRC, Meeus. 2022. “Politiek in 2022: het rondpompen van misstanden die mogelijk niet bestaan.” February 19.
Rathenau Instituut (2021). Trust in science in the Netherlands (2021 survey). The Hague (authors: Broek-Honingh van den, N., I. Glas and A. Vennekens). https://www.rathenau.nl/sites/default/files/2021-12/REPORT_Trust_in_science_in_the_Netherlands_2021_survey_Rathenau_Instituut.pdf
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of trade unions and business organizations in policymaking?
10
9
9
The government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is rarely able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
2
1
1
The government is not able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
CSOs for both capital and labor are still firmly embedded in the culture and practices of “poldering” (see “Effective Civil Society Organizations (Capital and Labor)”).
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading social welfare CSOs in policymaking?
10
9
9
The government is able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
2
1
1
The government is not able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
CSOs in most social welfare domains are still more or less firmly embedded in the culture and practices of “poldering” (see “Effective CSOs (Social Welfare)”).
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading environmental CSOs in policymaking?
10
9
9
The government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
2
1
1
The government is not able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
Most CSOs in the domain of the environment are still embedded in the practices and culture of “poldering” (see “Effective CSOs (Environment)”). Some practice venue shopping by turning to the judiciary as a means of avoiding the delays and sluggishness of the “poldering” style of governance.
To what extent does the government publish data and information that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable?
10
9
9
The government publishes data and information in a manner that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the government publishes data and information in a manner that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable.
5
4
3
4
3
The government rarely publishes data and information in a manner that strengthens citizens to hold the government accountable.
2
1
1
The government does not publish data and information in a manner that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable.
In a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of 25 years of Dutch government (digital) information policies, a mixed image arises. On one hand, since 2000 there has been active policymaking on the issue. But as in so many cases of Dutch government policy, promises have been comprehensive, but realization has been partial at best. For example, knowledge institutes dealing with economic and financial data production regularly publish their data, increasingly in machine-readable formats. But this is usable only by organizations and persons with sufficient professional interests and digital skills. Ordinary citizens still are only moderately well served by the media.
Citizens have a government-approved digital identity (DigID). All Dutch citizens can apply for a DigID. This allows them to carry out a number of government-related functions digitally. Also, residents have a reasonably guaranteed right to privacy. Citizens can use the internet without their data being out in the open. In the Netherlands, the GDPR places restrictions on the sharing of personal data; compared to other continents, privacy is relatively well regulated in Europe. At the same time, large companies like Google and Meta can still retrieve a lot of personal information and recombine it endlessly. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Dutch government itself in some cases obliges its civil servants to work with Google or Meta tools in order to harmonize their communication and interoperability. This is a real dilemma. Furthermore, generating comparable data across different regions and administrative levels is a significant challenge due to administrative fragmentation. The government struggles to adhere to a common agreement. This leads to 12 ministries, 12 provinces, and 342 municipalities each developing their own information systems, with each one independently reinventing the wheel.
Regarding timely information provision, the new Open Government Act contains new obligations regarding proactive public access. Much official information is publicly accessible through the Rijksoverheid.nl and Overheid.nl websites. At the same time, much background information is still not made public. The press has little trust in the operation of the Open Government Act. A survey published by the Advisory Committee on Openness and Information Management (ACOI) reports that the complaints seem little different from those under the old law: slow processing, opposition, information left out. “We see a gap of mutual distrust,” says one ACOI member. “Governments think journalists are just asking around without knowing what they are doing, journalists say their rights are being violated.” Sometimes government chooses to pay the legally enforceable monetary penalties rather than disclose the requested information (on time). According to some civil servants’ insider stories, there exists a culture of withholding information.
Without doubt this is true for lobbying. The Dutch lobby landscape is not transparent. There is still no lobby register. The House of Representatives has urged that public agendas be properly kept up to date and that a lobby register be established. The minister of the interior has promised to make the public agendas of ministers more transparent. The Open State Foundation examined ministers’ agenda appointments between 1 October 2022 and 1 October 2023. Although more appointments are being recorded, the majority of public agendas still lack transparency. Only 12% of all appointments list both an appointment subject and an interlocutor.
In terms of user friendliness of information provision, there is still much to be desired. Individual control of personal data has been promised for years, but little has come of it. Through Mijn-Overheid.nl, users can see what information is being shared with which organizations. This–– overview mainly raises questions – why with municipality X and not with province Y? Making individual choices about information sharing is not possible. One-time provision of data with multiple uses is still an unrealized goal. Citizens and companies thus have to repeat their data input unnecessarily, There is still little understanding of citizens’ informational needs. This is especially true for people in their role as “citizens,” as voters and co-producers of policy. Digital inclusion is patchy. Successive cabinets have invested in digital inclusion. Through the Alliance for Digital Inclusion, hundreds of thousands of “refurbished” laptops have been made available to children from disadvantaged backgrounds. But for some segments of society – the elderly, the illiterate – physical service points and telephone accessibility are essential.
Citations:
Maatschappelijke coalitie Over Informatie Gesproken. 2023. Over schone dromen en verbroken beloften. 25 jaar ICT, overheid en samenleving. ECP | Platform voor InformatieSamenleving, November.
Open State Foundation. 2023. “Onderzoek Open State wijst uit: agenda’s van ministers zijn minder transparant geworden.”
Wieringa, NRC. 2023. “Amper vertrouwen pers in werking Wet open overheid.” October 26.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Nieuwe wet leidt nog niet tot snellere openbaarmaking van documenten.” March 9.
Nieuwuur. 2022. “Ministeries betaalden Volkskrant bijna ton voor te laat delen informatie.” 18 July.
NRC, Kouwenhoven, Kuiper. 2022. “Oud-privacyfunctionaris: bij de overheid heerst een cultuur van achterhouden.” NRC June 15.
Citizens have a government-approved digital identity (DigID). All Dutch citizens can apply for a DigID. This allows them to carry out a number of government-related functions digitally. Also, residents have a reasonably guaranteed right to privacy. Citizens can use the internet without their data being out in the open. In the Netherlands, the GDPR places restrictions on the sharing of personal data; compared to other continents, privacy is relatively well regulated in Europe. At the same time, large companies like Google and Meta can still retrieve a lot of personal information and recombine it endlessly. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Dutch government itself in some cases obliges its civil servants to work with Google or Meta tools in order to harmonize their communication and interoperability. This is a real dilemma. Furthermore, generating comparable data across different regions and administrative levels is a significant challenge due to administrative fragmentation. The government struggles to adhere to a common agreement. This leads to 12 ministries, 12 provinces, and 342 municipalities each developing their own information systems, with each one independently reinventing the wheel.
Regarding timely information provision, the new Open Government Act contains new obligations regarding proactive public access. Much official information is publicly accessible through the Rijksoverheid.nl and Overheid.nl websites. At the same time, much background information is still not made public. The press has little trust in the operation of the Open Government Act. A survey published by the Advisory Committee on Openness and Information Management (ACOI) reports that the complaints seem little different from those under the old law: slow processing, opposition, information left out. “We see a gap of mutual distrust,” says one ACOI member. “Governments think journalists are just asking around without knowing what they are doing, journalists say their rights are being violated.” Sometimes government chooses to pay the legally enforceable monetary penalties rather than disclose the requested information (on time). According to some civil servants’ insider stories, there exists a culture of withholding information.
Without doubt this is true for lobbying. The Dutch lobby landscape is not transparent. There is still no lobby register. The House of Representatives has urged that public agendas be properly kept up to date and that a lobby register be established. The minister of the interior has promised to make the public agendas of ministers more transparent. The Open State Foundation examined ministers’ agenda appointments between 1 October 2022 and 1 October 2023. Although more appointments are being recorded, the majority of public agendas still lack transparency. Only 12% of all appointments list both an appointment subject and an interlocutor.
In terms of user friendliness of information provision, there is still much to be desired. Individual control of personal data has been promised for years, but little has come of it. Through Mijn-Overheid.nl, users can see what information is being shared with which organizations. This–– overview mainly raises questions – why with municipality X and not with province Y? Making individual choices about information sharing is not possible. One-time provision of data with multiple uses is still an unrealized goal. Citizens and companies thus have to repeat their data input unnecessarily, There is still little understanding of citizens’ informational needs. This is especially true for people in their role as “citizens,” as voters and co-producers of policy. Digital inclusion is patchy. Successive cabinets have invested in digital inclusion. Through the Alliance for Digital Inclusion, hundreds of thousands of “refurbished” laptops have been made available to children from disadvantaged backgrounds. But for some segments of society – the elderly, the illiterate – physical service points and telephone accessibility are essential.
Citations:
Maatschappelijke coalitie Over Informatie Gesproken. 2023. Over schone dromen en verbroken beloften. 25 jaar ICT, overheid en samenleving. ECP | Platform voor InformatieSamenleving, November.
Open State Foundation. 2023. “Onderzoek Open State wijst uit: agenda’s van ministers zijn minder transparant geworden.”
Wieringa, NRC. 2023. “Amper vertrouwen pers in werking Wet open overheid.” October 26.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Nieuwe wet leidt nog niet tot snellere openbaarmaking van documenten.” March 9.
Nieuwuur. 2022. “Ministeries betaalden Volkskrant bijna ton voor te laat delen informatie.” 18 July.
NRC, Kouwenhoven, Kuiper. 2022. “Oud-privacyfunctionaris: bij de overheid heerst een cultuur van achterhouden.” NRC June 15.