Vertical Accountability
#25Key Findings
The Netherlands performs relatively poorly in international comparison (rank 25) in the category of vertical accountability.
Elections are free and fair. Political parties receive state subsidies, while new parties must pay a significant entry fee. The party financing system raises concerns, as funding is not transparent, expenditures do not have to be declared and there is no independent body to audit finances. Sanctions for violating financing rules are rarely imposed.
The electoral system is fully proportional, with no threshold, allowing many political parties to compete. This system results in significant electoral volatility. Polarization has increased. Centrist parties have collaborated to exclude far-right parties from government in the past, but this system has broken down.
Responding to past criticisms, a Law on Open Government has been in place since 2022. However, as it contains considerable exclusions, it is not seen as having significantly changed the government’s culture of withholding information.
Elections are free and fair. Political parties receive state subsidies, while new parties must pay a significant entry fee. The party financing system raises concerns, as funding is not transparent, expenditures do not have to be declared and there is no independent body to audit finances. Sanctions for violating financing rules are rarely imposed.
The electoral system is fully proportional, with no threshold, allowing many political parties to compete. This system results in significant electoral volatility. Polarization has increased. Centrist parties have collaborated to exclude far-right parties from government in the past, but this system has broken down.
Responding to past criticisms, a Law on Open Government has been in place since 2022. However, as it contains considerable exclusions, it is not seen as having significantly changed the government’s culture of withholding information.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
Individual voter registration is passive and based on the unified population register maintained by municipalities. Voters residing abroad who wish to vote are required to actively register once. Over 1 million citizens reside outside of the Netherlands, but only some 109,000 requested to be registered for the 2023 elections. With a score of 78 out of 100 points in the 2023 Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index, the Netherlands – after other European countries like Finland (89) and Denmark (score 87) – was ranked 12th among 42 European countries. In 2018, its highest scores came in the categories of electoral laws and electoral procedures; somewhat lower scores were given for voter and party and candidacy registration. Some argue that party membership and selection by party caucus strongly diminish formal equality with regard to accessibility. Political parties with elected members receive state subsidies, while qualifying as a new party necessitates payment of a considerable entry fee. In the November 2023 national elections, two new political parties, the Farmer-Citizen Movement (Boeren Burger Beweging, BBB) and New Social Contract (NSC) participated and entered parliament, respectively winning seven and 20 seats in a 150-seat parliament. Two existing parties, Labor and Green Left, merged.
By buying commercial media time and microtargeting through social media, political parties have some influence on media attention and coverage. In the 2023 national elections, parties spent a total of approximately €2.5 million on microtargeting, mainly based on “lifestyle” cues. Extreme-right parties Forum for Democracy (Baudet) and Party for Freedom (Wilders) relied on the algorithms of general platforms like TikTok and YouTube. Microtargeting through “influencers” on social media platforms opens the door for free publicity by “fans” and possible organized foreign, especially Russian-origin, propaganda.
There are significant problems with the party financing system. Even though minor improvements have been implemented, substantial issues remain, according to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the anti-corruption watchdog. Party funding is not transparently monitored, and there is no independent body tasked with reviewing and auditing party finances. The members of the Political Parties Finance Oversight Committee, which advises the minister of the interior on party finance issues, are appointed by the same minister, who is also a partisan. Sanctions are rarely imposed, as much party finance can be hidden by political parties. Foreign donations can still be given to parties through Dutch entities and local branches. Parties do not need to declare expenditures, only formal income. Major parties, including the PVV, currently the largest party, are dependent on foreign funding. The PVV has no membership organization and receives no state subsidies, yet voters cannot verify who funds this major party. Anonymous gifts are still allowed, leaving the system open to foreign influence. Political parties, such as the major right-wing liberal VVD, organize meetings at which wealthy donors can buy time to sit down with ministers. Gifts in kind are not reported by parties, and local parties and branches/chapters are not covered by the Party Finance Law. Parties can hide sources of income and resources through these branches and ancillary organizations.
Citations:
Follow the Money. 2022. “Toezichthouder partijfinanciën: Geld is te belangrijk geworden in de politiek.” June 24.
Krouwel, A. 2021. “Wij zijn het Wilde Westen van het politieke geld.” NRC March 19.
https://nos.nl/artikel/2371252-tonnen-aan-giften-voor-partijen-donateur-wordt-zo-beetje-werkgever-van-politici
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2304406-nederland-is-het-wilde-westen-van-de-partijfinanciering
https://www.transparency.nl/nieuws/2019/10/nederlandse-regels-partijfinanciering-werken-corruptie-lokale-partijen-in-de-hand/
https://nos.nl/artikel/2372814-onderzoek-rechts-domineert-de-verkiezingscampagne-op-radio-en-tv
https://mediasuitedatastories.clariah.nl/nl/elections-2021-first-results/
Groene Amsterdammer. 30 November. “Online campagnes. De genegeerde burger.”
By buying commercial media time and microtargeting through social media, political parties have some influence on media attention and coverage. In the 2023 national elections, parties spent a total of approximately €2.5 million on microtargeting, mainly based on “lifestyle” cues. Extreme-right parties Forum for Democracy (Baudet) and Party for Freedom (Wilders) relied on the algorithms of general platforms like TikTok and YouTube. Microtargeting through “influencers” on social media platforms opens the door for free publicity by “fans” and possible organized foreign, especially Russian-origin, propaganda.
There are significant problems with the party financing system. Even though minor improvements have been implemented, substantial issues remain, according to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the anti-corruption watchdog. Party funding is not transparently monitored, and there is no independent body tasked with reviewing and auditing party finances. The members of the Political Parties Finance Oversight Committee, which advises the minister of the interior on party finance issues, are appointed by the same minister, who is also a partisan. Sanctions are rarely imposed, as much party finance can be hidden by political parties. Foreign donations can still be given to parties through Dutch entities and local branches. Parties do not need to declare expenditures, only formal income. Major parties, including the PVV, currently the largest party, are dependent on foreign funding. The PVV has no membership organization and receives no state subsidies, yet voters cannot verify who funds this major party. Anonymous gifts are still allowed, leaving the system open to foreign influence. Political parties, such as the major right-wing liberal VVD, organize meetings at which wealthy donors can buy time to sit down with ministers. Gifts in kind are not reported by parties, and local parties and branches/chapters are not covered by the Party Finance Law. Parties can hide sources of income and resources through these branches and ancillary organizations.
Citations:
Follow the Money. 2022. “Toezichthouder partijfinanciën: Geld is te belangrijk geworden in de politiek.” June 24.
Krouwel, A. 2021. “Wij zijn het Wilde Westen van het politieke geld.” NRC March 19.
https://nos.nl/artikel/2371252-tonnen-aan-giften-voor-partijen-donateur-wordt-zo-beetje-werkgever-van-politici
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2304406-nederland-is-het-wilde-westen-van-de-partijfinanciering
https://www.transparency.nl/nieuws/2019/10/nederlandse-regels-partijfinanciering-werken-corruptie-lokale-partijen-in-de-hand/
https://nos.nl/artikel/2372814-onderzoek-rechts-domineert-de-verkiezingscampagne-op-radio-en-tv
https://mediasuitedatastories.clariah.nl/nl/elections-2021-first-results/
Groene Amsterdammer. 30 November. “Online campagnes. De genegeerde burger.”
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
10
9
9
There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
This observation period saw three elections: one national election (22 November 2023), combined local and water board elections (16 March 2022), and provincial elections (16 March 2023).
In each election, more than 20 national political parties and many more local political parties fielded candidates. Ballot design had to be changed due to the increase in the number of political parties on the ballot: in 2021, 37 parties fielded 1,579 candidates; in 2023, 26 parties fielded 1,128 candidates. Because of the large number of participating parties, vote counting (by hand, not by computer) took more time. Each election resulted in a different “winner” (meaning the minority party gathering the most votes and seats), which testifies both to the enormous volatility of the Dutch electorate and to the fact that elections are truly free and fair.
All Dutch citizens aged 18 or over residing in the Netherlands are equally entitled to run for election, although some restrictions apply in cases which the candidate suffers from a mental disorder, or when a special court order has temporarily deprived the individual of eligibility for election. Convicts have the right to vote by authorization only; as part of their conviction, some may be denied voting rights for two to five years over and above their prison terms. Convicts have turned to the court to acquire the right to have polling stations inside prisons, but were denied.
Contrary to other civil rights, the right to vote in national, provincial or water board elections is restricted to the 13.3 million citizens with Dutch nationality who are at least 18 years old (as of election day). Since the elections in 2010, each voter has been obliged to show a legally approved ID in addition to a voting card/pass. Legally approved IDs include either a (nonexpired) passport or driver’s license. For local elections, voting rights apply to all individuals who have been registered as legal residents for at least five years, and to all EU nationals residing in the Netherlands.
Persons entitled to vote receive an invitation to vote and a voting pass/card at their home address no later than 14 days before the elections. No later than the Friday before voting, eligible voters will receive at home the list of candidates, as well as the addresses and opening times of polling stations and mobile polling stations. In 2023 there were approximately 9,500 polling stations, all wheelchair accessible. Corrected for housing prices, the median distance between a voter’s home address and a polling station was 300-400 meters.
Bearing testimony to the high level of trust in election procedures, the law regulates complaints and appeals regarding specific “up-front” parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration, registration of party names, candidate registration and election day proceedings, but there are no specific rules or regulations permitting judicial appeals related to crucial aspects including campaign finance behavior, campaigning or challenges to the election results. Only as late as 2023, in a generally more distrusting public mood, was the ballot counting process made public. In the 2023 election ballot-tallying process, the Election Council ordered one local government to recount due to a difference between the number of voting passes and votes cast.
Persons entitled to vote receive an invitation to vote at their home address no later than 14 days before the elections: a voting pass. No later than the Friday before voting, eligible voters are to receive the list of candidates, as well as the addresses and opening times of polling stations and mobile polling stations at home. Indicative of the high level of trust in election procedures in the Netherlands is the fact that the law regulates complaints and appeals regarding the input and some throughput parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration, registration of party names, candidate registration and election day proceedings, but there are no specific rules or regulations permitting judicial appeals to crucial throughput aspects such as campaign finance and style of campaigning. Nor are there provisions for challenging the election results themselves. However, election results in 2021 were also checked by volunteers from the Open State Foundation. Except for some aggression directed at extreme right-wing FvD’s political leader, Baudet, there were no irregularities reported in 2023.
Citations:
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Minder stembureaus dan in 2019, maar wel beter toegankelijk.” maandag 13 maart.
Kantar Public. 2023. “Evaluatie Verkiezingen. Evaluatie van de verkiezingen van de leden van de Provinciale Staten en van de Waterschappen, 15 maart 2023.” Published April 25.
NU.nl. 2023. “Politieke kopstukken geschokt na tweede aanval op Baudet: ‘Unacceptabel’.” November 20.
Open State Foundation. n.d. “Open Verkiezingsuitslagen 2021.”
In each election, more than 20 national political parties and many more local political parties fielded candidates. Ballot design had to be changed due to the increase in the number of political parties on the ballot: in 2021, 37 parties fielded 1,579 candidates; in 2023, 26 parties fielded 1,128 candidates. Because of the large number of participating parties, vote counting (by hand, not by computer) took more time. Each election resulted in a different “winner” (meaning the minority party gathering the most votes and seats), which testifies both to the enormous volatility of the Dutch electorate and to the fact that elections are truly free and fair.
All Dutch citizens aged 18 or over residing in the Netherlands are equally entitled to run for election, although some restrictions apply in cases which the candidate suffers from a mental disorder, or when a special court order has temporarily deprived the individual of eligibility for election. Convicts have the right to vote by authorization only; as part of their conviction, some may be denied voting rights for two to five years over and above their prison terms. Convicts have turned to the court to acquire the right to have polling stations inside prisons, but were denied.
Contrary to other civil rights, the right to vote in national, provincial or water board elections is restricted to the 13.3 million citizens with Dutch nationality who are at least 18 years old (as of election day). Since the elections in 2010, each voter has been obliged to show a legally approved ID in addition to a voting card/pass. Legally approved IDs include either a (nonexpired) passport or driver’s license. For local elections, voting rights apply to all individuals who have been registered as legal residents for at least five years, and to all EU nationals residing in the Netherlands.
Persons entitled to vote receive an invitation to vote and a voting pass/card at their home address no later than 14 days before the elections. No later than the Friday before voting, eligible voters will receive at home the list of candidates, as well as the addresses and opening times of polling stations and mobile polling stations. In 2023 there were approximately 9,500 polling stations, all wheelchair accessible. Corrected for housing prices, the median distance between a voter’s home address and a polling station was 300-400 meters.
Bearing testimony to the high level of trust in election procedures, the law regulates complaints and appeals regarding specific “up-front” parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration, registration of party names, candidate registration and election day proceedings, but there are no specific rules or regulations permitting judicial appeals related to crucial aspects including campaign finance behavior, campaigning or challenges to the election results. Only as late as 2023, in a generally more distrusting public mood, was the ballot counting process made public. In the 2023 election ballot-tallying process, the Election Council ordered one local government to recount due to a difference between the number of voting passes and votes cast.
Persons entitled to vote receive an invitation to vote at their home address no later than 14 days before the elections: a voting pass. No later than the Friday before voting, eligible voters are to receive the list of candidates, as well as the addresses and opening times of polling stations and mobile polling stations at home. Indicative of the high level of trust in election procedures in the Netherlands is the fact that the law regulates complaints and appeals regarding the input and some throughput parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration, registration of party names, candidate registration and election day proceedings, but there are no specific rules or regulations permitting judicial appeals to crucial throughput aspects such as campaign finance and style of campaigning. Nor are there provisions for challenging the election results themselves. However, election results in 2021 were also checked by volunteers from the Open State Foundation. Except for some aggression directed at extreme right-wing FvD’s political leader, Baudet, there were no irregularities reported in 2023.
Citations:
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Minder stembureaus dan in 2019, maar wel beter toegankelijk.” maandag 13 maart.
Kantar Public. 2023. “Evaluatie Verkiezingen. Evaluatie van de verkiezingen van de leden van de Provinciale Staten en van de Waterschappen, 15 maart 2023.” Published April 25.
NU.nl. 2023. “Politieke kopstukken geschokt na tweede aanval op Baudet: ‘Unacceptabel’.” November 20.
Open State Foundation. n.d. “Open Verkiezingsuitslagen 2021.”
Graph View
To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
2
1
1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
The Netherlands has a system of full proportional representation with no threshold requirements. A seat in parliament is guaranteed for any party which gains at least 0.67% of the national vote; this is between 69,000 and 88,000 votes, depending on the election turnout. In the 2023 national parliamentary elections, 26 political parties competed; during the 2021 – 2023 parliamentary sessions, 26 members of parliament changed their party affiliation, resulting in 21 political parties with serving legislators, the highest number ever. Only the major political parties have local branches, but there are hundreds of strictly local political parties both with and without formal affiliations with national political parties. Most strictly local political parties are protest parties. It is plausible to expect that many voters for local protest parties vote for national protest parties, like PVV, FvD, BBB and NSC, in national elections. Only one local political party, Lijst De Mos (The Hague), has been accused engaging in illegal clientelist practices. However, it was acquitted by court. National political party platforms are normally available months before the election date. Several well-used voter guides or electoral “compasses” help voters distinguish between the platforms of so many political parties.
Interestingly, parties have no status in the law. Legislation on political parties in the Netherlands is extremely weak and inconsistent (see Krouwel 2004, WRR 2004). In Dutch law, the existence of political parties is hardly recognized, and they have an almost “extra legem” status (Elzinga 1990). In the constitution, the existence of political parties is totally ignored. Parties have no separate status under Dutch law and are entirely subject to civil law. As a result, parliamentarians are formally considered citizens with an individual mandate, and formally vote “without burden” (Art. 67.3 Constitution). Dutch law does not require political parties to take a specific organizational form, and does not mandate internal democratic procedures. Registration based on Article 2 of the Commercial Register Act is sufficient (Elections Act Art. G1). Parties are recognized in the parliament’s Rules of Procedure (Art.11), which regulate the allocation of speaking time, while the Elections Act (Art. G andH) and the Media Act (Art. 39g) also recognize a number of party functions. However, parties here are called “political groupings,” and the requirements for recognition of that label remain unclear. The only direct legal recognition of political parties is found in the Law on Party Finance, where parties are defined as associations registered under Article G1 of the Elections Act. This legal denial of the existence of political parties also leads to problems in cases when a party violates the democratic rules of the game
There are numerous political parties with distinct social roots. In a 2023 research report, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research distinguishes between seven clearly differentiated “social classes” based on combined indicators of economic, social, cultural and political capital. Each is linked to a small set of preferred political parties – except for the working middle class, which makes up a floating vote of a quarter of all voters. Four of these classes and their share as part of the population are as follows:
Working upper layer (>40, high-educated, high income, in good health, life satisfaction score 8.1 (out of 10). Conservative (VVD) and Social Liberals (D66) and Green Left (GL): 19%
Younger with promising but uncertain prospects (60, middle-to-lower income, unemployed or retired, limited network, less healthy, 7.7). CDA, Labor (PvdA): 8.6%
Insecure workers (flexible/temporary jobs, non-western 33% migration background, lower educated, less healthy, most ‘unhappy’: 6.6.). Party for Freedom (PVV), Socialist Party (SP): 10%
Precariat (>60, little political, economic, social and political capital, 45% primary education only, no social network, 70% mild/severe health problems, 6.8) PVV, PvdA, DENK: 6.3% (author’s summary derived from SCP, Rapport Eigentijdse ongelijkheid).
It is this 25% of highly volatile floating voters that have produced the wildly fluctuating election results of the last years – providing strong totals in 2019 for the ultra-right-wing Forum for Democracy (in provincial elections), next for Labor (in European elections), for the VVD in 2021 (in national parliamentary elections), for the BBB in March 2023 (in provincial elections), and in the most recent shocking surprise, for the extremist right-wing PVV in the November 2023 national elections. One highly respected political analyst termed this: “Voters as bargain hunters.”
The large number of parties that participate in elections and enter parliament due to the low threshold provide for a wide range of political orientations and policy proposals. Coalition governments often span a substantial proportion of the Dutch political landscape. For example, the two most recent coalitions included the economically centrist and culturally progressive D66, the orthodox religious Christian Union, the right-wing liberal VVD and the center-right Christian Democratic CDA.
In terms of representation, studies show that voters’ proximity to parties tends to be higher on issues that parties emphasize more strongly. As these are the issues where parties typically have the greatest policy impact, this implies that the quality of representation is highest where it matters most. Research also shows that the congruence between voter preferences and party policy offerings is better for the niche and extremist parties than for the mainstream parties in the Netherlands (Costello et al 2021).
Citations:
Social Cultureel Planbureau. 2023. Eigentijdse Ongelijkheid.
NRC-H. 2023. “BBB-kiezer is relatief oud en gemiddeld lager opgeleid.” Pim van den Dool, March 17.
Julien van Ostaaijen, eds. n.d. Lokale partijen in de praktijk.
Een overzicht van kennis over het functioneren van lokale partijen in Nederland
https://lokale-democratie.nl/file/download/c8290e6e-6ae6-462d-8696-c7a5cab72a30
Senay Boztas. 2023. “Dutch Parties Vie for Voters with No Faith in Government after String of Scandals.” The Guardian November 23.
Human/VPRO. 2023. “Argos Wie zit er achter de stemhulpen in Nederland?” November 11.
Parlement.com, van den Braak. 2023. “De grillige kiezers.” https://www.parlement.com.
Tom-Jan Meeus. 2023. “De winst van radicaal-rechts maakt duidelijk: dit land is bezig zichzelf af te schaffen.” NRC, November 24.
De staat van de democratie. Democratie voorbij de staat. 2004. WRR-Verkenningen nr.4.
Krouwel, A. 2004. Partisan States. Legal Regulation of Political Parties in France, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri/Wolf Legal Publishers.
Costello, R., Toshkov, D., Bos, B., and Krouwel, A. 2021. “Congruence Between Voters and Parties: The Role of Party-Level Issue Salience.” European Journal of Political Research 60 (1): 92-113. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12388
Interestingly, parties have no status in the law. Legislation on political parties in the Netherlands is extremely weak and inconsistent (see Krouwel 2004, WRR 2004). In Dutch law, the existence of political parties is hardly recognized, and they have an almost “extra legem” status (Elzinga 1990). In the constitution, the existence of political parties is totally ignored. Parties have no separate status under Dutch law and are entirely subject to civil law. As a result, parliamentarians are formally considered citizens with an individual mandate, and formally vote “without burden” (Art. 67.3 Constitution). Dutch law does not require political parties to take a specific organizational form, and does not mandate internal democratic procedures. Registration based on Article 2 of the Commercial Register Act is sufficient (Elections Act Art. G1). Parties are recognized in the parliament’s Rules of Procedure (Art.11), which regulate the allocation of speaking time, while the Elections Act (Art. G andH) and the Media Act (Art. 39g) also recognize a number of party functions. However, parties here are called “political groupings,” and the requirements for recognition of that label remain unclear. The only direct legal recognition of political parties is found in the Law on Party Finance, where parties are defined as associations registered under Article G1 of the Elections Act. This legal denial of the existence of political parties also leads to problems in cases when a party violates the democratic rules of the game
There are numerous political parties with distinct social roots. In a 2023 research report, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research distinguishes between seven clearly differentiated “social classes” based on combined indicators of economic, social, cultural and political capital. Each is linked to a small set of preferred political parties – except for the working middle class, which makes up a floating vote of a quarter of all voters. Four of these classes and their share as part of the population are as follows:
Working upper layer (>40, high-educated, high income, in good health, life satisfaction score 8.1 (out of 10). Conservative (VVD) and Social Liberals (D66) and Green Left (GL): 19%
Younger with promising but uncertain prospects (60, middle-to-lower income, unemployed or retired, limited network, less healthy, 7.7). CDA, Labor (PvdA): 8.6%
Insecure workers (flexible/temporary jobs, non-western 33% migration background, lower educated, less healthy, most ‘unhappy’: 6.6.). Party for Freedom (PVV), Socialist Party (SP): 10%
Precariat (>60, little political, economic, social and political capital, 45% primary education only, no social network, 70% mild/severe health problems, 6.8) PVV, PvdA, DENK: 6.3% (author’s summary derived from SCP, Rapport Eigentijdse ongelijkheid).
It is this 25% of highly volatile floating voters that have produced the wildly fluctuating election results of the last years – providing strong totals in 2019 for the ultra-right-wing Forum for Democracy (in provincial elections), next for Labor (in European elections), for the VVD in 2021 (in national parliamentary elections), for the BBB in March 2023 (in provincial elections), and in the most recent shocking surprise, for the extremist right-wing PVV in the November 2023 national elections. One highly respected political analyst termed this: “Voters as bargain hunters.”
The large number of parties that participate in elections and enter parliament due to the low threshold provide for a wide range of political orientations and policy proposals. Coalition governments often span a substantial proportion of the Dutch political landscape. For example, the two most recent coalitions included the economically centrist and culturally progressive D66, the orthodox religious Christian Union, the right-wing liberal VVD and the center-right Christian Democratic CDA.
In terms of representation, studies show that voters’ proximity to parties tends to be higher on issues that parties emphasize more strongly. As these are the issues where parties typically have the greatest policy impact, this implies that the quality of representation is highest where it matters most. Research also shows that the congruence between voter preferences and party policy offerings is better for the niche and extremist parties than for the mainstream parties in the Netherlands (Costello et al 2021).
Citations:
Social Cultureel Planbureau. 2023. Eigentijdse Ongelijkheid.
NRC-H. 2023. “BBB-kiezer is relatief oud en gemiddeld lager opgeleid.” Pim van den Dool, March 17.
Julien van Ostaaijen, eds. n.d. Lokale partijen in de praktijk.
Een overzicht van kennis over het functioneren van lokale partijen in Nederland
https://lokale-democratie.nl/file/download/c8290e6e-6ae6-462d-8696-c7a5cab72a30
Senay Boztas. 2023. “Dutch Parties Vie for Voters with No Faith in Government after String of Scandals.” The Guardian November 23.
Human/VPRO. 2023. “Argos Wie zit er achter de stemhulpen in Nederland?” November 11.
Parlement.com, van den Braak. 2023. “De grillige kiezers.” https://www.parlement.com.
Tom-Jan Meeus. 2023. “De winst van radicaal-rechts maakt duidelijk: dit land is bezig zichzelf af te schaffen.” NRC, November 24.
De staat van de democratie. Democratie voorbij de staat. 2004. WRR-Verkenningen nr.4.
Krouwel, A. 2004. Partisan States. Legal Regulation of Political Parties in France, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri/Wolf Legal Publishers.
Costello, R., Toshkov, D., Bos, B., and Krouwel, A. 2021. “Congruence Between Voters and Parties: The Role of Party-Level Issue Salience.” European Journal of Political Research 60 (1): 92-113. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12388
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
2
1
1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
In 2015, Ombudsman Alex Brenninkmeijer issued what he called a “stress test” for the Netherlands’ rule of law, in which he wrote that “…(i)n many areas, fundamental rights are violated in the formation and implementation of policies.” Since that time, the number of lawyers in parliament has shrunk considerably. Their number has been steadily decreasing: from 26 in 2017 and 25 in 2021 to 22 today. They have had to cede space to parliamentarians trained as economists, public administration experts or political scientists – all disciplines that consider laws and legal rules as policy instruments, not as institutional devices for the rule of law and democratic government.
In November 2023, eight years later, a few days after election results in which the extreme-right-wing PVV party had made a formidable gain of 20 seats (to a total of 37 in a 150-seat parliament), four parties (PVV, NSC, BBB and VVD) started coalition formation talks. One topic addressed was the parties’ preliminary positions on respecting and advancing the constitution and the rule of law. This was not surprising, because a panel of the professional association of legal scholars had previously found that 11 out of 18 political parties likely to win seats featured positions in their party platforms that clearly violated the constitution and rule of law practices.
For example, the PVV, which at the time of writing was leading the coalition formation talks, has advocated banning the Koran and Islamic schools. Such a ban would violate the freedom of religion and belief, and therefore also go against the constitution. An asylum freeze, as strongly advocated by the PVV, and which was arguably their winning political argument in the November 2023 elections, would not be allowed under either the UN Refugee Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights. And a position such as setting up a digital pillory for criminals is also difficult to reconcile with the law. Quite a few PVV legislators have criminals record of petty crimes and other integrity problems, and have thus been shown not to hold the law in high respect. The brand-new party New Social Contract, which otherwise strongly advocates “decent government” and respect for the rule of law, nevertheless received a low rating from the legal scholars for its proposal to introduce a migration quota of no more than 50,000 individuals, because of the proposal’s conflict with international laws and regulations. The VVD, which at the time was still the largest party, was criticized for proposing minimum sentences for certain crimes and a ban on community service, while also seeking to reduce legal aid for underprivileged asylum-seekers.
At the time of writing, political tension between advocates of an open society (GL/PvdA, D66, Christina Union, Volt, SP, Party of the Animals) and right-wing political parties advocating a (more) closed society (PVV: “Dutch at #1 again!”) was reaching new heights. Rather than being due to ideological polarization by radicalized flank parties away from a political “middle,” this stemmed from the radicalization of voters tied to formerly mainstream parties (mainly CDA and VVD) around anti-migration issues and a closed society. Neutralizing radicalizing and/or anti-democratic tendencies through cooptation is a tried-and-tested strategy in Dutch politics. This makes cross-party cooperation almost a given, reinforced by the Dutch maximally proportional representative electoral system. The VVD’s exclusion of the PVV as coalition partner after the fall of the Rutte I government functioned as a de facto “cordon sanitaire.” However, this exclusion has now been lifted, and may actually have aided the PVV win. Yet, it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the PVV will be the leading party in a next majority coalition government. At the time of writing, the NSC was still raising the possibility of a minority coalition (as seen in Scandinavian countries), governing through shifting support by varying political parties depending on the content of government bills and policy proposals. As further historical precedent, Labor was excluded from governing in 1983 by a blocking coalition led by the CDA and VVD in spite of a huge electoral victory.
Citations:
Brenninkmeijer, A. 2015. “Stresstest Rechtsstaat Nederland.” Nederlands Juristenblad 16: 1046-1055.
Mr. OnlineJuridisch. 2023. “Aantal juristen in Tweede Kamer neemt verder af: van 25 naar 22.” 27 November.
Mr. OnlineJuridisch. 2023. “Nieuws, 6 November NOvA: tien verkiezingsprogramma’s bevatten onrechtsstatelijke voorstellen.”
De Dijn, Annelien. 2023. “‘Polarisatie’ is een frame waar vooral de VVD van profiteert.” NRC-H, June 9.
Pieter Immerzaal. 2023. “Criminele en foute PVV-toppers (update).” Welingelichte Kringen November 27.
M. Lubbers et al. 2023. “Ook de ‘nieuwe’ PVV-stemmer stemde vooral tegen migratie en uit politiek protest.” Stuk Rood Vlees, December 21.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Omtzigt: nog niet onderhandelen over meerderheid- of minderheidskabinet.” November 29.
In November 2023, eight years later, a few days after election results in which the extreme-right-wing PVV party had made a formidable gain of 20 seats (to a total of 37 in a 150-seat parliament), four parties (PVV, NSC, BBB and VVD) started coalition formation talks. One topic addressed was the parties’ preliminary positions on respecting and advancing the constitution and the rule of law. This was not surprising, because a panel of the professional association of legal scholars had previously found that 11 out of 18 political parties likely to win seats featured positions in their party platforms that clearly violated the constitution and rule of law practices.
For example, the PVV, which at the time of writing was leading the coalition formation talks, has advocated banning the Koran and Islamic schools. Such a ban would violate the freedom of religion and belief, and therefore also go against the constitution. An asylum freeze, as strongly advocated by the PVV, and which was arguably their winning political argument in the November 2023 elections, would not be allowed under either the UN Refugee Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights. And a position such as setting up a digital pillory for criminals is also difficult to reconcile with the law. Quite a few PVV legislators have criminals record of petty crimes and other integrity problems, and have thus been shown not to hold the law in high respect. The brand-new party New Social Contract, which otherwise strongly advocates “decent government” and respect for the rule of law, nevertheless received a low rating from the legal scholars for its proposal to introduce a migration quota of no more than 50,000 individuals, because of the proposal’s conflict with international laws and regulations. The VVD, which at the time was still the largest party, was criticized for proposing minimum sentences for certain crimes and a ban on community service, while also seeking to reduce legal aid for underprivileged asylum-seekers.
At the time of writing, political tension between advocates of an open society (GL/PvdA, D66, Christina Union, Volt, SP, Party of the Animals) and right-wing political parties advocating a (more) closed society (PVV: “Dutch at #1 again!”) was reaching new heights. Rather than being due to ideological polarization by radicalized flank parties away from a political “middle,” this stemmed from the radicalization of voters tied to formerly mainstream parties (mainly CDA and VVD) around anti-migration issues and a closed society. Neutralizing radicalizing and/or anti-democratic tendencies through cooptation is a tried-and-tested strategy in Dutch politics. This makes cross-party cooperation almost a given, reinforced by the Dutch maximally proportional representative electoral system. The VVD’s exclusion of the PVV as coalition partner after the fall of the Rutte I government functioned as a de facto “cordon sanitaire.” However, this exclusion has now been lifted, and may actually have aided the PVV win. Yet, it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the PVV will be the leading party in a next majority coalition government. At the time of writing, the NSC was still raising the possibility of a minority coalition (as seen in Scandinavian countries), governing through shifting support by varying political parties depending on the content of government bills and policy proposals. As further historical precedent, Labor was excluded from governing in 1983 by a blocking coalition led by the CDA and VVD in spite of a huge electoral victory.
Citations:
Brenninkmeijer, A. 2015. “Stresstest Rechtsstaat Nederland.” Nederlands Juristenblad 16: 1046-1055.
Mr. OnlineJuridisch. 2023. “Aantal juristen in Tweede Kamer neemt verder af: van 25 naar 22.” 27 November.
Mr. OnlineJuridisch. 2023. “Nieuws, 6 November NOvA: tien verkiezingsprogramma’s bevatten onrechtsstatelijke voorstellen.”
De Dijn, Annelien. 2023. “‘Polarisatie’ is een frame waar vooral de VVD van profiteert.” NRC-H, June 9.
Pieter Immerzaal. 2023. “Criminele en foute PVV-toppers (update).” Welingelichte Kringen November 27.
M. Lubbers et al. 2023. “Ook de ‘nieuwe’ PVV-stemmer stemde vooral tegen migratie en uit politiek protest.” Stuk Rood Vlees, December 21.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Omtzigt: nog niet onderhandelen over meerderheid- of minderheidskabinet.” November 29.
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
Since May 2022, there has been a new information regime in place based on a new Law on Open Government (Wet open overheid, WOO). All administrative bodies are obliged to proactively publish certain categories of information on a national Platform for Open Government Information (PLOOI). As under the older law, every citizen (but in practice mostly journalists) may request specified items of information. Every administrative body has a contact person tasked with helping citizens look for the information they require. In addition, there will be a special advisory body on publicity and information to help government apply the new law, which will also mediate in conflicts between government and the media.
The government is obliged to provide requested information unless there are compelling reasons not to. Under the old law, this included the personal policy opinions of officials as expressed in internal deliberations. The new law offers greater scope for providing such opinions in anonymous form. New grounds for refusal have been added, such as the “proper functioning of the state,” and protections for information shared by companies has also been expanded.
The new law appears not to have changed the culture of withholding information in government. In fact, the law stipulates five absolute grounds for information refusal (internal or external state security, confidential business or manufacturing data, and personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act); and nine relative grounds for exclusion (e.g., security data, personal policy views of officials and government officials, investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses, etc.). This expansion of formal grounds for exclusion reflects a problem in government thinking, confirmed by different research reports, in which government employees see themselves as primarily serving the minister, with any obligations to journalists and citizens deemed secondary at best. Some researchers have described seeing “fear” among officials.
Deadlines to provide the information requested have been shortened. However, research by the Open State Foundation (OSF) and the Institute for Social Innovation recently showed that the average processing time of a request under the new law (167 days) is even longer than that under the older law. The NL is an average European performer in this regard. While the law requires active disclosure, this does not as yet take place in practice yet. Moreover, the plug has been pulled on PLOOI, the platform on which active disclosure is supposed to take place.
Citations:
Leijten, NRC-H. 2022. “De Wob wordt de Woo: terugblik op 40 jaar primeurs, zwartgelakte pagina’s en politieke willekeur.” NRC-H May 1.
Business.gov.nl. “Information for Entrepreneurs, Requesting Information from the Government (WOO Request); Objecting to and Appealing Against a Government Decision.”
Retera. 2022. “Inspectie: premier Rutte overtrad Archiefwet met het dagelijks wissen van sms’jes.” NRC-H, October 3.
NRC-H, Kouwenhoven, Kuiper. 2022. “Oud-privacyfunctionaris: bij de overheid heerst een cultuur van achterhouden.” NRC Handelsblad June 15.
Binnenlands Bestuur, van der Sluis. 2022. “Hoe de ambitieuze wetgever zijn eigen doelen ondermijnt.” 19 oktober.
van der Sluis. 2022. “Hoe de ambitieuze wetgever zijn eigen doelen ondermijnt.” Binnenlands Bestuur, October 19.
The government is obliged to provide requested information unless there are compelling reasons not to. Under the old law, this included the personal policy opinions of officials as expressed in internal deliberations. The new law offers greater scope for providing such opinions in anonymous form. New grounds for refusal have been added, such as the “proper functioning of the state,” and protections for information shared by companies has also been expanded.
The new law appears not to have changed the culture of withholding information in government. In fact, the law stipulates five absolute grounds for information refusal (internal or external state security, confidential business or manufacturing data, and personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act); and nine relative grounds for exclusion (e.g., security data, personal policy views of officials and government officials, investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses, etc.). This expansion of formal grounds for exclusion reflects a problem in government thinking, confirmed by different research reports, in which government employees see themselves as primarily serving the minister, with any obligations to journalists and citizens deemed secondary at best. Some researchers have described seeing “fear” among officials.
Deadlines to provide the information requested have been shortened. However, research by the Open State Foundation (OSF) and the Institute for Social Innovation recently showed that the average processing time of a request under the new law (167 days) is even longer than that under the older law. The NL is an average European performer in this regard. While the law requires active disclosure, this does not as yet take place in practice yet. Moreover, the plug has been pulled on PLOOI, the platform on which active disclosure is supposed to take place.
Citations:
Leijten, NRC-H. 2022. “De Wob wordt de Woo: terugblik op 40 jaar primeurs, zwartgelakte pagina’s en politieke willekeur.” NRC-H May 1.
Business.gov.nl. “Information for Entrepreneurs, Requesting Information from the Government (WOO Request); Objecting to and Appealing Against a Government Decision.”
Retera. 2022. “Inspectie: premier Rutte overtrad Archiefwet met het dagelijks wissen van sms’jes.” NRC-H, October 3.
NRC-H, Kouwenhoven, Kuiper. 2022. “Oud-privacyfunctionaris: bij de overheid heerst een cultuur van achterhouden.” NRC Handelsblad June 15.
Binnenlands Bestuur, van der Sluis. 2022. “Hoe de ambitieuze wetgever zijn eigen doelen ondermijnt.” 19 oktober.
van der Sluis. 2022. “Hoe de ambitieuze wetgever zijn eigen doelen ondermijnt.” Binnenlands Bestuur, October 19.