Horizontal Accountability
#26Key Findings
In the area of horizontal accountability, the Netherlands performs relatively poorly (rank 26).
The General Audit Chamber annually scrutinizes reports and policy evaluations by ministerial departments. The Dutch Data Protection Authority can fine organizations for violations of Dutch and European data protection laws, but is understaffed and underfinanced.
The judiciary is broadly trusted by the public. The Supreme Court has shown a tendency to side with the government in its decisions. Civil rights are generally strongly respected, but political parties have increasingly made proposals that violate fundamental constitutional rights or treaty agreements.
Corruption is not seen as a significant issue, but the rise of organized drug crime is compromising the integrity of the public administration and political officials at all levels. Parliamentary offices are underfunded and understaffed, hindering oversight abilities, but legislative investigations can be highly effective.
The General Audit Chamber annually scrutinizes reports and policy evaluations by ministerial departments. The Dutch Data Protection Authority can fine organizations for violations of Dutch and European data protection laws, but is understaffed and underfinanced.
The judiciary is broadly trusted by the public. The Supreme Court has shown a tendency to side with the government in its decisions. Civil rights are generally strongly respected, but political parties have increasingly made proposals that violate fundamental constitutional rights or treaty agreements.
Corruption is not seen as a significant issue, but the rise of organized drug crime is compromising the integrity of the public administration and political officials at all levels. Parliamentary offices are underfunded and understaffed, hindering oversight abilities, but legislative investigations can be highly effective.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
The General Audit Chamber (Algemene Rekenkamer) annually scrutinizes annual reports and ex post policy evaluations by ministerial departments. In 2012, the government introduced the Regulation for Regular Evaluation Studies, which specifies criteria for assessing policy efficiency, goal achievement, evidence-based policymaking and subsidy-based policies. The Chamber chooses its own research agenda formally independently, but informally in consultation and coordination with the government and its departments. In line with the general trend toward more instrumental advice, the General Audit Chamber has focused its attention on specific points in departmental agendas. Multiyear research programs focus on policy areas and themes of significant financial and societal importance. Accountability research consists of examination of departmental annual reports, with the goal of doing more than simply approving the national accounts and giving an opinion on the quality of operational management. In the coming years, the focus will be on data management and the use of (machine learning) algorithms.
Since evaluation findings are just one factor in designing new or adjusting existing policies, it is not clear how much policy learning actually occurs. A recent study commissioned by the minister of finance assessed past evaluations and their use. The study confirmed that although “no other country evaluates so many of its policies,” policymaking civil servants and members of parliament are less sensitive to the outcomes of previous policies than to images and incidents (as reported in the press). One thing is very clear though: If learning occurs, it becomes evident only years after a seriously problematic situation is first signaled.
One cause of this delay may be political interference in the functioning of inspectorates and monitoring agencies. State inspectorates are currently part of a ministry. As such, they are embedded in terms of finances, external communication and press relations, and research programming. Even the assessment of its performance depends on the ministry. A minister has far-reaching powers to issue instructions. These sometimes involve the omission of serious inspection in certain policy aspects or areas, and sometimes the intensification of such activity. Ministries may also influence the effectivenss of inspectorates by withholding research budgets. One inspector has described the swing of the pendulum: “After every disaster there is criticism: The government is lax, supervision is inadequate. But if things go well for a while, the opposite is heard: The government must take a step back. The Netherlands can do with less supervision, because the administrative burden is too high.”
Studies show that the selection of cases to be investigated by the auditors (Rekenkamers) – especially at the local level – seems to be rather random, and methods used for evaluation are not always very convincing. At the same time, there is much more scrutiny than elsewhere, and it is relatively independent, with serious criticisms resulting. Yet again, much of this critique is often ignored for years, and always draws almost immediate denials by those in power.
Citations:
P. Omtzigt. “Concept Verslag Notaoverleg, Tweede Kamer, Initiatiefnota van het lid Omtzigt ‘Voorstellen ter versterking van de onafhankelijkheid van rijksinspecties’ (36149).”
Algemene Rekenkamer. 2021. Vertrouwen in verantwoording, Strategie 2021-2025.
Toezine. “Toezichthouders kunnen meer hun rol als evaluator pakken.”
02 november 2021
NRC, Karlijn Kuijpers, Derk Stokmans. 2023. “Houd de politiek buiten het toezicht, zeggen de inspecteurs.” NRC June 11.
F. Mertens. 2023. De minister en de inspecteur-generaal. Fragmenten uit de geschiedenis van het onderwijstoezicht. Delft: Eburon.
Since evaluation findings are just one factor in designing new or adjusting existing policies, it is not clear how much policy learning actually occurs. A recent study commissioned by the minister of finance assessed past evaluations and their use. The study confirmed that although “no other country evaluates so many of its policies,” policymaking civil servants and members of parliament are less sensitive to the outcomes of previous policies than to images and incidents (as reported in the press). One thing is very clear though: If learning occurs, it becomes evident only years after a seriously problematic situation is first signaled.
One cause of this delay may be political interference in the functioning of inspectorates and monitoring agencies. State inspectorates are currently part of a ministry. As such, they are embedded in terms of finances, external communication and press relations, and research programming. Even the assessment of its performance depends on the ministry. A minister has far-reaching powers to issue instructions. These sometimes involve the omission of serious inspection in certain policy aspects or areas, and sometimes the intensification of such activity. Ministries may also influence the effectivenss of inspectorates by withholding research budgets. One inspector has described the swing of the pendulum: “After every disaster there is criticism: The government is lax, supervision is inadequate. But if things go well for a while, the opposite is heard: The government must take a step back. The Netherlands can do with less supervision, because the administrative burden is too high.”
Studies show that the selection of cases to be investigated by the auditors (Rekenkamers) – especially at the local level – seems to be rather random, and methods used for evaluation are not always very convincing. At the same time, there is much more scrutiny than elsewhere, and it is relatively independent, with serious criticisms resulting. Yet again, much of this critique is often ignored for years, and always draws almost immediate denials by those in power.
Citations:
P. Omtzigt. “Concept Verslag Notaoverleg, Tweede Kamer, Initiatiefnota van het lid Omtzigt ‘Voorstellen ter versterking van de onafhankelijkheid van rijksinspecties’ (36149).”
Algemene Rekenkamer. 2021. Vertrouwen in verantwoording, Strategie 2021-2025.
Toezine. “Toezichthouders kunnen meer hun rol als evaluator pakken.”
02 november 2021
NRC, Karlijn Kuijpers, Derk Stokmans. 2023. “Houd de politiek buiten het toezicht, zeggen de inspecteurs.” NRC June 11.
F. Mertens. 2023. De minister en de inspecteur-generaal. Fragmenten uit de geschiedenis van het onderwijstoezicht. Delft: Eburon.
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
10
9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The Dutch Data Protection Authority (DPA) succeeded the College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (CBP) in 2016, and simultaneously saw its formal competencies somewhat enhanced by the right to fine public and private organizations that are in violation of Dutch law, or, since mid-2018, European data protection laws (e.g., the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR). Pursuant to Article 7 of the General Data Protection Regulation Implementation Act, the organization’s chair was reappointed (in August 2023) for a term of five years. This was done by royal decree on the recommendation of the minister of justice and security. The independence of the organization seems to be in order, despite the fact that right-wing political parties in particular keep insisting on replacing chair Aleid Wolfsen. So far, this push against independent monitoring has been curbed.
Really effective data protection is practically impossible for a number of reasons. The authority is understaffed, even though the number of staff has increased, and is underfinanced. Hardly any consequential fines have been imposed. “Naming and shaming” appears to work, but comprehensive oversight capacity is lacking. It looks like the DPA is evolving from a supervisory body into a Janus-faced organization that also advises public and private organizations and individual citizens on privacy issues, including on how to deal with personal data in ways that (more or less) comply with ever-changing regulations and interpretations.
Compliance with and enforcement of the GDPR still leave much to be desired. The privacy authority has handed out no more than 36 fines since the GDPR went into effect in 2018. The chances of catching offenders is too low. This is due to the organization’s limited number of employees, about 180 in total plus several dozen temporary staff. The authority now has a budget of €35 million euros, but supervision obviously is not keeping pace with digitalization. The number of complaints in the first years of the GDPR quickly rose to 25,590 in 2020, but then began a decline to 18,914 in 2021 and 13,113 in 2022 – “in part because the DPA was forced to reduce the opening hours of the telephone consultation hours,” according to a statement from the organization itself. Staff shortages play a role in this. At the end of 2022, a total of 5,723 complaints were still pending at the DPA, which may include complaints from earlier than 2022 that take longer to resolve.
Digital civil rights organization Bits of Freedom is dissatisfied with GDPR compliance at most Dutch government agencies. A survey it conducted last year among the 10 largest municipalities showed that only one (Utrecht) scored “satisfactory.” Municipalities appeared to be insufficiently aware of what data they had and how they protected it, and citizens were not given access to their own data quickly enough. Incidentally, citizens themselves are also often ignorant about how to better protect their personal data.
Citations:
Juurd Eijsvoogel. 2023. “Foto’s niet meer zomaar in de schoolgids – hoe bevalt de AVG?” NRC, May 26.
Rijksbreed AVG. 2022. Deelrapport van bevindingen ministerie BZK, December 6.
Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens. 2023. “Actueel Nieuwsbrief.” 5 jaar AVG May 26.
N. Benaissa. 2022. “De staat van privacy bij gemeenten.” https://bitsoffreedom.nl
Really effective data protection is practically impossible for a number of reasons. The authority is understaffed, even though the number of staff has increased, and is underfinanced. Hardly any consequential fines have been imposed. “Naming and shaming” appears to work, but comprehensive oversight capacity is lacking. It looks like the DPA is evolving from a supervisory body into a Janus-faced organization that also advises public and private organizations and individual citizens on privacy issues, including on how to deal with personal data in ways that (more or less) comply with ever-changing regulations and interpretations.
Compliance with and enforcement of the GDPR still leave much to be desired. The privacy authority has handed out no more than 36 fines since the GDPR went into effect in 2018. The chances of catching offenders is too low. This is due to the organization’s limited number of employees, about 180 in total plus several dozen temporary staff. The authority now has a budget of €35 million euros, but supervision obviously is not keeping pace with digitalization. The number of complaints in the first years of the GDPR quickly rose to 25,590 in 2020, but then began a decline to 18,914 in 2021 and 13,113 in 2022 – “in part because the DPA was forced to reduce the opening hours of the telephone consultation hours,” according to a statement from the organization itself. Staff shortages play a role in this. At the end of 2022, a total of 5,723 complaints were still pending at the DPA, which may include complaints from earlier than 2022 that take longer to resolve.
Digital civil rights organization Bits of Freedom is dissatisfied with GDPR compliance at most Dutch government agencies. A survey it conducted last year among the 10 largest municipalities showed that only one (Utrecht) scored “satisfactory.” Municipalities appeared to be insufficiently aware of what data they had and how they protected it, and citizens were not given access to their own data quickly enough. Incidentally, citizens themselves are also often ignorant about how to better protect their personal data.
Citations:
Juurd Eijsvoogel. 2023. “Foto’s niet meer zomaar in de schoolgids – hoe bevalt de AVG?” NRC, May 26.
Rijksbreed AVG. 2022. Deelrapport van bevindingen ministerie BZK, December 6.
Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens. 2023. “Actueel Nieuwsbrief.” 5 jaar AVG May 26.
N. Benaissa. 2022. “De staat van privacy bij gemeenten.” https://bitsoffreedom.nl
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
10
9
9
The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
2
1
1
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The judiciary is trusted by nearly 80% of the Dutch population, the highest such figure for any state power in the country. The judiciary also performs well in completing a large proportion of the 1.5 million court cases per year on time. Yet the Council for the Judiciary, the judiciary’s highest administrative body, warns that the system is under severe pressure due to understaffing, and thus courtroom capacity. One journalistic commentator even speaks of a crisis of the rule of law, because judges and prosecutors are fed up with failing judicial policies and workload and were recently even close to going on strike.
Regardless of such practical matters, the Dutch judiciary has to make do without a constitutional court with the power to render constitutional review of laws. In 2023, the new political party New Social Contract made the establishment of such a national constitutional court one of its major reform proposals in the area of “better governance.” This is in line with criticisms offered by leading legal scholars. In spite of de facto co-production of laws, the European Union is not mentioned in the constitution. In political debate, “Brussels” is still seen at most as a treaty partner. Whereas the Supreme Court is part of the judiciary and is supposedly independent of politics, it serves both as an advisor to the government on all legislative affairs and is the highest court of appeal in matters of administrative law. Its members, nominated by legal experts, are most frequently proposed by the Council of Ministers and appointed for life by the States General. They are often not legally trained scholars, but instead former politicians with a reputation as elderly statesmen.
This may explain why the Supreme Court sides with government most of the time, as shown in instances such as appeals of the tax authorities’ decisions in the childcare benefits scandal. Regarding the childcare benefits affair, the Administrative Court’s highest judge recently apologized that the courts had stuck to a strict law enforcement “groove” far too long, attributing this to a “political climate” pressing for “zero tolerance” for fraud. The Supreme Court was also charged with making rulings that were too “executive friendly” when dealing with information from refugees and foreigners.
The relationship between the judiciary and the executive has been under tension since the former’s rulings on climate goals, and more recently on fundamental social rights like housing and subsistence security. It is therefore significant that the cabinet did not implementing a motion, supported by major mainstream parties including the VVD and CDA, on making litigation by interest groups against the state more difficult. This is critical at a time when the Dutch state, partly due to shortages of trained personnel and finances, will not or cannot comply with its own laws in an increasing number of areas. Other civil society organizations such as employment agencies and municipal services also claim they are forced to break the law on grounds of financial and/or personnel incapacities.
Citations:
NRC, Wafa Al Ali. 2023. “Interview Henk Naves: De rechtspraak staat onder druk door gebrek aan menskracht. ‘Het strafrecht heeft meer zittingscapaciteit nodig.’“ January 16.
NRC-H, Folkert Jensma. 2023. “Nooit was een staking van rechters en officieren zó dichtbij.” NRC-H May 19.
NRC. 2022. “De grondwet is het draaiboek voor burger en staat dat niemand echt kent. Of goed leest.” April 20.
NRC-H, Wafa Al Ali. 2023. “Kabinet wil stap belangenorganisaties naar rechter niet bemoeilijken.” NRC-H April 17.
Folkert Jensma. 2022. “Aan een niet-functionerende overheid kan ook een bestuursrechter weinig doen.” NRC-H November 3.
NRC-H, Martin Kuiper, Christiaan Pelgrim. 2022. “Een op de zeven uitzendbureaus overtreedt doelbewust de wet, denkt de Arbeidsinspectie.” November 17.
NRC-H, Camil Driessen. 2023. “Strafrecht Door niets openbaar te maken over klachten tegen de reclassering, schendt deze organisatie de eigen regels.” February 6.
NRC. 2023. “Ombudsmannen Van Zutphen en Kalverboer: gemeenten schenden mensenrechten bij huisuitzettingen.” Pelgrim January 24.
Regardless of such practical matters, the Dutch judiciary has to make do without a constitutional court with the power to render constitutional review of laws. In 2023, the new political party New Social Contract made the establishment of such a national constitutional court one of its major reform proposals in the area of “better governance.” This is in line with criticisms offered by leading legal scholars. In spite of de facto co-production of laws, the European Union is not mentioned in the constitution. In political debate, “Brussels” is still seen at most as a treaty partner. Whereas the Supreme Court is part of the judiciary and is supposedly independent of politics, it serves both as an advisor to the government on all legislative affairs and is the highest court of appeal in matters of administrative law. Its members, nominated by legal experts, are most frequently proposed by the Council of Ministers and appointed for life by the States General. They are often not legally trained scholars, but instead former politicians with a reputation as elderly statesmen.
This may explain why the Supreme Court sides with government most of the time, as shown in instances such as appeals of the tax authorities’ decisions in the childcare benefits scandal. Regarding the childcare benefits affair, the Administrative Court’s highest judge recently apologized that the courts had stuck to a strict law enforcement “groove” far too long, attributing this to a “political climate” pressing for “zero tolerance” for fraud. The Supreme Court was also charged with making rulings that were too “executive friendly” when dealing with information from refugees and foreigners.
The relationship between the judiciary and the executive has been under tension since the former’s rulings on climate goals, and more recently on fundamental social rights like housing and subsistence security. It is therefore significant that the cabinet did not implementing a motion, supported by major mainstream parties including the VVD and CDA, on making litigation by interest groups against the state more difficult. This is critical at a time when the Dutch state, partly due to shortages of trained personnel and finances, will not or cannot comply with its own laws in an increasing number of areas. Other civil society organizations such as employment agencies and municipal services also claim they are forced to break the law on grounds of financial and/or personnel incapacities.
Citations:
NRC, Wafa Al Ali. 2023. “Interview Henk Naves: De rechtspraak staat onder druk door gebrek aan menskracht. ‘Het strafrecht heeft meer zittingscapaciteit nodig.’“ January 16.
NRC-H, Folkert Jensma. 2023. “Nooit was een staking van rechters en officieren zó dichtbij.” NRC-H May 19.
NRC. 2022. “De grondwet is het draaiboek voor burger en staat dat niemand echt kent. Of goed leest.” April 20.
NRC-H, Wafa Al Ali. 2023. “Kabinet wil stap belangenorganisaties naar rechter niet bemoeilijken.” NRC-H April 17.
Folkert Jensma. 2022. “Aan een niet-functionerende overheid kan ook een bestuursrechter weinig doen.” NRC-H November 3.
NRC-H, Martin Kuiper, Christiaan Pelgrim. 2022. “Een op de zeven uitzendbureaus overtreedt doelbewust de wet, denkt de Arbeidsinspectie.” November 17.
NRC-H, Camil Driessen. 2023. “Strafrecht Door niets openbaar te maken over klachten tegen de reclassering, schendt deze organisatie de eigen regels.” February 6.
NRC. 2023. “Ombudsmannen Van Zutphen en Kalverboer: gemeenten schenden mensenrechten bij huisuitzettingen.” Pelgrim January 24.
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
10
9
9
There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
8
7
6
7
6
There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
5
4
3
4
3
There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
2
1
1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Universal civil rights and the rule of law are not in acute danger in the Netherlands. But in a 2015 article “Stress test rule of law Netherlands,” a professor who studies institutional aspects of the rule of law concluded that “especially in the functioning of our democratic system, there are insufficient guarantees that rule of law values are protected adequately and in a timely manner” (Brenninkmeijer 2015). In 2020, the Council for Public Administration (Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, ROB) wrote an unsolicited opinion entitled “A Stronger Rule of Law.” For too long, the ROB said, the ideas underlying the rule of law have been neglected through ignorance, clumsiness or indifference. For too long, it added, the rule of law had been taken for granted. Rulings by the Council of State from 2023 show that in the child allowance affair, fundamental rights including the rights to privacy, family life and nondiscrimination, were not sufficiently protected.
A fall 2023 evaluation of party programs by the Dutch Bar Association additionally showed that Dutch politicians no longer unconditionally respect fundamental rights or the Dutch constitution. As many as 10 (out of 18) parties featured proposals that directly violated fundamental rights as guaranteed in the constitution or international treaties signed by the Dutch state. In 2021, seven parties did so. Legal experts see problems especially with proposals for asylum, harsher punishment, rules in prisons and the abolishment of laws. For example, setting a maximum number of asylum-seekers per year, as proposed by parties including the BBB, NSC, PVV, BVNL and FvD, would violate international obligations and treaties. The SGP’s suggestion to reintroduce the death penalty raises similar concerns. DENK, according to lawyers, goes too far in proposing mandatory chemical castration for pedosexuals. The VVD goes too far with the supervision of Islamic weekend schools, they say. Standard prison sentences or minimum sentences (JA21, PVV), the imposition of life sentences after three serious crimes (JA21, BBB) and simply scrapping the nitrogen law (BVNL) would also violate existing legal standards, according to lawyers. Furthermore, according to the lawyers, FvD seeks to restrict freedom of speech with “LGBTI+ propaganda.”
At both the elite and mass level there is clear evidence that the Netherlands is backsliding democratically, with political leaders showing greater tendencies to undermine the rule of law and the constitution, and the public demonstrating lower levels of support for democracy and lower levels of trust in institutions.
Citations:
A. Brenninkmeijer. 2015. “Stresstest rechtsstaat Nederland.” Nederlands Juristenblad 16: April 24.
ROB. 2020. “Een sterkere rechtsstaat. Verbinden en beschermen in een pluriforme samenleving.”
Groene Amsterdammer. 2023. “In de kou.” Tamar de Waal March 15.
Twee uitspraken van de Raad van State inzake de kindertoeslagen tonen opnieuw aan dat de rechtsbescherming van grondrechten niet adequaat is.
NOS. 2023. “Nieuws.” November 5.
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten. 2023. “NovA-commissie toetst verkiezingsprogramma’s op rechtsstatelijkheid.” Nieuwsoverzicht September 13.
Platform O, Van Ommeren. 2023. “Rechtsstaatagenda en -monitor: zeer noodzakelijk!” 09 augustus.
Groene Amsterdammer. 2023. “Hoe het demonstratierecht steeds meer wordt uitgehold.” March 23.
A fall 2023 evaluation of party programs by the Dutch Bar Association additionally showed that Dutch politicians no longer unconditionally respect fundamental rights or the Dutch constitution. As many as 10 (out of 18) parties featured proposals that directly violated fundamental rights as guaranteed in the constitution or international treaties signed by the Dutch state. In 2021, seven parties did so. Legal experts see problems especially with proposals for asylum, harsher punishment, rules in prisons and the abolishment of laws. For example, setting a maximum number of asylum-seekers per year, as proposed by parties including the BBB, NSC, PVV, BVNL and FvD, would violate international obligations and treaties. The SGP’s suggestion to reintroduce the death penalty raises similar concerns. DENK, according to lawyers, goes too far in proposing mandatory chemical castration for pedosexuals. The VVD goes too far with the supervision of Islamic weekend schools, they say. Standard prison sentences or minimum sentences (JA21, PVV), the imposition of life sentences after three serious crimes (JA21, BBB) and simply scrapping the nitrogen law (BVNL) would also violate existing legal standards, according to lawyers. Furthermore, according to the lawyers, FvD seeks to restrict freedom of speech with “LGBTI+ propaganda.”
At both the elite and mass level there is clear evidence that the Netherlands is backsliding democratically, with political leaders showing greater tendencies to undermine the rule of law and the constitution, and the public demonstrating lower levels of support for democracy and lower levels of trust in institutions.
Citations:
A. Brenninkmeijer. 2015. “Stresstest rechtsstaat Nederland.” Nederlands Juristenblad 16: April 24.
ROB. 2020. “Een sterkere rechtsstaat. Verbinden en beschermen in een pluriforme samenleving.”
Groene Amsterdammer. 2023. “In de kou.” Tamar de Waal March 15.
Twee uitspraken van de Raad van State inzake de kindertoeslagen tonen opnieuw aan dat de rechtsbescherming van grondrechten niet adequaat is.
NOS. 2023. “Nieuws.” November 5.
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten. 2023. “NovA-commissie toetst verkiezingsprogramma’s op rechtsstatelijkheid.” Nieuwsoverzicht September 13.
Platform O, Van Ommeren. 2023. “Rechtsstaatagenda en -monitor: zeer noodzakelijk!” 09 augustus.
Groene Amsterdammer. 2023. “Hoe het demonstratierecht steeds meer wordt uitgehold.” March 23.
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
In the public eye, corruption is not perceived as a significant problem in the Netherlands. However, in Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, the Netherlands dropped two points to ninth place internationally – its lowest ranking ever. This decline can be attributed to two major causes. First, the structural influence of organized crime, particularly around the mass-scale production and distribution of drugs, has compromised the integrity of the public administration and political officials at all levels of government. This influence is evident in the significant rise in street violence, bombings, and assassinations in larger cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which are linked to conflicts within organized crime gangs. Second, Dutch politics has failed to respond adequately to past calls by GRECO and the Council of Europe for stricter self-regulation. There have been delays is passing regulations on political integrity, poor control of political party funding and insufficient monitoring of lobbyists’ influence. Recently, three top-level Dutch politicians quickly transitioned to lobbying roles for the gambling, weapons and energy industries. Previously, three former prime ministers moved to consultancy or corporate board positions. Additionally, protections for whistleblowers and regulation and oversight of political party finances remain weak or nonexistent. For example, members of parliament and even part-time university professors are formally obliged to register their paid secondary functions but frequently fail to do so without facing significant sanctions.
Organized drug-related crime is significantly undermining democracy and public safety in the Netherlands. Evidence shows that most serious episodes of violence, including bombings and assassinations against journalists, whistleblowers, lawyers and rival individuals within criminal networks, is drug-related. More concerning is the undermining of local and regional politics and the corruption of civil servants within the police and judiciary. Criminal information brokers corrupt officials to sell sensitive information or obtain passports and other valuable documents for significant sums of money in the underworld. Certain sectors of the Dutch economy, including farming, transport and hospitality, are particularly vulnerable to deep penetration by organized crime.
Of particular concern is the high level of corruption in the Caribbean part of the kingdom, particularly Bonaire. The proximity to large-scale drug production activities and the weakness of local institutions have undermined political, governmental and social structures on the islands.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2023. “Omkoping in het buitenland? Vinden we in Nederland geen probleem.” September 14.
NRC-H. 2023. “Nederland scoorde nog nooit zo laag op internationale corruptie-ranglijst.” Jos Verlaan, January 31.
Corruptie Nederland hoort nog tot de landen met weinig corruptiegevoeligheid in de publieke sector, maar de achtste plaats is de laagste sinds Transparency International deze ranglijst publiceert.
Clingendael. 2021. “De Nederlandse sleutelrol in de geglobaliseerde drugshandel en productie.”
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/08/een-integere-overheid-is-geen-vanzelfsprekendheid-zegt-de-baas-van-de-rijksrecherche-a4164146
https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/287061918/JV_2023_49_03_H5_Kleemans_2023_gepubliceerdeversie.pdf
https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3326/3374-ambtelijk-bestuurlijke-integriteit-caribisch-nederland-volledige-tekst.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Organized drug-related crime is significantly undermining democracy and public safety in the Netherlands. Evidence shows that most serious episodes of violence, including bombings and assassinations against journalists, whistleblowers, lawyers and rival individuals within criminal networks, is drug-related. More concerning is the undermining of local and regional politics and the corruption of civil servants within the police and judiciary. Criminal information brokers corrupt officials to sell sensitive information or obtain passports and other valuable documents for significant sums of money in the underworld. Certain sectors of the Dutch economy, including farming, transport and hospitality, are particularly vulnerable to deep penetration by organized crime.
Of particular concern is the high level of corruption in the Caribbean part of the kingdom, particularly Bonaire. The proximity to large-scale drug production activities and the weakness of local institutions have undermined political, governmental and social structures on the islands.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2023. “Omkoping in het buitenland? Vinden we in Nederland geen probleem.” September 14.
NRC-H. 2023. “Nederland scoorde nog nooit zo laag op internationale corruptie-ranglijst.” Jos Verlaan, January 31.
Corruptie Nederland hoort nog tot de landen met weinig corruptiegevoeligheid in de publieke sector, maar de achtste plaats is de laagste sinds Transparency International deze ranglijst publiceert.
Clingendael. 2021. “De Nederlandse sleutelrol in de geglobaliseerde drugshandel en productie.”
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/08/een-integere-overheid-is-geen-vanzelfsprekendheid-zegt-de-baas-van-de-rijksrecherche-a4164146
https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/287061918/JV_2023_49_03_H5_Kleemans_2023_gepubliceerdeversie.pdf
https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3326/3374-ambtelijk-bestuurlijke-integriteit-caribisch-nederland-volledige-tekst.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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9
9
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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7
6
7
6
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
5
4
3
4
3
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
1
1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The competition for media attention, political fragmentation, political pressures, the demands of social media and the accessibility of legislators through media accounts all put significant pressure on legislators’ parliamentary activities and on parliament’s civil servant support staff.
Dutch MPs are underfunded and understaffed, a circumstance that hinders their ability to work rigorously and hold ministers accountable. Although the Netherlands has a relatively small parliamentary staff, research shows that parties often allocate funds to public relations and campaign staff instead of hiring experts and researchers to support legislators’ parliamentary work. There is a lack of transparency regarding how many staff members are working on substantive issues versus those who are essentially campaigners.
During the Rutte IV government, 10% or 15 MPs stepped down for health or personal reasons. The second chamber, consisting of 150 legislators, employs about 1,000 people. Individual MPs have two to three personal political assistants employed by foundations established by their political party, with funding based on the party’s number of seats in parliament (in 2021: €243,000 per seat). Additionally, around 600 civil servants serve parliament as a whole, led by an administrative officer accountable to the speaker of the house and her presidium. The high level of work pressure likely contributes to the frequency of public clashes between civil servant support staff and the speaker. The administrative service comprises various departments, including security (85 staff), communication and external relations (23), clerks (62) and archives and information (42). The permanent commissions’ secretariats (120 staff) and analysis and research division (40 staff) provide legislators with planning serves, expertise and knowledge brokering. The A&R department explicitly links parliamentary work to scientific judgment and advice, offering tools such as network exploration, scientific fact sheets, breakfast meetings and formal scientific assessments of bills.
Parliament does not have the power to set its own budget; this responsibility lies with the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. In the Dutch dual system, parliament both oversees the government and co-produces legislation and public policies. It is estimated that a political party needs a minimum of 13 seats in parliament to meaningfully fulfill both roles and participate in all parliamentary activities. During the Rutte IV cabinet period, only four parties (VVD, D66, PVV and CDA) met this minimum size. The next five parties with some influence had nine seats (SP, PvdA) or eight seats (GL, FvD). These parties sometimes combined forces in the permanent commissions or chose to participate only in the more important ones.
Fearing negative voter reactions, Dutch legislators are reluctant to request more and better staff support. Consequently, the Council of Public Administration (Raad Openbaar Bestuur, ROB) has advocated doubling the parliament’s support functions. The Dutch parliament is small by international standards (one seat per 110,000 inhabitants). Increasing the number of seats to about 250 and providing more and better support would be an obvious solution, pending the advice of a parliamentary subcommittee.
Citations:
Parlement.com. 2022. “Werkdruk in de Tweede Kamer.” https://www.parlement.com/9353000/1/j9vvknrzl7sjtxl/vlnpfx1mj0y0
Parlement.com. n.d. “Tussentijds vertrek tot de Tweede Kamer.”
Raad Openbaar Bestuur. 2021. “Briefadvies Ondersteuning Tweede Kamer.” Verdubbeling ondersteuning Tweede Kamer is nodig, November 4.
Parlement & Wetenschap. n.d. “Instrumentarium.” parlementenwetenschap.com
Otjes, S. 2022. “What explains the size of parliamentary staff?” West European Politics.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2022.2049068
https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/id/vlvrf2354sct/nieuws/een_kamer_met_weinig_ondersteuning_hoe?colctx=vlnjkeqq63pg
Dutch MPs are underfunded and understaffed, a circumstance that hinders their ability to work rigorously and hold ministers accountable. Although the Netherlands has a relatively small parliamentary staff, research shows that parties often allocate funds to public relations and campaign staff instead of hiring experts and researchers to support legislators’ parliamentary work. There is a lack of transparency regarding how many staff members are working on substantive issues versus those who are essentially campaigners.
During the Rutte IV government, 10% or 15 MPs stepped down for health or personal reasons. The second chamber, consisting of 150 legislators, employs about 1,000 people. Individual MPs have two to three personal political assistants employed by foundations established by their political party, with funding based on the party’s number of seats in parliament (in 2021: €243,000 per seat). Additionally, around 600 civil servants serve parliament as a whole, led by an administrative officer accountable to the speaker of the house and her presidium. The high level of work pressure likely contributes to the frequency of public clashes between civil servant support staff and the speaker. The administrative service comprises various departments, including security (85 staff), communication and external relations (23), clerks (62) and archives and information (42). The permanent commissions’ secretariats (120 staff) and analysis and research division (40 staff) provide legislators with planning serves, expertise and knowledge brokering. The A&R department explicitly links parliamentary work to scientific judgment and advice, offering tools such as network exploration, scientific fact sheets, breakfast meetings and formal scientific assessments of bills.
Parliament does not have the power to set its own budget; this responsibility lies with the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. In the Dutch dual system, parliament both oversees the government and co-produces legislation and public policies. It is estimated that a political party needs a minimum of 13 seats in parliament to meaningfully fulfill both roles and participate in all parliamentary activities. During the Rutte IV cabinet period, only four parties (VVD, D66, PVV and CDA) met this minimum size. The next five parties with some influence had nine seats (SP, PvdA) or eight seats (GL, FvD). These parties sometimes combined forces in the permanent commissions or chose to participate only in the more important ones.
Fearing negative voter reactions, Dutch legislators are reluctant to request more and better staff support. Consequently, the Council of Public Administration (Raad Openbaar Bestuur, ROB) has advocated doubling the parliament’s support functions. The Dutch parliament is small by international standards (one seat per 110,000 inhabitants). Increasing the number of seats to about 250 and providing more and better support would be an obvious solution, pending the advice of a parliamentary subcommittee.
Citations:
Parlement.com. 2022. “Werkdruk in de Tweede Kamer.” https://www.parlement.com/9353000/1/j9vvknrzl7sjtxl/vlnpfx1mj0y0
Parlement.com. n.d. “Tussentijds vertrek tot de Tweede Kamer.”
Raad Openbaar Bestuur. 2021. “Briefadvies Ondersteuning Tweede Kamer.” Verdubbeling ondersteuning Tweede Kamer is nodig, November 4.
Parlement & Wetenschap. n.d. “Instrumentarium.” parlementenwetenschap.com
Otjes, S. 2022. “What explains the size of parliamentary staff?” West European Politics.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2022.2049068
https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/id/vlvrf2354sct/nieuws/een_kamer_met_weinig_ondersteuning_hoe?colctx=vlnjkeqq63pg
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
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9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
Public trust in the House of Representatives is at its lowest level in a decade, according to research by CBS. By the end of 2022, only a quarter of people aged 15 or above reported having confidence in parliament, the lowest such level since the survey began in 2012. This decline reflects a public perception that the legislative and oversight functions of both chambers (the lower house and the upper house or Senate) have diminished in quality.
Several factors have contributed to this decline, including the government’s conduct toward parliament. Pieter Omtzigt, a prominent legislator and founder of the new political party Nieuw Sociaal Contract, which gained 20 seats in the 22 November 2023 national elections, highlighted several government-related issues in his Thorbecke lecture: 1) Decisions are made by selective parts of the Council of Ministers in the prime minister’s official residence or office, at climate “tables” with stakeholders or lobbyists, bypassing the full cabinet and parliament, thereby diminishing parliamentary control; 2) Budget rights are being eroded by labeling initiatives as “emergency” programs with special budgets; 3) The government has a problematic habit of allowing laws adopted by parliament to enter into force only partially or not at all; and 4) Insufficient information is being provided to the legislature, as parliamentary inquiries and investigations often reveal that the chamber has been incorrectly, belatedly or incompletely informed on crucial issues. For example, the childcare alloWwance scandal would have been uncovered three years earlier if the government had properly informed the chamber, Omtzigt said.
Another significant contributor to the decline in trust is the fragmentation of political parties, driven by voter behavior and the highly proportional electoral system. When the Rutte IV government took office in March 2021, 17 parties entered the new House of Representatives. By 2023, due to party splits, the lower house had 20 political groups, a record. This fragmentation hampers the ability of MPs to thoroughly review laws, leading to insufficiently debated and increasingly complex legislation. Additionally, parliamentary support staff must spread their attention across too many topics. The importance of the co-legislation function has also declined as policy is increasingly shaped through other means, such as covenants or policy frameworks. The parliamentary agenda has become more varied, requiring attention to a broader range of subjects.
Tabling motions, even if they have not been financially reviewed, has become a trend among smaller groups. It is an easy way to score points during televised plenary sessions. In the parliamentary year 2022, more than 5,000 motions were submitted, compared to just a few hundred per year in the 1990s. This abundance of motions causes essential proposals to get lost in the noise. In a media climate where serious politics are overlooked and opportunistic politics are rewarded, resisting the temptation to table such motions is difficult.
Fragmentation also affects the constitutional relations between the House and Senate. Since 2010, Rutte cabinets have not had a clear majority in the Senate, even though every bill must pass both chambers. As a result, the government seeks support from Senate factions, compromising the Senate’s role as a “chambre de réflexion” with a focus on the quality, consistency and enforceability of legislation.
There is currently a proposal by two small parties to increase the number of chamber members from 150 to 250, aligning with European standards. However, this change would take years to implement, as it would require a constitutional amendment in two separate sessions.
Citations:
Omtzigt. 2023. “Thorbecke lezing, Zwolle.”
NOS Nieuws dinsdag 9 mei 2023
CBS: vertrouwen in Tweede Kamer in tien jaar tijd niet zo laag als nu
Th.J. van den Berg. 2022. “Ongemak over gedragscode TK.” Parlement. com, October 21.
B. van de Braak. 2022. “Nutteloze debatten.” Parlement.com October 28.
Groene Adammer. 2023. “Veel kleine fracties zorgen voor slechtere wetten.” 16 november.
De Correspondent, Jesse Frederik, 29 september 2022 Moties indienen, doorgerekend of niet, is een sport geworden in de Tweede Kamer.
Chavannes. 2023. “Pop-up verkiezingen voor de Eerste Kamer (en o ja, de provincie).” De Correspondent, March 3.
NRC-H, Valk. 2023. “Volt en ChristenUnie willen Tweede Kamer uitbreiden naar 250 zetels.” 29 August.
Several factors have contributed to this decline, including the government’s conduct toward parliament. Pieter Omtzigt, a prominent legislator and founder of the new political party Nieuw Sociaal Contract, which gained 20 seats in the 22 November 2023 national elections, highlighted several government-related issues in his Thorbecke lecture: 1) Decisions are made by selective parts of the Council of Ministers in the prime minister’s official residence or office, at climate “tables” with stakeholders or lobbyists, bypassing the full cabinet and parliament, thereby diminishing parliamentary control; 2) Budget rights are being eroded by labeling initiatives as “emergency” programs with special budgets; 3) The government has a problematic habit of allowing laws adopted by parliament to enter into force only partially or not at all; and 4) Insufficient information is being provided to the legislature, as parliamentary inquiries and investigations often reveal that the chamber has been incorrectly, belatedly or incompletely informed on crucial issues. For example, the childcare alloWwance scandal would have been uncovered three years earlier if the government had properly informed the chamber, Omtzigt said.
Another significant contributor to the decline in trust is the fragmentation of political parties, driven by voter behavior and the highly proportional electoral system. When the Rutte IV government took office in March 2021, 17 parties entered the new House of Representatives. By 2023, due to party splits, the lower house had 20 political groups, a record. This fragmentation hampers the ability of MPs to thoroughly review laws, leading to insufficiently debated and increasingly complex legislation. Additionally, parliamentary support staff must spread their attention across too many topics. The importance of the co-legislation function has also declined as policy is increasingly shaped through other means, such as covenants or policy frameworks. The parliamentary agenda has become more varied, requiring attention to a broader range of subjects.
Tabling motions, even if they have not been financially reviewed, has become a trend among smaller groups. It is an easy way to score points during televised plenary sessions. In the parliamentary year 2022, more than 5,000 motions were submitted, compared to just a few hundred per year in the 1990s. This abundance of motions causes essential proposals to get lost in the noise. In a media climate where serious politics are overlooked and opportunistic politics are rewarded, resisting the temptation to table such motions is difficult.
Fragmentation also affects the constitutional relations between the House and Senate. Since 2010, Rutte cabinets have not had a clear majority in the Senate, even though every bill must pass both chambers. As a result, the government seeks support from Senate factions, compromising the Senate’s role as a “chambre de réflexion” with a focus on the quality, consistency and enforceability of legislation.
There is currently a proposal by two small parties to increase the number of chamber members from 150 to 250, aligning with European standards. However, this change would take years to implement, as it would require a constitutional amendment in two separate sessions.
Citations:
Omtzigt. 2023. “Thorbecke lezing, Zwolle.”
NOS Nieuws dinsdag 9 mei 2023
CBS: vertrouwen in Tweede Kamer in tien jaar tijd niet zo laag als nu
Th.J. van den Berg. 2022. “Ongemak over gedragscode TK.” Parlement. com, October 21.
B. van de Braak. 2022. “Nutteloze debatten.” Parlement.com October 28.
Groene Adammer. 2023. “Veel kleine fracties zorgen voor slechtere wetten.” 16 november.
De Correspondent, Jesse Frederik, 29 september 2022 Moties indienen, doorgerekend of niet, is een sport geworden in de Tweede Kamer.
Chavannes. 2023. “Pop-up verkiezingen voor de Eerste Kamer (en o ja, de provincie).” De Correspondent, March 3.
NRC-H, Valk. 2023. “Volt en ChristenUnie willen Tweede Kamer uitbreiden naar 250 zetels.” 29 August.
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
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9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
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4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
Legislative investigations in the Netherlands can be highly effective and are even capable of bringing down an entire government. For instance, the Kok government fell due to a NIOD investigation into the role of Dutchbat during the Srebrenica massacre, and the Rutte III cabinet resigned following a parliamentary investigation into the childcare benefit scandal. However, initiating legislative investigations requires a parliamentary majority, meaning that opposition parties cannot launch such investigations on their own. This dependency on majority support is one reason why the role of the second chamber itself – and specifically its demand for a stringent anti-fraud law – often goes undiscussed.
Parliamentary inquiries in the Netherlands aim to investigate and improve political decision-making, policy implementation and government spending. The Dutch parliament has recognized its inadequacy in performing legislative and oversight tasks due to the small size of the second chamber (150 members) and political fragmentation into as many as 20 factions or more. The complexity of the work and parliamentarians’ reluctance to delve deeply into policy issues further exacerbate these challenges. Most of the effort during parliamentary inquiries involves examining documentation and conducting interviews with involved parties, tasks typically performed by officials and specialized researchers. The most visible and consequential part of these inquiries are the public hearings conducted by the Inquiry Committee, which focus on reconstructing decision-making processes and uncovering the truth. While most individuals questioned during these hearings do not face direct consequences, some (former) government officials have been held personally responsible and have resigned. The enduring impact of parliamentary inquiries lies not in political accountability but in substantive recommendations that lead to significant adjustments in government policy and regulations. Since the first modern parliamentary inquiry in 1984, inquiries have led to important changes in various areas. Research has shown that the most substantial learning occurs when inquiries focus on the legality and legal certainty for citizens and other actors, emphasizing long-term implications rather than the short-term fate of individual officials or politicians.
Political complications have arisen in the case of approved parliamentary investigations into the government’s COVID-19 policies and the Groningen gas exploitation and earthquake problem. Major political parties have been reluctant to provide commission members, likely due to political polarization. These parties fear that opposition groups such as PVV and Forum for Democracy, which have sided with demonstrators and conspiracy theorists during past anti-pandemic-policy demonstrations, will use these investigations to showcase their political convictions.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2023. “Bruno Bruins: ‘Niets kon Kamer of kabinetten weerhouden van het doorzetten van het hardvochtige fraudebeleid’.” September 15.
NRC. 2023. “De parlementaire enquête naar het coronabeleid komt er nu niet, en misschien nooit.” June 27.
Wolffram, D. J. 2021. “Enquêtes: gaat de Kamer ten onder?” De Hofvijver 12 (134).
https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/9394000/1/j9vvllwqvzjxdyx/vlwkjbb869ss ?pk_campaign=hofv-2209&pk_kwd=vlwkjbb869ss
Tinnevelt, R., Jansen, R., and van Emmerik, M. 2023. De weerbare democratische rechtsstaat.
Straalen, L. V. 2023. De Parlementaire Enquête: het kan nog steeds. Master’s thesis, Leiden Universiteit.
Parliamentary inquiries in the Netherlands aim to investigate and improve political decision-making, policy implementation and government spending. The Dutch parliament has recognized its inadequacy in performing legislative and oversight tasks due to the small size of the second chamber (150 members) and political fragmentation into as many as 20 factions or more. The complexity of the work and parliamentarians’ reluctance to delve deeply into policy issues further exacerbate these challenges. Most of the effort during parliamentary inquiries involves examining documentation and conducting interviews with involved parties, tasks typically performed by officials and specialized researchers. The most visible and consequential part of these inquiries are the public hearings conducted by the Inquiry Committee, which focus on reconstructing decision-making processes and uncovering the truth. While most individuals questioned during these hearings do not face direct consequences, some (former) government officials have been held personally responsible and have resigned. The enduring impact of parliamentary inquiries lies not in political accountability but in substantive recommendations that lead to significant adjustments in government policy and regulations. Since the first modern parliamentary inquiry in 1984, inquiries have led to important changes in various areas. Research has shown that the most substantial learning occurs when inquiries focus on the legality and legal certainty for citizens and other actors, emphasizing long-term implications rather than the short-term fate of individual officials or politicians.
Political complications have arisen in the case of approved parliamentary investigations into the government’s COVID-19 policies and the Groningen gas exploitation and earthquake problem. Major political parties have been reluctant to provide commission members, likely due to political polarization. These parties fear that opposition groups such as PVV and Forum for Democracy, which have sided with demonstrators and conspiracy theorists during past anti-pandemic-policy demonstrations, will use these investigations to showcase their political convictions.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2023. “Bruno Bruins: ‘Niets kon Kamer of kabinetten weerhouden van het doorzetten van het hardvochtige fraudebeleid’.” September 15.
NRC. 2023. “De parlementaire enquête naar het coronabeleid komt er nu niet, en misschien nooit.” June 27.
Wolffram, D. J. 2021. “Enquêtes: gaat de Kamer ten onder?” De Hofvijver 12 (134).
https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/9394000/1/j9vvllwqvzjxdyx/vlwkjbb869ss ?pk_campaign=hofv-2209&pk_kwd=vlwkjbb869ss
Tinnevelt, R., Jansen, R., and van Emmerik, M. 2023. De weerbare democratische rechtsstaat.
Straalen, L. V. 2023. De Parlementaire Enquête: het kan nog steeds. Master’s thesis, Leiden Universiteit.
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
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9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
There are 12 Permanent parliamentary committees (vaste kamercommissies) in the Netherlands, each corresponding to the policy domains of the ministries. In 2023, only two of these committees were chaired by opposition-party members. The prime minister’s Department of General Affairs is the only ministry without a corresponding parliamentary committee. There are also permanent commissions for interdepartmental policymaking on aggregate government expenditure, European affairs, and foreign trade and development aid. Parliamentary committees usually have 25 members, representing all political parties with seats in the States General. Smaller political parties tend to participate only in committees that align closely with their platforms. In recent decades, the core of parliamentary activity has shifted from plenary oversight sessions to the co-legislative committees. Most parliamentary work occurs in these committees, which held an estimated 1,700 public and nonpublic meetings per year, averaging almost three per committee per week. However, this trend has recently reversed.
The number of plenary debates on bills has been decreasing, paralleling the declining number of bills tabled. Instead, the chamber is increasingly holding plenary debates on subjects other than legislation. Retrospective debates, which examine the roles of ministers or knowledge institutes in the preparation of bills or important decisions, primarily serve an oversight function. Consequently, the relationship between legislation and control on the plenary agenda has shifted, with significantly more “oversight debates” now taking place.
Various publications have indicated that during legislative debates, there is little systematic attention to the quality of legislation, and especially to core values such as consistency, enforceability, practicability, constitutionality, the European dimension, and a proper understanding of citizens’ needs and capabilities. To address this, the Van der Staay Working Group, which was tasked with developing proposals to strengthen the role of parliament, suggested nominating one legislator as a “rapporteur” tasked with alerting other MPs to salient issues in new bills. Currently, over 100 MPs hold the status of rapporteur’ for designated bills.
Overall, it seems that in a fragmented parliament with many political factions of fewer than 10 members, the legislative capacity for policy guidance is in serious decline. This indicates that in the Dutch dual system, the executive branch increasingly outweighs the legislative branch. To counter this imbalance, the Van der Staay Working Group recommends not waiting for bills to come to the House but instead periodically discussing the legislative agenda in committees, especially after a new administration takes office.
Citations:
Parlement.com, consulted 21 December 2023.
Investico, Kuipers et al. 2021. “Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?”
Tweede Kamer. 2023. “Kamervoorzitter ontvangt eindrapport over versterking functies.” 6 June.
The number of plenary debates on bills has been decreasing, paralleling the declining number of bills tabled. Instead, the chamber is increasingly holding plenary debates on subjects other than legislation. Retrospective debates, which examine the roles of ministers or knowledge institutes in the preparation of bills or important decisions, primarily serve an oversight function. Consequently, the relationship between legislation and control on the plenary agenda has shifted, with significantly more “oversight debates” now taking place.
Various publications have indicated that during legislative debates, there is little systematic attention to the quality of legislation, and especially to core values such as consistency, enforceability, practicability, constitutionality, the European dimension, and a proper understanding of citizens’ needs and capabilities. To address this, the Van der Staay Working Group, which was tasked with developing proposals to strengthen the role of parliament, suggested nominating one legislator as a “rapporteur” tasked with alerting other MPs to salient issues in new bills. Currently, over 100 MPs hold the status of rapporteur’ for designated bills.
Overall, it seems that in a fragmented parliament with many political factions of fewer than 10 members, the legislative capacity for policy guidance is in serious decline. This indicates that in the Dutch dual system, the executive branch increasingly outweighs the legislative branch. To counter this imbalance, the Van der Staay Working Group recommends not waiting for bills to come to the House but instead periodically discussing the legislative agenda in committees, especially after a new administration takes office.
Citations:
Parlement.com, consulted 21 December 2023.
Investico, Kuipers et al. 2021. “Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?”
Tweede Kamer. 2023. “Kamervoorzitter ontvangt eindrapport over versterking functies.” 6 June.