Environmental Sustainability
#19Key Findings
In the category of environmental sustainability, the Netherlands falls into the sample’s lower-middle ranks (rank 19).
Recent court rulings have pushed climate policy to the political forefront. The state’s reliance on private-sector cooperation has not been altogether successful, as most major firms have not been on track to meet goals.
Political and social opposition to climate policies has grown, with significant resistance from industry, farmers and citizens concerned about financial burdens and lifestyle changes. Efforts to reduce nitrogen levels in soils led to massive protests among farmers. This opposition led to strong gains by climate-skeptic parties in the 2023 elections.
Environmental health efforts remain fragmented, focusing on localized pollution rather than constituting a cohesive national policy. Water management has been a strong focus in the country’s global climate diplomacy.
Recent court rulings have pushed climate policy to the political forefront. The state’s reliance on private-sector cooperation has not been altogether successful, as most major firms have not been on track to meet goals.
Political and social opposition to climate policies has grown, with significant resistance from industry, farmers and citizens concerned about financial burdens and lifestyle changes. Efforts to reduce nitrogen levels in soils led to massive protests among farmers. This opposition led to strong gains by climate-skeptic parties in the 2023 elections.
Environmental health efforts remain fragmented, focusing on localized pollution rather than constituting a cohesive national policy. Water management has been a strong focus in the country’s global climate diplomacy.
Graph View
Graph View
How committed is the government to the goal of achieving net zero emissions by 2050?
10
9
9
The government is clearly committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is only somewhat committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.
2
1
1
The government is not at all committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.
The minister for climate and energy in the Rutte IV cabinet, D66’s Rob Jetten, was deeply committed to effective climate action, encompassing adaptation, mitigation and financing mechanisms for addressing losses and damages. The Supreme Court’s 20 December 2019 validation of the Urgenda judgment marked a definitive step by climate policy to the political forefront. Prior to 2021, climate policy had been formulated through the “poldering” process. In 2019, five “climate tables” comprising representatives from business, government and civil society were established to address specific areas such as traffic, agriculture, industry, electricity and the built environment.
However, there was considerable ambiguity regarding the roles and responsibilities of these tables. Minister Jetten expressed the government’s intention to take a more assertive role, stating, “In recent years we as politicians have really thrown a lot of climate policy over the fence at others. … My message now is: This is the coalition agreement (of the Rutte IV government) and we are not going to negotiate about it.” From 2022 onward, departments have been tasked with implementation responsibilities, while the consultative tables have been tasked with practical elaboration.
Despite this sharpening of policy, private sector business plans have not aligned with the government objectives. None of the 29 industrial companies recently surveyed by Milieudefensie regarding their climate plans were on track to meet climate goals. These companies, collectively the recipients of millions of euros in subsidies in order to support an environmental transition, often lack comprehensive data on their CO2 emissions and are not transparent about their environmental impacts. They have complained about slow licensing procedures and labor shortages, and have resisted the implementation of emissions measurement requirements that would hold them accountable for emissions throughout their entire business chains.
In agriculture, there is resistance among major nitrogen emitters to a rapid transition toward sustainability and circular economy practices. Farmer protests and highway blockades with tractors have garnered public sympathy and contributed to the success of the newly established political party Farmer-Citizen Movement (Boeren Burger Beweging, or BBB) in provincial elections (see “Effective Ecosystem and Biodiversity Preservation”)
Despite confusion and transparency issues regarding government climate plans, and amidst growing social and political resistance, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to climate policy. In March 2023, Minister Jetten launched a nine-member Scientific Climate Council to provide advice on long-term policy. Monitoring and evaluation tasks continue to be managed by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, PBL) and the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu).
By the end of 2022, the PBL estimated that current implementation policies could potentially halve CO2 emissions by 2030 in the best-case scenario, with a reduction of only 39% in the worst-case scenario. Particularly in the areas of traffic, agriculture and the built environment (including homes, offices and public buildings), achieving government climate goals remains challenging. Minister Jetten has proposed 120 additional climate measures that would cost €28 billion, to be funded from the Climate Fund, as approved in the coalition agreement.
Jetten emphasized that these plans involve standardization, pricing mechanisms and incentives. The €28 billion Climate Fund aims to facilitate widespread participation in the transition, focusing on expanding wind and solar energy parks. He acknowledged that the transition would be challenging and would provoke resistance at times, but stressed that now is the time to accelerate climate policy, saying, “The time of noncommitment is over.”
Nevertheless, the government’s firm stance on climate policies has sparked considerable political and social opposition, not only from industrial firms, agricultural sectors and farmers, but also from citizens concerned about perceived financial burdens and lifestyle changes. This opposition was reflected in the outcome of the 22 November 2023 national elections, where climate skeptics and deniers (PVV, NSC, and BBB) emerged as significant winners. As a result, commitment to climate policies is expected to diminish in the foreseeable future.
Citations:
PBL. 2022. Climate and Energy Outlook of the Netherlands: English summary of the full Dutch report ‘Klimaat- en Energieverkenning 2022 (KEV).
Climate Adapt, The Netherlands, Information on national adaptation actions reported under the Governance Regulation Reporting updated until: 2023-03-11 https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/countries-regions/countries/netherlands
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat. October 2022. Internationale Klimaatstrategie. Van ambitie naar transitie.
Wikipedia. “Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wetenschappelijke_Klimaatraad (consulted 10 December 2023)
NRC-H. 2022. “Jetten gaat het klimaatbeleid ‘ongehoord strak sturen’.” van de Walle, May 24.
NRC, Stellinga, Bart, and Eddy van de Walle. 2023. “Kabinet trekt 28 miljard uit voor 120 klimaatmaatregelen: ‘Zal af en toe knellen’.” NRC, April 26.
NRC. 2023. “De eerste echte klimaatverkiezingen.” Kruk March 23.
Algemene Rekenkamer. 2023. “Inzicht in uitgaven klimaatbeleid, naar aanleiding van Onderzoek Uitgaven Klimaatbeleid.” 22 January.
However, there was considerable ambiguity regarding the roles and responsibilities of these tables. Minister Jetten expressed the government’s intention to take a more assertive role, stating, “In recent years we as politicians have really thrown a lot of climate policy over the fence at others. … My message now is: This is the coalition agreement (of the Rutte IV government) and we are not going to negotiate about it.” From 2022 onward, departments have been tasked with implementation responsibilities, while the consultative tables have been tasked with practical elaboration.
Despite this sharpening of policy, private sector business plans have not aligned with the government objectives. None of the 29 industrial companies recently surveyed by Milieudefensie regarding their climate plans were on track to meet climate goals. These companies, collectively the recipients of millions of euros in subsidies in order to support an environmental transition, often lack comprehensive data on their CO2 emissions and are not transparent about their environmental impacts. They have complained about slow licensing procedures and labor shortages, and have resisted the implementation of emissions measurement requirements that would hold them accountable for emissions throughout their entire business chains.
In agriculture, there is resistance among major nitrogen emitters to a rapid transition toward sustainability and circular economy practices. Farmer protests and highway blockades with tractors have garnered public sympathy and contributed to the success of the newly established political party Farmer-Citizen Movement (Boeren Burger Beweging, or BBB) in provincial elections (see “Effective Ecosystem and Biodiversity Preservation”)
Despite confusion and transparency issues regarding government climate plans, and amidst growing social and political resistance, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to climate policy. In March 2023, Minister Jetten launched a nine-member Scientific Climate Council to provide advice on long-term policy. Monitoring and evaluation tasks continue to be managed by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, PBL) and the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu).
By the end of 2022, the PBL estimated that current implementation policies could potentially halve CO2 emissions by 2030 in the best-case scenario, with a reduction of only 39% in the worst-case scenario. Particularly in the areas of traffic, agriculture and the built environment (including homes, offices and public buildings), achieving government climate goals remains challenging. Minister Jetten has proposed 120 additional climate measures that would cost €28 billion, to be funded from the Climate Fund, as approved in the coalition agreement.
Jetten emphasized that these plans involve standardization, pricing mechanisms and incentives. The €28 billion Climate Fund aims to facilitate widespread participation in the transition, focusing on expanding wind and solar energy parks. He acknowledged that the transition would be challenging and would provoke resistance at times, but stressed that now is the time to accelerate climate policy, saying, “The time of noncommitment is over.”
Nevertheless, the government’s firm stance on climate policies has sparked considerable political and social opposition, not only from industrial firms, agricultural sectors and farmers, but also from citizens concerned about perceived financial burdens and lifestyle changes. This opposition was reflected in the outcome of the 22 November 2023 national elections, where climate skeptics and deniers (PVV, NSC, and BBB) emerged as significant winners. As a result, commitment to climate policies is expected to diminish in the foreseeable future.
Citations:
PBL. 2022. Climate and Energy Outlook of the Netherlands: English summary of the full Dutch report ‘Klimaat- en Energieverkenning 2022 (KEV).
Climate Adapt, The Netherlands, Information on national adaptation actions reported under the Governance Regulation Reporting updated until: 2023-03-11 https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/countries-regions/countries/netherlands
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat. October 2022. Internationale Klimaatstrategie. Van ambitie naar transitie.
Wikipedia. “Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wetenschappelijke_Klimaatraad (consulted 10 December 2023)
NRC-H. 2022. “Jetten gaat het klimaatbeleid ‘ongehoord strak sturen’.” van de Walle, May 24.
NRC, Stellinga, Bart, and Eddy van de Walle. 2023. “Kabinet trekt 28 miljard uit voor 120 klimaatmaatregelen: ‘Zal af en toe knellen’.” NRC, April 26.
NRC. 2023. “De eerste echte klimaatverkiezingen.” Kruk March 23.
Algemene Rekenkamer. 2023. “Inzicht in uitgaven klimaatbeleid, naar aanleiding van Onderzoek Uitgaven Klimaatbeleid.” 22 January.
Graph View
How committed is the government to protecting the public from environmental health risks?
10
9
9
The government is clearly committed to the goal of protecting environmental health.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely committed to the goal of protecting environmental health.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is only somewhat committed to the goal of protecting environmental health.
2
1
1
The government is not at all committed to the goal of protecting environmental health.
The 2018 Public Health Foresight Study (Volksgezondheid Toekomst Verkenning, VTV) reveals that 4% of the total disease burden in the Netherlands stems from environmental factors. Specifically, outdoor factors contribute approximately 175,000 disability-adusted life years (DALYs), or the loss of the equivalent of one year of full health, primarily from air pollution and UV radiation. Indoor factors account for about 25,000 DALYs, notably due to second-hand smoke, radon and thoron exposure. Annually, there are 12,000 deaths attributed to outdoor environmental factors, with air pollution alone causing 11,000 deaths, and 1,000 deaths linked to indoor environmental factors. Notably, not all environmental disease burdens are covered in the VTV. Drawing on the VTV 2018 and adding estimates concerning noise, lead exposure and other environmental factors as yet unaccounted for, the Heart Council estimates that at least 5% of the total disease burden in the Netherlands is environmentally related.
Despite persistent advocacy from healthcare professionals and institutions such as the national Health Council (Gezondheidsraad), the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM), and regional health services (GGD/GHOR), the Dutch government’s commitment to safeguarding citizens from environmental health risks remains limited. Efforts thus far have been fragmented, focusing mainly on localized “hotspots” like areas affected by industrial pollution from Chemours and Tata Steel, without a cohesive national policy approach. For instance, health impacts are not systematically integrated into the Policy Compass checklist used by civil servants in national policy formulation.
While numerous health indicators exist, their utilization in environmental policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation, and in establishing safe threshold values for licensing decisions, is often inadequate or nonexistent. The Clean Air Agreement (Schoneluchtakkoord, SLA), a covenant between the national government, provinces and a large number of municipalities, exemplifies this issue, as it lacks intermediate targets and outcome obligations, and participation is voluntary, leading to disparities between participating and nonparticipating municipalities. Moreover, the licensing system for environmental health protection policies is deficient, further hindering effective implementation.
Efforts to address these shortcomings are underway, with plans to decentralize responsibilities under the Environment Act expected to enhance the incorporation of health considerations into local environmental policies. The Health Council advocates for the development of a robust knowledge infrastructure to facilitate knowledge exchange among research institutions, policymakers and practitioners.
Overall, environmental health protection in the Netherlands remains a patchwork of initiatives and experiments, lacking a cohesive, evidence-based national approach. While promises for improvement abound, current efforts are hindered by insufficient support and decentralized governance structures at the provincial and local levels.
Citations:
Onderzoeksraad voor de Veiligheid. 2023. “Betere bescherming tegen industriële uitstoot is mogelijk en noodzakelijk.”
Rijksoverheid. 2023. “Kabinet vraagt RIVM om onderzoek naar effecten Chemours.”
NRC. 2023. “Schipholbaas baalt van afblazen krimpplannen: ‘Buren trekken aan kortste eind’.” NRC November 19.
RIVM. 2022. “Gezonde Leefomgeving.” GGD trekt instrument GES terug, December 12.
Gezind in de Stad (GIDS). 2020. “Decentralisatie Uitkerring Gezond in de Stad (GIDS).” February 13.
Gezondheidsraad. 2022. “Kansen voor gezondheidswinst in omgevingsbeleid.” Nr. 2022/16, Den Haag, July 13.
Despite persistent advocacy from healthcare professionals and institutions such as the national Health Council (Gezondheidsraad), the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM), and regional health services (GGD/GHOR), the Dutch government’s commitment to safeguarding citizens from environmental health risks remains limited. Efforts thus far have been fragmented, focusing mainly on localized “hotspots” like areas affected by industrial pollution from Chemours and Tata Steel, without a cohesive national policy approach. For instance, health impacts are not systematically integrated into the Policy Compass checklist used by civil servants in national policy formulation.
While numerous health indicators exist, their utilization in environmental policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation, and in establishing safe threshold values for licensing decisions, is often inadequate or nonexistent. The Clean Air Agreement (Schoneluchtakkoord, SLA), a covenant between the national government, provinces and a large number of municipalities, exemplifies this issue, as it lacks intermediate targets and outcome obligations, and participation is voluntary, leading to disparities between participating and nonparticipating municipalities. Moreover, the licensing system for environmental health protection policies is deficient, further hindering effective implementation.
Efforts to address these shortcomings are underway, with plans to decentralize responsibilities under the Environment Act expected to enhance the incorporation of health considerations into local environmental policies. The Health Council advocates for the development of a robust knowledge infrastructure to facilitate knowledge exchange among research institutions, policymakers and practitioners.
Overall, environmental health protection in the Netherlands remains a patchwork of initiatives and experiments, lacking a cohesive, evidence-based national approach. While promises for improvement abound, current efforts are hindered by insufficient support and decentralized governance structures at the provincial and local levels.
Citations:
Onderzoeksraad voor de Veiligheid. 2023. “Betere bescherming tegen industriële uitstoot is mogelijk en noodzakelijk.”
Rijksoverheid. 2023. “Kabinet vraagt RIVM om onderzoek naar effecten Chemours.”
NRC. 2023. “Schipholbaas baalt van afblazen krimpplannen: ‘Buren trekken aan kortste eind’.” NRC November 19.
RIVM. 2022. “Gezonde Leefomgeving.” GGD trekt instrument GES terug, December 12.
Gezind in de Stad (GIDS). 2020. “Decentralisatie Uitkerring Gezond in de Stad (GIDS).” February 13.
Gezondheidsraad. 2022. “Kansen voor gezondheidswinst in omgevingsbeleid.” Nr. 2022/16, Den Haag, July 13.
Graph View
How committed is the government to preserving ecosystems and protecting biodiversity?
10
9
9
The government is clearly committed to protecting ecosystems and biodiversity.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely committed to protecting ecosystems and biodiversity.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is only somewhat committed to protecting ecosystems and biodiversity.
2
1
1
The government is not at all committed to protecting ecosystems and biodiversity.
Ecosystem and biodiversity issues have long vexed Dutch politicians. Successive cabinets have failed to provide clear direction, leaving farmers and provinces uncertain about nitrogen policy. This uncertainty fuels ongoing debates over its efficacy and necessity.
The Rutte IV cabinet elevated this issue to a top political priority by appointing a dedicated minister for nature and nitrogen. The government aimed to accelerate policy plans beyond the pace of normal legislative procedures. Originally, the Nature Protection Act targeted reducing the expanse of nitrogen-sensitive Natura 2000 areas that exceeded critical deposition values (KDWs), so that the total proportion of protected territory no longer exceeding these values would reach 40% by 2025, 50% by 2030 and 74% by 2035. However, the Rutte IV coalition agreement advanced the 74% target to 2030.
Using politically and scientifically contested models created by the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), maps identified high-KDW areas requiring urgent action. Farmers, organized through protest movements like Agraractie and the Farmers Defense Force, viewed this as a direct threat to their livelihoods. They contested RIVM models used as the scientific basis for government policy, demanding that real-world nitrogen measurements be conducted around suspected peak emitters. This culminated in massive nationwide protests in summer 2022. By October 2022, the agriculture minister resigned amidst government crisis, intense lobbying, and distrust between his department and fragmented agricultural organizations.
In November 2022, the nitrogen issue expanded beyond agriculture and nature policy, with stringent nitrogen testing mandated for all licensing decisions, a decision affirmed by the Council of State’s Porthos ruling. This affected new housing, construction, infrastructure projects and the energy transition. By February 2023, new calculations incorporating transport and industrial nitrogen emissions revealed that without technological fixes, large-scale buyouts, strong reductions in cattle farming or even land ownership reforms, no viable exit strategy under current rules existed, posing a serious threat to economic activity.
In March 2023, a cabinet compromise put the nitrogen policy on hold. The newly influential Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB), spawned from the stalemate, dominated provincial elections, winning 16 out of 75 seats in the Senate, which is indirectly elected through the provincial councils. The Christian Democrats (CDA), former advocates for farmers, were marginalized. The CDA, as a coalition partner, sought to renegotiate the 2030 nitrogen reduction goal in provincial negotiations with BBB, aiming for a 2035 deadline.
Central to the political struggle is a “science war” over defining the critical deposition value and its application in national, provincial and local policies. The principal bone of contention is whether the uncertainty bandwidths around calculations and modeling, derived from a mix of lab experiments, field observations and expert judgments, are too large for far-reaching policy decisions, especially decisions that would undermine many farms’ business models. Farmers and the agro-industry argue that policy decisions based on precautionary principles and academic advice were undermining their livelihoods, and lacked practical understanding. They contended that strict interpretations of these principles were neglect farming realities and harming economic viability.
Scientists conceded that without real-time measurements, the critical deposition values were not ideal standards to use for local licensing decisions. Political priorities are now shifting toward balancing the burdens of stringent nitrogen policy imposed on farmers and citizen demands for new housing developments. This has sparked debates on relaxing nitrogen standards and reassessing the significance of Natura 2000 areas.
Following the November 2023 elections, in which right-wing and extreme-right parties (PVV, BBB, NSC) dominated, new coalition negotiations were expected to reflect this altered political landscape.
Citations:
Stichting Agri Facts. 2021. “Ook het KDW-model rammelt.” 24 March.
NRC, van den Boot en Rikken. 2022. “Stikstofplannen van het kabinet zijn ‘de gevolgen van een supervluggertje’.” NRC July 11.
NRC, Bovend’Eert. 2022. “Rutte IV: geen respect voor de rechtsstaat.” NRC July 11.
NRC, Meeus. 2022. “De bedrijven van Quote 500-families die het boerenprotest aanwakkeren.” June 17.
NOS Nieuws. 2022. “Remkes: uitkopen dan wel halveren boerenbedrijven is eenzijdig.” August 18.
beeld.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Kabinet bouwt pauze stikstof in om CDA in coalitie te houden.” March 31.
Botje. 2023. “Bestseller ‘De stikstoffuik’ is een warwinkel aan missers en komt niet met oplossingen.” Follow the Money April 24.
Tullis, Paul. 2023. “Nitrogen Wars: The Dutch Farmers’ Revolt that Turned a Nation Upside Down.” The Guardian, November 16.
The Rutte IV cabinet elevated this issue to a top political priority by appointing a dedicated minister for nature and nitrogen. The government aimed to accelerate policy plans beyond the pace of normal legislative procedures. Originally, the Nature Protection Act targeted reducing the expanse of nitrogen-sensitive Natura 2000 areas that exceeded critical deposition values (KDWs), so that the total proportion of protected territory no longer exceeding these values would reach 40% by 2025, 50% by 2030 and 74% by 2035. However, the Rutte IV coalition agreement advanced the 74% target to 2030.
Using politically and scientifically contested models created by the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), maps identified high-KDW areas requiring urgent action. Farmers, organized through protest movements like Agraractie and the Farmers Defense Force, viewed this as a direct threat to their livelihoods. They contested RIVM models used as the scientific basis for government policy, demanding that real-world nitrogen measurements be conducted around suspected peak emitters. This culminated in massive nationwide protests in summer 2022. By October 2022, the agriculture minister resigned amidst government crisis, intense lobbying, and distrust between his department and fragmented agricultural organizations.
In November 2022, the nitrogen issue expanded beyond agriculture and nature policy, with stringent nitrogen testing mandated for all licensing decisions, a decision affirmed by the Council of State’s Porthos ruling. This affected new housing, construction, infrastructure projects and the energy transition. By February 2023, new calculations incorporating transport and industrial nitrogen emissions revealed that without technological fixes, large-scale buyouts, strong reductions in cattle farming or even land ownership reforms, no viable exit strategy under current rules existed, posing a serious threat to economic activity.
In March 2023, a cabinet compromise put the nitrogen policy on hold. The newly influential Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB), spawned from the stalemate, dominated provincial elections, winning 16 out of 75 seats in the Senate, which is indirectly elected through the provincial councils. The Christian Democrats (CDA), former advocates for farmers, were marginalized. The CDA, as a coalition partner, sought to renegotiate the 2030 nitrogen reduction goal in provincial negotiations with BBB, aiming for a 2035 deadline.
Central to the political struggle is a “science war” over defining the critical deposition value and its application in national, provincial and local policies. The principal bone of contention is whether the uncertainty bandwidths around calculations and modeling, derived from a mix of lab experiments, field observations and expert judgments, are too large for far-reaching policy decisions, especially decisions that would undermine many farms’ business models. Farmers and the agro-industry argue that policy decisions based on precautionary principles and academic advice were undermining their livelihoods, and lacked practical understanding. They contended that strict interpretations of these principles were neglect farming realities and harming economic viability.
Scientists conceded that without real-time measurements, the critical deposition values were not ideal standards to use for local licensing decisions. Political priorities are now shifting toward balancing the burdens of stringent nitrogen policy imposed on farmers and citizen demands for new housing developments. This has sparked debates on relaxing nitrogen standards and reassessing the significance of Natura 2000 areas.
Following the November 2023 elections, in which right-wing and extreme-right parties (PVV, BBB, NSC) dominated, new coalition negotiations were expected to reflect this altered political landscape.
Citations:
Stichting Agri Facts. 2021. “Ook het KDW-model rammelt.” 24 March.
NRC, van den Boot en Rikken. 2022. “Stikstofplannen van het kabinet zijn ‘de gevolgen van een supervluggertje’.” NRC July 11.
NRC, Bovend’Eert. 2022. “Rutte IV: geen respect voor de rechtsstaat.” NRC July 11.
NRC, Meeus. 2022. “De bedrijven van Quote 500-families die het boerenprotest aanwakkeren.” June 17.
NOS Nieuws. 2022. “Remkes: uitkopen dan wel halveren boerenbedrijven is eenzijdig.” August 18.
beeld.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Kabinet bouwt pauze stikstof in om CDA in coalitie te houden.” March 31.
Botje. 2023. “Bestseller ‘De stikstoffuik’ is een warwinkel aan missers en komt niet met oplossingen.” Follow the Money April 24.
Tullis, Paul. 2023. “Nitrogen Wars: The Dutch Farmers’ Revolt that Turned a Nation Upside Down.” The Guardian, November 16.
Graph View
To what extent is the government committed and credible in designing and promoting global environmental protection regimes and policies?
10
9
9
Government policy and institutions are fully aligned with efforts to achieve global environmental sustainability.
8
7
6
7
6
Government policy and institutions are largely aligned with efforts to achieve global environmental sustainability.
5
4
3
4
3
Government policy and institutions are somewhat aligned with efforts to achieve global environmental sustainability.
2
1
1
Government policy and institutions are not at all aligned with efforts to achieve global environmental sustainability.
In the Commitment to Development Index, the Netherlands has dropped over time from the top spot in 2003 to sixth place in 2023. When adjusted for national income, it falls to thirteenth place. Despite this, the country excels in integrating aid and trade, maintaining its top position in the area of trade. This integration was reflected in the renaming of the Department for Development Aid and International Trade to the Department for International Trade and Development Aid under the Rutte IV coalition government. One commentator likened this integration to merging the roles of “pastor and businessman.”
A notable example of Dutch global climate diplomacy is its emphasis on national water management expertise. While advocating for climate issues broadly, the Netherlands prioritizes water within climate action frameworks. The government’s climate diplomacy efforts in 2023 focused on preparations for the UN 2023 Water Conference, and on influencing global climate agendas to enhance actions under SDG 6 and other water-related goals.
Traditionally, Dutch environmental and sustainability policies are conceptually robust but suffer from weak implementation. Efforts to monitor Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for medium-term progress have been substantial. Identifying synergies and trade-offs among SDGs is crucial for policy relevance. Notably, progress on SDG 13 (Climate Action) can positively impact other SDGs, although SDG 10 (Reduced Inequality) often faces trade-offs. This aligns with national priorities where distributive concerns and “climate justice” are paramount.
In its 2023 policy, the Dutch government aimed to significantly reduce CO2 emissions. This included doubling financial contributions to tropical rainforest protection to €50 million by 2025, thereby enhancing global carbon sequestration. Additionally, increased funding for clean energy in developing countries aims to expand access to renewable energy for 100 million people by 2030. More than half of the Netherlands’ public climate funding will be allocated to adaptation measures, supporting initiatives like safe deltas and climate-smart agriculture in developing nations.
Dutch companies and knowledge institutions excel in solar energy, wind energy, hydrogen and sustainable mobility. Future policies will leverage this expertise by encouraging Dutch investments in low- and middle-income countries, fostering both economic development in these nations and market access for Dutch enterprises. Initiatives like energy partnerships in hydrogen-rich countries aim to accelerate local energy transitions while potentially facilitating export of surplus energy.
Citations:
Center for Global Development. 2023. CDI 20th Anniversary Edition. Netherlands.
Ministry of Economics and Climate, and Ministry of Climate and Energy. 2023. “Letter on Progress in Global Climate Diplomacy.” February 20.
CBS. February 2021. “Vijf jaar implementatie van de SDG’s in Nederland (2016-2020) monitoring en reflectie.”
Rijksoverheid. 2022. “Nieuwsbericht: Nederland verhoogt klimaatsteun aan ontwikkelingslanden.” https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2022/10/07/nederland-verhoogt-klimaatsteun-aan-ontwikkelingslanden
A notable example of Dutch global climate diplomacy is its emphasis on national water management expertise. While advocating for climate issues broadly, the Netherlands prioritizes water within climate action frameworks. The government’s climate diplomacy efforts in 2023 focused on preparations for the UN 2023 Water Conference, and on influencing global climate agendas to enhance actions under SDG 6 and other water-related goals.
Traditionally, Dutch environmental and sustainability policies are conceptually robust but suffer from weak implementation. Efforts to monitor Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for medium-term progress have been substantial. Identifying synergies and trade-offs among SDGs is crucial for policy relevance. Notably, progress on SDG 13 (Climate Action) can positively impact other SDGs, although SDG 10 (Reduced Inequality) often faces trade-offs. This aligns with national priorities where distributive concerns and “climate justice” are paramount.
In its 2023 policy, the Dutch government aimed to significantly reduce CO2 emissions. This included doubling financial contributions to tropical rainforest protection to €50 million by 2025, thereby enhancing global carbon sequestration. Additionally, increased funding for clean energy in developing countries aims to expand access to renewable energy for 100 million people by 2030. More than half of the Netherlands’ public climate funding will be allocated to adaptation measures, supporting initiatives like safe deltas and climate-smart agriculture in developing nations.
Dutch companies and knowledge institutions excel in solar energy, wind energy, hydrogen and sustainable mobility. Future policies will leverage this expertise by encouraging Dutch investments in low- and middle-income countries, fostering both economic development in these nations and market access for Dutch enterprises. Initiatives like energy partnerships in hydrogen-rich countries aim to accelerate local energy transitions while potentially facilitating export of surplus energy.
Citations:
Center for Global Development. 2023. CDI 20th Anniversary Edition. Netherlands.
Ministry of Economics and Climate, and Ministry of Climate and Energy. 2023. “Letter on Progress in Global Climate Diplomacy.” February 20.
CBS. February 2021. “Vijf jaar implementatie van de SDG’s in Nederland (2016-2020) monitoring en reflectie.”
Rijksoverheid. 2022. “Nieuwsbericht: Nederland verhoogt klimaatsteun aan ontwikkelingslanden.” https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2022/10/07/nederland-verhoogt-klimaatsteun-aan-ontwikkelingslanden