Diagonal Accountability
#18Key Findings
The Netherlands falls into the sample’s lower-middle ranks (rank 18) with regard to diagonal accountability.
The media is not subject to government censorship. Journalists face some dangers from organized crime – as in the killing of crime reporter Peter R. de Vries in 2021 – resulting in increased police protection. The media sector is dominated by a few large international companies, leading to plurality concerns.
The country ranks very high with regard to protecting political freedoms. Police forces have increased pressure on peaceful protesters. Under the poldering model of consultation, governments have historically worked closely with interest groups to make policy.
Unions and employers groups strongly influence socioeconomic policy, and negotiate over working conditions and wages. While welfare and environmental groups are also part of the poldering process, some environmental organizations have successfully turned to lawsuits to speed up policy change.
The media is not subject to government censorship. Journalists face some dangers from organized crime – as in the killing of crime reporter Peter R. de Vries in 2021 – resulting in increased police protection. The media sector is dominated by a few large international companies, leading to plurality concerns.
The country ranks very high with regard to protecting political freedoms. Police forces have increased pressure on peaceful protesters. Under the poldering model of consultation, governments have historically worked closely with interest groups to make policy.
Unions and employers groups strongly influence socioeconomic policy, and negotiate over working conditions and wages. While welfare and environmental groups are also part of the poldering process, some environmental organizations have successfully turned to lawsuits to speed up policy change.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
On the World Press Freedom Index (WPFI) compiled by Reporters without Borders (RSF 2023), the Netherlands has made a strong comeback from 28th place in 2022 to sixth place in 2023 (out of 180 countries). This is specifically – and sadly – due in part to stepping up security measures for reporters following the killing of crime reporter Peter R. de Vries in July 2021. Ongoing dangers from organized crime as well as threatening behavior from supporters of populist parties toward journalists during demonstrations – cheered on by PVV political leader Wilders, who publicly called journalists “scum of the earth” – have resulted in somewhat improved police protection and an emergency number that journalists can use to report crimes and receive advice on what to do. Nevertheless, the Center for Media Pluralism and Media
Freedom (CMPF 2023) index sees the country as being low-risk with regard to the media’s fundamental protection, social inclusiveness and political independence. Although there are some signs of self-censorship, Dutch media feel free to question and criticize government ministers and members of parliament. Journalists have practically unlimited access to the parliament building, and may approach MPs and ministers after commission meetings, with the informal rule being that they will allow (short) interviews.
The Dutch media landscape consists of commercial media – owned by three large press conglomerates (one Dutch-German, two Belgian) – and public media, overseen by Dutch Public Broadcasting (NPO). The small number of media owners and the dominance of uncontrollable international mega-companies in commercial media is considered a plurality risk. The Dutch Authority on Consumers and Market (ACM) prohibited a merger between Talpa and RTL. There is no formal legislation to limit media concentration.
NPO is still structured to serve putatively different segments of the population, each with their own distinct set of beliefs, perspectives and convictions, along with a number of paying members. The system has been modernized several times; most recently by limiting the number of media organizations to six. Every five years, two “aspiring” members are admitted on a temporary basis. To the astonishment of many, in 2021, Unheard Netherlands! (ON!) – the mouthpiece of adherents of extreme right-wing political parties such as PVV and FvD – and Black (Zwart) – which leans toward BIJ1 and DENK – were admitted. Both broadcasting organizations are rooted in vocal protest movements, and have played a prominent role in Dutch public debates for some time thanks to demonstrations and provocative actions. In 2022 and 2023, ON! was formally accused by the NPO board of engaging in biased reporting and interviewing, thus violating rules of good journalistic practice. However, the minister of culture, acting for a caretaker government after the PVV election win, declined to take punitive action. This is in line with the national culture of political noninterference, leaving freedom and pluralism issues to be dealt with by the editorial statutes of the media themselves.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders (RSF). 2023. “Netherlands.” https://rsf.org/en/country/netherlands
Commissariaat voor de Media. 2023. Mediamonitor.
CMPF. 2023. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom: Freedom Country Report: The Netherlands. Fiesole: European University Institute.
Leen d’Haenens, Hanne Vandenberghe. “Country Report Netherlands.” https://media-ownership.eu/findings/countries/the-netherlands/
NRC_H. 2022. “Toezichthouder legt niet alleen Ongehoord Nederland, maar héle publieke omroep onder vergrootglas.” van den Bos, July 22.
RTL Nieuws. 2023. “Scholieren kiezen liefst heel links, of heel rechts: ‘Ze zijn gevoelig voor oneliners’.” November 22.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Streep door fusie Talpa and RTL, ‘consument zou de rekening betalen’.” January 30.
Ohme, Jakob, Kiki de Bruin, Yael de Haan, Sanne Kruikemeier, Toni G.L.A. van der Meer, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2023. “Avoiding the News to Participate in Society? The Longitudinal Relationship Between News Avoidance and Civic Engagement.” Communications 48 (4): 551-562. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2021-0099
Verboord, M. 2023. “Bundles of Trust? Examining the Relationships between Media Repertoires, Institutional Trust, and Social Contexts.” Communications.
Freedom (CMPF 2023) index sees the country as being low-risk with regard to the media’s fundamental protection, social inclusiveness and political independence. Although there are some signs of self-censorship, Dutch media feel free to question and criticize government ministers and members of parliament. Journalists have practically unlimited access to the parliament building, and may approach MPs and ministers after commission meetings, with the informal rule being that they will allow (short) interviews.
The Dutch media landscape consists of commercial media – owned by three large press conglomerates (one Dutch-German, two Belgian) – and public media, overseen by Dutch Public Broadcasting (NPO). The small number of media owners and the dominance of uncontrollable international mega-companies in commercial media is considered a plurality risk. The Dutch Authority on Consumers and Market (ACM) prohibited a merger between Talpa and RTL. There is no formal legislation to limit media concentration.
NPO is still structured to serve putatively different segments of the population, each with their own distinct set of beliefs, perspectives and convictions, along with a number of paying members. The system has been modernized several times; most recently by limiting the number of media organizations to six. Every five years, two “aspiring” members are admitted on a temporary basis. To the astonishment of many, in 2021, Unheard Netherlands! (ON!) – the mouthpiece of adherents of extreme right-wing political parties such as PVV and FvD – and Black (Zwart) – which leans toward BIJ1 and DENK – were admitted. Both broadcasting organizations are rooted in vocal protest movements, and have played a prominent role in Dutch public debates for some time thanks to demonstrations and provocative actions. In 2022 and 2023, ON! was formally accused by the NPO board of engaging in biased reporting and interviewing, thus violating rules of good journalistic practice. However, the minister of culture, acting for a caretaker government after the PVV election win, declined to take punitive action. This is in line with the national culture of political noninterference, leaving freedom and pluralism issues to be dealt with by the editorial statutes of the media themselves.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders (RSF). 2023. “Netherlands.” https://rsf.org/en/country/netherlands
Commissariaat voor de Media. 2023. Mediamonitor.
CMPF. 2023. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom: Freedom Country Report: The Netherlands. Fiesole: European University Institute.
Leen d’Haenens, Hanne Vandenberghe. “Country Report Netherlands.” https://media-ownership.eu/findings/countries/the-netherlands/
NRC_H. 2022. “Toezichthouder legt niet alleen Ongehoord Nederland, maar héle publieke omroep onder vergrootglas.” van den Bos, July 22.
RTL Nieuws. 2023. “Scholieren kiezen liefst heel links, of heel rechts: ‘Ze zijn gevoelig voor oneliners’.” November 22.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Streep door fusie Talpa and RTL, ‘consument zou de rekening betalen’.” January 30.
Ohme, Jakob, Kiki de Bruin, Yael de Haan, Sanne Kruikemeier, Toni G.L.A. van der Meer, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2023. “Avoiding the News to Participate in Society? The Longitudinal Relationship Between News Avoidance and Civic Engagement.” Communications 48 (4): 551-562. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2021-0099
Verboord, M. 2023. “Bundles of Trust? Examining the Relationships between Media Repertoires, Institutional Trust, and Social Contexts.” Communications.
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
The arrival of commercial broadcasters made the media landscape much more diverse. The advent of social media had a major impact on both the reporting of debates and the behavior that politicians (parliamentarians and ministers) themselves exhibit. With Twitter (now X), Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, blogs on websites, etc., politicians were given the opportunity to deliver news themselves. Increased competition has resulted in a wider range of offerings, but at the same time, an impoverishment of content. This multiplicity ultimately detracted from a reliability that had previously been taken for granted. Paradoxically, this plethora of information has contributed to making the public worse rather than better informed about politics. “Fast” and “fun” became more appealing than “professional” and “reliable.”
There are no anti-monopoly laws, though in practice Dutch print media and commercial broadcast media are owned by just two-and-a-half international corporations (DPG, Mediahuis and RTL/Bertelsmann). These oligopolistic practices have kept newspapers financially healthy, while rendering the media sector as a whole vulnerable. For the time being, this does not endanger plurality of views in the (inter)national media landscape, because the owners are “journalism-friendly” and allow for liberal editorial statutes. Local media do suffer from a lack of plurality due to “imported” reporting, because of affiliations with national media organizations, as well as due to a lack of resources. There are many municipalities that have just one or even no local newspaper. Radio and TV broadcasting organizations are being forced into regional cooperation structures to survive.
The real change in the media landscape is the fact that people are increasingly exposed to news through indirect access, for instance via news gathering sites, notifications or search engines. This change is particularly evident among young people. Thus, access to news is gradually becoming more and more determined by personalized notifications or by the intervention of a recommendation system. About 22% of young people target specific individuals rather than news brands when it comes to online news.
Confidence in the media has declined among all age groups, but especially among young people. About 19% of young people report difficulty understanding or following the news. Although Dutch people’s overall trust in the news has declined, trust in various news media does remain stable compared to previous years. The NOS receives the highest trust rating (7.4 out of 10 possible poiints), followed by RTL News (6.7). Podcasts also continue to rise in popularity, a trend that has continued in recent years. More than three-quarters of young people report listening to podcasts over the course of a month.
Dutch media consistently critique government policies, though some do so more than others. Special mention is deserved by crowdfunded investigative journalism initiatives (affiliated with and supported by some of the quality journals) like Follow the Money, the Correspondent and Investico. Moreover, some well-known TV anchors have said they have meticulously prepared interview strategies to expose leading politicians as habitual liars, frauds or truth evaders. It thus appears that many in the media see their primary task as critiquing government and revealing abuses of power and broken promises, especially certainly after the childcare benefit, Groningen gas exploitation and earthquake scandals. The logic of the media rejects the political practice of compromise that underlies a consensus democracy like the Netherlands. In that sense, the media have developed as distrust-producing machines.
Yet the Netherlands is not a mediocracy. The major media outlets encompass most political perspectives in a fairly unbiased way. Of course, major political parties draw more attention, but smaller parties (like Party for the Animals; DENK, a party focused on minority rights; and BIJ1, a left-wing social-justice-focused party) are regularly, though less frequently, covered. There is no media bias against opposition parties/candidates. Thanks to social media they have their own outlets, and they are sometimes able to enter the formal system. But such parties do get less attention than major political parties, as defined by ongoing polling results.
During crucial political periods, however, there is substantial distortion of the playing field. A media analysis of all NPO radio and TV programs during the 2021 campaign revealed a notable imbalance in the coverage of political figures, with a clear emphasis on right-wing ideologies and male politicians. The findings underscore the importance of considering media dynamics when evaluating political discourses and representation in the context of elections. Further analysis is warranted to explore the specific subjects discussed during the election campaign, as this would help provide a comprehensive understanding of media influence on political narratives.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2022. “Vrijwel alle dagbladen zijn in handen van twee concerns. Wat merkt de lezer daarvan?” August 21.
Parlement.com. 2022. “Misschien wel de grootste verandering: de media.” https://www.parlement.com
Commissariaat voor de Media. 2022. “Digital News Report, Nederland.”
NRC-H. 2022. “Vertrouwen in het nieuws weer gedaald na piek in coronatijd.” Fit, July 15.
NRC. “Hoogtepunt voor Wollaars in prijswinnend Hoekstra-interview: ‘Heb ik nou antwoord gekregen op mijn vraag?’”
Rob Wijberg. 2023. “Hoe onze mediacratie een wantrouwenmachine werd.” De Correspondent September 23.
https://mediasuitedatastories.clariah.nl/elections-2021-first-results/
https://nos.nl/artikel/2372814-onderzoek-rechts-domineert-de-verkiezingscampagne-op-radio-en-tv
There are no anti-monopoly laws, though in practice Dutch print media and commercial broadcast media are owned by just two-and-a-half international corporations (DPG, Mediahuis and RTL/Bertelsmann). These oligopolistic practices have kept newspapers financially healthy, while rendering the media sector as a whole vulnerable. For the time being, this does not endanger plurality of views in the (inter)national media landscape, because the owners are “journalism-friendly” and allow for liberal editorial statutes. Local media do suffer from a lack of plurality due to “imported” reporting, because of affiliations with national media organizations, as well as due to a lack of resources. There are many municipalities that have just one or even no local newspaper. Radio and TV broadcasting organizations are being forced into regional cooperation structures to survive.
The real change in the media landscape is the fact that people are increasingly exposed to news through indirect access, for instance via news gathering sites, notifications or search engines. This change is particularly evident among young people. Thus, access to news is gradually becoming more and more determined by personalized notifications or by the intervention of a recommendation system. About 22% of young people target specific individuals rather than news brands when it comes to online news.
Confidence in the media has declined among all age groups, but especially among young people. About 19% of young people report difficulty understanding or following the news. Although Dutch people’s overall trust in the news has declined, trust in various news media does remain stable compared to previous years. The NOS receives the highest trust rating (7.4 out of 10 possible poiints), followed by RTL News (6.7). Podcasts also continue to rise in popularity, a trend that has continued in recent years. More than three-quarters of young people report listening to podcasts over the course of a month.
Dutch media consistently critique government policies, though some do so more than others. Special mention is deserved by crowdfunded investigative journalism initiatives (affiliated with and supported by some of the quality journals) like Follow the Money, the Correspondent and Investico. Moreover, some well-known TV anchors have said they have meticulously prepared interview strategies to expose leading politicians as habitual liars, frauds or truth evaders. It thus appears that many in the media see their primary task as critiquing government and revealing abuses of power and broken promises, especially certainly after the childcare benefit, Groningen gas exploitation and earthquake scandals. The logic of the media rejects the political practice of compromise that underlies a consensus democracy like the Netherlands. In that sense, the media have developed as distrust-producing machines.
Yet the Netherlands is not a mediocracy. The major media outlets encompass most political perspectives in a fairly unbiased way. Of course, major political parties draw more attention, but smaller parties (like Party for the Animals; DENK, a party focused on minority rights; and BIJ1, a left-wing social-justice-focused party) are regularly, though less frequently, covered. There is no media bias against opposition parties/candidates. Thanks to social media they have their own outlets, and they are sometimes able to enter the formal system. But such parties do get less attention than major political parties, as defined by ongoing polling results.
During crucial political periods, however, there is substantial distortion of the playing field. A media analysis of all NPO radio and TV programs during the 2021 campaign revealed a notable imbalance in the coverage of political figures, with a clear emphasis on right-wing ideologies and male politicians. The findings underscore the importance of considering media dynamics when evaluating political discourses and representation in the context of elections. Further analysis is warranted to explore the specific subjects discussed during the election campaign, as this would help provide a comprehensive understanding of media influence on political narratives.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2022. “Vrijwel alle dagbladen zijn in handen van twee concerns. Wat merkt de lezer daarvan?” August 21.
Parlement.com. 2022. “Misschien wel de grootste verandering: de media.” https://www.parlement.com
Commissariaat voor de Media. 2022. “Digital News Report, Nederland.”
NRC-H. 2022. “Vertrouwen in het nieuws weer gedaald na piek in coronatijd.” Fit, July 15.
NRC. “Hoogtepunt voor Wollaars in prijswinnend Hoekstra-interview: ‘Heb ik nou antwoord gekregen op mijn vraag?’”
Rob Wijberg. 2023. “Hoe onze mediacratie een wantrouwenmachine werd.” De Correspondent September 23.
https://mediasuitedatastories.clariah.nl/elections-2021-first-results/
https://nos.nl/artikel/2372814-onderzoek-rechts-domineert-de-verkiezingscampagne-op-radio-en-tv
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
All the usual political liberties are guaranteed by the constitution. The Netherlands is a signatory to all pertinent major international treaties (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Convention on Human Rights). All relevant ranking institutions, such as The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index and the Freedom House ranking of political liberties, consistently list the Netherlands as one of the top five most free countries in the world.
However, the freedoms of assembly and demonstration have been subject to considerable pressure. The number and size of demonstrations is changing due to the fast organizing power of social media. Meanwhile, in addition to the “classic” forms of demonstration, there are new forms of protest such as the defacement of art, gluing oneself to the street or blocking a highway. Especially when protests turn into unannounced visits to the homes of politicians, police officers or journalists, demonstrators are seen as going over the bounds of normal rules of conduct.
In summer 2022, farmers organized a series of protests against government policies relating to the reduction of nitrogen emissions by agricultural enterprises near protected Natura 2000 areas. Demonstrators used huge parades of tractors to block the nation’s highways and access to supermarkets’ distribution centers and government buildings in provincial capitals. Police forces were accused of failing to intervene and manage the protests. The Sinterklaas parade in Staphorst in 2022 featured tensions between anti-Blackface activists who were on their way to the site of an approved demonstration and a crowd of intimidating and even violent pro-Blackface individuals. Despite a large-scale police presence, security forces proved unable or unwilling to deal with this. The mayor subsequently issued a ban on the anti-Blackface demonstration. Thus, a legal demonstration was banned only because of the behavior of a hostile public that could no longer be adequately dealt with by the public authorities.
Amnesty International has argued that both national and local governments are failing to guarantee the right to demonstrate. In practice, police frequently ask peaceful protesters for their identification. Demonstrators are sometimes monitored via social media or even receive unannounced visits from the police. Especially with large demonstrations and blockades, the police quite often engage in (mass) detentions or enclose groups of protesters (kettling), or administratively relocate protesters.
In brief, demonstrations are seen primarily as a risk to public order, not as the exercise of a human right. Adequate, independent evaluation of government action is lacking. However, consultations sometimes take place in which organized demonstrators and local government negotiate on conditions for safe demonstrations.
In addition, there is a process of democratic backsliding underway, visible in public opinion and behavior of political elites. There is an increasing proportion of Dutch citizens that are tolerant of violence for political means. Even some legislators, particularly those belonging to the extreme-right FvD party, have threatened colleagues belonging to other parties.
Citations:
Parlementaire Monitor. 2023. “mw. Bruins Slot, Minister van BZK.” July 7.
Amnesty International. n.d. DEMONSTRATIERECHT ONDER DRUK. Regels en praktijk in Nederland moeten beter.
Groene Amsterdammer/Investico Onderzoeksjournalisten. 2023. “Klein tegen de grote politie. Onderzoek Demonstratierecht in de knel.” Groene Amsterdammer March 23.
Erasmus School of Law. 2023. “Hoe de drang naar veiligheid het demonstratierecht in gevaar brengt.” 30 mrt.
NOS Nieuws. 2022. “Politici voelen zich onveilig door protest bij voordeur, ‘aanval op democratie’.” June 29.
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/5426691/onderzoek-scp-omverwerpen-overheidssysteem-hardere-acties-regering
However, the freedoms of assembly and demonstration have been subject to considerable pressure. The number and size of demonstrations is changing due to the fast organizing power of social media. Meanwhile, in addition to the “classic” forms of demonstration, there are new forms of protest such as the defacement of art, gluing oneself to the street or blocking a highway. Especially when protests turn into unannounced visits to the homes of politicians, police officers or journalists, demonstrators are seen as going over the bounds of normal rules of conduct.
In summer 2022, farmers organized a series of protests against government policies relating to the reduction of nitrogen emissions by agricultural enterprises near protected Natura 2000 areas. Demonstrators used huge parades of tractors to block the nation’s highways and access to supermarkets’ distribution centers and government buildings in provincial capitals. Police forces were accused of failing to intervene and manage the protests. The Sinterklaas parade in Staphorst in 2022 featured tensions between anti-Blackface activists who were on their way to the site of an approved demonstration and a crowd of intimidating and even violent pro-Blackface individuals. Despite a large-scale police presence, security forces proved unable or unwilling to deal with this. The mayor subsequently issued a ban on the anti-Blackface demonstration. Thus, a legal demonstration was banned only because of the behavior of a hostile public that could no longer be adequately dealt with by the public authorities.
Amnesty International has argued that both national and local governments are failing to guarantee the right to demonstrate. In practice, police frequently ask peaceful protesters for their identification. Demonstrators are sometimes monitored via social media or even receive unannounced visits from the police. Especially with large demonstrations and blockades, the police quite often engage in (mass) detentions or enclose groups of protesters (kettling), or administratively relocate protesters.
In brief, demonstrations are seen primarily as a risk to public order, not as the exercise of a human right. Adequate, independent evaluation of government action is lacking. However, consultations sometimes take place in which organized demonstrators and local government negotiate on conditions for safe demonstrations.
In addition, there is a process of democratic backsliding underway, visible in public opinion and behavior of political elites. There is an increasing proportion of Dutch citizens that are tolerant of violence for political means. Even some legislators, particularly those belonging to the extreme-right FvD party, have threatened colleagues belonging to other parties.
Citations:
Parlementaire Monitor. 2023. “mw. Bruins Slot, Minister van BZK.” July 7.
Amnesty International. n.d. DEMONSTRATIERECHT ONDER DRUK. Regels en praktijk in Nederland moeten beter.
Groene Amsterdammer/Investico Onderzoeksjournalisten. 2023. “Klein tegen de grote politie. Onderzoek Demonstratierecht in de knel.” Groene Amsterdammer March 23.
Erasmus School of Law. 2023. “Hoe de drang naar veiligheid het demonstratierecht in gevaar brengt.” 30 mrt.
NOS Nieuws. 2022. “Politici voelen zich onveilig door protest bij voordeur, ‘aanval op democratie’.” June 29.
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/5426691/onderzoek-scp-omverwerpen-overheidssysteem-hardere-acties-regering
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
The Netherlands reaches agreement on socioeconomic policy through consultation. This happens at different levels. In companies, the works council consults with management. At the branch level, trade unions negotiate collective bargaining agreements with employers’ organizations. At national level, there are the Social and Economic Council (SER) and the Labor Foundation. All these forms of consultation constitute long-standing parts of the Dutch consultation economy.
At the national level, the SER) is an advisory body in which entrepreneurs, employees and independent experts (“crown members”) work together to reach agreement on important socioeconomic issues. The SER is tasked with promoting entrepreneurship, decent work, sustainable growth and an inclusive society with a balanced income distribution. The SER advises the government and parliament on major issues of socioeconomic policy. The SER also facilitates agreements and covenants. Examples are the establishment of the Energy Agreement (2013) and its successor, the Climate Agreement (2019); the (unsuccessful) Agriculture Agreement (2023); and various covenants for international corporate social responsibility.
At the sectoral level, trade unions in the Netherlands have a major role in negotiating with employers over working conditions and wages. In collective bargaining agreements (CAOs) – of which there are over 600 – unions agree on behalf of workers how much their salaries will rise. Apart from these, CAOs also pay attention to labor scarcity, workers’ distance to the labor market, hybrid working conditions, climate and sustainability issues, welfare functions, and specific types of leave. Union members can then vote on whether they approve of a negotiated settlement. If approved, a collective bargaining agreement applies both to members and nonmembers of a union. By 1 January 2023, 667 CAOs had been negotiated, covering 5.9 million workers.
Fifteen years ago, 1.9 million Dutch people were members of a trade union. That figure has now fallen to only 1.4 million. Moreover, a considerable portion of today’s union members are already retired. Although membership fees are partly paid for by employers (the “vakbondstientje,” as a small percentage of wages) and are partly tax deductible, younger people frequently do not even consider membership. This trend raises the issue of how representative trade unions can be now that their membership ranks are eroding significantly. The size of a union’s strike fund determines the scope of its power. Apart from membership fees, trade unions have paradoxically become dependent on obligatory and voluntary employers’ contributions through so-called social funds. Unions are not very transparent about where their resources come from. It is estimated that in 2019, the largest trade unions depended on employers’ contributions for only about 22% of their revenues. The small Alternative for Trade Union (AVV), with some 1,400 members, was found to lean almost entirely (96%) on employer contributions.
Experts believe it is time to fundamentally rethink the system of collective labor relations, unions and their financing. Declines in membership figures not only make unions less representative, but also limits their effectiveness. De Unie is already experimenting with a different collective bargaining agreement model; in collaboration with a research institute specialized in surveys and consultative procedures, major themes and needs of a representative sample of all workers in a particular industrial sector are mapped, and the results inform the negotiation strategy. In this way, there appears to be a solution for sectors and companies in which there are few union members but both parties would like to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. Employers may come to prefer dealing with smaller unions. And smaller unions may enter into collective bargaining agreements to bring in money for their members rather than because they think it’s a good agreement for all workers.
Citations:
ser.nl, Wat is de SER?
Wikipedia. “Boerenprotesten tegen stikstofbeleid. Protestacties vanaf 2019 tegen stikstofbeleid van de Nederlandse overheid.” https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boerenprotesten_tegen_stikstofbeleid
Wikipedia. n.d. “Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei.”
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. 2023. “Cao-afspraken 2023.”
Rouffaer, FTM, and Claessens. 2023. “Vakbond De Unie morrelt aan de fundamenten van het poldermodel.” 25 November.
www.unie.nl, 24 March 2023. Mearsk: Start DigiC traject - De Unie
At the national level, the SER) is an advisory body in which entrepreneurs, employees and independent experts (“crown members”) work together to reach agreement on important socioeconomic issues. The SER is tasked with promoting entrepreneurship, decent work, sustainable growth and an inclusive society with a balanced income distribution. The SER advises the government and parliament on major issues of socioeconomic policy. The SER also facilitates agreements and covenants. Examples are the establishment of the Energy Agreement (2013) and its successor, the Climate Agreement (2019); the (unsuccessful) Agriculture Agreement (2023); and various covenants for international corporate social responsibility.
At the sectoral level, trade unions in the Netherlands have a major role in negotiating with employers over working conditions and wages. In collective bargaining agreements (CAOs) – of which there are over 600 – unions agree on behalf of workers how much their salaries will rise. Apart from these, CAOs also pay attention to labor scarcity, workers’ distance to the labor market, hybrid working conditions, climate and sustainability issues, welfare functions, and specific types of leave. Union members can then vote on whether they approve of a negotiated settlement. If approved, a collective bargaining agreement applies both to members and nonmembers of a union. By 1 January 2023, 667 CAOs had been negotiated, covering 5.9 million workers.
Fifteen years ago, 1.9 million Dutch people were members of a trade union. That figure has now fallen to only 1.4 million. Moreover, a considerable portion of today’s union members are already retired. Although membership fees are partly paid for by employers (the “vakbondstientje,” as a small percentage of wages) and are partly tax deductible, younger people frequently do not even consider membership. This trend raises the issue of how representative trade unions can be now that their membership ranks are eroding significantly. The size of a union’s strike fund determines the scope of its power. Apart from membership fees, trade unions have paradoxically become dependent on obligatory and voluntary employers’ contributions through so-called social funds. Unions are not very transparent about where their resources come from. It is estimated that in 2019, the largest trade unions depended on employers’ contributions for only about 22% of their revenues. The small Alternative for Trade Union (AVV), with some 1,400 members, was found to lean almost entirely (96%) on employer contributions.
Experts believe it is time to fundamentally rethink the system of collective labor relations, unions and their financing. Declines in membership figures not only make unions less representative, but also limits their effectiveness. De Unie is already experimenting with a different collective bargaining agreement model; in collaboration with a research institute specialized in surveys and consultative procedures, major themes and needs of a representative sample of all workers in a particular industrial sector are mapped, and the results inform the negotiation strategy. In this way, there appears to be a solution for sectors and companies in which there are few union members but both parties would like to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. Employers may come to prefer dealing with smaller unions. And smaller unions may enter into collective bargaining agreements to bring in money for their members rather than because they think it’s a good agreement for all workers.
Citations:
ser.nl, Wat is de SER?
Wikipedia. “Boerenprotesten tegen stikstofbeleid. Protestacties vanaf 2019 tegen stikstofbeleid van de Nederlandse overheid.” https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boerenprotesten_tegen_stikstofbeleid
Wikipedia. n.d. “Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei.”
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. 2023. “Cao-afspraken 2023.”
Rouffaer, FTM, and Claessens. 2023. “Vakbond De Unie morrelt aan de fundamenten van het poldermodel.” 25 November.
www.unie.nl, 24 March 2023. Mearsk: Start DigiC traject - De Unie
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
The Civicus Monitor rates the Netherlands as one of the world’s 32 open civil spaces. International references to the “polder model” as a form of consensus-building through practices of societal consultation testify to the Dutch reputation for negotiating nonparliamentary support for public policies, often on contested issues, as a precondition for parliamentary approval. In this form of neocorporatism and network governance, the government consults extensively with vested interest groups in civil society during policy preparation, and attempts to involve them in policy implementation. It has been a strong factor in the modes of political operation and public policymaking deployed by all the Rutte governments.
The downside is that interest representation in civil society has become so focused on consultative relations with the state that interest representation is getting in the way of self-organization within civil society. Most sectors in civil society – healthcare, youth care, care for the elderly, sports, education, and even groups representing state employees such as local civil servants, police officers and professionals working in the judiciary – are assembled in councils, forums, platforms, “tables” and other arrangements intended to influence policy preparation and implementation. One might well speak of an “étatization” of Dutch social civil society. Professional associations representing the interests of teachers, general practitioner doctors, nurses, patients, youth care workers, farmers, sports officials and many others frequently express their disaffection with agreements negotiated. Added to the glaring government failures like the continuing story of the child benefit scandal, and the inability to bring closure to the Groningen gas and earthquake fiasco, these disappointments have contributed to a general decline of confidence in government in a country that used to be a high-trust society.
Even the High Council of State (Hoge Raad) issued a warning that agreements reached using the polder model are too often presented to parliament as a fait accompli. They also too often lead to very broad platform legislation that specifies future goals and allocates a budget, but leaves implementation plans and legal implications undetermined. Another criticism is that this model leads to sluggish policymaking, creating a “musical chairs” process in which the responsibilities of government, business, and influential civil society or non-governmental organizations remain blurred, thus paralyzing effective decision-making.
Citations:
Civicus. 2022. “Monitor Tracking Civic Space.”
CBS. 2023. “Minste vertrouwen in Tweede Kamer in 10 jaar tijd.” 9 May.
Fatima Bajja. 2022. “Wantrouwen in de overheid: ‘Burgers zijn kopschuw geworden’.” NOS Nieuws November 15.
NU.nl. 2022. “Politiek houdt demonstrerende huisartsen tegen die naar Binnenhof willen.” 1 Juli.
RTL Nieuws. 2023. “Vandaag demonstratie. Vaker onbevoegde leraren voor de klas: ‘Geen onderwijs is erger’.” RTL Nieuws February 3.
RTL Nieuws. 2023. “Grote lerarenstaking op 5 oktober: ‘Laten ons niet piepelen’.” RTL Nieuws June 28.
Nursing. 2023. “Protesters, spandoelen en ludieke acties: dit was de staking van 16 maart.” March 17.
Wikipedia. n.d. “Toeslagenaffaire.”
NU.nl. 2023. “Dit zijn de belangrijkste punten uit het rapport over de aardbevingen in Groningen.” February 24.
The downside is that interest representation in civil society has become so focused on consultative relations with the state that interest representation is getting in the way of self-organization within civil society. Most sectors in civil society – healthcare, youth care, care for the elderly, sports, education, and even groups representing state employees such as local civil servants, police officers and professionals working in the judiciary – are assembled in councils, forums, platforms, “tables” and other arrangements intended to influence policy preparation and implementation. One might well speak of an “étatization” of Dutch social civil society. Professional associations representing the interests of teachers, general practitioner doctors, nurses, patients, youth care workers, farmers, sports officials and many others frequently express their disaffection with agreements negotiated. Added to the glaring government failures like the continuing story of the child benefit scandal, and the inability to bring closure to the Groningen gas and earthquake fiasco, these disappointments have contributed to a general decline of confidence in government in a country that used to be a high-trust society.
Even the High Council of State (Hoge Raad) issued a warning that agreements reached using the polder model are too often presented to parliament as a fait accompli. They also too often lead to very broad platform legislation that specifies future goals and allocates a budget, but leaves implementation plans and legal implications undetermined. Another criticism is that this model leads to sluggish policymaking, creating a “musical chairs” process in which the responsibilities of government, business, and influential civil society or non-governmental organizations remain blurred, thus paralyzing effective decision-making.
Citations:
Civicus. 2022. “Monitor Tracking Civic Space.”
CBS. 2023. “Minste vertrouwen in Tweede Kamer in 10 jaar tijd.” 9 May.
Fatima Bajja. 2022. “Wantrouwen in de overheid: ‘Burgers zijn kopschuw geworden’.” NOS Nieuws November 15.
NU.nl. 2022. “Politiek houdt demonstrerende huisartsen tegen die naar Binnenhof willen.” 1 Juli.
RTL Nieuws. 2023. “Vandaag demonstratie. Vaker onbevoegde leraren voor de klas: ‘Geen onderwijs is erger’.” RTL Nieuws February 3.
RTL Nieuws. 2023. “Grote lerarenstaking op 5 oktober: ‘Laten ons niet piepelen’.” RTL Nieuws June 28.
Nursing. 2023. “Protesters, spandoelen en ludieke acties: dit was de staking van 16 maart.” March 17.
Wikipedia. n.d. “Toeslagenaffaire.”
NU.nl. 2023. “Dit zijn de belangrijkste punten uit het rapport over de aardbevingen in Groningen.” February 24.
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Green civil society action in the Netherlands follows three strategies. First, there are the very cooperative and policy-oriented actions from the vested nature and environmental organizations like Natuurmonumenten, Wereld Natuur Fonds, Provinciale Landschappen and Vogelbescherming. Jointly, they represent almost 2 million members, all of whom are paying donors. (Compare this to total political party membership in 2023 of just 379,000.) The Foundation of Nature and Environment Federations supports green civil organizations at the local and provincial levels (claiming 1,300 affiliated local groups) and influences policymaking at the provincial level (claiming participation in 728 policy projects across 13 provinces).
Second, green NGOs dissatisfied with the influence possible through the polder model, and which have witnessed one implementation delay after another, have successfully turned to the judiciary to force the government to finally take its climate goal commitments seriously. This group gained momentum after two successful legal challenges. Internationally famous was the Urgenda ruling of 20 December 2019, which forced the Dutch government to start implementing its CO2 emission promises in earnest. The initiators founded Urgenda as a network organization of so-called regional spinners that identify connect and boost sustainability projects in the areas of climate and energy, building, mobility, production, and agriculture and biodiversity. Another successful organization is Johan Vollenbroek’s Mobilization for the Environment (MOB). MOB acts as a representative of resident and environmental organizations in the legal review of environmental permits, and in challenging violations of environmental regulations. MOB established its reputation through a successful legal challenge to the state’s PFAS policy. More recently, MOB successfully challenged the government’s failure to implementation its nitrogen emission policy.
Irritated by this strategy, interpreted as leading to “rule by judges” (“dikastocracy”), parliament accepted a motion in February 2023 that urged the government to explore the possibility of complicating legal action by citizen interest organizations by imposing stricter rules governing representativeness. This motion was rejected as being incompatible with a unanimously adopted 2020 law on class action lawsuits, which allows interest groups to seek the enforcement of the government’s own laws and regulations in court.
A third strategy is civil disobedience, in which organizations step up street demonstrations, causing a nuisance for other citizens as a consciousness-raising tactic. This strategy, particularly used by (traditionally) Greenpeace and more recently by Extinction Rebellion, follows a more general trend toward tougher street protests and demonstrations.
Citations:
Compendium voor de Leefomgeving. 2023. “Ledenaantal particuliere natuur- en milieuorganisaties.” 13 November.
De Natuur- en milieufederaties. 2022. Jaarverslag de Natuur en Milieufederaties.
Greenpeace. 2023. “Extinction Rebellion en Greenpeace voeren actie bij Rabobank-kantoren om financiering natuurverwoesting te stoppen.” https://www.greenpeace.org/nl/natuur/42314/extinction-rebellion-en-greenpeace-voeren-actie-bij-rabobank-kantoren-om-financiering-natuurverwoesting-te-stoppen
Greenpeace. 2022. “Actievoerders houden 6,5 uur privéjets aan de grond op Schiphol.” Karst November 5.
Groene Amsterdammer. 2023. “Blokkades? Wees creatiever: Interview Kees Schuyt over Extinction Rebellion.” September 23.
NRC, Schravesande. 2022. “Met control-F voor de vergunningen: zo wint Johan Vollenbroek keer op keer zijn rechtszaken.” NRC Handelsblad September 7.
NRC, Al Ali. 2023. “Kabinet wil stap belangenorganisaties naar rechter niet bemoeilijken.” NRC April 17.
Second, green NGOs dissatisfied with the influence possible through the polder model, and which have witnessed one implementation delay after another, have successfully turned to the judiciary to force the government to finally take its climate goal commitments seriously. This group gained momentum after two successful legal challenges. Internationally famous was the Urgenda ruling of 20 December 2019, which forced the Dutch government to start implementing its CO2 emission promises in earnest. The initiators founded Urgenda as a network organization of so-called regional spinners that identify connect and boost sustainability projects in the areas of climate and energy, building, mobility, production, and agriculture and biodiversity. Another successful organization is Johan Vollenbroek’s Mobilization for the Environment (MOB). MOB acts as a representative of resident and environmental organizations in the legal review of environmental permits, and in challenging violations of environmental regulations. MOB established its reputation through a successful legal challenge to the state’s PFAS policy. More recently, MOB successfully challenged the government’s failure to implementation its nitrogen emission policy.
Irritated by this strategy, interpreted as leading to “rule by judges” (“dikastocracy”), parliament accepted a motion in February 2023 that urged the government to explore the possibility of complicating legal action by citizen interest organizations by imposing stricter rules governing representativeness. This motion was rejected as being incompatible with a unanimously adopted 2020 law on class action lawsuits, which allows interest groups to seek the enforcement of the government’s own laws and regulations in court.
A third strategy is civil disobedience, in which organizations step up street demonstrations, causing a nuisance for other citizens as a consciousness-raising tactic. This strategy, particularly used by (traditionally) Greenpeace and more recently by Extinction Rebellion, follows a more general trend toward tougher street protests and demonstrations.
Citations:
Compendium voor de Leefomgeving. 2023. “Ledenaantal particuliere natuur- en milieuorganisaties.” 13 November.
De Natuur- en milieufederaties. 2022. Jaarverslag de Natuur en Milieufederaties.
Greenpeace. 2023. “Extinction Rebellion en Greenpeace voeren actie bij Rabobank-kantoren om financiering natuurverwoesting te stoppen.” https://www.greenpeace.org/nl/natuur/42314/extinction-rebellion-en-greenpeace-voeren-actie-bij-rabobank-kantoren-om-financiering-natuurverwoesting-te-stoppen
Greenpeace. 2022. “Actievoerders houden 6,5 uur privéjets aan de grond op Schiphol.” Karst November 5.
Groene Amsterdammer. 2023. “Blokkades? Wees creatiever: Interview Kees Schuyt over Extinction Rebellion.” September 23.
NRC, Schravesande. 2022. “Met control-F voor de vergunningen: zo wint Johan Vollenbroek keer op keer zijn rechtszaken.” NRC Handelsblad September 7.
NRC, Al Ali. 2023. “Kabinet wil stap belangenorganisaties naar rechter niet bemoeilijken.” NRC April 17.