Coordination
#28Key Findings
In the category of coordination, the United States falls into the sample’s bottom ranks (rank 28).
The president and White House staff lead the executive branch, setting priorities based on the president’s agenda. Federal departments generally operate with significant policy autonomy, and much policymaking happens within individual departments. Cross-department coordination is often informal, relying on personal networks.
The executive branch under Trump saw calamitous coordination failures, largely reflecting general problems of understaffing and a lack of competent leadership. The Biden administration has hired more staff and appointed competent leaders, showing a more orderly approach.
The country’s system of federalism creates very uneven delivery of public services across the nation. The federal government can impose conditionality on funding, but states in some cases refuse the funding in opposition to federal policy priorities. In general, state governments exercise a high degree of autonomy.
The president and White House staff lead the executive branch, setting priorities based on the president’s agenda. Federal departments generally operate with significant policy autonomy, and much policymaking happens within individual departments. Cross-department coordination is often informal, relying on personal networks.
The executive branch under Trump saw calamitous coordination failures, largely reflecting general problems of understaffing and a lack of competent leadership. The Biden administration has hired more staff and appointed competent leaders, showing a more orderly approach.
The country’s system of federalism creates very uneven delivery of public services across the nation. The federal government can impose conditionality on funding, but states in some cases refuse the funding in opposition to federal policy priorities. In general, state governments exercise a high degree of autonomy.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
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Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
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1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
The closest comparison to a government office or prime minister’s office in the U.S. system is the White House staff, along with other units of the Executive Office of the President (e.g., the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council).
In the U.S. system, coordination involves how the executive departments and agencies engage the president and the White House staff in their work. Long-established practice, however, shows that the president and the White House staff are dominant within the executive branch, allowing them to prioritize issues that align with the president’s agenda. During the Trump administration, agency policy development was heavily influenced by Trump’s desire to cut regulations and reverse actions taken by the Obama administration, with little focus on long-term agency missions or priorities. Upon entering the White House, President Biden took steps to rebuild federal departments and agencies by hiring a large number of senior officials to address the “talent exodus” (Zhao and Lippman, 2021) that occurred during the Trump years.
In the U.S. system, coordination involves how the executive departments and agencies engage the president and the White House staff in their work. Long-established practice, however, shows that the president and the White House staff are dominant within the executive branch, allowing them to prioritize issues that align with the president’s agenda. During the Trump administration, agency policy development was heavily influenced by Trump’s desire to cut regulations and reverse actions taken by the Obama administration, with little focus on long-term agency missions or priorities. Upon entering the White House, President Biden took steps to rebuild federal departments and agencies by hiring a large number of senior officials to address the “talent exodus” (Zhao and Lippman, 2021) that occurred during the Trump years.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Historically, federal government departments have established their own policy autonomy and operate fairly independently from other departments. Departmental autonomy was seen as a major initiative of strong departmental leaders, and this instinct still operates today (Carpenter 2001).
Once appointed, agency leaders tend to stay in place for at least the political lifecycle of their appointer. A department might see just one or two leaders over a four-year presidential term. For example, despite the personnel difficulties of the Trump administration, Trump had the same secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Housing, Transportation, Education, and Trade for his full four-year presidency. State, Interior, Health, and Energy had just one change during his presidency. It is difficult for presidents to reshuffle their Cabinets because Senate approval is required for any new appointment, including moving an already confirmed departmental head to another department (e.g., from Education to Health). This gives department leaders greater staying power, even when the president might have some buyer’s remorse in appointing them to a position (Jenkins and Milkis 2014).
The Executive Office of the President (EOP), created during the 1930s reforms to the federal government bureaucracy, serves as a crucial coordinating institution at the core of the federal government. The EOP provides the president and his White House team with the capacity to develop policy and produce broad administration initiatives. However, much of the actual policymaking occurs within individual departments, and cross-department coordination is variable and sometimes quite weak (Skowronek et al. 2021).
The Biden administration released its President’s Management Agenda (PMA) in 2021, which defines government-wide management priorities for all federal agencies. The PMA is designed to support progress and opportunities beyond the reach of any single federal agency.
Citations:
Stephen Skowronek, John Dearborn, and Desmond King. 2021. Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic: The Deep State and the Unitary Executive. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jeffrey Jenkins and Sidney Milkis. 2014. “Introduction: The Rise of a Policy State?” In The Politics of Major Policy Reform in Postwar America, eds. Jeffrey Jenkins and Sidney Milkis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Daniel Carpenter. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Once appointed, agency leaders tend to stay in place for at least the political lifecycle of their appointer. A department might see just one or two leaders over a four-year presidential term. For example, despite the personnel difficulties of the Trump administration, Trump had the same secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Housing, Transportation, Education, and Trade for his full four-year presidency. State, Interior, Health, and Energy had just one change during his presidency. It is difficult for presidents to reshuffle their Cabinets because Senate approval is required for any new appointment, including moving an already confirmed departmental head to another department (e.g., from Education to Health). This gives department leaders greater staying power, even when the president might have some buyer’s remorse in appointing them to a position (Jenkins and Milkis 2014).
The Executive Office of the President (EOP), created during the 1930s reforms to the federal government bureaucracy, serves as a crucial coordinating institution at the core of the federal government. The EOP provides the president and his White House team with the capacity to develop policy and produce broad administration initiatives. However, much of the actual policymaking occurs within individual departments, and cross-department coordination is variable and sometimes quite weak (Skowronek et al. 2021).
The Biden administration released its President’s Management Agenda (PMA) in 2021, which defines government-wide management priorities for all federal agencies. The PMA is designed to support progress and opportunities beyond the reach of any single federal agency.
Citations:
Stephen Skowronek, John Dearborn, and Desmond King. 2021. Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic: The Deep State and the Unitary Executive. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jeffrey Jenkins and Sidney Milkis. 2014. “Introduction: The Rise of a Policy State?” In The Politics of Major Policy Reform in Postwar America, eds. Jeffrey Jenkins and Sidney Milkis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Daniel Carpenter. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal coordination across departments plays a significant role in cross-departmental coordination (Nou 2016). It relies primarily on personal networks, constituency relationships, and other methods. The nature of this coordination is context-specific and often depends on the issue at hand. For instance, during crisis situations, various government departments may come together to manage the situation by sending representatives to ad hoc cross-agency crisis meetings. Departments and agencies also distribute briefs and other forms of information to relevant agencies to keep them updated on their activities.
Since 1980, the federal government has operated a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which brings together various law enforcement agencies from both the federal government and local authorities (Herman 2005). Relevant federal agencies in the JTTF include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The JTTF helps coordinate informal information sharing, allocate resources on an ad hoc basis when necessary, and manage responses during crisis situations. Agencies also share memos with each other using the JTTF as a conduit.
The Trump administration’s lack of experienced personnel in key agency positions led to an increased role for informal coordination. The executive branch under Trump saw calamitous coordination failures. These failures largely reflected general problems of understaffing and a lack of competent leadership in the departments and agencies during the Trump presidency.
The Biden administration is currently addressing these challenges by hiring more staff and appointing competent leaders across departments and agencies. The Biden administration is also adopting a management style reminiscent of the Obama administration’s, which was more orderly than the Trump administration’s chaotic approach.
Citations:
Jennifer Nou. 2016. “Intra-Agency Coordination.” Harvard Law Review.
Susan Herman. 2005. “Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism, and the War on Terror.” Willamette Law Review.
Since 1980, the federal government has operated a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which brings together various law enforcement agencies from both the federal government and local authorities (Herman 2005). Relevant federal agencies in the JTTF include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The JTTF helps coordinate informal information sharing, allocate resources on an ad hoc basis when necessary, and manage responses during crisis situations. Agencies also share memos with each other using the JTTF as a conduit.
The Trump administration’s lack of experienced personnel in key agency positions led to an increased role for informal coordination. The executive branch under Trump saw calamitous coordination failures. These failures largely reflected general problems of understaffing and a lack of competent leadership in the departments and agencies during the Trump presidency.
The Biden administration is currently addressing these challenges by hiring more staff and appointing competent leaders across departments and agencies. The Biden administration is also adopting a management style reminiscent of the Obama administration’s, which was more orderly than the Trump administration’s chaotic approach.
Citations:
Jennifer Nou. 2016. “Intra-Agency Coordination.” Harvard Law Review.
Susan Herman. 2005. “Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism, and the War on Terror.” Willamette Law Review.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
The system of federalism in the United States creates very uneven delivery of public services across the nation (Singh 2012). The Constitution gave Congress limited powers, including the ability to lay and collect taxes, pay debts and borrow money, declare war, and raise and support an Army and Navy. Powers not listed belong to the states. Since 1887 Congress has been using the interstate commerce clause to regulate interstate commerce – a powerful tool for Congress to expand its power vis-à-vis the subnational level.
The most powerful tool the federal government has to enforce uniform standards, beyond Supreme Court judgments, is imposing conditionality on national funding to states and localities. It is very common for the federal government to seek to achieve its policy priorities by making funding conditional, either as a condition of receipt of the funds or as a condition for receipt of further funds. This method of central control is known in the academic literature as “fiscal federalism” (Hackett 2017).
While fiscal federalism can be a powerful tool, it is an imperfect one. The ability of federal officials to monitor the activities of state actors is ultimately limited by the information state governments provide or that federal agents can try to collect. More significantly, state governments often attempt to bend the conditions of funding to pursue their own policy aims. In some cases, states simply refuse the funding altogether in an expression of disagreement with the federal government’s policy priorities (Miller 2008).
Jamila Michener (2018) has compellingly discussed how Medicaid, a federally funded public health insurance program for those in poverty, is unevenly delivered. Although most of the funding comes from the federal government, states are empowered to shape the delivery of the service. This means some states impose higher levels of conditionality on Medicaid qualification than others, leading to substantial variation in the types of conditions and services Medicaid funds from state to state. This has repercussions for the internal mobility of poor Americans, who might be hesitant to move to a different state – even if employment opportunities are more attractive – due to the potential loss of health insurance for themselves or a dependent. Overall, federalism tends to exacerbate conditions of inequality within the United States, with poorer areas trapped in poverty and wealthier areas hoarding their wealth (Kelly and Witko 2012).
Citations:
Lisa Miller. 2008. The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nathan Kelly, and Christopher Witko. 2012. “Federalism and American Inequality.” Journal of Politics.
Ursula Hackett. 2017. “Offers and Throffers: Education Policy Under Obama.” In The Obama Presidency and the Politics of Change, eds. E. Ashbee and J. Dumbrell. Palgrave.
Jamila Michener. 2018. Fragmented Democracy: Medicaid, Federalism, and Unequal Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The most powerful tool the federal government has to enforce uniform standards, beyond Supreme Court judgments, is imposing conditionality on national funding to states and localities. It is very common for the federal government to seek to achieve its policy priorities by making funding conditional, either as a condition of receipt of the funds or as a condition for receipt of further funds. This method of central control is known in the academic literature as “fiscal federalism” (Hackett 2017).
While fiscal federalism can be a powerful tool, it is an imperfect one. The ability of federal officials to monitor the activities of state actors is ultimately limited by the information state governments provide or that federal agents can try to collect. More significantly, state governments often attempt to bend the conditions of funding to pursue their own policy aims. In some cases, states simply refuse the funding altogether in an expression of disagreement with the federal government’s policy priorities (Miller 2008).
Jamila Michener (2018) has compellingly discussed how Medicaid, a federally funded public health insurance program for those in poverty, is unevenly delivered. Although most of the funding comes from the federal government, states are empowered to shape the delivery of the service. This means some states impose higher levels of conditionality on Medicaid qualification than others, leading to substantial variation in the types of conditions and services Medicaid funds from state to state. This has repercussions for the internal mobility of poor Americans, who might be hesitant to move to a different state – even if employment opportunities are more attractive – due to the potential loss of health insurance for themselves or a dependent. Overall, federalism tends to exacerbate conditions of inequality within the United States, with poorer areas trapped in poverty and wealthier areas hoarding their wealth (Kelly and Witko 2012).
Citations:
Lisa Miller. 2008. The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nathan Kelly, and Christopher Witko. 2012. “Federalism and American Inequality.” Journal of Politics.
Ursula Hackett. 2017. “Offers and Throffers: Education Policy Under Obama.” In The Obama Presidency and the Politics of Change, eds. E. Ashbee and J. Dumbrell. Palgrave.
Jamila Michener. 2018. Fragmented Democracy: Medicaid, Federalism, and Unequal Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
The quality of collaboration between federal and state governments depends on the specific policy area. For example, some areas, such as transport infrastructure (especially interstate transport), public health, and emergency management, have tended to show good levels of coordination and interaction between federal and state governments (Bloom 2019).
Yet, in many policy areas, state governments exercise a reasonably high degree of autonomy (Grumbach 2019). Although the federal government is a major financer of health, education, and welfare programs, ultimately, the delivery of these largely rests with state governments (Merriman 2019).
The frequency of meetings between federal and state officials depends on context and policy area (Bakvis and Brown 2010). The closest moments of interaction are typically tied to specific emergencies or threats (Rossi 2013). For example, when concerns over public health emerge, the Department of Health and Human Services may meet with state health departments to coordinate a response.
The president occasionally convenes “White House Summits,” which are intended both to signal the president’s policy priorities and to serve as coordinating and networking opportunities for state and local officials at a high level.
Government departments that provide funding for major programs administered by state and local governments may regularly meet with subnational officials to monitor the progress of these programs. Officials in the U.S. Department of Education, for example, will meet with state education policymakers and officials to discuss issues such as curriculum, student performance, and funding inequalities (Hackett 2017).
Some departments have joint federal-state programs. This is especially true in law enforcement, with federal agencies like the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice working with local agencies on matters such as anti-terrorism or immigration enforcement (Stuntz 2001).
Citations:
Ben Merriman. 2019. Conservative Innovators: How States Are Challenging Federal Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jacob Grumbach. 2018. “From Backwaters to Major Policymakers: Policy Polarization in the States, 1970-2014.” Perspectives on Politics.
Nicholas Bloom. 2019. How States Shaped Postwar America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
William Stuntz. 2001. “Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy.
Herman Bakvis and Douglas Brown. 2010. “Policy Coordination in Federal Systems: Comparing Intergovernmental Processes and Outcomes in Canada and the United States.” Publius.
Jim Rossi. 2014. “Maladaptive Federalism: The Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives.”
Yet, in many policy areas, state governments exercise a reasonably high degree of autonomy (Grumbach 2019). Although the federal government is a major financer of health, education, and welfare programs, ultimately, the delivery of these largely rests with state governments (Merriman 2019).
The frequency of meetings between federal and state officials depends on context and policy area (Bakvis and Brown 2010). The closest moments of interaction are typically tied to specific emergencies or threats (Rossi 2013). For example, when concerns over public health emerge, the Department of Health and Human Services may meet with state health departments to coordinate a response.
The president occasionally convenes “White House Summits,” which are intended both to signal the president’s policy priorities and to serve as coordinating and networking opportunities for state and local officials at a high level.
Government departments that provide funding for major programs administered by state and local governments may regularly meet with subnational officials to monitor the progress of these programs. Officials in the U.S. Department of Education, for example, will meet with state education policymakers and officials to discuss issues such as curriculum, student performance, and funding inequalities (Hackett 2017).
Some departments have joint federal-state programs. This is especially true in law enforcement, with federal agencies like the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice working with local agencies on matters such as anti-terrorism or immigration enforcement (Stuntz 2001).
Citations:
Ben Merriman. 2019. Conservative Innovators: How States Are Challenging Federal Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jacob Grumbach. 2018. “From Backwaters to Major Policymakers: Policy Polarization in the States, 1970-2014.” Perspectives on Politics.
Nicholas Bloom. 2019. How States Shaped Postwar America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
William Stuntz. 2001. “Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy.
Herman Bakvis and Douglas Brown. 2010. “Policy Coordination in Federal Systems: Comparing Intergovernmental Processes and Outcomes in Canada and the United States.” Publius.
Jim Rossi. 2014. “Maladaptive Federalism: The Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives.”