Coordination
#22Key Findings
The UK performs comparatively poorly (rank 22) in the category of coordination.
The Prime Minister’s Office is relatively limited in its scope. Instead, the Cabinet Office plays the key role in coordinating policy, supported by the Treasury. The prime minister can set priorities, but overall policy coordination remains outside of their direct control. The inquiry into pandemic governance revealed considerable incoherence within the central government.
Flexibility and informal meetings are key features of UK governance. Cabinet committees provide opportunities to seek interministerial agreement. Because single-party governments are typical, informal cross-party meetings are not common.
The UK has two main types of delegation: from the central government to devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and from these devolved governments to local authorities. The devolved governments, particularly in Wales and Scotland, cooperate with local authorities on public services like education.
The Prime Minister’s Office is relatively limited in its scope. Instead, the Cabinet Office plays the key role in coordinating policy, supported by the Treasury. The prime minister can set priorities, but overall policy coordination remains outside of their direct control. The inquiry into pandemic governance revealed considerable incoherence within the central government.
Flexibility and informal meetings are key features of UK governance. Cabinet committees provide opportunities to seek interministerial agreement. Because single-party governments are typical, informal cross-party meetings are not common.
The UK has two main types of delegation: from the central government to devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and from these devolved governments to local authorities. The devolved governments, particularly in Wales and Scotland, cooperate with local authorities on public services like education.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
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9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
Although the prime minister holds a very powerful position in the UK system, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is relatively limited in its scope. In practice, the Cabinet Office fulfills this central role, coordinating effectively with teams for each line ministry. Additionally, the Treasury extends its remit beyond budgeting, providing a secondary coordination mechanism. However, the effectiveness of this coordination is sometimes called into question. The public inquiry into the governance of the pandemic, although not yet complete, is revealing significant incoherence at the heart of government. UK policy studies often describe this issue with phrases such as “incoherent state” (Richards et al. 2022) to indicate the lack of coordinated action within the government and across the public sector (summarized in Cairney and Kippin 2024). While the prime minister has considerable power to set specific priorities, this power does not extend to overall policy coordination.
Citations:
Richards, D., Warner, S., Smith, M.J., and Coyle, D. 2022. “Crisis and state.”
transformation: Covid-19, levelling up and the UK’s incoherent state,’ Cambridge
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsac038
Cairney, P., and S. Kippin. 2024. Politics and Policymaking in the UK. Bristol: BUP.
Citations:
Richards, D., Warner, S., Smith, M.J., and Coyle, D. 2022. “Crisis and state.”
transformation: Covid-19, levelling up and the UK’s incoherent state,’ Cambridge
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsac038
Cairney, P., and S. Kippin. 2024. Politics and Policymaking in the UK. Bristol: BUP.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
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9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Although the prime minister holds considerable power, it is somewhat paradoxical that their private office is usually relatively small and often reshaped when a new prime minister takes over. For instance, Boris Johnson’s tenure saw multiple “resets” of his office. Instead, the Cabinet Office is the principal body responsible for policy coordination, with its head, the cabinet secretary, attending cabinet meetings. Traditionally, the cabinet secretary was also the head of the civil service, though this role was separated during the 2010s before being re-consolidated. HM Treasury also plays a more extensive coordinating role than many other finance ministries. The UK government faces a recurring dilemma: whether to “mainstream” an issue across all departments or to set up specific units to coordinate activities, such as for health inequalities or climate change. It has typically opted to establish units or departments to signal the importance of cross-cutting issues, rather than creating an overarching structure to support routine cross-departmental cooperation.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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7
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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3
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3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Flexibility and informal meetings are key features of the UK government system, allowing it to respond uniquely to different situations. This approach is highly valued and is an essential component of prime ministerial government in the UK. Formally, civil servants take notes on informal meetings between ministers. The ongoing inquiry into the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has documented coordination issues, highlighting the proliferation of WhatsApp groups and raising questions about how they were monitored and recorded.
Cabinet committees provide opportunities for seeking agreement among relevant ministries and feed into the full cabinet or 10 Downing Street. A distinctive feature of the UK system is that cabinet committees can be radically reconfigured by the prime minister and can change rapidly in response to events and the prime minister’s preferences. For example, during the pandemic, four new committees were established, taking the number under the Johnson administration to 20. Liz Truss, during her brief tenure, reduced the number to six, and under Sunak, it has increased to 11.
The government can also establish interministerial groups, which, according to the Institute for Government, “cannot take binding decisions but can support policy development and decision-making where collective cabinet agreement is not required.” Although not binding on the cabinet, these groups are approved by the prime minister and can be used to shape policy.
Informal coordination also arises from regular monthly meetings of the Civil Service Board (CSB), chaired by the Chief Operating Officer of the Civil Service and comprising selected permanent secretaries (the top civil servant in a ministry). A complementary Civil Service Shadow Board (CSSB), consisting of members from grades below the Senior Civil Service, provides different perspectives on the issues discussed at the CSB. The CSSB reviews papers going to the CSB in advance of each monthly meeting, and its representatives attend the CSB meetings to contribute their views in person.
The UK usually has single-party government, so informal meetings of party groups are not a significant factor. However, factions within the ruling party can meet and attempt to exert influence at full party meetings.
Whether these processes support or undermine formal coordination is context-specific, making a single answer to this question challenging. The UK COVID-19 inquiry has also resurfaced criticisms from devolved governments regarding what they perceive as an excessive reliance on informal mechanisms at the expense of proper use of formal mechanisms for intergovernmental relations, such as the Joint Ministerial Committee (Henderson 2023).
Citations:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/cabinet-committees#:~:text=How%20Has%20The%20Number%20of%20Cabinet%20Committees%20Changed%20Over%20time?
Henderson, A. 2023. “Expert report to UK Covid-19 Inquiry (INQ000269372).” https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000269372-expert-report-of-professor-ailsa-henderson-titled-devolution-and-the-uks-response-to-covid-19-dated-07-september-2023/
Cabinet committees provide opportunities for seeking agreement among relevant ministries and feed into the full cabinet or 10 Downing Street. A distinctive feature of the UK system is that cabinet committees can be radically reconfigured by the prime minister and can change rapidly in response to events and the prime minister’s preferences. For example, during the pandemic, four new committees were established, taking the number under the Johnson administration to 20. Liz Truss, during her brief tenure, reduced the number to six, and under Sunak, it has increased to 11.
The government can also establish interministerial groups, which, according to the Institute for Government, “cannot take binding decisions but can support policy development and decision-making where collective cabinet agreement is not required.” Although not binding on the cabinet, these groups are approved by the prime minister and can be used to shape policy.
Informal coordination also arises from regular monthly meetings of the Civil Service Board (CSB), chaired by the Chief Operating Officer of the Civil Service and comprising selected permanent secretaries (the top civil servant in a ministry). A complementary Civil Service Shadow Board (CSSB), consisting of members from grades below the Senior Civil Service, provides different perspectives on the issues discussed at the CSB. The CSSB reviews papers going to the CSB in advance of each monthly meeting, and its representatives attend the CSB meetings to contribute their views in person.
The UK usually has single-party government, so informal meetings of party groups are not a significant factor. However, factions within the ruling party can meet and attempt to exert influence at full party meetings.
Whether these processes support or undermine formal coordination is context-specific, making a single answer to this question challenging. The UK COVID-19 inquiry has also resurfaced criticisms from devolved governments regarding what they perceive as an excessive reliance on informal mechanisms at the expense of proper use of formal mechanisms for intergovernmental relations, such as the Joint Ministerial Committee (Henderson 2023).
Citations:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/cabinet-committees#:~:text=How%20Has%20The%20Number%20of%20Cabinet%20Committees%20Changed%20Over%20time?
Henderson, A. 2023. “Expert report to UK Covid-19 Inquiry (INQ000269372).” https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000269372-expert-report-of-professor-ailsa-henderson-titled-devolution-and-the-uks-response-to-covid-19-dated-07-september-2023/
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To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
There are two distinct forms of delegation in the UK: from central government to the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales according to constitutional provisions, and within the four nations to local governments. Central government is also responsible for England in several policy areas, such as education, as well as certain UK-wide functions like defense and foreign policy.
In England, but not in the other three nations, the relatively recent creation of metro mayors has emerged, mainly (but not exclusively) covering larger conurbations. These mayors have powers over selected policies, such as policing and transport. However, since they rely on large fiscal transfers from central government and have limited taxing powers, their budgets depend heavily on central government, which retains a degree of control over service delivery. Local authorities allocate a significant portion of their budgets to statutory services, particularly social care and education, and are subject to oversight by relevant ministries from central or devolved governments.
Given this complex patchwork, it is difficult to generalize about the central government’s role in meeting national standards, especially when the situation is further complicated by central government having responsibility for England and Wales in some areas, but not Scotland. Central government can intervene to put local authority councils in “special measures” in England if deemed necessary by a minister. This intervention can involve demanding plans for change or, in more extreme cases, appointing commissioners. In the past year, several prominent councils have declared or come close to bankruptcy, often due to ill-judged non-statutory policies, including property or other business schemes. Cuts in transfers from central government, particularly during the austerity period of the previous decade, have also strained local governments, sometimes leading to a retreat to providing only statutory minimum services.
For the devolved governments, especially regarding their major responsibilities like health, central government does not impose or control standards, leaving this to the voters. Compared to the UK, the Welsh and Scottish governments tend to cooperate more with local authorities to ensure relative uniformity in services such as school provision. Scotland also has a separate and distinctive education system. Where policy outcomes differ, central government has no effective role, although in the special case of Northern Ireland, when the executive is suspended due to political disagreements, the UK government rules directly and can, de facto, assure standards.
In England, but not in the other three nations, the relatively recent creation of metro mayors has emerged, mainly (but not exclusively) covering larger conurbations. These mayors have powers over selected policies, such as policing and transport. However, since they rely on large fiscal transfers from central government and have limited taxing powers, their budgets depend heavily on central government, which retains a degree of control over service delivery. Local authorities allocate a significant portion of their budgets to statutory services, particularly social care and education, and are subject to oversight by relevant ministries from central or devolved governments.
Given this complex patchwork, it is difficult to generalize about the central government’s role in meeting national standards, especially when the situation is further complicated by central government having responsibility for England and Wales in some areas, but not Scotland. Central government can intervene to put local authority councils in “special measures” in England if deemed necessary by a minister. This intervention can involve demanding plans for change or, in more extreme cases, appointing commissioners. In the past year, several prominent councils have declared or come close to bankruptcy, often due to ill-judged non-statutory policies, including property or other business schemes. Cuts in transfers from central government, particularly during the austerity period of the previous decade, have also strained local governments, sometimes leading to a retreat to providing only statutory minimum services.
For the devolved governments, especially regarding their major responsibilities like health, central government does not impose or control standards, leaving this to the voters. Compared to the UK, the Welsh and Scottish governments tend to cooperate more with local authorities to ensure relative uniformity in services such as school provision. Scotland also has a separate and distinctive education system. Where policy outcomes differ, central government has no effective role, although in the special case of Northern Ireland, when the executive is suspended due to political disagreements, the UK government rules directly and can, de facto, assure standards.
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
The highest-level mechanism for coordination in the UK is the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), chaired by the prime minister and attended by the leaders of the devolved administrations. An explainer from the Institute for Government (2017) sets out the tasks of the JMC, based on a Memorandum of Understanding. It “should provide central coordination of the overall relationship between the UK and the devolved nations, and: consider non-devolved matters which affect devolved responsibilities (and vice versa); consider devolved matters if it is beneficial to discuss their respective treatment in the different parts of the UK; keep the arrangements for liaison between the governments under review; and consider disputes between the governments.”
The explainer documents the limitations of the JMC and its subcommittees for specific policy areas, noting its purely consultative role and the perception from the devolved administrations (DAs) that the agenda is set by the central government. As noted (see G1.3), the UK government seems to prefer informal mechanisms over the formal use of intergovernmental relations mechanisms like the JMC (Henderson 2023). The JMC machinery exists to discuss arising matters (e.g., disputes), not routine coordination. The UK government respects the right of devolved governments to set their own public service priorities, such as health services and schools, and often leads “four nations” approaches to emergencies like COVID-19 and common concerns such as tobacco controls, which involve both UK-reserved and devolved elements (Cairney 2024).
Within the UK government, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (which has had several name changes over the years) has the most direct coordinating role with subnational governments. Most of the department’s work focuses on England, but it also has some UK-wide responsibilities.
Citations:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/explainer/devolution-joint-ministerial-committee#:~:text=The%20Joint%20Ministerial%20Committee%20%28JMC%29%20is%20a%20set,created%20in%201999%20at%20the%20start%20of%20devolution
Cairney, P. 2024. “Expert Report for the UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry – Module 2A: Core UK Decision-Making and Political Governance – Scotland.” https://www.covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000274154-expert-report-by-professor-paul-cairney-titled-expert-report-for-the-uk-covid-19-public-inquiry-module-2a-core-uk-decision-making-and-political-governance-scotland-dated-09-01/
The explainer documents the limitations of the JMC and its subcommittees for specific policy areas, noting its purely consultative role and the perception from the devolved administrations (DAs) that the agenda is set by the central government. As noted (see G1.3), the UK government seems to prefer informal mechanisms over the formal use of intergovernmental relations mechanisms like the JMC (Henderson 2023). The JMC machinery exists to discuss arising matters (e.g., disputes), not routine coordination. The UK government respects the right of devolved governments to set their own public service priorities, such as health services and schools, and often leads “four nations” approaches to emergencies like COVID-19 and common concerns such as tobacco controls, which involve both UK-reserved and devolved elements (Cairney 2024).
Within the UK government, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (which has had several name changes over the years) has the most direct coordinating role with subnational governments. Most of the department’s work focuses on England, but it also has some UK-wide responsibilities.
Citations:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/explainer/devolution-joint-ministerial-committee#:~:text=The%20Joint%20Ministerial%20Committee%20%28JMC%29%20is%20a%20set,created%20in%201999%20at%20the%20start%20of%20devolution
Cairney, P. 2024. “Expert Report for the UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry – Module 2A: Core UK Decision-Making and Political Governance – Scotland.” https://www.covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000274154-expert-report-by-professor-paul-cairney-titled-expert-report-for-the-uk-covid-19-public-inquiry-module-2a-core-uk-decision-making-and-political-governance-scotland-dated-09-01/