Coordination
#25Key Findings
The Netherlands scores relatively poorly (rank 25) in the category of coordination.
The Dutch prime minister is responsible for coordinating overall government policy, chairing Council of Ministers meetings, and adjudicating interdepartmental conflicts. However, the Prime Minister’s Office has limited capacity to evaluate policy content unless it conflicts with the government platform.
Under the last Rutte government, the prime minister deliberately violated coalition conduct rules, leading to the government’s collapse. The poldering model of consultation encourages informal contacts between the government and stakeholders, leading to transparency concerns.
Local governments receive funding from the national level in return for implementing polices decided at the national level, with sums tied to economic swings. A new policy aims to ensure that local and regional governments are consulted early on in new policy proposals, and that structural budget allocations are made accordingly.
The Dutch prime minister is responsible for coordinating overall government policy, chairing Council of Ministers meetings, and adjudicating interdepartmental conflicts. However, the Prime Minister’s Office has limited capacity to evaluate policy content unless it conflicts with the government platform.
Under the last Rutte government, the prime minister deliberately violated coalition conduct rules, leading to the government’s collapse. The poldering model of consultation encourages informal contacts between the government and stakeholders, leading to transparency concerns.
Local governments receive funding from the national level in return for implementing polices decided at the national level, with sums tied to economic swings. A new policy aims to ensure that local and regional governments are consulted early on in new policy proposals, and that structural budget allocations are made accordingly.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
8
7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
The Dutch prime minister is formally responsible for coordinating government policy as a whole, and possesses a range of powers. These include deciding on the agenda and formulating conclusions and decisions for the Council of Ministers, chairing its meetings and committees, adjudicating interdepartmental conflicts, serving as the primary press spokesperson, speaking in the States General, and representing the Netherlands in international forums such as the European Union and the United Nations. The prime minister also oversees all affairs concerning the Royal House.
The prime minister’s Ministry of General Affairs includes 10-12 advising councilors (raadadviseurs, with junior assistants) who are top-level civil servants rather than political appointees. These councilors serve as secretaries of the cabinet sub-councils and committees, controlling the flow of information to the prime minister. Additionally, the prime minister maintains a special relationship with the Scientific Council for Government Policy. Directors of planning agencies and permanent knowledge institutes sometimes act as secretaries for interdepartmental “front gates.” Despite these resources, the Prime Minister’s Office has a limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of proposals from line ministries unless they openly conflict with the government platform (regeerakkoord). Prime Minister Rutte’s style reportedly allowed sectoral ministers considerable scope for action, reflecting the small size of the Prime Minister’s Office:
Line ministries typically involve the prime minister in the development of legislation, and coalition formations formally end with a constitutive meeting at which all ministers sign the coalition agreement and take joint responsibility for its implementation. To promote unity in spokesmanship among ministers, a set of principles for the cabinet’s communication policy has been developed. The prime minister is the primary spokesperson for the cabinet, especially on unresolved issues and those requiring collective political support.
Briefings between the prime minister and line ministries occur during weekly Council of Ministers meetings, usually held on Fridays at the Ministry of General Affairs. Additional meetings can be convened whenever the prime minister or at least two other ministers deem it necessary. For efficient decision-making, proposals for the cabinet are first submitted to a sub-council. The prime minister chairs all sub-councils and ministerial committees, each with a fixed composition of ministers and state secretaries.
This meticulous coordination mechanism relies on the political willingness to cooperate and mutual trust. In the Rutte IV cabinet, both factors were missing from the start. The prime minister’s involvement in the childcare benefit affair resulted in distrust and resistance to his leadership. Additionally, the VVD and Christian Democrats did not trust their D66 and Christian Union coalition partners, perceiving them as being too proactive in climate change, circular economy transition and nitrogen reduction policies, while migration policy also remained a significant point of contention. After less than two years, the prime minister deliberately violated coalition conduct rules by threatening a coalition break and calling for an open vote in a plenary Council of Ministers meeting, leading to the government’s collapse.
Citations:
G. Buitendijk, Seccretaris-Genraal. n.d. Introductiedossier. Kennismaking met de organisatie van AZ.
Bekkers. 2021. “Algemene Zaken, de kleine spin in het web.” Binnenlands Bestuur, March 30.
Joustra, T., and P. Van Venetiç. 1993. De geheimen van het torentje. Praktische gids voor het premierschap.
NRC. 2023. “De gang van zaken van de afgelopen dagen kan op het Binnenhof diepe sporen nalaten.” NRC, July 8.
The prime minister’s Ministry of General Affairs includes 10-12 advising councilors (raadadviseurs, with junior assistants) who are top-level civil servants rather than political appointees. These councilors serve as secretaries of the cabinet sub-councils and committees, controlling the flow of information to the prime minister. Additionally, the prime minister maintains a special relationship with the Scientific Council for Government Policy. Directors of planning agencies and permanent knowledge institutes sometimes act as secretaries for interdepartmental “front gates.” Despite these resources, the Prime Minister’s Office has a limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of proposals from line ministries unless they openly conflict with the government platform (regeerakkoord). Prime Minister Rutte’s style reportedly allowed sectoral ministers considerable scope for action, reflecting the small size of the Prime Minister’s Office:
Line ministries typically involve the prime minister in the development of legislation, and coalition formations formally end with a constitutive meeting at which all ministers sign the coalition agreement and take joint responsibility for its implementation. To promote unity in spokesmanship among ministers, a set of principles for the cabinet’s communication policy has been developed. The prime minister is the primary spokesperson for the cabinet, especially on unresolved issues and those requiring collective political support.
Briefings between the prime minister and line ministries occur during weekly Council of Ministers meetings, usually held on Fridays at the Ministry of General Affairs. Additional meetings can be convened whenever the prime minister or at least two other ministers deem it necessary. For efficient decision-making, proposals for the cabinet are first submitted to a sub-council. The prime minister chairs all sub-councils and ministerial committees, each with a fixed composition of ministers and state secretaries.
This meticulous coordination mechanism relies on the political willingness to cooperate and mutual trust. In the Rutte IV cabinet, both factors were missing from the start. The prime minister’s involvement in the childcare benefit affair resulted in distrust and resistance to his leadership. Additionally, the VVD and Christian Democrats did not trust their D66 and Christian Union coalition partners, perceiving them as being too proactive in climate change, circular economy transition and nitrogen reduction policies, while migration policy also remained a significant point of contention. After less than two years, the prime minister deliberately violated coalition conduct rules by threatening a coalition break and calling for an open vote in a plenary Council of Ministers meeting, leading to the government’s collapse.
Citations:
G. Buitendijk, Seccretaris-Genraal. n.d. Introductiedossier. Kennismaking met de organisatie van AZ.
Bekkers. 2021. “Algemene Zaken, de kleine spin in het web.” Binnenlands Bestuur, March 30.
Joustra, T., and P. Van Venetiç. 1993. De geheimen van het torentje. Praktische gids voor het premierschap.
NRC. 2023. “De gang van zaken van de afgelopen dagen kan op het Binnenhof diepe sporen nalaten.” NRC, July 8.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Since the 2006 elections, politicians have called for a reduction in the number of civil servants. Early retirement schemes have led to a significant loss of substantive expertise. Moreover, sectoral expertise has not been considered an essential characteristic of departmental leadership. For instance, at the beginning of the pandemic and for much of its duration, the Ministry of Public Health had no medical experts among its top-level civil servants. This was corrected during the Rutte IV cabinet, when a gastroenterologist and former director of the Rotterdam Medical Center, one of the major COVID-19 policy advisers, was appointed minister of public health.
Equally if not more serious, as even the Council of State has warned, is the erosion of traditional loyalty and trust between (deputy) ministers and top-level officers. Ministers have increasingly turned to outside experts such as consultants, lobbyists and political trustees, breaking the monopoly formerly held by senior civil servants on providing policy-relevant information and advice. Last year, the Ministry of Economic Affairs spent 30% of its personnel budget on hiring outside experts. In response, top-level officers have adopted risk-averse and defensive behavior, specializing in process management and embracing Dutch variations of New Public Management (NPM) practices. Professor of Public Administration Noordegraaf evaluated the General Administrative Service (ABD), a pool of about 1,400 top civil service managers, and concluded that their high levels of career mobility – staying in their positions for an average of 4.3 years – may conflict with the development of substantial expertise. Consequently, it is no longer assumed that they are experts in their areas of responsibility. This undermines a core principle of good civil service, of championing a long-term perspective in opposition to the short-term outlook characteristic of politic cycles.
Recent departmental reorganizations have also been less than thoughtful. In 2010, the Rutte I government redefined the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), which previously focused on administration, personnel and security. The security portfolio was transferred to the Ministry of Security and Justice (now Justice and Security), while the policy areas of housing and spatial planning from the dissolved Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment were added to BZK. This reorganization was implausible, as it brought housing and spatial planning under an administrative department and subordinated the police to the Ministry of Justice, violating the system of checks and balances. Another example is the transfer of agriculture to Economic Affairs and its subsequent reautonomization at the next cabinet formation, reflecting an ill-considered reorganization of the civil service.
As a result, the Netherlands received a below-average score in policymaking in the 2019 International Civil Service Effectiveness Index (InCiSE). There have been some attempts at improvement. After a reduction of the number of civil servants, their total numbers grew to 321,396 in 2022, an increase of 10,000 from 2021. New legislation often spurs but does not guarantee better coordination. The abolition of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment is now being addressed through a comprehensive Environment Act (see also “Effective Sustainability Checks”). Additionally, although government agencies have previously been reluctant to share information, the Rathenau Institute has issued proposals for better embedding algorithmic decision-making into law, conducting proportionality tests, requiring human intervention and oversight, requiring careful monitoring, and establishing a Permanent Committee on Digital Affairs. The Rutte IV cabinet installed a minister with special duties in this area.
Citations:
Bekkers. 2022. “Leger rijksambtenaren groeide met 10.000 in 2021.” Binnenlands Bestuur, December 29.
Hamilton et al. 2022. “Hoe kan de Haagse bestuurscultuur daadwerkelijk veranderen?” Groene Amsterdammer, January 5.
NRC. 2023. “Algemene Rekenkamer: overheidsdiensten te terughoudend met uitwisselen van informatie.” Endedijk, March 30.
Rathenau Instituut. 2022. “Algoritmische besluitvorming. Handreiking aan de Eerste Kamer.”
Chavannes, De Correspondent. 2023. “Kunnen de overheid en de politiek dan niets meer?” De Correspondent May 27.
Van der Schoot. 2024. “Doemdenken en stemming maken over Omgevingswet.” Binnenlands Bestuur, January 8.
Ziesemer. 2023. “Zelfs de overheid vertrouwt de overheid niet meer.” De Correspondent August 8.
Platform O, Boersma. 2023. “De topambtelijke spagaat.”
Equally if not more serious, as even the Council of State has warned, is the erosion of traditional loyalty and trust between (deputy) ministers and top-level officers. Ministers have increasingly turned to outside experts such as consultants, lobbyists and political trustees, breaking the monopoly formerly held by senior civil servants on providing policy-relevant information and advice. Last year, the Ministry of Economic Affairs spent 30% of its personnel budget on hiring outside experts. In response, top-level officers have adopted risk-averse and defensive behavior, specializing in process management and embracing Dutch variations of New Public Management (NPM) practices. Professor of Public Administration Noordegraaf evaluated the General Administrative Service (ABD), a pool of about 1,400 top civil service managers, and concluded that their high levels of career mobility – staying in their positions for an average of 4.3 years – may conflict with the development of substantial expertise. Consequently, it is no longer assumed that they are experts in their areas of responsibility. This undermines a core principle of good civil service, of championing a long-term perspective in opposition to the short-term outlook characteristic of politic cycles.
Recent departmental reorganizations have also been less than thoughtful. In 2010, the Rutte I government redefined the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), which previously focused on administration, personnel and security. The security portfolio was transferred to the Ministry of Security and Justice (now Justice and Security), while the policy areas of housing and spatial planning from the dissolved Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment were added to BZK. This reorganization was implausible, as it brought housing and spatial planning under an administrative department and subordinated the police to the Ministry of Justice, violating the system of checks and balances. Another example is the transfer of agriculture to Economic Affairs and its subsequent reautonomization at the next cabinet formation, reflecting an ill-considered reorganization of the civil service.
As a result, the Netherlands received a below-average score in policymaking in the 2019 International Civil Service Effectiveness Index (InCiSE). There have been some attempts at improvement. After a reduction of the number of civil servants, their total numbers grew to 321,396 in 2022, an increase of 10,000 from 2021. New legislation often spurs but does not guarantee better coordination. The abolition of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment is now being addressed through a comprehensive Environment Act (see also “Effective Sustainability Checks”). Additionally, although government agencies have previously been reluctant to share information, the Rathenau Institute has issued proposals for better embedding algorithmic decision-making into law, conducting proportionality tests, requiring human intervention and oversight, requiring careful monitoring, and establishing a Permanent Committee on Digital Affairs. The Rutte IV cabinet installed a minister with special duties in this area.
Citations:
Bekkers. 2022. “Leger rijksambtenaren groeide met 10.000 in 2021.” Binnenlands Bestuur, December 29.
Hamilton et al. 2022. “Hoe kan de Haagse bestuurscultuur daadwerkelijk veranderen?” Groene Amsterdammer, January 5.
NRC. 2023. “Algemene Rekenkamer: overheidsdiensten te terughoudend met uitwisselen van informatie.” Endedijk, March 30.
Rathenau Instituut. 2022. “Algoritmische besluitvorming. Handreiking aan de Eerste Kamer.”
Chavannes, De Correspondent. 2023. “Kunnen de overheid en de politiek dan niets meer?” De Correspondent May 27.
Van der Schoot. 2024. “Doemdenken en stemming maken over Omgevingswet.” Binnenlands Bestuur, January 8.
Ziesemer. 2023. “Zelfs de overheid vertrouwt de overheid niet meer.” De Correspondent August 8.
Platform O, Boersma. 2023. “De topambtelijke spagaat.”
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Although informal consultations undoubtedly occur among ministers themselves; between ministers and senior officials; between ministers and legislators (such as the former Tower consultations between core cabinet members and coalition party leaders); among senior officials; between senior officials and legislators; and involving lobbyists, journalists, and scientists, there is little definitive reporting in this area. Informal consultations remain secretive, despite open government campaigns that have increased accessibility to formal documents.
Permanent parliamentary committees, for example, can serve as venues for informal contacts between legislators and senior officials, although the latter are formally constrained by the “Oekaze Kok,” which prohibits such interactions. Recently, a group of administrative scientists and secretary-generals advocated relaxing this rule. The cabinet has also convened ad hoc committees around a “fixer” figure, former minister and legislator Johannes Remkes, to address pressing issues that the cabinet itself could not resolve, such as the nitrogen crisis and safety concerns related to gas drilling in Groningen.
Although there has been some disclosure about ministers’ agendas, the extent of visits by lobbyists remains unclear. The popular “poldering” model also fosters an environment where informal contacts can thrive. For instance, around topics like energy transition or climate policy, formal “tables” are established with invited stakeholders, serving as both formal and informal access points for business and other interest groups. Some, including prominent parliamentarian Pieter Omtzigt, have expressed concerns that this approach could diminish parliamentary oversight of cabinet decision-making.
Citations:
Boonstra. 2023. “Topambtenaren rijk houden tegenspraak tegen.” Binnenlands Bestuur November 22.
EW, Joosten. 2023. “Onder kabinetten-Rutte explosieve groei adviescolleges.” EW August 22.
De Groene Amsterdammer. 2021. “Achter de minister. Wie is toch de ambtenaar?” June 2.
Omtzigt. 2023. “Thorbeckelezing Zwolle.” April 14.
Permanent parliamentary committees, for example, can serve as venues for informal contacts between legislators and senior officials, although the latter are formally constrained by the “Oekaze Kok,” which prohibits such interactions. Recently, a group of administrative scientists and secretary-generals advocated relaxing this rule. The cabinet has also convened ad hoc committees around a “fixer” figure, former minister and legislator Johannes Remkes, to address pressing issues that the cabinet itself could not resolve, such as the nitrogen crisis and safety concerns related to gas drilling in Groningen.
Although there has been some disclosure about ministers’ agendas, the extent of visits by lobbyists remains unclear. The popular “poldering” model also fosters an environment where informal contacts can thrive. For instance, around topics like energy transition or climate policy, formal “tables” are established with invited stakeholders, serving as both formal and informal access points for business and other interest groups. Some, including prominent parliamentarian Pieter Omtzigt, have expressed concerns that this approach could diminish parliamentary oversight of cabinet decision-making.
Citations:
Boonstra. 2023. “Topambtenaren rijk houden tegenspraak tegen.” Binnenlands Bestuur November 22.
EW, Joosten. 2023. “Onder kabinetten-Rutte explosieve groei adviescolleges.” EW August 22.
De Groene Amsterdammer. 2021. “Achter de minister. Wie is toch de ambtenaar?” June 2.
Omtzigt. 2023. “Thorbeckelezing Zwolle.” April 14.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
10
9
9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
2
1
1
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
National standards are implicit in the nationwide local government funding model, which allocates a share of national tax revenues to the 342 local governments on the basis of numerous variables corrected for economic conjuncture. This funding today comprises 86% of local government budgets. For local governments, the problem with this funding system is its economic volatility and its weak level of responsiveness to new implementation tasks deriving from new national legislation. This frequently implies policy co-production with regional and local government. This of course has budgetary implications which are negotiated per new policy and with different standards. In this way, local governments are turned rapidly into implementers of national policy, and equality of standards is not guaranteed.
Local governments by themselves try to meet mutually agreed-upon standards. Several studies by local audit chambers have involved comparisons and benchmarks for particular kinds of services. Local governments have been organizing voluntary peer reviews of each other’s executive capacities. As part of a knowledge platform (Waarstaatjegemeente.nl), the Association of Dutch Local Governments (VNG) produces a comparative report on the status of local governments that collects relevant policy evaluations and is intended to assist local governments in their policymaking-related information management.
Nevertheless, due to the implementation of ill-considered decentralization plans, which frequently include funding cutbacks (e.g., in local youth care), it is likely that the uniformity of national standards in the delivery of services has diminished. Particularly, perceived disparities between public services in rural as compared to urban areas has become a topic of political concern. This partially contributed to the establishment of a new political party, the Farmers Citizen Movement. Instead of strict output equality, official discourse now refers to “situational equality.”
The fast pace of decentralization eroded many possible benefits. Decentralization was accompanied by the expectation that municipalities could manage with less money. Instead, they have been structurally short of money for years now, leading to a reduction of crucial social services and backlogs in assistance to those who are most vulnerable. Local governments’ high level of dependence on the national government for additional financing during financial shortages is exacerbated by factors such as economic decline. Limited options for increasing local revenues lead either to attempts to seek additional funding from the national government or expenditure cuts. However, expanding municipal taxes itself may have drawbacks, such as creating disparities in service offerings between wealthier and poorer municipalities. Moreover, local revenues can be volatile and sensitive to economic cycles, potentially requiring municipalities to maintain higher reserves or take on more debt during challenging times, depending on the type of taxes levied. Further research is suggested, with the goal of exploring the extent of these issues in countries where local governments rely heavily on their own revenues.
The development toward less equality is somewhat counteracted by increasing cooperation between municipalities in transboundary tasks (e.g., tax collection, garbage collection and treatment, youth care, care for the elderly, regional energy and innovation policy). Cooperation agreements for such transboundary tasks escape normal democratic control by local councils, and have reached numbers, budgets and degrees of intensity that give rise to concerns about the scope and quality of local democracy.
Citations:
Jansen. 2023. “Principeakkoord over Hervormingsagenda Jeugd. De zorgen over bezuinigingen en financiële afspraken zijn niet geheel weggenomen.” Binnenlands Bestuur May 17.
Bekkers. 2023. “Nieuwe financiering gemeenten pas vanaf 2027.” Binnenlands Bestuur May 2.
Waarstaatjegemeente.nl. 2022.
Jonker. 2023. “Oost-Nederland krijgt te weinig agenten, de Randstad juist relatief veel.” NOS Nieuws March 4.
Platform O. 2022. “Overheid moet meer oog krijgen voor regionaal onbehagen.” In gesprek met hoogleraar Caspar van den Berg, January 25.
Ockhuijsen. 2023. “Een kloof tussen stad en platteland? Dat hangt ervan af aan wie je het vraagt.” Nieuwsuur March 13.
Staat van de uitvoering. 2022. Den Haag. January 18, 2023.
https://nos.nl/artikel/2356722-scp-hoge-verwachtingen-decentralisati e-niet-waargemaakt
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/de-nederlandse-economie/2020/nederlandse-lokale-overheid-veel-centrale-financiering-veel-decentrale-uitgaven?onepage=true#c-4–Conclusies
Local governments by themselves try to meet mutually agreed-upon standards. Several studies by local audit chambers have involved comparisons and benchmarks for particular kinds of services. Local governments have been organizing voluntary peer reviews of each other’s executive capacities. As part of a knowledge platform (Waarstaatjegemeente.nl), the Association of Dutch Local Governments (VNG) produces a comparative report on the status of local governments that collects relevant policy evaluations and is intended to assist local governments in their policymaking-related information management.
Nevertheless, due to the implementation of ill-considered decentralization plans, which frequently include funding cutbacks (e.g., in local youth care), it is likely that the uniformity of national standards in the delivery of services has diminished. Particularly, perceived disparities between public services in rural as compared to urban areas has become a topic of political concern. This partially contributed to the establishment of a new political party, the Farmers Citizen Movement. Instead of strict output equality, official discourse now refers to “situational equality.”
The fast pace of decentralization eroded many possible benefits. Decentralization was accompanied by the expectation that municipalities could manage with less money. Instead, they have been structurally short of money for years now, leading to a reduction of crucial social services and backlogs in assistance to those who are most vulnerable. Local governments’ high level of dependence on the national government for additional financing during financial shortages is exacerbated by factors such as economic decline. Limited options for increasing local revenues lead either to attempts to seek additional funding from the national government or expenditure cuts. However, expanding municipal taxes itself may have drawbacks, such as creating disparities in service offerings between wealthier and poorer municipalities. Moreover, local revenues can be volatile and sensitive to economic cycles, potentially requiring municipalities to maintain higher reserves or take on more debt during challenging times, depending on the type of taxes levied. Further research is suggested, with the goal of exploring the extent of these issues in countries where local governments rely heavily on their own revenues.
The development toward less equality is somewhat counteracted by increasing cooperation between municipalities in transboundary tasks (e.g., tax collection, garbage collection and treatment, youth care, care for the elderly, regional energy and innovation policy). Cooperation agreements for such transboundary tasks escape normal democratic control by local councils, and have reached numbers, budgets and degrees of intensity that give rise to concerns about the scope and quality of local democracy.
Citations:
Jansen. 2023. “Principeakkoord over Hervormingsagenda Jeugd. De zorgen over bezuinigingen en financiële afspraken zijn niet geheel weggenomen.” Binnenlands Bestuur May 17.
Bekkers. 2023. “Nieuwe financiering gemeenten pas vanaf 2027.” Binnenlands Bestuur May 2.
Waarstaatjegemeente.nl. 2022.
Jonker. 2023. “Oost-Nederland krijgt te weinig agenten, de Randstad juist relatief veel.” NOS Nieuws March 4.
Platform O. 2022. “Overheid moet meer oog krijgen voor regionaal onbehagen.” In gesprek met hoogleraar Caspar van den Berg, January 25.
Ockhuijsen. 2023. “Een kloof tussen stad en platteland? Dat hangt ervan af aan wie je het vraagt.” Nieuwsuur March 13.
Staat van de uitvoering. 2022. Den Haag. January 18, 2023.
https://nos.nl/artikel/2356722-scp-hoge-verwachtingen-decentralisati e-niet-waargemaakt
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/de-nederlandse-economie/2020/nederlandse-lokale-overheid-veel-centrale-financiering-veel-decentrale-uitgaven?onepage=true#c-4–Conclusies
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
10
9
9
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Since 2023, there has been a formalized code for intergovernmental relations between the central government, the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) and the Union of Water Authorities (UvW). It was concluded because national government had the bad habit of formulating new policies with far-reaching policy co-production implications for regional or local governments without much prior consultation or structural budget allocation. The intention of the code is that national government will involve other tiers of government early enough that the new policy proposals can still be amended.
Putting this into perspective: Since the decentralization of national spatial and housing planning in 2001, and the abolition of the Ministry for Spatial Planning and the Environment in 2010, the central government has faced all sorts of complex, “wicked” problems, in some cases deriving from European agreements, and often exacerbated by intentionally delayed implementation. It often then tasks municipalities (youth care, housing asylum-seekers) or provinces (climate, nitrogen, housing, asylum reception/registration, energy transition) with (co)implementing solutions. Importantly, such tasks have been imposed without certainty regarding corresponding structural budgets.
The political implication is that regional and local policymaking has gained in importance, even for voters. Provincial responsibility and thus political resistance against policies for licenses to operate (new or expanded) nitrogen-emitting farms and licenses to locate solar panel fields or large windmill parks led almost directly to the Farmer-Citizen Movement’s rise to become the largest political party in the Senate (which is indirectly elected by provincial councils). Another implication is that differences and inequalities between regions have become a focus of political debate about equal opportunities. Similarly, choices in funding (or failing to fund) large infrastructure projects have increased the gap between cities and rural areas. There is a sense that The Hague does not really understand the regions, and that it sometimes deliberately keeps regions small.
Provinces depend on the Provincial Fund for almost half of their revenues; one-third comes from motor vehicle tax surcharges, from which the increasing number of electrical cars are exempted. Provincial governments are displeased with the central government because it has discontinued the normal funding system for special allowances without offering any clarity about a possible alternative. More and more, a temporary pot of money is being added to new tasks on the basis of ad hoc negotiations; this transforms the province level from an independent administrative tier into a project office that implements government policy.
Something similar is occurring at the local level, where implementation of the new system has been delayed until 2027, plunging local governments into years of financial uncertainty.
Citations:
Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), Union of Water Authorities (UvW), and the national government. 2023. Code on Inter-Administrative Relations.
I&O Research, Kanne, and Van der Schelde. 2023. “Provinciale Staten: Stikstof en Linkse Samenwerking Zorgen voor Dynamiek.” February 16.
Elke regio telt! Een nieuwe aanpak van verschillen tussen regio’s, Den Haag: Raad voor de leefomgeving en infrastructuur; Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, Raad voor Volksgezondheid en Samenleving, maart 2023.
Chavannes, De Correspondent. 2023. “Welkom bij Projectbureau Provincie, voor alle Lastige Zaken waar Den Haag niet uitkomt.” March 13.
NRC. 2022. “Grote stadsregio’s groeien, het noorden blijft achter.” November 27.
Van den Berg. 2023. “Polarisatie in de provincie.” Parlement.com March 10.
Centrum voor Onderzoek van de Economie van de Lagere Overheden (COELO). 2022. “Advies over het uitkeringsstelsel tussen Rijk en provincies en gemeenten.”
Leeuw, Binnenlands. 2022. “VNG: rijk overlegde niet over verandering financiering.” Bestuur, October 14.
Putting this into perspective: Since the decentralization of national spatial and housing planning in 2001, and the abolition of the Ministry for Spatial Planning and the Environment in 2010, the central government has faced all sorts of complex, “wicked” problems, in some cases deriving from European agreements, and often exacerbated by intentionally delayed implementation. It often then tasks municipalities (youth care, housing asylum-seekers) or provinces (climate, nitrogen, housing, asylum reception/registration, energy transition) with (co)implementing solutions. Importantly, such tasks have been imposed without certainty regarding corresponding structural budgets.
The political implication is that regional and local policymaking has gained in importance, even for voters. Provincial responsibility and thus political resistance against policies for licenses to operate (new or expanded) nitrogen-emitting farms and licenses to locate solar panel fields or large windmill parks led almost directly to the Farmer-Citizen Movement’s rise to become the largest political party in the Senate (which is indirectly elected by provincial councils). Another implication is that differences and inequalities between regions have become a focus of political debate about equal opportunities. Similarly, choices in funding (or failing to fund) large infrastructure projects have increased the gap between cities and rural areas. There is a sense that The Hague does not really understand the regions, and that it sometimes deliberately keeps regions small.
Provinces depend on the Provincial Fund for almost half of their revenues; one-third comes from motor vehicle tax surcharges, from which the increasing number of electrical cars are exempted. Provincial governments are displeased with the central government because it has discontinued the normal funding system for special allowances without offering any clarity about a possible alternative. More and more, a temporary pot of money is being added to new tasks on the basis of ad hoc negotiations; this transforms the province level from an independent administrative tier into a project office that implements government policy.
Something similar is occurring at the local level, where implementation of the new system has been delayed until 2027, plunging local governments into years of financial uncertainty.
Citations:
Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), Union of Water Authorities (UvW), and the national government. 2023. Code on Inter-Administrative Relations.
I&O Research, Kanne, and Van der Schelde. 2023. “Provinciale Staten: Stikstof en Linkse Samenwerking Zorgen voor Dynamiek.” February 16.
Elke regio telt! Een nieuwe aanpak van verschillen tussen regio’s, Den Haag: Raad voor de leefomgeving en infrastructuur; Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, Raad voor Volksgezondheid en Samenleving, maart 2023.
Chavannes, De Correspondent. 2023. “Welkom bij Projectbureau Provincie, voor alle Lastige Zaken waar Den Haag niet uitkomt.” March 13.
NRC. 2022. “Grote stadsregio’s groeien, het noorden blijft achter.” November 27.
Van den Berg. 2023. “Polarisatie in de provincie.” Parlement.com March 10.
Centrum voor Onderzoek van de Economie van de Lagere Overheden (COELO). 2022. “Advies over het uitkeringsstelsel tussen Rijk en provincies en gemeenten.”
Leeuw, Binnenlands. 2022. “VNG: rijk overlegde niet over verandering financiering.” Bestuur, October 14.